In re Lorenzo G.
Filed 8/6/12 In re Lorenzo G. CA2/7
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
In re LORENZO G., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B238956
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. MJ20626)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LORENZO G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County.
Mitchel J. Harris, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.
Kevin D.
Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In March 2011, police took then 13-year-old Lorenzo G. into custody for
felony vandalism after he admitted defacing City of Palmdale
and Palmdale School
District property with graffiti on various
occasions in 2010 and 2011. In May 2011,
the People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against
Lorenzo, alleging six counts of felony vandalism.
On October 25,
2011, the juvenile court granted
Lorenzo’s motion for discovery of the arresting officer’s personnel files
pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (
that officer’s personnel and administrative records for complaints concerning
“coerced confessions,” and found no relevant material.
On January 25,
2012, the juvenile court heard Lorenzo’s motion to suppress the statements he
made to the arresting officer on grounds the officer failed to advise him of
his right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to
appointed counsel (Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]) and coerced him to admit the acts of
vandalism of city and school district property.
The same day, following the court’s denial of the motion, Lorenzo
admitted two of the alleged counts of vandalism and agreed to pay victim
restitution resulting from all six counts of vandalism, pursuant to a
restitution was to be determined at a restitution hearing. Prior to his admission, Lorenzo was advised
of and waived his constitutional rights. The court found Lorenzo’s waivers and
admissions were knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and the conditions of
satisfied. The court dismissed the
remaining counts, ordered probation on specified conditions and granted
deferred entry of judgment for not less than 12 months and not more than 36
months. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
790.) The court also scheduled a
restitution hearing.
On
February 7, 2012, Lorenzo
filed a notice of appeal from the January 25, 2012 order for deferred
entry of judgment. We appointed counsel
to represent him on appeal.
After
an examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues
were raised. On May 4, 2012,
we advised Lorenzo he had 30 days in which to personally submit any
consider. No response has been received
to date.
We have examined the
entire record and are satisfied Lorenzo’s attorney has fully complied with the
responsibilities of counsel and no arguable
issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000)
528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113;
436, 441.)
The
January 25, 2012 order for
deferred entry of judgment and probation is not appealable. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 800; People v.
Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 794; In
re Mario C. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1307-1309.) Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
ZELON, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P.
J. JACKSON,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Angel D., who was found to have
committed the acts of vandalism with Lorenzo, is not a party to this appeal.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The transcript of the in camera hearing
is not part of the record on appeal.
