In re K.R.
Filed 1/31/14 In re K.R. CA1/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re K.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN MATEO COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
S.R.,
Defendant;
D.H. et al.,
Appellants.
A138121
(San
Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. JV81521)
The minor K.R., the San Mateo County
Human Services Agency (Agency),
and the presumed father D.H., all appeal from the juvenile court’s order of March
7, 2013, denying the minor’s Welfare and
Institutions Code section 388
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] motion to vacate a
prior order finding D.H. to be the presumed father, placing the
determining the Agency provided D.H. with reasonable
Background
We set forth only those facts necessary for a determination of the
issues on appeal.
title="">[2]
In June 2011, the Agency filed a
section 300 petition regarding K.R. and her half siblings, who were then living
with their mother. The petition alleged
failure to protect based on the mother’s
involvement in domestic violence. K.R., then three years old, was detained and placed
in a foster home.
The following month, the Agency filed
an amended petition identifying K.R.’s alleged father and alleging his whereabouts
were unknown. Following a contested
hearing, the juvenile court sustained the amended petition. On August 15, the court declared the minor a
home would be contrary to [her] welfare,†and committed her to the care,
custody and control of the Agency.
In the meantime, on August 1, D.H.
contacted the social worker and requested placement of the minor and her half brothers.
D.H. stated he and the mother “began
dating when [K.R.] was born and had known each other for a few months prior.
[D.H.] stated they met in Merced County when he drove a bus for a program that brought people to church on
Friday evenings.†The Agency indicated
it was “assessing the situation, but there are concerns about [D.H.’s] mental
health and substance abuse history as well as the situation with his own
children.â€
On October 18, D.H. filed a “De Facto Parent Statement.†In it, he indicated he was the “Step Dad
trying to get all 3 kids back per CPS since July.†As to K.R., he stated he had been her
stepfather for over three years, and that she lived with him from August 2008
through September 2010, and from April 2011 through May 2011. D.H also indicated he had responsibility for
the day-to-day care of the minor during those dates. He stated, “I met [K.R.] the day she was born
I am the only father she has ever know[n].†In an attached letter, D.H. stated the
children had been living in his studio apartment for two months “prior to
[Mother’s] eviction and Jennifer Toler (Da[ly] City CPS) did come see and
approved of the children staying here before they moved in.†He also attached a September 13, 2011, letter
from the Agency stating “approval of your home for placement of the above named
children is [r]escinded, the denial or rescission of approval of your home is
based upon the following: [¶] (a)
The[] dwelling in which you currently reside (studio) would not provide
sufficient space for the three children, and their respective ages/sex.â€
The court set D.H.’s request for de
facto parent status for hearing on February 8, 2012, the date previously set for the six-month review hearing. At the
hearing, the court appointed counsel for D.H. and continued the issue of de
facto parent status until March 9. The hearing was apparently continued twice
more, until May 3. At the hearing, the court
ordered supervised visits between the minor and D.H, and again continued the issue
of de facto parent status until June 7.
Two supervised visits occurred in
May, which the social worker described as “appropriate.†The Agency indicated it was “opposed†to the
de facto parent request, but was in agreement with continuing visitation
because “the visits have been appropriate.â€
The Agency also observed the minor “does not appear to have a connection
with [D.H.] although she was raised by him for the first two [and a] half years
of her life.â€
In preparation for the June 7
hearing, D.H.’s attorney filed a trial brief seeking “presumed father†status. At the hearing, the court granted D.H.’s
request for de facto parent status, and continued the issue of presumed father
status until July 19.
D.H. had two more supervised
visitations with the minor in June, which the social worker again described as
“appropriate.†The social worker
indicated D.H. was “more aware of the child’s cues as when the child wants to
move on to another activity . . . . The child . . . appears to build rapport with
[D.H.] as she continues to have visitation.†The social worker also spoke with D.H., who
told her he lived with the minor for the first two and a half years of her
life, and cared for her while Mother worked. He stated the minor’s “well-being was his main
concern and that he did not want the mother’s children in foster care, as he is
willing to care for [them] and provide them with a stable home.†In addition, the social worker spoke with mother
about D.H., and she indicated she was “in agreement with [D.H.] being declared
the presumed father of the child . . . .
