In re K.D.
Filed 7/26/12 In re K.D. CA1/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
In re K.D.,
a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A133765
(Contra
Costa County
Super. Ct.
No. J11-00042)
The
juvenile court sustained a petition alleging K.D. committed two counts of
misdemeanor resisting arrest in
violation of Penal Code Section 69. She
was placed on probation. She appeals
from the dispositional order of the juvenile court that imposed a probation
condition requiring her to submit to warrantless
given the circumstances of her offense.
We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
On December 15, 2010, K.D. was involved
in a fight at school. While she was
being escorted to the administration building by a police officer, K.D. looked
toward a group of students standing nearby who had been involved in the fight
and gestured as though she wanted to continue the fight. The officer ordered K.D. to look forward and
walk straight ahead, but K.D. again turned toward the students and continued
gesturing. The officer grabbed K.D. by the neck and arm. K.D. resisted and turned toward the officer,
at which point the officer tried to force her to the ground. K.D. resisted by pushing up with her
head. A second officer arrived on the
scene to assist and K.D. was taken to the ground and arrested. K.D. was charged with two misdemeanor counts
of resisting arrest in violation of Penal Code section 69. The charges were sustained on September 29, 2011. The court placed her on probation for one
year, citing its concerns not with gangs or drugs but that K.D. finish school. As a condition of probation, K.D. must submit
her “person, property, any vehicle under [her] control, and residence to search
and seizure by any peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or
without a warrant.” K.D. did not object
to this condition when it was imposed by the juvenile court. K.D. reported to her probation officer that
she experimented with alcohol, and prior to her arrest smoked marijuana almost
every day, but claimed to have quit. Her
probation officer remained concerned about her admitted use of marijuana and
did not believe that she quit using it.
K.D.
argues that the probation condition requiring her to submit to warrantless
searches and seizure is unreasonable given the circumstances of her offense,
citing People v. Lent (1975) 15
Cal.3d 481, 486. The parties dispute
whether K.D. preserved this issue for appeal because she did not object to the
condition in the juvenile court. Because
we will affirm the juvenile court’s decision on the merits, we need not determine
whether this issue has been forfeited.
An
appellate court will not modify a juvenile court’s probation decisions absent
an abuse of discretion. (
246.) The juvenile court may “impose and
require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and
rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) “A condition of probation will not be held
invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality . . . .’ ”
(People v. Lent, supra, 15
Cal. 3d. at p. 486.) Even if a
condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted, it is still valid if it relates to conduct which is criminal or
requires or forbids conduct that is reasonably related to future
criminality. (See People v. Olguin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379–380.)
Although
the warrantless search and seizure condition is not related to K.D.’s
conviction for resisting arrest, it is valid because it relates to other
criminal conduct and aims to prevent her future criminality. Possession of marijuana (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11357) and possession of alcohol by a minor (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 25662, subd. (a)) are criminal offenses. Because K.D. admitted to possessing and using
these substances in the past and because her probation officer believes that
she has not quit using marijuana, the search condition is reasonably related to
preventing and deterring K.D. from criminally possessing these substances. K.D.’s argument that the search condition is
an abuse of discretion because the trial judge stated that she did not “have a
concern about . . . drugs” is without merit. The juvenile court could have found K.D.’s
use of drugs and alcohol troubling enough to impose the warrantless
was not the trial court’s chief concern.
K.D.
attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from those in
imposition of a warrantless search and seizure condition. (In re
Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194.)
The attempted distinction is unpersuasive. In Binh
L., a warrantless search and seizure condition was reasonable because the
minor had admitted to automobile theft, “an activity that rationally connotes
possession of tools to enter and operate locked automobiles, possession of
small articles taken from such automobiles, and other forms of larcenous
behavior.” (Id. at p. 204.)
Similarly, K.D. has admitted to using marijuana and alcohol. Although these are not the offenses for which
she was placed on probation, it is certainly reasonable for the juvenile court
to want to prevent her from repeating these criminal
activities. Admitting use of
marijuana and alcohol “rationally connotes” possession of the substances.
We
reject K.D.’s contention that her use of marijuana and alcohol does not justify
the search condition. In choosing
probation conditions, it is appropriate for the court to consider not only the
circumstances of the crime at issue but also the minor’s entire social
history. (See In re Todd L. (1998) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 14.) Probation conditions may address other
incidents of criminality besides the one that is before the juvenile
court. In In re Kacy S. a condition requiring minors “ ‘submit to urine
testing to determine the presence of alcohol and illegal drugs in [their]
system[s]’ ” (In re. Kacy S. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 704, 707) withstood a Lent
challenge although the minors were only guilty of fighting in a public
place and there was “no previous involvement with alcohol and drugs” in their
social histories. (Id. at p. 711.)
We
also reject K.D.’s contention that her rehabilitation goals are “clearly met”
by the court’s other probation conditions, “specifically that K.D. not use or
possess illegal drugs or alcohol; submit to drug and alcohol testing, and
report all police contact within twenty-four hours.” Under an abuse of discretion standard, we
strongly defer to the judgment of the trial court in deciding which conditions
clearly meet the reformative and rehabilitative goals of the
The
judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
_________________________
Siggins,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
McGuiness, P.J.
_________________________
Pollak, J.
