Filed 2/21/18 In re L.C.B. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


In re L.C.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CARMEN C. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
A150127

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J14-00945)



I. INTRODUCTION
This is the third time we are called upon to review a juvenile court order in this case involving L.C.B. who became a court dependent in 2014 when she was a year old.
In September 2015, we directed the juvenile court to set aside an order scheduling a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider terminating the parental rights of L.C.B.’s parents, Carmen C. and Andrew B., because there was insufficient evidence that this family was offered six months of reasonable reunification services. (In re L.C.B. (Sept. 21, 2015, A145815 [nonpub. opn.]) (hereafter, L.C.B. I).)
However, in November 2016, we refused to set aside another order scheduling a section 366.26 hearing because by that stage in the case, these parents had been afforded reasonable services and yet L.C.B. could not be safely returned to their home. (In re L.C.B. (Nov. 7, 2016, A149154 [nonpub. opn.]) (hereafter, L.C.B. II).)
This appeal is from a December 2016 order terminating the parental rights of Carmen and Andrew and selecting adoption as L.C.B.’s permanent plan. On appeal, Andrew contends that his parental rights cannot be terminated because there is insufficient evidence that he is an unfit parent. Carmen has filed a “joinder” in Andrew’s argument, but does not make the same claim about herself. We affirm.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Background
Several years before L.C.B. was born, Carmen was hit by a truck and suffered a brain injury, which affected her speech, movement, and short-term memory. As an adult, Carmen has also been diagnosed with multiple conditions, including osteoarthritis in both knees, chronic pain disorders, depression with anxiety, and poly-substance abuse, in remission. Approximately a year after Carmen’s car accident, she developed a romantic relationship with Andrew. However, they were temporarily separated when Carmen became pregnant with L.C.B. Although Andrew is not L.C.B.’s biological father, he has always claimed her as his own. (L.C.B. I, at p. 4.)
In September 2014, Carmen took one-year-old L.C.B. to the hospital complaining she had a fever. Carmen appeared to be under the influence of something, exhibited signs of mental illness, and made bizarre statements about her relationship with Andrew. The following day, the Contra Costa County Bureau of Child and Family Services (the Bureau) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Carmen’s use of prescription drugs and mental health problems put L.C.B. at risk of serious harm. (L.C.B. I, at p. 3.)
A few days later, at L.C.B.’s detention hearing, the juvenile court appointed separate counsel to represent Carmen, Andrew, and L.C.B. The court found that Andrew was an alleged father and ordered the Bureau to complete a paternity inquiry.
The jurisdiction hearing was held in October 2014, after a guardian ad litem was appointed for Carmen. The court exercised jurisdiction over L.C.B. and placed her in the home of her maternal uncle. (L.C.B. I, at p. 4.) In December 2014, L.C.B. was adjudged as a dependent child, and the court ordered the Bureau to provide reunification services for both Carmen and Andrew. On February 5, 2015, Andrew was formally elevated to presumed father status. (Id. at p. 5.)
B. The First Six-Month Review
In May 2015, the Bureau filed a status review report recommending that the juvenile court terminate reunification services and schedule a section 366.26 hearing. (L.C.B. I, at pp. 5–6.) During this reporting period, Carmen had spent several weeks in the hospital or a convalescent center recovering from double knee replacement surgery, and then stayed with a family friend until she moved into a motel with Andrew. Andrew worked as a security guard, and looked for housing for the family. The Bureau opined that Carmen was not capable of taking care of L.C.B. due to her physical problems and reliance on medications. The Bureau was also concerned that Andrew was unable to understand the danger that Carmen posed to L.C.B. (Id. at pp. 6–7.)
In July 2015, the juvenile court conducted a contested review hearing at which it adopted the Bureau’s recommendation to terminate services and schedule a section 366.26 hearing. (L.C.B. I, at pp. 6–12.) The court found, among other things, that both parents had been afforded reasonable reunification services and that returning L.C.B. to their home would create a substantial risk to her well-being. (Id. at p. 12.)
