In re Joey H.
Filed 2/15/13 In re Joey H. CA4/1
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re JOEY H. et al., Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO
COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MICHELLE R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062210
(Super. Ct.
No. EJ003123A,B)
APPEAL from
orders of the Superior Court
of
County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge.
Affirmed.
Michelle R.
appeals juvenile court orders suspending her right to make educational
decisions on behalf of her minor daughters, Joey H. and Kylie H. (together, the
minors) after the court declared the minors dependents and removed them from
Michelle's custody. Michelle contends
that she was willing and able to make decisions for the minors' education, and
that her guidance would be in the minors' best interests. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Michelle
has a history of substance abuse and felony convictions. Her history with child protective services
dates to 1998 and includes 14 prior referrals.
In 2009, the minors were taken into protective custody based on
allegations of general neglect and drug use by the parents. Michelle successfully participated in family
terminated jurisdiction in April 2011.
Less than a year later, four-year-old Joey and three-year-old Kylie were
again removed from their home when Michelle was found to be under the influence
of a controlled substance. Michelle
admitted that she had recently used methamphetamine, marijuana and
alcohol. The home contained numerous
dangerous items that were accessible to the minors, including methamphetamine,
pipes, pills, razors, a butane torch and a large knife. The minors tested presumptively positive for
drugs. Michelle admitted that she has
some mental health issues.
The
Agency (Agency) filed petitions in the juvenile court under Welfare and
Institutions Code
title="">[1]
section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that the minors were at substantial risk
of harm because their home was unsafe and Michelle had a history of substance
abuse. The court detained the minors in out-of-home care.
Michelle
was not present at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, even though she
had received notice and was ordered to return for that hearing. After considering the evidence and arguments
of counsel, the court sustained the allegations of the petitions, declared the
minors dependents, removed them from parental custody, placed them with a
non-relative extended family member and ordered the parents to participate in
reunification services. Noting that the
parents were not present, the court suspended their rights to make educational
decisions for the minors. However, the
court stated that it would be willing to restore those rights if the parents
came forward and began participating in reunification
services.
DISCUSSION
A
Parents
have a constitutionally protected right
to control their children's education. (
57, 65; In re R.W. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276.) However, when a
child has been declared a dependent under section 300, the court may limit that
control. (§ 361; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.650(a).) The court has
broad discretion to make reasonable orders for the care and support of a child,
but any limitations on a parent's control over educational decisions under
section 361 must not exceed "those necessary to protect the
child." (§ 361;
Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087, fn. 12.)
"If
the court specifically limits the right of the
parent . . . to make educational . . . decisions
for the child . . . the court shall at the same time
appoint a responsible adult to make
educational . . . decisions . . . ."
(§ 361, subd. (a).) However,
section 361, subdivision (a) does not condition the court's ability to appoint
an educational representative on the parent's inability or unwillingness to
make educational decisions. Instead, a
parent's inability and unwillingness to make educational decisions are factors
that are relevant to a determination of whether a limitation is "necessary
to protect the child." (§ 361,
subd. (a).) Indeed, "[a]ll
educational decisions must be based on the best interests of the child." (In re Samuel G. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 502, 510.)
We review
the court's order limiting a parent's educational rights for abuse of
discretion. (
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.)
A proper exercise of discretion is "'neither arbitrary nor
capricious, but is an impartial discretion, guided and controlled by fixed
legal principles, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law, and
in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial
justice.' [Citation.]" (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) Exercises
of discretion must be "'grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal
principles and legal policies appropriate to the particular matter at
issue.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) Thus, although the abuse of discretion
standard is deferential, "it is not empty." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 162.) The standard "asks in
substance whether the ruling in question 'falls outside the bounds of reason'
under the applicable law and the relevant facts. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
B
The
evidence showed that Michelle was unable to protect the minors or make any
healthy decisions on their behalf.
Despite frequent and ongoing interventions by Agency and law
enforcement, Michelle continued to place the minors at risk by exposing them to
her substance abuse. Following her most
recent relapse, she had not enrolled in drug treatment or any other
services. Michelle admittedly was
unstable, had mental health issues, and admitted that she needed help for her
substance abuse problem. She told the
social worker that she was not the best mom for the minors all the time, and
said that she had considered relinquishing them for adoption because she had
made "some stupid choices" and her "thinking is
crazy." She also said that she
suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, and either
personality disorder. Michelle later
claimed that she never had a substance abuse problem that warranted removing
the minors from her home, and maintained that she is the best person to care for
the minors. Under these circumstances,
the court could reasonably find that Michelle was unable to make educational
decisions in the minors' best interests and thus, that an order suspending her
education rights was necessary to protect the minors.
Significantly,
Michelle failed to appear in court for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing
and her whereabouts at that time were unknown.
The court could not know if or when Michelle would be available in the
event that educational decisions needed to be made for the minors. Under these circumstances, the court did not
abuse its discretion by suspending Michelle's education rights until she came
forward and started to participate in reunification
services.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
