In re Jonathan C.






Filed 12/16/10 In re Jonathan C. CA2/4





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re JONATHAN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B220355
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN C., Defendant and Appellant.	(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ42733)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Morton Rochman, Judge. Affirmed.
Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jonathan C. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following the juvenile court’s finding that he committed the offense of vandalism, in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that he had the capacity to form criminal intent pursuant to Penal Code section 26. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Ernest Ponce owned a home in Los Angeles County that was vacant in March 2008 while it was for sale. Ponce discovered that the house was vandalized sometime in March 2008. Windows were broken, gallons of paint were tossed around the house, and there was graffiti drawn with markers and paint on the floor and walls. Ponce had recently replaced the carpet and painted the house because it had been vandalized three or four months prior to this incident. Ponce reported the incident to the police and took pictures of the damage, which he emailed to Los Angeles Police Department Officer Airam Potter.
Appellant, who was ten years old at the time, spoke with Officer Potter at the police station regarding a different incident. Appellant’s mother stated that appellant was “out of control” and that she “could not control him.” Appellant told Officer Potter that he was “hanging out at abandoned houses” with his friends and that they had once tried to light a bonfire inside an abandoned house, and the fire department had come. Appellant told Officer Potter the locations of two vacant homes he had been in.
After Officer Potter realized that appellant had been at Ponce’s home, he asked appellant to return to the police station a second time, placed him under arrest, and Mirandized him. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) Appellant agreed to speak with Officer Potter. Appellant stated that he went to Ponce’s home with some boys, and the other boys took Sharpies into the house and told appellant to write on the walls. Appellant told Officer Potter that “he did not do everything. . . . He was with another subject and they began to do the—the other subject began to do the graffiti. And the other subject said, you know, do the graffiti with me. And [appellant] said that he did not know how to do the graffiti.” After the other boys showed appellant what to do, he started to do it as well.
Officer Potter showed appellant the pictures of the damage to Ponce’s home and asked appellant to circle the things that appellant did. Appellant circled and initialed the pictures of the graffiti that he drew.
Because of appellant’s age, Officer Potter prepared a Gladys R. questionnaire and wrote down appellant’s responses to the questions. (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855.) Question No. 2 asked, “Do you know the difference between doing what’s right and doing what’s wrong,” and appellant replied, “Yes.” In response to the question, “Give me an example of something right to do,” appellant replied, “Do your homework.” As an example of something that is wrong to do, appellant replied, “Vandalize the school.” Officer Potter asked appellant, “What happens to you when you do something wrong,” and appellant replied, “You get consequences.” Question No. 6 asked, “Do you know it is wrong to vandalize or burn stuff inside [a] house,” and appellant replied, “Yes.” Question No. 7 asked, “Did you know it was wrong to vandalize before 3/15/08‌” Appellant replied, “No. My friend told me to tag and I didn’t know how to do it but then I did it.”
A petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant committed the crime of vandalism, in violation of Penal Code section 594. Following the close of the People’s evidence at the adjudication hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the evidence to establish that appellant understood the wrongfulness of the activity at the time. The court denied the motion, stating, “Reviewing the evidence in its totality, especially the conversation with the officer with [appellant] as to the Gladys R. issue, overall the court is satisfied that he did know the wrongfulness of the activity at the time.”
The court found true the allegation that appellant committed the offense of vandalism, a misdemeanor, and sustained the petition. The court declared appellant a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, placed appellant home on probation, and imposed probation conditions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of Penal Code section 26 that a child under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime.[1] “Penal Code section 26, which applies to proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, articulates a presumption that a minor under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. To defeat this presumption, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the minor committed the charged act he or she knew of its wrongfulness. [Citations.] ‘Only if the age, experience, knowledge, and conduct of the child demonstrate by clear proof that he has violated a criminal law should he be declared a ward of the court under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602.’ [Citation.]
“On appeal, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the trial court’s findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if they are supported by ‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.] This standard of review applies with equal force to claims that the evidence does not support the determination that a minor understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. [Citation.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.)
As an initial matter, we reject appellant’s argument that it is not clear that the juvenile court applied the correct standard of proof, citing the court’s statement that it was satisfied that the evidence established that appellant understood the wrongfulness of his activity. There is no requirement that the juvenile court make an express finding regarding this issue, let alone express which standard of proof it is relying upon. (See In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298 [“On appeal from the true findings, we must affirm an implied finding that the juvenile understood the wrongfulness of his conduct if the implied finding is supported by substantial evidence. [Fn. omitted.] [Citations.]”].)
We further conclude that appellant’s answers to Officer Potter’s questions indicate that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time. Appellant told Officer Potter that he knew the difference between right and wrong and even cited vandalism of a school as an example of something wrong to do. Appellant also stated that he knew it was wrong to vandalize or set a fire inside a house. Appellant points to the fact that he answered “no” to the question, “Did you know it was wrong to vandalize before 3/15/08‌” The record indicates, however, that appellant misunderstood Officer Potter’s question because he went on to reply, “My friend told me to tag and I didn’t know how to do it but then I did it.” This answer indicates that appellant’s “no” answer meant that he did not know how to do graffiti before the date of the offense, not that he did not know it was wrong to do graffiti before that date.
“In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence such as the minor’s age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense, including its method of commission and concealment. [Citation.]” (In re James B., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 872.) In addition to appellant’s answers to Officer Potter, the record contains circumstantial evidence of appellant’s understanding of the wrongfulness of the conduct. For example, appellant had experience with the same type of wrongful conduct because he admitted that he and his friends previously had tried to set a fire in a vacant house, requiring the fire department to come.
The juvenile court’s finding that appellant understood the wrongfulness of his conduct is supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



WILLHITE, J.
We concur:



EPSTEIN, P. J.



MANELLA, J.

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