Andrew and Carmen both filed petitions for extraordinary review of the July 2015 order, which led to our opinion in L.C.B. I. Andrew’s first claim of error was that the juvenile court “violated section 366.21, subdivision (e) by failing to ‘return’ L.C.B. to his custody at the end of the six-month reunification period.” (L.C.B. I, at p. 13.) This court rejected Andrew’s claim for two related reasons.
First, we found that section 366.21 did not require the juvenile court to consider whether placing L.C.B. in Andrew’s custody would pose a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being. L.C.B. was not removed from Andrew, who was only an alleged father when L.C.B. was removed from Carmen’s custody. Subsequently Andrew obtained presumed father status, but he did not become a noncustodial parent. Rather, he was Carmen’s partner when L.C.B. was removed and remained so throughout the dependency case. Thus, at the end of the six-month review hearing the issue under section 366.21, subdivision (e) was not whether L.C.B. could be safely returned to Andrew, but rather whether returning her to the home of her parents posed a substantial risk of detriment. The juvenile court found that such a risk existed, and this court affirmed that finding because it was supported by substantial evidence of “the family’s ongoing struggles to resolve Carmen’s problems with prescription drug abuse and mental health and to secure stable housing.” (L.C.B. I, at p. 14.)
Second, we concluded that Andrew had not actually made a request to the juvenile court to have L.C.B. placed in his sole custody. (L.C.B. II, at p. 14.) In this regard, we observed that Andrew could not rely on section 361.2, which authorizes a noncustodial presumed father to appear in court and request custody of his child. (In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Section 361.2 did not apply to Andrew because he was not a presumed father or a noncustodial father when L.C.B. was removed from Carmen’s custody. A person in Andrew’s position, who became a presumed father after disposition, could request sole custody of his child only by filing a motion under section 388 for a hearing to consider new information and changed circumstances. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 454–455.)
In L.C.B. I, Andrew and Carmen also claimed that the Bureau did not provide them with reasonable reunification services. (L.C.B. I, at p. 14.) We accepted this claim because the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Andrew and Carmen received reasonable services. (Id. at pp. 14–19.) In reaching this conclusion, we found that the Bureau did not provide any services to address Carmen’s substance abuse problems or to assist Andrew in gaining insight about those problems. (Id. at pp. 15–16.) Nor did it assist the family in areas where it was clear that case plan compliance would be difficult, but instead used Carmen’s knee surgery as an excuse to limit services to the family. (Id. at p. 17.) Accordingly, we issued a writ directing the juvenile court to vacate the July 2015 order and enter a new order providing the parents with six months of appropriate reunification services. (Id. at pp. 19–20.)
C. The Second Six-Month Review
Following our remand in L.C.B. I, the juvenile court adopted new case plans for Carmen and Andrew, ordered weekly visitation, and authorized the Bureau to provide the parents with overnight visits. (L.C.B. II, at pp. 4–5.)
In January 2016, the court completed a second six-month status review. (L.C.B. II, at pp. 5–6.) The Bureau presented evidence that L.C.B. continued to do well in her uncle’s home. Meanwhile, Carmen had completed a residential substance abuse program in December 2015 and had a plan in place for outpatient treatment and support programs. However, following her release, Carmen produced positive drug tests. Also, she refused to tell the Bureau where she and Andrew were living. Furthermore, the social worker had made several attempts to meet with the parents and review their case plans before the review hearing, but Carmen cancelled all of the scheduled meetings. Carmen and Andrew had attended five of seven scheduled visits with L.C.B., which were held on Sundays in Sacramento near the home of L.C.B.’s uncle. However, Carmen ended one visit early because L.C.B. was having a tantrum. Furthermore, the Bureau reported that the parents did not appear interested in increasing visits or having overnight visits with L.C.B. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the court continued all prior orders, and extended the reunification period until the next review hearing.
D. The Combined 12-Month and 18-Month Review
In April 2016, the court conducted a combined 12-month/18-month review. (L.C.B. II, at p. 8.) The Bureau filed a report recommending that the court terminate reunification services and schedule a section 366.26 hearing. Both parents contested the Bureau’s recommendations. (Id. at pp. 6–8.) Over the course of several court sessions, the court received extensive evidence regarding the services offered to the family, the progress made by each parent, and their relationship with L.C.B. (Id. at pp. 8–20.) After completing its review, the court announced its decision on August 4, 2016. (Id. at pp. 21–22.)
