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In re J.G.

In re J.G.
11:26:2013





In re J




 

In re J.G.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 7/29/13  In re J.G. CA2/5













>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS



 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
FIVE

 

 
>










In re J.G., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.


      B244684

      (Los Angeles
County

      Super. Ct.
No. CK93807)

 


 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

 

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

 

            v.

 

D.G.,

 

            Defendant and Appellant.

 


 


 

            APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los
Angeles
, Zeke Zeidler, Judge. 
Affirmed.

            Linda Rehm,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

            Office of
the County Counsel, John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant
County Counsel, David Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

            D.G.
(mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings in connection with the
jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding her minor children,
seven-year-old J.G. and one-year-old R.R., whom the juvenile court held to be
dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]  Mother contends that there is not href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">substantial evidence to support the
juvenile court’s findings.  We affirm.

 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            On June 6, 2012, plaintiff
and respondent
Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) filed a detention
report stating that on June 1, 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (Sheriff’s Department), and
Pasadena Police Department executed a search and arrest warrant at the home of
mother and M.R. (R-father), mother’s boyfriend and biological father of
R.R.  Mother and R-father were the
“targets” of the warrant.  Law
enforcement contacted the Department and requested that an independent
investigation be conducted into allegations of felony child endangerment.

            The June 6, 2012, detention report stated that a Children’s
Social Worker (CSW) arrived at the family home and spoke with the investigating
officer, Pasadena Police Department Detective Duran, who stated that both
mother and R-father were suspects “involved in major narcotic sales” and have
been indicted by the federal government. 
Detective Duran stated that mother and R-father were arrested, and
during the search of the home, gun ammunition and a gun case were found.  Detective Duran stated that “mother reported
not knowing where the gun was located and reported that the gun should be
inside the case.”  The Department
reported that, “According to Det. Duran, the gun was recovered, but he reported
that the details of the case will soon be revealed.  However, at the current time only limited
information could be provided by law enforcement to the Department.” 

            According
to the June 6, 2012, detention report, CSW
spoke to mother and was only able to obtain from her identifying information
about mother and the two children; mother refused to speak with the CSW any
further.  R.R. was taken into protective
custody, and the Department placed R.R. with his maternal great aunt.

            The CSW
spoke with Jason G. (father), who stated that he is the biological father of
J.G.  Father informed the CSW that he had
been married to mother for six years, they were in the process of divorcing, he
and mother shared custody of J.G., J.G. does not spend the night at mother’s
home, and J.G. only visits with mother for a few hours at a time.  Father stated that mother did not follow the
family court’s visitation orders, never asked for J.G. to spend the night at
her house, and father “suspects that [mother] knows that it’s best for [J.G.]
not to be around her home.”  J.G. said
that he lives with his father and grandmother, “[s]ometimes” goes to mother’s
house,” and “sometimes” spends the night at mother’s house, “but not too
often.” 

            The June 6,
2012, detention report
stated that a CSW went to the Altadena Sheriff’s station and met with Detective
Ventigan who said that R-father was an active member of a criminal street gang,
the Pasadena Denver Lane Bloods
(Denver Lanes), is “a shot caller” for this gang, and has been an active
participant in narcotic trafficking. 
Detective Ventigan also stated that in January 2012 a police report was
filed concerning domestic violence. 
Detective Ventigan stated that according to the report, mother had
suffered a “busted lip” for which she received stitches.  Mother informed a nurse that R-father had
caused the injuries to her lips.  When
law enforcement became involved, however, mother denied being a victim of
domestic violence.

            The police
report prepared by the Sheriff’s Department regarding the domestic violence
incident was attached to the June 6,
2012, detention
report.  The police report stated that mother
had gone to the hospital for injuries sustained to her face.  Nurse Sherman asked mother what had happened,
and mother replied her boyfriend pushed her to the ground causing her to hit
her mouth on the ground.  Mother
subsequently told a nurse practitioner treating her that she had sustained her
injuries because she slipped and fell. 
Nurse Sherman believed mother was not being truthful about the cause of
her injuries and felt she had to report the incident.  Mother received four stitches to her lip and
was discharged.  Sheriff’s Department
deputies arrived at mother’s home later that day and reported that mother had
swelling to her upper left cheek and left side of her upper head.  They noticed mother was “very uncomfortable”
having them in her home, and several objects in mother’s home appeared to have
been “thrown around.”  Mother told the
officers that she cut her lip when she slipped and fell, hitting her face on
the arm of a couch.  Mother showed the
officers the couch.  The officers
observed that due to the amount of padding on the arm of the couch “it would
almost be impossible to sustain those type[s] of injuries.”  The officers took photographs of mother’s
injuries.

