In re L.T.









Filed 12/23/08 In re L.T. CA5





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re L.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.T., Defendant and Appellant.	F055119 (Super. Ct. No. 08CEJ600214-1) O P I N I O N

THE COURT^*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Timothy A. Kams, Judge.
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Brian Alvarez and Sarah J. Hopper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant L.T. admitted allegations, set forth in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a))^[1] that he committed two misdemeanors: second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b); count 1) and petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a); count 2). At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court; placed him under the supervision of the Fresno County Probation Department; ordered him committed to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility boot camp program (boot camp); declared appellant’s maximum period of physical confinement to be one year two months; and imposed various terms and conditions of probation.
On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion in ordering appellant committed to boot camp. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Facts^[2]
Count 1
On February 14, 2008, police, responding to a report of a theft, made contact with appellant’s mother (the victim) at the residence where appellant lived with the victim and other family members, at which time the victim told police the following. Upon discovering $20 missing from her purse, which she kept locked in her car because appellant had previously stolen items from her purse, the victim checked her jewelry box and discovered that her spare car key was missing. She confronted appellant who initially denied taking either the key or the money, but eventually admitted he took the key. The victim called the police because she believed appellant was taking drugs.
Appellant admitted to the officers that he took both the key and the money. He further stated that he used the money to purchase marijuana, and that he had “smoked all of it.”
Count 2
On November 28, 2007, Eduardo Lopez, a relative who lives with appellant and his family, reported to police that he had discovered that $40 belonging to him was missing, and that he suspected appellant of taking it. Officers contacted appellant, who admitted he stole the money. He stated further that he had used $20 of the money to purchase marijuana, “and had been smoking it all day.”
Additional Factual Background^[3]
Appellant’s first contact with the juvenile justice system occurred in 2004, after “[appellant] and a co-participant were throwing rocks at windows ... and were observed by officers.” Appellant completed one day in the community service work program. No wardship petition was filed.
At the time of the disposition hearing in the instant case, in March 2008, appellant was less than four months shy of his seventeenth birthday. At that time he was not enrolled in school “because he state[d], ‘I like waking up in my own time.’”
Appellant told the probation officer “he is not in need of a substance abuse program because he can quit using drugs when he wants.” He admitted using marijuana on a daily basis, cocaine “2-3x a year” and alcohol on “Special Occasions.”
The probation officer stated: “The minor appears to suffer from a severe marijuana addiction, which he denies. Denial is the major obstacle to addicts getting treatment. The minor states he can quit when he desires. If the minor is accepted in the Substance Abuse Unit (SAU), that would hopefully help the minor gain some insight into his behavior and addiction. This officer feels that based on the minor’s substance abuse, this would be the most appropriate recommendation. [¶] If he is not accepted into SAU, the minor could benefit from a commitment to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility, Boot Camp. The minor needs to be held accountable and the program would address the structure and accountability he needs on a daily basis.”
Disposition Hearing
At the disposition hearing, in arguing against the probation officer’s recommendation, defense counsel asserted: “The Minor has stated that since being in juvenile hall his outlook has changed. He is ready to be enrolled in school. He is ready to go to drug treatment. He would just like to go home to his parents. Mom and dad are both on the same page as the Minor, and they’ve agreed that the mother will stop working to keep an eye on the Minor.”
In response, the probation officer reiterated that appellant “needs the structure and accountability that boot camp would offer.” The court, just prior to ordering boot camp commitment, stated, “I think actually [the Fresno County] SAU would be better, but there is no bed available ....”
Subsequent Proceeding
Following the disposition hearing, appellant filed an application for an order modifying the court’s disposition order. He asserted in this application that “[his] parents are requesting [he] receive drug treatment,” and “[t]here is no drug treatment in Boot Camp.” The court denied appellant’s request.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there was no evidence to support that the conclusion that a disposition less restrictive than boot camp commitment would have been “inappropriate[],” and therefore the court abused its discretion in ordering appellant committed to boot camp. In support of this contention appellant asserts the following: he has “never been tried on probation, on electronic monitoring, or in a group home”; “[i]t does not appear [his] parents were ever provided any services that might enable them to supervise [him] more effectively and prevent the need for [him] to be removed from the home”; he will not receive substance abuse treatment in boot camp; and the “only reason the court placed [appellant] in the boot camp” was the lack of space in SAU. Appellant’s challenge to the instant disposition order is without merit.
“In reviewing a juvenile court’s disposition--whether it be a commitment to the California Youth Authority or a disposition of a less serious nature--the appellate court must indulge in all reasonable inferences from the evidence and the record to support the action of the juvenile court. [Citations.] An order of disposition, made by the juvenile court, may be reversed by the appellate court only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.” (In re Darryl T. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 874, 877.) A juvenile court does not abuse its discretion where its dispositional order is supported by substantial evidence. (Cf. In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53 [Youth Authority commitment].)
In determining whether a particular disposition was within the juvenile court’s discretion, we must examine the record in light of the purposes of the law governing delinquency adjudications. (§ 200 et seq; In re Lorenza M., supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 53.) Accordingly, we look to section 202, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“(a) The purpose of this chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public .… If the minor is removed from his or her own family, it is the purpose of this chapter to secure for the minor custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his or her parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.
“(b) … Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.”
The portion of section 202, subdivision (b) quoted above means that “when we assess the record in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law [citation] we evaluate the exercise of discretion with punishment and public safety and protection in mind.” (In re Lorenza M., supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 58; accord, In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684 [“[a] fundamental premise of delinquency adjudication is that the court must focus on the dual concerns of the best interests of the minor and public protection”]; In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473 [“the 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the public”].) And while the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, there is no absolute rule that the court may not impose a particular commitment until less restrictive placements have actually been attempted. (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577.)
Here, notwithstanding that the instant case represents appellant’s first wardship proceeding, several factors support the juvenile court’s disposition order. Appellant committed multiple acts of theft, failed to attend school altogether and used drugs and alcohol, developing a dependency on marijuana serious enough to be characterized as “severe” by the probation officer. Moreover, appellant initially denied he had a drug problem and indicated that going to school interfered with his desire to sleep late. The court was not required to accept at face value appellant’s belated admission that he was in need of substance abuse treatment or his promise to begin attending school. Nor did the court’s expressed preference for an alternative disposition that was not available, or the apparent absence of a drug treatment program in boot camp, compel a disposition less restrictive than boot camp. On this record, the court reasonably could have concluded that a less restrictive disposition would not be adequate to (1) discourage appellant’s drug and alcohol use, if by no means other than restricting his access to drugs and alcohol; (2) address the problem of appellant’s failure to attend school; and (3) hold appellant accountable for his actions. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant committed to boot camp.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.



Publication courtesy of San Diego pro bono legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Poway Property line attorney.
San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com

---