The mother stated that the child . . . recognizes the name [D.H.] as
being her dad.†The Agency agreed D.H.
should be granted de facto parent status (which had already been granted). It also stated, “it appears that [D.H.] is
also a potential presumed father for the child†and recommended the court
declare him “to be the alleged presumed father of [K.R.].â€
At the July 19 hearing, the court found
D.H. to be the minor’s presumed father. No
party objected. The minor’s counsel merely
observed D.H. was “aware that this matter has been pending for some time, and
he would like an opportunity to participate in services.†The court ordered the Agency to prepare a
reunification plan for D.H. and continued the matter until August 21.
In its August 20 report, the Agency stated
“In regards to [D.H.] the presume[d] father . . . [, the] Agency respectfully recommends
that the Matter be set for a continued hearing to address services for [D.H.]. The[re] has not been enough time to address
[D.H.’s] protective capacity especially around contact with the mother, to
address [D.H.’s] mental health state as he has indicated th[at] he was 5150’d
and that he was on psychotropic medications and to address any other services
that he may need t[o] assist with facilitating reunification.†The Agency recommended termination of services
to Mother, supervised visitation with D.H. and continuing the matter of services
for D.H. until September 11. In an
addendum report filed the following day, the Agency recommended the minor and
D.H. “participat[e] in, [and] successfully complete, a program of
counseling/psychiatric therapy as directed by the social worker, with specific
treatment to be based upon an assessment completed by an approved therapist,†and
that D.H. participate in a mental health evaluation.
At the August 21 hearing, the court terminated
services to Mother and ordered D.H. to participate in counseling/psychiatric
therapy as directed by the social worker, a parenting class, dyad therapy, and therapeutic
visitation. The court also ordered D.H.
to participate in a mental health evaluation, and authorized unsupervised
visitation with the minor “when deemed appropriate by the Dept.â€
Approximately one month later, D.H.
had his first unsupervised visit with the minor. After five minutes, D.H. called the foster
mother because K.R. was crying and he could not console her. D.H. had three more unsupervised visits with the
minor, with the foster mother in attendance. The minor, then four years old, told the
social worker she did not want to visit D.H.
D.H. also participated in five
“collateral†therapy sessions with the minor’s therapist between September 14, 2012 and November 6, 2012. When the social worker informed the therapist
the Agency was not recommending placement with D.H., the therapist stated “this
might change when Dyad Therapy occurs between the child and [D.H.].â€
Psychologist Robin Press conducted a
psychological evaluation of D.H. He tested
in the high average range of intelligence. In her report, Dr. Press concluded his
“character is fundamentally collaborative, altruistic and kind. He is prone to blame himself for problems
rather than to find fault with others.
His motives for caring for [K.R.] appear genuinely humane. . . . He has achieved a stable sobriety and has also
managed to achieve stability in his mood although he still struggles with
experiences of apathy, dysphoria, detachment, emotional deadness and a sense of
physical malfunction. . . . [D.H.]
tests as capable of functioning as a loving, responsible, stable parent to this
child at this time. He would be
considered a safer parent if he returned to AA meetings at this time and if he
agreed to seek treatment at any time in the future if his symptoms of depression
worsened.â€
In the Agency’s December 12 status
review report, the social worker indicated a dyad therapy session with D.H. and
K.R. occurred on November 16, 2012. The therapist reported the minor “ ‘did
not invite [D.H.] into her play until the very end of the session.’ †The therapist recommended a bonding study. The social worker told the therapist the court
had ordered that dyad therapy occur more than once a week, but the therapist
responded “this was [my] clinical decision.â€
The social worker also indicated that despite the court’s August 21
order, she had not referred D.H. to a parenting class and had not referred him
for therapeutic visitations.
The 18-month review hearing, as well
as D.H.’s placement request, was heard over eight days between December 21, 2012, and January 28, 2013. During this time period, the minor’s attorney,
on January 22, 2013, filed a section 388 “motion†to set aside D.H.’s presumed
father status “based upon new information obtained through testimony at trial.â€
On March 7, 2013,
the court denied the section 388 motion, ruling it did “not state new evidence
for a change of circumstances that is in the best interest of the child†and the
testimony at the review hearing was simply an “increased level of specificity .