The court prefaced its findings by observing that 23 months had passed since L.C.B. was first detained; L.C.B. was an infant when the case was filed, and she had spent most of her life out of the care of her parents. The court also acknowledged that there was a period of time when these parents had not been provided with reasonable services, but concluded that was no longer the case. (L.C.B. II, at p. 21.)
The court identified two primary barriers to family reunification. First, Carmen had failed to resolve her substance abuse problem. She completed residential treatment and had outpatient services but continued to miss drug tests and return positive tests. Furthermore, she appeared to be under the influence even when she attended court hearings, including the hearing that day. The second problem plaguing this family was that Andrew was blinded by his unqualified devotion to Carmen. Andrew made his position clear that he would stay with Carmen, no matter what happened to L.C.B., and he did not grasp the fact that Carmen’s failure to address her substance abuse problems made her “wholly unsafe to parent her child.” (L.C.B. II, at p. 21.)
The court found that Carmen and Andrew both loved L.C.B. very much, but they had no “insight into what led to this dependency proceeding in the first place.” (L.C.B. II, at p. 22.) They tried, but failed to meaningfully address some problems, and did not even try to address others. For example, Andrew chose not to participate in individual therapy. Furthermore, neither parent would work with the social worker, or even maintain regular communication with the Bureau. The court concluded by finding that the “wealth of evidence presented in these proceedings” supported the Bureau’s recommendations. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court terminated reunification services to both parents and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing for November 30, 2016.
Meanwhile, Andrew and Carmen filed separate writ petitions challenging the August 2016 order, which we addressed in L.C.B. II. That decision contains three conclusions that are relevant here.
First, we rejected the parents’ contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that returning L.C.B. to their custody would create a substantial risk to the child’s well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) As we explained, “L.C.B. was removed from the home because Carmen’s substance abuse posed a substantial danger to L.C.B.’s physical safety and emotional well-being. Almost two years later, Carmen continued to abuse her prescription medications and Andrew continued to enable that dangerous behavior. In their writ petitions, neither parent squarely addresses these pertinent facts which amply support the detriment finding in this case.” (L.C.B. II, at p. 23.)
Second, we rejected Andrew’s claim that “as a matter of law,” there was “no basis for sustaining the detriment finding against him because the dependency petition did not allege that he was a dangerous parent.” (L.C.B. II, at p. 24.) We explained: “Andrew defeats his own argument, however, by expressly acknowledging that he did not request that the juvenile court place L.C.B. in his sole custody. Thus, the issue is whether L.C.B. can be safety returned to the home of both parents. Substantial evidence—indeed undisputed evidence—establishes that Andrew will support Carmen no matter what her behavior. Unfortunately, that environment is not a safe home for L.C.B.” (Ibid.)
Third, we rejected claims by Andrew and Carmen that they were not afforded reasonable reunification services. (L.C.B. II, at pp. 24–27.) Substantial evidence supporting the reasonable services findings showed, among other things, that after our decision in L.C.B. I, the Bureau implemented new case plans for both parents, which were tailored to address the problems that led to this dependency, and that the Bureau made reasonable efforts to assist the parents with their plan objectives. (Id. at pp. 25–26.) Furthermore, the evidence also disproved specific complaints by each parent about the quality of their services. (Id. at pp. 26–27.) For example, Andrew complained that the Bureau did nothing more than provide him with referrals, but the record showed that the social worker made multiple attempts to assist Andrew in achieving his plan objectives. (Id. at p. 26.) We also found that there was “substantial evidence that Andrew made a conscious decision to resist individual counseling, and that he consistently limited his role in these dependency proceedings to that of an advocate for Carmen rather than an independent parent for L.C.B.” (Ibid.)
E. The Present Appeal
The section 366.26 hearing began on November 30, 2016. The juvenile court admitted the Bureau’s report and “a very thorough caregiver information form.” Then, the court continued the hearing until December 16, 2016 because Carmen’s guardian ad litem was not present to assist her. At the December 16 hearing, the court heard testimony from the social worker, Andrew, and Carmen and then announced its rulings.
