In re Madison R
Filed 1/15/13 In
re Madison R. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re MADISON
R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
FRESNO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F065552
(Super. Ct. No. 07CEJ3000298-3)
THE COURT
APPEAL
from orders of the Superior Court of
County. Brian M. Arax,
Judge.
Sharon
Rollo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Michael R. (father) appealed from a
2012 order terminating parental rights
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his three-year-old daughter, Madison
(child).
title="">[1] After reviewing the entire
record, father’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she
could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. Counsel requested, and this court granted,
leave for father to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing
that an arguable issue of reversible error did exist. (In re
Father has since
submitted a letter in which he complains the juvenile court violated the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy when, in early 2011, it
removed Madison from his custody. As
discussed below, we conclude father has not made a good cause showing of
arguable error by the juvenile court. We
will dismiss father’s appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In July 2010,
respondent Fresno County Department of
Social Services (department) detained then eight-month-old Madison and
initiated the underlying juvenile dependency proceedings. The child’s
mother abused methamphetamine while father was incarcerated on domestic
violence charges involving the mother. He had been in custody since Madison was four
months old and had a history of violent criminal behavior.
Later in 2010,
the juvenile court exercised its dependency
jurisdiction over Madison. In the spring of 2011, the court conducted a dispositional
hearing at which it adjudged Madison a juvenile dependent, removed her from parental custody and ordered
reunification services for only father.
Although father
completed his court-ordered services over the following year, the juvenile
court found it remained detrimental to return Madison to father’s
custody on account of his pervasive drug and mental health problems.
Meanwhile, Madison neither showed any excitement when she had supervised visits with
father nor displayed the kind of behavior around him that a child displays
towards a parent. The juvenile court consequently terminated
reunification services in the winter of 2012, and set a section 366.26 hearing
to select and implement a permanent plan for Madison.
The juvenile
court conducted its section 366.26 hearing in the summer of 2012. Based
on the department’s report, the court found it was likely that Madison would be
adopted and terminated parental rights.
The court, in the process, rejected father’s argument that termination
would be detrimental to Madison based on her relationship with him.
DISCUSSION
An
appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is up to an appellant to raise claims of
reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each
point made. If an appellant does not do
so, the appeal should be dismissed. (
994.)
Father neither
addresses the termination proceedings nor sets forth a good cause showing that
any arguable issue of reversible error at the termination hearing does
exist. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) He instead claims the juvenile court took Madison from his
custody “for the past actions, of which have been paid for once.†Father’s argument is meritless.
First, father
appears to assume that the juvenile court prosecuted him a second time for some
offense. However, he provides no details
or support for his claim. Second, father
ignores the purpose of juvenile dependency proceedings, which is to provide for
the protection and safety of children and to remove a child from parental custody
only when necessary for the child’s welfare.
(§ 202, subd. (a).) Its
purpose is not to prosecute parents.
Third, father’s complaint, regarding the juvenile court’s 2011
dispositional order removing Madison from his custody, is untimely.
Appellate jurisdiction to review an appealable order depends upon a
timely notice of appeal. (
1327, 1331.) Father never appealed from
the 2011 disposition order, which is now final.
An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter,
such as the termination order in this case, does not permit an appellant to
challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has
passed. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563.)
Accordingly, we
will dismiss his appeal.
DISPOSITION
This
appeal is dismissed.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Franson, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