. . not new information.†The court also
found the reunification services provided to D.H. “were reasonable in the
context of this case.†The court further
found the Agency had not met its burden of establishing, either by substantial
evidence or clear and convincing evidence, that returning the minor to D.H.’s
custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to her, and ordered a
“transitional return†over a 30-day period.
Presumed Father
Status
The minor and the Agency both contend the juvenile court abused its
discretion in denying the minor’s section 388 motion to vacate the order
finding D.H. to be the minor’s presumed father. The Agency, alone, further contends the court
should have invoked “its inherent power to set aside the order†under section
385.
“Under the dependency law scheme,
only mothers and presumed parents have legal status as ‘parents,’ entitled to
the rights afforded such persons in dependency proceedings, including standing,
the appointment of counsel and reunification services. [Citations.] In an appropriate case, a man or a woman who
is not a child’s biological parent may be deemed his or her ‘presumed parent.’ â€
(In
re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197, 211.) Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) provides
a man may be a child’s presumed father if he “receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural . . . child.†“Presumed fatherhood, for purposes of
dependency proceedings, denotes one who “promptly comes forward and
demonstrates a full commitment to his paternal responsibilities—emotional,
financial, and otherwise[.]†’ [Citation]†(In re
Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801–802.)
An order declaring an individual to be
the presumed father, like other orders in a dependency proceeding, may be
modified on a showing of change of circumstances or new evidence. Section 388 provides in part: “Any parent or other person having an interest
in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for
a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made.†(§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) However, the court may modify an order under
this section, “only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the proposed change is in the best interests of the child.†(
“ ‘[I]t is not enough for [the
petitioner] to show just a genuine
change of circumstances under the statute. The [petitioner] must show that the undoing of
the prior order would be in the best interests of the child. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . The
change of circumstances or new evidence ‘must be of such significant nature
that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior
order.’ [Citation.]†(In re
Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.)
We review a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388 motion for abuse of
discretion. (In re Mickel O., at p. 616.)
The change of circumstances alleged
by the minor here was that the testimony at the extended 18 month hearing showed
D.H. “had not received [K.R.] into his home within the meaning of Family Code
section 7611, subdivision (d).†She asserted
the “testimony revealed that [K.R.] had never lived with [D.H.] because the truth
was that [D.H.] lived with Mother and [K.R.]†She further asserted this “new†evidence
showed D.H. “was not responsible for [K.R.]’s day-to-day care even when he did
live with Mother: he was more like a live-in babysitter than a parent in that
he only took care of [K.R.] when Mother was at work or at appointments.â€
In support of her assertion that
D.H. cannot be the presumed father because he “lived with Mother and K.R.†in
the mother’s home, the minor relies on three cases. None is on point.
In In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, the mother’s boyfriend, who
was not the biological father, moved in with her three months before the minor was
born. (Id. at p. 545.) The
boyfriend helped the mother prepare the home for an infant, bought baby supplies,
and visited the minor in the hospital. (
custody directly from the hospital based on the mother’s lack of bonding,
termination of parental rights to a sibling, and an ongoing dependency
proceeding regarding another sibling. (
the presumed father, observing he had “ ‘received the child into his home
as far as he could under the circumstances of this particular case.’ †(Id.
at p. 548.) The Court of Appeal
reversed, stating “the juvenile court’s observation that [the boyfriend] had
done what he could to ‘develop’ a bond . . . suggest[s]that the court
considered only the possibility that [the boyfriend] would develop a parental relationship with the child, not that the
relationship already existed.†(Id.
at p. 555, italics added.) Here, in
contrast, D.H. had a parental relationship and lived with the minor for most of
the first three years of her life.
In In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, two men, the biological
father and de facto father, sought presumed father status. The court granted de facto status to R.B. and
allowed the minor to be placed with him, but held the biological father was the
presumed father. (Id. at p. 778.) The Court of
Appeal reversed, holding the de facto father had held himself out as the
minor’s father, and “[a]lthough the minor was not received into [the de facto
father’s] home to live with him on a full-time basis, he was involved with the
minor from the very beginning, with Mother’s blessing.†(Id. at
p. 784.) As for the biological father, there
was no evidence he held the child out as his own, or that the minor was
received into his home. (
the biological father’s lawyer) that the minor lived with the mother and
biological father in “somebody’s home for one to three months,†insufficient to
support presumed father status. (
contrast—D.H. consistently stated he resided with and cared for the minor for
most of the first three years of her life.