1. The Section 366.26 Report
In its section 366.26 report, the Bureau recommended terminating the parental rights of Carmen, Andrew, and anyone else claiming to be the father of L.C.B., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for L.C.B.
The report included an update about L.C.B. and her relative placement. The child was in good physical health, presented as friendly and happy, and had a strong but insecure attachment to her relative caregivers. She needed constant reassurance and was prone to intense tantrums that often lasted as long as an hour. Recently, she was diagnosed with autism, and she was in the process of an evaluation to determine if she qualified for additional services. These circumstances were distressing to L.C.B.’s caretakers because they did not like to see her suffer, but they were confident in their ability to meet her needs. L.C.B. had been living with her uncle and his family for over two years, and they were very committed to her. They had an approved home study from children’s services, and they had made it clear that they wanted to adopt L.C.B.
The Bureau also updated the court about visitation matters. After the parents’ reunification services were terminated, they were offered monthly supervised visits. The social worker attempted to contact Carmen to confirm the place and time of the September visit, but she did not answer her phone and her voicemail was full. When the social worker contacted Andrew, he seemed more concerned about Carmen having a visit than himself, and he said he would make sure she got the information. The social worker tried to advise Andrew that he “needed to focus on his visits and not the mother’s visits.” L.C.B. was transported from Sacramento to Antioch for the September 2016 visit, but the parents were 20 minutes late and the visit was cancelled.
The Bureau reported that the primary issue before the court was to select “the most appropriate permanent plan” for L.C.B., and it recommended adoption as the best plan for several reasons. First, there is a statutory preference for adoption if there is clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted. (§ 366.26.) Second, L.C.B. had been in a relative concurrent home for over two years, with a family who loved her, was committed to her care, and wanted to adopt her. Third, L.C.B. appeared to feel safe and loved and looked to her placement family to meet her emotional and physical needs. Fourth, Carmen’s visitation was inconsistent, and although Andrew’s visits were positive, he “appear[ed] more concerned about the welfare of the mother than . . . about doing what is needed to care for [L.C.B.].” Fifth, L.C.B. was “crying out for permanency and stability.” With respect to this last factor, the Bureau opined that it was in the best interest of L.C.B. to have permanency through adoption, and that her need for permanency outweighed the benefits of retaining a parental relationship with Carmen and Andrew.
2. Witness Testimony
Andrew testified that he had a parental relationship with L.C.B because he was the only father figure she has known and he had been there since the beginning. He took care of L.C.B. prior to the dependency and was her sole caretaker when Carmen “was either tired or sick.” During visits, L.C.B. continued to call him “daddy,” was affectionate with him, enjoyed spending time with him, talked about what was on her mind, and did not want the visits to end.
Andrew testified that he did not want his parental rights terminated because that would mean that he had abused L.C.B., which was not true. Andrew also opined that terminating his rights would harm L.C.B. because she would no longer have an “actual” father. He explained that L.C.B. would want somebody who looked like him and shared his ethnicity to be her father, because she loved him.
Under cross-examination, Andrew testified that he had skimmed the section 366.26 report. He did not read the entire report because all of the reports repeated the same information. Andrew did read, however, that L.C.B. was recently diagnosed with autism. He did not do any research about that condition, but noted that he had worked with children who had autism and other disabilities. Andrew did not contact the social worker about L.C.B.’s diagnosis or do any research about the medication that had been prescribed for her because nobody told him he needed to do that.
County counsel called Carmen as a witness. Carmen testified that she was taking medication for fibromyalgia, high blood pressure, and anxiety, and also offered that she had been crying a lot. During her brief testimony, Carmen twice denied that she was having trouble staying awake. She testified that she heard all of the testimony Andrew gave before she took the stand. However, she could not recall what Andrew said about receiving the Bureau’s section 366.26 report.
