In re Kendrick C.


Filed 1/6/11 In re Kendrick C. CA2/5



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re KENDRICK C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B225085 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK15125)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DONNA C., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Anthony Trendacosta, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Anna L. Ollinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Judith A. Luby, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________

Donna C. appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her twin sons, Kendrick and K. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)^[1] Appellant's contention on appeal is that there was no substantial evidence for the finding that the children were adoptable. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154 [substantial evidence standard of review].) Finding such evidence, we affirm.
These are the relevant facts:
When these children were born, in January 2008, Mother had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. Her four older children had been dependents of the court, and three of them had been adopted. Kendrick and K. were premature babies, and had medical problems. A section 300 petition was filed on January 24, 2008, and was sustained on May 30, 2008, on allegations concerning Mother's history of drug and alcohol abuse. No reunification services were ordered. (§ 361.5, subd. (b).)
When the twins were released from the hospital, they were placed in a medical foster home. They remained in foster care throughout the dependency. Parental rights were terminated on April 29, 2010.
The children continued to have medical problems, but they did well in foster care, and exhibited no behavior problems. They received care from, inter alia, a physical therapist named Laura S. By March 2009, DCFS was reporting that Laura S. and her husband Tom S. had expressed an interest in adopting them.
A home study was initiated. The record reflects that the home study was completed before termination of parental rights, but also includes information to the contrary, that the home study was not completed.
By July 2009, DCFS was reporting that both Laura and Tom were visiting the children. By September, both had completed training on the care of medically fragile children. The twins soon began to have overnight and weekend visits with the S. family, with no problems. In early December, the children were placed with Laura and Tom S., and by February, DCFS was reporting that the children were bonded to them, and were thriving.
The twins still had medical problems and needed treatments with a breathing machine four times a day, and other special care. The Regional Center assessed them as developmentally delayed, and eligible for speech and occupational therapy, and the S.'s ensured that they got those services. By April, in placement with the S.'s, the twins were making "great strides" in speaking and in meeting developmental milestones.
Throughout, DCFS reported that Laura and Tom S. were fully informed of the children's problems and needs, and were committed to adopting them.
This record thus contains substantial evidence for the trial court's finding that the children were adoptable. "The issue of adoptability posed in a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor's age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor." (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) "[T]he fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor's age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650, italics omitted; In re Lukas B. supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.) "It is not necessary that the child already be placed in a preadoptive home, or that a proposed adoptive parent be waiting. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)" (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.)
Here, although the children had medical problems, a couple who knew and understood those problems had expressed unwavering commitment to adoption. The S.'s had been trained to care for these children, and on visits and in the placement, had proved that they could do so. The children knew the S.'s and did well in their care. That is substantial evidence for the juvenile court's finding.
Mother makes a variety of arguments to the contrary. She points out that no other families were being considered, and that the reports lack specific information about the children's medical status, in particular any evaluation from the Regional Center, although the children were receiving Regional Center services. This is essentially an argument that there could have been more evidence. Perhaps, but that is of no moment. There was enough.
Mother also argues that no home study had been completed for the S.'s, and that the children had not lived with the S.'s for the requisite six months, and argues that the placement with the S.'s was unstable, in that, having had no children in the 29 years of their marriage, the introduction of two medically needy children into the S. home would be too difficult. This is speculation, and does not establish a lack of substantial evidence.

Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



ARMSTRONG, J.


We concur:



TURNER, P. J.



KRIEGLER, J.


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