In In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, the court, indeed,
observed that the individual denied presumed father status “did not receive the
child into his home, but instead . .
. [the] mother permitted [him] to live in her
home.†(Id. at p. 1653.) However,
the fact the individual lived in the mother’s home, and not vice versa, was
presumed father status. Rather, it was because
of other aspects of his relationship with the mother and child. These included, for example, the fact the
mother paid all the expenses and supported the boyfriend using the money she
received from the aid to families with dependent children program, and that he stopped
residing with her when her income ceased.
This revealed the individual “acted out of personal convenience and
self-interest,†not a commitment to the child. He was also “equivocal in asserting his
parental relationship†and “specifically told the social worker he was
at pp. 1651, 1653.) Thus, the Court of Appeal
readily agreed there was no evidence of “either foundational element required
for presumed father status†and affirmed the order denying such. (Id. at
p. 1655.) As we have recounted, the
evidence here was distinctly different.
Moreover, in S.Y. v. S.B. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1023, the court concluded that where
the mother’s home serves as the family home, an individual seeking presumed
parent status can meet the “receiving into the home†requirement. In S.Y.,
the mother contended the individual seeking presumed parent status “ ‘failed
to satisfy the receiving requirement because she never brought the children
into her own house,’ †but instead lived with mother and the
children. (Id. at p. 1032.) The
court rejected this assertion, explaining “there is ample evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that [mother’s] home served as the family home, and
that S.Y. received the children into their joint home.†(Ibid.)
“ ‘This is not a case where [S.Y.]
just cared for the kids because it was convenient or because of self-interest. [S.Y.] made personal, professional and
financial sacrifices to care for the children.’ †(Id.
at p. 1033.)
Thus, whether D.H. initially moved
into the mother’s residence is beside the point. The evidence before the juvenile court showed
that in December 2009, he and mother got an apartment together and his name was
on the lease. The minor and her half brothers
lived with them, and D.H. took care of the minor, feeding her, changing
diapers, taking her to appointments, buying her toys and taking her on outings.
The minor’s counsel acknowledges all
this, but contends D.H. was “more like a live-in babysitter than a parent in
that he only took care of [K.R.] when Mother was at work or at appointments.†However, the record, even those pages to which
the minor cites, shows otherwise. In
response to the question “can you describe some of the things you did . . . to
care for [K.R.] while you were living with her?,†D.H. responded “Everything,
really. Sun up to sun down. Watch [K.R.] when [Mother] went to her
appointments. . . . [¶] [E]verything
around the house, waking her up, dressing her, brushing her hair, giving her
baths, . . . preparing the meal, feeding, cleaning the house, picking up, you
know, shows on TV, laying down with her and reading her books.†Then, in March 2011, the minor and her two half
brothers moved in with D.H. at his apartment in Redwood City
following Mother’s “open CPS case.†Prior
to the children moving in, a social worker visited his home and gave him “the
okay†for the children to live with him.
D.H. acted as the children’s primary caregiver without help from anyone else
while they lived with him. He also was
their sole financial support. The
children stopped living with D.H. in May 2011, after Mother came to get the
minor and the social worker told D.H. he “couldn’t keep her kids from her.â€
As the juvenile court found, the purportedly
new evidence—the testimony at the hearing—was simply an “increased level of
specificity . . . not new information.†Furthermore,
the additional specificity confirmed the juvenile court’s initial determination
of presumed father status was solidly grounded—there was ample evidence before
the court supporting its finding that D.H. had established both requirements of
presumed father status. Accordingly, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the minor failed to meet
her burden under section 388 of making a prima facie showing of “new evidenceâ€
to support a finding that “the best interests of the child . . . may be
promoted by the proposed change of order.†(§ 388, subd. (d).)
Minor’s
Placement with D.H.
The minor and the Agency also
contend the juvenile court erred in returning the minor to D.H.’s custody,
asserting the evidence showed placing her in his custody “would be detrimental
to her physical and emotional well-being†under section 366.22.
Section 366.22 sets forth the
standards for the 18-month review hearing.
