In re Luis V.
Filed 4/17/13 In re Luis V. CA2/7
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
>
In re LUIS V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B238829 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ48648) |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS V., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County, Shep Zebberman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Steven A.
Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback
II and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant
Luis V. appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to the
California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it ordered the DJJ commitment.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant’s
DJJ commitment resulted from two delinquency
petitions, the first concerning an incident in Orange
County that occurred when appellant
was 14 years old, and the second concerning an incident occurring two years
later in Los Angeles County,
when appellant was 16 years old.
However, the Los Angeles County
delinquency petition was adjudicated prior to the earlier Orange
County delinquency petition.
In January
2009, Rafael N. and Jonathan M. were in Rafael’s car in Santa
Ana, when they were approached by appellant and two
companions. Appellant demanded Rafael’s
keys at gunpoint, and his companions assaulted Jonathan M. After Rafael surrendered his car keys, wallet
and cell phone, appellant and his companions fled in Rafael’s car.href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] Jonathan suffered multiple lacerations and
bruising to his face.
On March 17, 2011, Norma Martinez was on
a street in Los Angeles when
appellant and a companion snatched her purse and fled, causing injury to her
finger. The Los Angeles District
Attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging appellant had committed robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211). In a negotiated
disposition, appellant waived his constitutional rights and admitted he had
committed grand theft person (>id., § 487, subd. (c)). The juvenile court declared appellant a ward
of the court, ordered him into a six-month camp community placement program,
and dismissed the robbery allegation on the People’s motion.
On August 26, 2011, the Orange County
District Attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging as to count 1,
appellant had committed carjacking
(Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)), with a special allegation he had personally
used a firearm to commit the offense (id.,
§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to
counts 2 and 3, the petition alleged respectively appellant had committed the
offenses of receiving stolen property (id.,
§ 496d) and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (>id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)).
On October 14, 2011, appellant was
transferred from the camp community placement program to the juvenile court in Orange
County for a jurisdiction hearing
on the August 26 petition. In a
negotiated plea, appellant waived his constitutional rights and admitted he had
committed carjacking and had personally used a firearm to commit the offense. The juvenile court found true the allegations
as to count 1 and the enhancement, calculated the maximum term of confinement
as 19 years, dismissed the remaining counts and ordered the case transferred
back to Los Angeles County
for disposition.
Before
entertaining arguments by counsel at the January 11, 2012 disposition hearing, the juvenile court
in Los Angeles indicated it had
read and considered appellant’s “entire†juvenile court file, and its tentative
ruling was to order appellant committed to the DJJ.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">>[2]
Defense
counsel argued that appellant should be ordered into a nine-month camp
community placement program. Counsel
noted that, apart from two recent episodes at juvenile hall, appellant had
behaved well and was on the verge of successfully completing the six-month camp
community placement program. However, on
the date of his release, appellant was served with a no-bail arrest warrant and
transferred to Orange County
to face allegations relating to three-year old offenses. Counsel maintained that had the carjacking
and related allegations been resolved prior to the grand theft person
allegation,href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"
title="">[3] appellant would likely have been ordered into
a nine-month camp community placement program, which is a suitable less
restrictive alternative to a commitment to the DJJ and an appropriate
disposition in this case.
The
prosecutor argued in favor of a commitment to the DJJ, in light of the serious
nature of the carjacking offense, the personal use of a firearm, and the
beating suffered by one of the victims.
Following
argument, the juvenile court stated it was aware appellant was 14 years old at
the time of the carjacking and his current age was 17 years 8 months, and the
carjacking predated the grand theft offense.
Of concern to the court was the serious nature of appellant’s criminal
conduct, and his history of self-admitted gang involvement and of marijuana and
methamphetamine use. The court was also
troubled by appellant’s behavior in juvenile hall before the disposition hearing: He was disciplined for flashing gang signs
and for using a telephone without permission.
The juvenile court found that “[t]he mental and physical condition and
qualifications of [appellant] render it probable that [he] will benefit from
the reformatory discipline or other treatment provided by the [DJJ].†The court ordered that appellant remain a
ward of the court and be committed to the DJJ for a period not to exceed 19
years, which it calculated as nine years for carjacking, plus 10 years for the
firearm-use enhancement.
>DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“The decision of the juvenile court
to commit a juvenile offender to [the DJJ] may be reversed on appeal only by a
showing that the court abused its discretion.
[Citation.] ‘[D]iscretion is
abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.’
[Citation.]†(>In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th
423, 431-432.) “A decision by the
juvenile court to commit a minor to the [DJJ] will not be deemed to constitute
an abuse of discretion where the evidence ‘demonstrate[s] probable benefit to
the minor from commitment to the [DJJ] and that less restrictive alternatives
would be ineffective or inappropriate.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(In re
Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, disapproved on another ground
in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56
Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) “Although the
DJJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a
DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been
attempted. [Citations.]†(In re
M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)
Moreover, “[i]n evaluating the [juvenile] court’s exercise of discretion
in committing a minor to [the DJJ], we now do so with punishment, public
safety, and protection in mind.†(>In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
978, 987-988.)
“An appellate court will not lightly
substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to
support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings
when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.]â€
(In re Michael D. (1987) 188
Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) “The term
‘substantial evidence’ means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value.
[Citation.]†(>In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426,
1433.)
B. The DJJ Commitment Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its
discretion because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that
the less restrictive alternative disposition of the nine-month camp community
placement program would be ineffective or inappropriate compared to a
commitment to the DJJ. We disagree.>
The record before the juvenile court
supports the court’s decision to commit appellant, who was nearly 18 years old
at the time of disposition, to the DJJ.
The court carefully considered the less restrictive alternative urged by
defense counsel in light of appellant’s history of delinquency, his gang
involvement, drug use and criminal conduct.
Of particular significance to the court was that appellant still
self-identified as a gang member and violated rules, despite having recently
completed a six-month camp community placement program. While the court was also aware appellant had
done well at camp, it could reasonably find that another camp commitment would
be ineffective in his rehabilitation.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
JACKSON,
J.
We concur:
WOODS,
Acting P. J.
ZELON, J.