3. The Juvenile Court’s Order
At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the court made the following findings: First, L.C.B.’s caregivers were absolutely committed to her and wanted to adopt her. Second, these parents failed to establish that the “beneficial relationship exception” to adoption applied in this case. Their visitation had been satisfactory and they had demonstrated a level of love and commitment. However, neither of them established that “the benefit to the child of maintaining the parent/child relationship outweighs the benefit of adoption.” Rather, every relevant factor—the age of the child, the portion of the life spent in parental custody, the positive or negative interactions between parent and child, and the special needs of the child—weighed in favor of adoption.
Finally, the court found that there was a significant concern that Carmen could not safely care for herself, wholly aside from whether she could care for her child. Once again, Carmen had appeared in court with an “altered affect [sic]” and “incredibly slurred” speech. Meanwhile, the court found, Andrew put Carmen’s needs “before his genuine efforts to reunify.” The court continued: “It speaks to his level of commitment to mom. And that’s nice, that’s nice for mom, and it’s nice for dad that he loves her that much, but unfortunately that just doesn’t work in terms of being a safe capable parent and meeting the needs particularly of a little girl who has all of the diagnoses that are noted by this particular physician, including autism, Reactive Attachment Disorder, um, and other developmental delays related to speech . . . .”
In light of these findings, the court adopted the Bureau’s recommendations, terminated the parental rights of Carmen, Andrew, and other person claiming to be L.C.B.’s father, and ordered the Bureau to refer L.C.B. for an adoptive placement. The court’s findings were recorded in a December 16, 2016 minute order (the December 2016 order).
III. DISCUSSION
Andrew contends that the December 2016 order terminating his parental rights is “constitutionally invalid” because the record does not establish that he is an unfit parent. Carmen filed a “joinder” in Andrew’s argument, which does not state any claim of her own. Thus, we limit our discussion to Andrew’s single claim of error.
A. The Due Process Requirement of Parental Unfitness
“Parents have a fundamental interest in the care, companionship, and custody of their children. (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 758 (Santosky).) Santosky establishes minimal due process requirements in the context of state dependency proceedings. ‘Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.’ (Id. at pp. 747–748.) ‘After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do diverge.’ (Id. at p. 760.) ‘But until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’ (Ibid.)” (In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, 848, italics omitted (Gladys L.).)
“California’s dependency system comports with Santosky’s requirements because, by the time parental rights are terminated at a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit. [Citation.] ‘The number and quality of the judicial findings that are necessary preconditions to termination convey very powerfully to the fact finder the subjective certainty about parental unfitness and detriment required before the court may even consider ending the relationship between natural parent and child.’ [Citation.] The linchpin to the constitutionality of the section 366.26 hearing is that prior determinations ensure ‘the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must align itself.’ [Citation.]” (Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 848, citing Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254–256.)
“California’s dependency scheme no longer uses the term ‘parental unfitness,’ but instead requires the juvenile court [to] make a finding that awarding custody of a dependent child to a parent would be detrimental to the child. [Citation.]” (In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211 (P.A.).) Thus, a finding of detriment is the equivalent of a finding of unfitness. (Ibid.; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 224, fn. 3.) “Due process requires that a finding of detriment be made by clear and convincing evidence before terminating a parent’s parental rights. [Citation.]” (In re Z.K. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 65 (Z.K.).) If the requirements of Santosky were ignored or for some other reason the safeguards embedded in the dependency scheme do not establish parental unfitness and detriment, due process prohibits an appellate court from affirming an order terminating the parental rights of that parent. (Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 848–849.)
B. Analysis
Andrew contends that findings made by the juvenile court prior to the section 366.26 hearing in this case do not establish that he is an unfit parent under the clear and convincing standard of proof.
Preliminarily, the Bureau contends that Andrew forfeited this claim by failing to raise it at the section 366.26 hearing. “A party forfeits a claim of error on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court; however, ‘ “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re D.H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 719, 728.) Courts often exercise their discretion to consider the merits of arguments that implicate an important constitutional issue such as a father’s due process right to the care and custody of his child. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we conclude the forfeiture doctrine does not bar this appeal.
