In re K.L.
Filed 4/22/13 In re K.L. CA2/8
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
EIGHT
>
In re K.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B240694 |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.L., Defendant and Appellant. | (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ19437) |
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Tamara Hall, Judge.
Reversed.
Mary
Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steve D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Minor K.L. appeals from the court’s judgment sustaining
the allegation that he committed residential
burglary of Graciela Tinoco’s home.
Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the allegation, we
reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
For three
or four days in late January 2012, then 14-year-old appellant K.L. was the
invited house guest of Graciela Tinoco “living†with Tinoco and her 15-year-old
son, Everardo. Around 9:00 or 10:00
a.m. on January 27, 2012,
Tinoco returned home after dropping off her daughters at school. K.L., who had slept the previous night in
Everardo’s bedroom, had not yet left for school. Tinoco was surprised to find K.L. still at
home. She testified, “I found him inside
the house, but since he’d spend the night there, I asked him, [K.L.] what are
you doing here. Why aren’t you in
school. [¶] He didn’t answer. He just closed the door. He locked – he locked it, and I said, well
who is there then. He said ‘It’s [K.L.],
I’m changing.’ †A few moments
later, K.L. emerged from the bedroom and left the house. Tinoco looked inside the bedroom and saw that
dresser drawers containing clothes were open.
Because K.L. had been wearing the same clothes for “many days,†Tinoco
assumed he had been looking for socks.
was otherwise amiss or missing. Tinoco
testified, “Q. When you said that you
saw him in the bedroom one day and he was – said, hold on, I’m changing. [¶]
There was nothing stolen that day, was there? [¶]
A. No. [¶]
Q. Nothing unusual occurred that
day? [¶]
A. No.â€
Five days
later on February 1, Tinoco’s house and a neighboring house sitting in the
front of the lot on which Tinoco’s house sat were burglarized. In investigating the burglaries, a sheriff’s
detective interviewed Tinoco, who had seen the suspected burglars. The detective and Tinoco discussed her
discovering K.L. five days earlier at home when she expected him to be at
school. Tinoco testified, “Q. You talked to the police about when you saw
him there that day; right? [¶] A.
Yes. [¶] Q. Now, is that because they asked
about it? [¶] A. We
talked about the theft that same day from the front house. [¶]
Q. So the officers were asking
you about the theft from the front house?
[¶] A. Yes.
[¶] Q. Okay.
So is that the reason you mentioned that you saw him in your house on
the 27th? [¶] A.
Yes. [¶] Q. But
other than that, there was nothing unusual about him being in your son’s room
changing clothes? [¶] A.
No.â€
The People
filed an amended petition alleging K.L. committed residential burglary the
morning Tinoco discovered him in the bedroom.
allegation and placed K.L. home on probation.
This appeal followed.
In an “appeal challenging the sufficiency
sustaining the criminal allegations
of a petition made under the provisions of section 602 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code, we must apply the same
standard of review applicable to
any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence
to support a judgment of conviction on
appeal. Under this standard, the critical
inquiry is ‘whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]
An appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence – that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
– such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] [¶]
our perspective must favor the judgment.
[Citations.] ‘This court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trial court’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely
because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary
finding. [Citations.]’ †(In re
Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371-1373; see In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994-995 [same].)
Appellant
contends the People’s evidence against him was insufficient to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had committed burglary the morning Tinoco discovered
him in her son’s bedroom where he had slept the night before. “The crime of burglary consists of an act –
unlawful entry – accompanied by the ‘intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony.’ †(
1041.) Appellant emphasizes the absence
of evidence that he entered Tinoco’s house or her son’s bedroom with a
felonious intent. He was an invited
houseguest, and had permission to sleep in the very bedroom where Tinoco found
him. (Cf. People v. Sparks (2002) 28 Cal.4th 71, 73 [one invited into house
nevertheless commits burglary if he enters a separate room within the house
with felonious intent]; In re M.A.
(2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 317, 321 [same].)
appellant emerged from it, she found nothing missing or anything unusual other
than open drawers, which she assumed appellant had rummaged through looking for
clean socks because he had been wearing the same clothing for “many days.â€
The
prosecutor’s theory at trial emphasized that appellant was supposed to be at
school when Tinoco found him inside her son’s bedroom, and that her arrival
home after dropping off her daughters at school interrupted his plan to
steal. The prosecutor’s closing argument
to the court summarized the People’s case as follows: “He was seen inside the dwelling and based on
the fact that he is there in the home at a time he is not supposed to be there,
he is not usually there. Ms. [Tinoco]
described to the court what the general schedule was for him spending the night
there. He would leave in the morning, go
to school, and come home in the evening.
It was very odd for him to be there that day. She was surprised for him to be there. He was startled when she came in, and she
notices her son’s drawer ransacked after.
So far he is in a home at a time when he is not supposed to be there,
caught by surprise, and also given the fact that this house in front is
burglarized for loss of property, I think, clearly, circumstantially, the
intent is shown why he was inside the house on the 27th. That is he was caught before he took
anything.â€
The trial
court did not discuss on the record its view of the evidence or explain its
reasons for finding the burglary allegation true beyond a reasonable
doubt. Viewing the evidence against
appellant in the light most favorable to the prosecution’s allegations, and
indulging every reasonable inference that supports the trial court’s judgment,
we nevertheless find insufficient evidence to support the judgment. Appellant had Tinoco’s permission to sleep in
her son’s bedroom. She testified, “Q. So you let [K.L.] live with you for about a
week sometime in the end of January. [¶] A. Yes. [¶]
Q. He had permission to sleep at
your house; right? [¶] A. On
my behalf, yes. . . . [¶] Q.
But it was okay with you for him to stay at your house; right? [¶]
A. Yes. [¶] Q. It
was okay with you for him to sleep over; right.
[¶] A. Yes. [¶]
Q. And he would sleep over and in the morning you would take
your daughters to school and him and your son Everardo would still be in the
house; right? [¶] A.
Yes, they stayed there. [¶] Q. And
you trusted [K.L.] to stay in your house; right? [¶]
A. Yes.†The prosecution offered
no evidence that appellant left the bedroom (or the house) after waking up that
morning and then reentered the bedroom, with or without a felonious intent,
while Tinoco was delivering her daughters to school. The prosecution offered no evidence that
appellant committed, or intended to commit, any theft or other felony while in
the bedroom, other than the speculation that Tinoco’s return to the house
interrupted appellant’s plan to steal something. To the contrary, Tinoco herself offered the
entirely reasonable – and unrebutted – explanation that appellant had opened
dresser drawers looking for clean socks.
It is true that appellant was supposed to be at school and not at home
when Tinoco returned to her house, and in that sense his presence in the
bedroom was without her permission, perhaps a technical trespass. But it is speculation that a teenage boy who
may have overslept, lingered too long, or even perhaps hoped to play hooky,
entered with a felonious intent a bedroom in which he had been invited to
sleep. The court erred in sustaining the
burglary allegation.
The
judgment is reversed for insufficiency of evidence and the trial court is directed
to dismiss the burglary allegation with prejudice. (In re
Anthony C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1509; In re Marco A. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1522.) Because we are reversing the judgment
outright, we need not address appellant’s other contentions on appeal.
RUBIN,
Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FLIER,
J.
GRIMES,
J.
detective’s later report stated the drawers had been “ransacked,†a description
Tinoco did not adopt at trial; she instead testified the clothes had been
“moved around.â€
petition alleged two other counts of residential burglary against K.L.
involving the February 1 burglaries of the front house and of Tinoco’s house,
but the court dismissed one count for insufficient evidence and found the other
count untrue.
