In re K.S.








Filed 11/19/10 In re K.S. CA2/1





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re K.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B222924, B224250 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK80496)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES S., Defendant and Appellant; K.S. et al., Appellants.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elizabeth Kim, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed.
Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant James S.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minors.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________

James S. (Father) and his seven minor children challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the March 8, 2010 jurisdiction and disposition orders. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), based on Father’s failure regularly to take his psychotropic medication. The children were removed from Father and placed with G.S. (Mother), who was nonoffending.[1] Pending this appeal, on June 28, 2010, the juvenile court permitted Father to return to the family home.[2]
In an October 1, 2010 letter to the court, DCFS stated that “in the interests of the parties, and in consideration of judicial economy, DCFS does not oppose a reversal of the March 8, 2010, jurisdiction/disposition findings and orders.” The attorneys for Father and the children sent letters accepting DCFS’s concession that the orders be reversed. We deem the parties to have requested that we enter a stipulated reversal under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). We conclude that this case meets the requirements for a stipulated reversal, and reverse the jurisdiction and disposition orders.
BACKGROUND
The family consists of the parents and their seven children, K.S. (born in 1998), V.S. (born in 2001), James S. IV (born in 2001), Charles S. (born in 2003), H.S. (born in 2004), J.S. (born in 2005), and Marc S. (born in 2008).[3]
The family came to the attention of DCFS in August 2009 with a referral that Father had physically abused three of the children. V.S. stated that Father hit his knee with a chair, but DCFS saw no marks or bruises. James reported that he saw Father push V.S., but did not see Father hit V.S. The other children said that Father would scream at them, but he did not hit them. All of the children reported feeling safe in the home and unafraid of their parents. Father denied throwing a chair at V.S, but admitted he grabbed V.S.’s shirt to bring him closer to him. Father was a certified nurse; when he came home from work he was tired and would scream at the children, but he did not hit them. Father was prescribed Prozac and Abilify for depression and was in contact with his therapist. The family entered into a safety plan with DCFS.
DCFS filed a petition in December 2009 after Mother informed DCFS that Father had stopped taking his medications, tensions had escalated between them, Mother was so concerned about Father’s mental stability that she and the children left the family home to stay with the maternal grandparents, and they returned to the family home after Father agreed to leave. After the petition was filed, the children remained in the home with Mother; Father agreed to remain out of the home.
In January 2010, Mother explained to DCFS that Father had been experiencing stress at work and his stress was increased without his medication. Mother stated that she was capable of protecting her children from abuse. Mother believed that Father was able to provide for his family when he was taking his medication regularly. In February 2010, DCFS reported that Father was participating in therapy. Father’s psychiatrist said that Father’s prognosis for recovery was good and that Father’s level of functioning should be stable and normal if he takes his medication regularly and continues with therapy.
At an adjudication hearing on March 2, 3, and 8, 2010, the juvenile court received in evidence DCFS reports and heard testimony from both parents. The court sustained one count under section 300, subdivision (b), finding that Father has mental and emotional problems and that he failed to take his psychotropic medications regularly, placing the children at risk of harm. The children were removed from Father’s custody and placed with Mother under a home of parent order. Mother was afforded family maintenance services, and Father was afforded reunification services. Father was ordered to attend individual counseling and couples counseling, to take his prescribed medication, and to submit to a psychological evaluation if recommended by his therapist. Father’s visits were to be monitored.
The children and Father appealed from the jurisdiction and disposition orders. Pending this appeal, the juvenile court ordered on June 28, 2010, that Father was permitted to live in the family home, where he remains.
On October 1, 2010, DCFS sent a letter to us in lieu of a respondent’s brief. DCFS wrote that because Father was permitted to return to the family home, and in the interests of the parties and for judicial economy, DCFS did not oppose a reversal of the March 8, 2010 orders. The attorneys for Father and the children accepted DCFS’s concession that the orders be reversed. We deem the parties to have agreed to a stipulated reversal.
DISCUSSION
Motions to reverse or vacate duly entered judgments are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). In pertinent part, that subdivision provides that “[a]n appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.”
The absence of reversible error is not a bar to the acceptance of a stipulated reversal so long as the appellate court makes the findings listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). (Union Bank of California v. Braille Inst. of America, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330 (Union Bank).) The stipulated reversal provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8) applies in a juvenile dependency proceeding. (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 378; In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 198, fn. 8.)
We have examined the record, the parties’ briefs on appeal, and the letters from the parties’ attorneys and conclude that this case meets the requirements for a stipulated reversal.
There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of the public and nonparties will be adversely affected by the reversal because DCFS, representing the interests of the government agency, has determined that a settlement of the pending appeal is in the public interest. When there is no fraud, settlements of pending appeals are “‘highly favored as productive of peace and goodwill in the community, and reducing the expense and persistency of litigation.’” (Union Bank, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331.)
We determine that the reasons for the stipulated reversal outweigh any erosion of public trust that may result. The attorneys for DCFS, Father, and the minors have taken appropriate steps to expedite the resolution of the appeal and to conserve judicial resources, which will only enhance public trust in the judicial system. Finally, this case presents no risk of reducing the incentive for pretrial settlement because it involves changed circumstances which occurred after the orders from which the appeals were taken.
DISPOSITION
Respondent’s motion to take judicial notice is granted. The March 8, 2010 orders are reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MALLANO, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.
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