            According
to the June 6, 2012, detention
report, R-father suffered a sustained criminal charge for carrying a
loaded firearm in 1994,
and criminal convictions for assault in 1995, battery in 1997, and assault in
1998, the latter of which R-father was sentenced to 12 years in prison.  R-father was also arrested in 1995 for
possession of a narcotic controlled substance, in 1996 for possession of marijuana,
and in 2011 for a parole violation.

            On June 6, 2012, the Department filed a
section 300 petition on behalf of

J.G. and R.R., based on the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">domestic violence incident as well as the
detrimental home environment created for the children by mother and
R-father.  At the detention hearing,
mother and R-father did not appear because they were in federal custody.  The juvenile court found a prima facie case
for detaining the children and that they were minors described by section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b).  The juvenile
court ordered J.G. released to father’s custody, and R.R. detained with the
maternal great aunt. 

            On July 25,
2012, the Department
filed a jurisdiction/disposition report stating that the Department interviewed
mother at the Metropolitan Detention Center. 
Regarding the domestic violence incident, mother stated that she
suffered the injuries to her lip when she slipped with R.R. in her arms, the
nurse who reported the abuse was “inappropriate,” and the law enforcement
officers knew R-father and were trying “to get him in trouble.” 
Regarding the ammunition and missing gun, mother stated that she was a
registered gun owner.  J.G. denied
seeing any guns in the home.  J.G said he
saw “shooting rounds,” but could not clarify what they were.

            According to the July 25,
2012, jurisdiction/disposition
report, the maternal great aunt said that in the past she has seen mother with
“two black eyes.”  She said that mother
“wouldn’t admit to it [domestic violence] at first.  [Mother] would say things like a door hit or
she was working with a dog.”  The
maternal great aunt said that at one point mother nearly left R-father but then
changed her mind.

            The July 25, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition
report provided that Altadena Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Fender said
that there had been a 21-month investigation into mother and R-father’s drug
activities resulting in their federal indictment for distributing drugs,
R-father is a documented member of the criminal street gang—the Denver Lanes,
and R-father had his two “baby mamas,” including mother, distribute drugs for him.

            According to the July
25, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition
report, Pasadena Police Department Detective Cordova said, “‘When [R.R.]
was in the womb, her parents were dealing large amounts of crack cocaine.  [R-father] ended up in state custody for a
time and was in custody at the time [R.R.] was born. . . .  The day both were arrested, no narcotics were
recovered [in the home], but [R-father] was seen climbing out of the bathroom
window.  We are confident there were
drugs in the home, but [R-father] flushed them when we showed up.  Ammunition was also recovered in the
home.  . . .  [Mother] was
doing deliveries for [R-father].  I don’t
know if she brought the baby with her when she did that.”  Mother’s paternal cousin told Department that
she knew mother was transporting drugs before R.R. was born.

            The July 25, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition
report provided that on June 27, 2012, R-father’s parole officer stated
on May 25, 2011, that R-father had a parole violation for being associated with
a gang, and on May 31, 2012, after having “maxed out on parole,” he was
discharged from parole and an indictment was served the following day.

            Department
determined that father had adequately protected J.G., and mother stated that
“she would like [father] to have full custody of [J.G.] and feels he is an
excellent father to the child, [J.G.]” 
The Department recommended that the juvenile court close J.G.’s case
with a family law order giving father full legal and physical custody of
J.G.  The Department recommended that
R.R. remain placed in her maternal great aunt’s house while mother and R-father
completed their family reunification services.

            A federal
indictment filed on May 24, 2012, against mother, R-father, and several other
individuals involved in drug trafficking was attached to the July 25, 2012, jurisdiction/disposition
report.  The federal indictment
detailed numerous sales transactions and communications between the named
defendants and federal authorities acting undercover, starting in October 2010,
and continuing through approximately May 2011.

            On July 25,
2012, the Department
filed a supplemental report providing that R-father denied any incidents
of domestic violence and R-father stated his parole officer would have deemed
his parole to be violated had he physically abused mother.  The dependency investigator observed a Denver
Lanes tattoo on R-father’s arm, but R-father stated he no longer was involved
with the gang.