It provides in part: “After
considering the admissible and relevant evidence, the court shall order the
return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal
guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child. The social worker shall have the
burden of establishing that detriment.†(§ 366.22,
subd. (a).) We review a juvenile court’s
findings under section 366.22 for substantial evidence. (Jennifer
A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1345.)
The minor claims her “bonding [with
D.H.] was interrupted,†and “[i]t is
highly unlikely†she has “any memory of ever having lived†with D.H. Specifically, she contends the interruption took
place between September 2009 and December 2009. However, D.H. testified he continued to have
contact with K.R. during that time “[t]wo or three times a week, maybe four,â€
and the minor, her siblings and mother “came for Thanksgiving.†In December 2009, D.H. moved back in with the
family, and the minor admits that after the three-month “interruption,†D.H.
saw her “nearly every day after school and on some weekends,†and she and her
half brothers moved in with him in March 2011.
The minor next contends placing her
with D.H. would be “detrimental to her physical and emotional well-being
[because D.H.] was not cooperative with [the Agency]: he had angry outbursts
directed at social workers, did not maintain consistent communication with [the
Agency], could not get along with foster parents, and expected everything to be
done around his schedule.†Even if these
allegations were true, none of them establish a substantial risk of detriment
to the minor’s physical or emotional well-being. “[I]t bears repeating that the government
cannot separate children from their parents based on a psychologist’s estimate
that a parent is[, among other human characteristics,] . . . ‘cynical,
passive-aggressive, rigid, [or] easily argumentative. . . .’ †(In re
Kimberley F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 533.) Moreover, the minor bases her accusations on the
social worker’s opinion in the December 2012 report that D.H. “was very
accusatory†and claimed she (the social worker) was a “ ‘liar,’ and [her]
intent was never to reunify him with [K.R.].†Given the Agency’s continued rebuffment of
D.H.’s ongoing attempts to obtain visitation and custody, beginning when the
minor and her half siblings were initially detained in July 2011, an angry
outburst at the social worker after a year and a half of frustration is hardly
surprising.
The minor and the Agency also contend
D.H.’s “history presented several protective risks.†They assert his alcoholism and depression,
which included a suicide attempt in 2009, demonstrate a substantial risk of
detriment because he does not go to A.A. meetings, “does not consistently
participate in any treatment and does not take any medication,†purportedly demonstrating
a “blatant denial of his alcohol and mental health problems.†However, the court ordered D.H. be evaluated
by a psychologist, who found otherwise.
The psychologist concluded, D.H. “has overcome considerable adversity in
childhood and adulthood. He has achieved
a stable sobriety and has also managed to achieve stability in his mood
although he still struggles with experiences of apathy, dysphoria, detachment,
emotional deadness and a sense of physical malfunction. . . . [D.H.] tests as capable of functioning as a
loving, responsible, stable parent to this child at this time. He would be considered a safer parent if he returned to AA meetings at this time and if he
agreed to seek treatment at any time in
the future if his symptoms of depression worsened.†(Italics added.) In addition, the court expressly found D.H.’s
testimony to be “credible†and that “he was very forthcoming about his
background, his struggles in life . . . .†It also observed D.H. “has achieved stable
sobriety, hence, no problem presently for alcohol for more than three years
based on the evidence that was presented to the Court.â€
Lastly, the minor and Agency contend
D.H.’s ongoing relationship with mother presents a substantial risk of
detriment. However, the evidence was
D.H. and mother were no longer in a romantic relationship. Again, the court found D.H. very open about
his relationship with Mother: “They are
friends and because he is a kind man, he tries to help her.†Nevertheless, when Mother engages in behavior
that endangers the children, “[h]e has called the police. . . . [H]e went to mother’s home and asked
undesirables to leave when he was concerned about the children.â€
In short, in challenging the
juvenile court’s section 366.22 custody determination, the minor and the Agency
are simply rearguing their view of the evidence. Our review, however, is confined to whether
substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s different take on the
case—as we have recited, there was ample evidence before the court to support
its custody ruling.
Reunification
Services
For his part, D.H. contends the juvenile
court erred in ruling the Agency provided reasonable reunification services.