However, we do find that Andrew forfeited an important right. After Andrew achieved presumed father status, he chose not to file a section 388 petition to establish a change of circumstances that might entitle him to sole custody of L.C.B. And, during the section 366.26 hearing, which was scheduled for the express purpose of determining whether to terminate parental rights, Andrew did not suggest that he was willing or able to be a single parent to L.C.B. Under these circumstances, Andrew forfeited any right he may have had to seek sole custody of L.C.B.
Turning to the merits of this appeal, Andrew has failed to establish a due process violation with respect to the termination of his parental rights. At least three judicial findings that were made prior to the section 366.26 hearing establish parental unfitness with respect to both Andrew and Carmen.
First, the December 2014 disposition order contained the following finding: “There is clear & convincing evidence that the welfare of [the] child requires that physical cust[ody] be removed from parent/guardian in that: . . . There is substantial danger to [the] child’s physical health, or would be if [the] child were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect child w/o removal of physical custody.” As discussed above, when this finding was made Andrew was only an alleged father. Nevertheless, this finding applied to Andrew because he was Carmen’s partner and L.C.B.’s caretaker at the time of removal and he was responsible along with Carmen for creating the unsafe home environment necessitating the removal of L.C.B.
Second, in its July 2015 review order, the juvenile court adopted the Bureau’s recommended finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that returning L.C.B. to “the custody of her parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection or physical or emotional wellbeing of the child.” This finding was made after Andrew was elevated to presumed father status and squarely applied to both Andrew and Carmen, as we explained in L.C.B. I.
Third, the August 2016 review order setting the section 366.26 hearing contained another finding by clear and convincing evidence that returning L.C.B. to “the custody of her parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Again, this finding applied to Carmen, who continued to abuse her medications, and to Andrew, who continued to enable Carmen’s dangerous conduct, as we explained in L.C.B. II. Andrew contends that the detriment finding in the disposition order applied exclusively to Carmen because L.C.B. was removed from her custody pursuant to jurisdictional findings that pertained solely to her conduct. However, there is no requirement that a detriment finding in a disposition order must relate to a corresponding jurisdictional finding. (P.A., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1212.) In this case, the detriment finding applied to Andrew as well as Carmen because he lived with Carmen and acted as her co-parent at the time of removal, and he actively participated in the creation of a home environment that was not safe for L.C.B.
Andrew appears to concede that the detriment findings in the July 2015 order and the August 2016 order apply to him, but he contends these findings were “faulty” because they were not supported by the record. However, this court already rejected Andrew’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges to the detriment findings that were made against him in July 2015 and August 2016. Andrew may not relitigate these issues here. (See James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021 [a parent who obtains review of a juvenile court order pursuant to a petition for extraordinary writ is barred from making a further challenge to that order in subsequent appeals].)
Andrew relies on several cases in which an order terminating parental rights was reversed because prior orders in the dependency case did not establish parental unfitness. (Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 845; In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202 (G.S.R.); In re P.C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 98 (P.C.); In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532 (Frank R.); Z.K., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 51.)
Most of these cases are inapposite because they involved a noncustodial parent who was found by the juvenile court to be a nonoffending parent, and who was not the subject of any detriment finding during the dependency action. (Gladys L., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 845; Frank R., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 532; Z.K., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 51.) In this case, Andrew was a member of the home from which L.C.B. was removed, became a presumed father during the dependency case in his capacity as Carmen’s partner, was afforded reasonable reunification services, and had at least two detriment findings made against him, both of which were judicially reviewed and affirmed on their merits.
Andrew also relies on two cases that support the proposition that poverty, even if it results in homelessness, is insufficient to establish parental unfitness. (G.S.R., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 1202; P.C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 99–100.) However, that is not what happened here. The detriment findings made against Andrew were based on clear and convincing evidence that his relationship with Carmen created an unsafe home for L.C.B. and that he was unwilling to change this fact. These findings are sufficient to establish parental unfitness and thus satisfy the requirement of constitutional due process.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appealed order is affirmed.

 




_________________________
RUVOLO, P. J.


We concur:


_________________________
REARDON, J.


_________________________
STREETER, J.

























A150127, In re L.C.B.