In re Juan D.
Filed 1/11/13 In re Juan D.
CA1/5
Opinion on remand from the Supreme Court
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
In
re JUAN D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
JUAN D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A130776
(
No. SCUKJDSQ 10-1596001-002)
The juvenile court committed the
minor Juan D. (appellant), born in May 1994, to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ).
dismissed appellant’s most recent juvenile
delinquency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602),
commitment (§ 733, subd. (c)) (section 733(c)) and reached back to an
earlier petition that alleged a DJJ‑eligible offense (§ 707, subd.
(b)). On appeal, we reversed the order
of commitment, concluding the court lacked authority under section 782 to
dismiss appellant’s most recent petition in order to commit him to DJJ.
The Supreme Court granted review,
and it recently transferred the matter back to this court for reconsideration
in light of In re Greg F. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 393 (Greg F.). Greg F.
held dismissal of a petition for the purpose of allowing a DJJ commitment on a
minor’s previously-sustained section 602 petition is appropriate under section
782 so long as the juvenile court finds that the dismissal is required by the
interests of justice and the welfare of the minor. (Id.
at p. 420.) Following
orders.
BACKGROUND
In May 2010, appellant admitted two
counts of a four count juvenile delinquency petition (§ 602), filed in
April 2010 and amended in May 2010. The
remaining counts were dismissed.
Appellant admitted committing felony mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and
felony assault with a deadly weapon (id.,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) with infliction of great bodily injury (
of the relevant police report, the charges were based on an incident in which
appellant allegedly beat the victim with a baseball bat and carved the victim’s
back with a piece of metal.
In July 2010, after the probation
department recommended appellant be committed to DJJ, the juvenile court
granted the defense request to have appellant evaluated by a psychologist. In August 2010, the
that appellant be placed at the Northern California Regional Center (CRC) in
Humboldt, instead of DJJ. On August 31,
the juvenile court indicated its intent to place appellant at CRC if the
facility found appellant suitable for that program.
On September 22, 2010, a second
petition was filed, alleging that appellant assaulted a fellow juvenile hall
detainee by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). On October
14, the petition was amended to reduce the allegation to misdemeanor battery (
that allegation.
In November 2010, appellant was
evaluated by another psychologist, who recommended either a 90-day DJJ
diagnostic evaluation or a straight commitment to DJJ. On November 30, at a combined dispositional
hearing on the two petitions, the juvenile court declared appellant a ward of
the court, committed him to DJJ, and found the maximum term of confinement was
12 years.
In December 2010, the probation
officer recommended dismissal of the second petition and the juvenile court did
so on December 15. The court also
affirmed the DJJ commitment on the first petition.
On appeal, we reversed the order of
commitment, concluding the court lacked authority to dismiss the second
petition in order to commit appellant to DJJ.
The Supreme Court granted review and, on August 27, 2012, the court
decided Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th 393. On
December 19, 2012, the high court transferred the matter back to this court for
reconsideration in light of Greg F. Neither party filed a supplemental brief in
this court following the transfer.
DISCUSSION
A juvenile court’s authority to
commit a minor to DJJ is a matter of statutory
law. Pursuant to section 733(c),
“[a] ward of the juvenile court who meets any condition described below shall
not be committed to the [DJJ]:
[¶] . . . [¶] (c) The
ward has been or is adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Section 602, and
the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be
true by the court is not described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the
offense is a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the
Penal Code.â€
The offense alleged in the second
petition and admitted by appellant, misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code,
§ 242), is not an offense “described in subdivision (b) of Section 707†or
a sex offense set forth in Penal Code section 290.008. Thus, pursuant to section 733(c), it could
not provide a legal basis for committing appellant to DJJ.
Pursuant to section 782 and
the juvenile court dismissed the second petition, so that under section 733(c)
“the most recent offense[s] alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be
true by the court†would be the felony mayhem and assault offenses, which are
offenses “described in subdivision (b) of Section 707†that could support
appellant’s DJJ commitment. In
dismissing the second petition, the court stated it was doing so “in the
interest of justice.â€
Section 782 provides in relevant
part: “A judge of the juvenile court in
which a petition was filed, at any time before the minor reaches the age of 21
years, may dismiss the petition or may set aside the findings and dismiss the
petition if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of
the minor require such dismissal, or if it finds that the minor is not in need
of treatment or rehabilitation.â€
In Greg F., the Supreme Court examined the interaction between
sections 733(c) and 782. (
The court held “that section 733(c) does not deprive the juvenile court
of its discretion to dismiss a [section] 602 petition and commit a ward to
[DJJ] when, in compliance with section 782, such a dismissal is in the
interests of justice and for the benefit of the minor.†(Greg
F., at p. 402.) The high court
reasoned, “Sections 733(c) and 782 can
be harmonized. Section 733(c) prohibits
a commitment to [DJJ] unless the minor’s most recent offense alleged in a
petition is of a particular class. If
the juvenile court exercises its discretion under section 782 to dismiss a
[section] 602 petition, its decision does not nullify or abrogate section
733(c). It simply changes the ‘most
recent offense alleged in any petition’ to which section 733(c) applies
F., at p. 408.)
Appellant, having failed to file a
supplement brief, does not argue that Greg
F. is inapplicable in the present case, or that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in dismissing the second petition under section 782. (Greg
F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p.
413.) We will affirm the juvenile
court’s orders.
DISPOSITION
The
juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
SIMONS,
J.
We concur.
JONES, P.J.
NEEDHAM, J.
formerly known as the Department of the Youth Authority (or California Youth
Authority) became known as the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF).
The DJF is part of the DJJ.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1710, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 6001;
Gov. Code, §§ 12838, subd. (a), 12838.3, 12838.5, 12838.13.) Statutes that formerly referred to the
Department of the Youth Authority, such as Welfare and Institutions Code
section 733, now refer to the DJF. The
juvenile court and the parties on appeal, however, refer to the authority to
which appellant was committed as the DJJ.
We will do likewise.
the Welfare and Institutions Code.