Section 366.22, subdivision (a),
provides that in determining whether to return physical custody of the minor to
a parent, “the court shall . . . make appropriate findings pursuant to
subdivision (a) of Section 366.†(§
366.2, subd. (a).) Section 366,
subdivision (a), provides in part: “The
status of every dependent child shall be reviewed periodically as determined by
the court but no less frequently than once every six months . . . . The court shall consider the safety of the
child and shall determine all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The extent of the
agency’s compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts . . . to
return the child to a safe home . . . .†(§ 366, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Section 366.22, subdivision (a), further
provides: “The court shall determine
whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or
legal guardian.†(§ 366.22, subd.
(a).)
As a preliminary matter, the minor
and the Agency contend the “reasonable services†issue is “not justiciable†and
“moot†because the court was not required to make such a determination since it
placed the minor with the presumed father, D.H. Section 366.22 does not state that the
“reasonable services†determination is to be made only when a child is not returned
to his or her parents. Moreover, California
Rules of Court, rule 5.708(i) provides: “Regardless of whether or not the child is
returned home, the court . . . must determine all of the following: . . . (2) The extent of the agency’s
compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts . . . to return the child to a s safe home .
. . .†Accordingly, the juvenile court’s
determination that reasonable services had been provided was not a superfluous
finding. Nor is the issue moot. At any future section 366.26 hearing, the
court “shall not terminate parental rights if: [¶] (A) At each hearing at which the
court was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court has
found that reasonable efforts were not made or that reasonable services were
not offered or provided.†(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A).) We therefore consider D.H.’s challenge to the
court’s adequate services finding.
“ ‘Reunification services implement
“the law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all
possible.†[Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . [The
Department] must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ †’ to provide
reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family. [Citation.]
‘[T]he plan must be specifically tailored to fit the circumstances of
each family [citation], and must be designed to eliminate those conditions which
led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . The adequacy of [the Department’s] efforts to
provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the
particular case. [Citation.] ‘[T]he record should show that the supervising
agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services
designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the
service plan, and made reasonable
efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’
[Citation.]†(Earl L.
v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1501.)
“The standard is not whether the
services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but
whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.†(In re
Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
“[W]ith regard to the sufficiency of reunification services, our sole
task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial
evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services
were provided or offered.†(
36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)
D.H. maintains the services provided
to him were not reasonable because “no visitation was permitted between
[K.R.’s] removal on June 15, 2011 and May 4, 2012.†However, “ ‘ “ ‘[o]nly a “statutorily
presumed father†is entitled to reunification services under . . . section
361.5, subdivision (a) and custody of his child under . . . section
361.2.’ †’ [Citation.]†(In re
Cody B. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009.) Neither stepparents nor de facto parents are
entitled to “reunification services, custody, or visitation.†(Clifford
S. v. Superior Court (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 747, 752.) D.H. was not
found to be the presumed father until July 19, 2012. Accordingly, he was not entitled to services
prior to that time.
D.H. next contends reunification
services were inadequate because he had only two dyad sessions with the minor, no
“therapeutic†visitation, and no referral to a parenting class. However, D.H. had been having regular
visitation with K.R. since May 2012. He
began having unsupervised visitation in October 2012, and concedes he had six
visits that month, three visits in November, and five visits in December. He also participated in five “collateralâ€
therapy sessions with the minor’s therapist between September 14 and November
16. On November 9, the court
ordered “frequent therapeutic, dyad and unsupervised visits . . . , including
overnights.†While the therapeutic
visits never occurred, D.H. continued to have regular visitation. He also had two dyad sessions, on November 16
and December 3. The record also reflects
D.H. travelled to New York twice during that time, once in November and once in
December, and was gone for a total of approximately two weeks, making
scheduling of services more difficult. He
was also in a nursing assistant training program, and could only take parenting
classes in the evening. The social
worker, however, was not able to find an evening program.
All told, the juvenile court found
the reunification services were reasonable. While the services provided may not have
measured up exactly to what the court had ordered, the court was on solid
ground in concluding that, overall, reasonable services were provided.
The juvenile court’s order of March 7,
2013, is affirmed.
_________________________
Banke,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Margulies,
Acting P. J.
_________________________
Dondero, J.
references to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
on appeal only the record before the juvenile court at the time of the order
from which the parties have appealed, namely the record before the court as of
March 7, 2013. We therefore deny D.H.’s
request for judicial notice (made on September 25, 2013) of orders and
proceedings occurring after March 7.