            The parents
wanted R.R placed with the paternal grandmother and paternal aunt who had been
visiting R.R.  The Department reported
that although R.R had experienced trauma from being removed from her parents,
she had been with the maternal great aunt for months and had bonded with the
maternal great aunt.  The maternal great
aunt had ensured R.R. had visits with J.G., and her family, including the
paternal side of her family.  The
Department indicated there were no identifiable issues why R.R should be moved,
and on July 5, 2012, the maternal great aunt’s home had an Adoptions and Safe
Families Act (42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.) clearance.

            At the September 4, 2012,
adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the counts in
the petition to be true and that J.G. and R.R. were minors described by section 300, subdivisions
(a) and (b).  The sustained counts
(a)(l), (b)(2) in the petition read as follows: “The children [J.G.] and
[R.R.]’s mother,  . . . and the mother’s male
companion [R-father] father of [R.R.], have a history of engaging in a violent
altercation.  On 01-27-12, [R-father]
pushed the mother to
the ground causing the mother to hit the mother’s face and mouth on the ground
sustaining a bleeding laceration to the mother’s lip requiring stitches and
swelling to the mother’s cheek and lip. 
The mother failed to protect the children in that the mother allowed the
[R-father] to
reside in the children’s home and to have unlimited access to the
children.  Such violent conduct on the
part of the [R-father] against the mother and the
mother’s failure to protect the children endangers the children’s physical
health and safety and places the children at risk of physical harm, damage,
danger and failure to protect.”

            The sustained count (b)(1) in the
petition read as follows: “The children [J.G.] and [R.R.]’s mother, . . . and the mother’s male
companion [R-father] father of [R.R.], created a
detrimental and endangering home environment for the children in that [R-father>] and mother possessed ammunition in the children’s home within
access of the children.  Such a
detrimental and endangering home environment established for the children by [R-father>] and the mother endangers the children’s physical health,
safety and well being and places the children at risk of physical harm and
damage.”

            Regarding disposition, mother did
not object to the court terminating jurisdiction over J.G., but requested joint
legal and physical custody of him. 
Mother also asked that R.R. be returned to her custody so that she could
make an appropriate plan for R.R.’s care. 
The juvenile court declared J.G. and R.R. dependents of the court, offered family reunification
services for mother and R-father, ordered R.R. removed from parental custody and placed her
with her paternal grandmother, and upon receipt of the family law custody order
granting father legal and physical custody of J.G., terminated jurisdiction
over J.G. on
September 6, 2012.href="#_ftn2"
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] 

>DISCUSSION

            In this
appeal R-father is not challenging the jurisdictional findings.  Mother contends that there is not substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that J.G. and
R.R. are dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b).  Mother’s
appeal is nonjusticiable, and even if the appeal is justiciable, we hold that
mother’s substantial evidence contention is not meritorious. 

 

            >A.        Justiciability

             â€œWhen a dependency petition alleges multiple
grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction,
a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over
the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are
enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.  In such a case, the reviewing court need not
consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for
jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” 
(In re Alexis E. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)

            “[I]t is
necessary only for the court to find that one parent’s conduct has created
circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over
the child.  [Citations.]  Once the child is found to be endangered in
the manner described by one of the subdivisions of section 300[,] the child
comes within the court’s jurisdiction, even if the child was not in the
physical custody of one or both parents at the time the jurisdictional events
occurred.  [Citation.]  For jurisdictional purposes, it is irrelevant
which parent created those circumstances. 
A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a particular parent is
not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that parent, once
dependency jurisdiction has been established. 
[Citation.]  As a result, it is
commonly said that a jurisdictional finding involving one parent is ‘“good
against both.  More accurately, the minor
is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of
the statutory definitions of a dependent.”’ 
[Citation.]  For this reason, an
appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any
remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be
supported by the evidence.  (E.g., >In re Alexis E.[, supra,] 171 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 451 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 44] [addressing
remaining findings only ‘[f]or [f]ather’s benefit’]; In re Joshua G. [(2005)] 129 Cal.App.4th [189,] 202 [when a
jurisdictional allegation involving one parent is found supported, it is
‘irrelevant’ whether remaining allegations are supported]; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d
922] [declining to address remaining allegations after one allegation found
supported], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in >In re Christopher C. (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 73, 82; Randi R. v. Superior
Court
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 770] [same].)”  (In re
I.A
. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491-1492.) 

            When
“issues raised in [an] appeal present no genuine challenge to the court’s
assumption of dependency jurisdiction[,] . . . any order we enter will have no
practical impact on the pending dependency proceeding, thereby precluding a
grant of effective relief.  For that
reason, we find [such an] appeal to be nonjusticiable.”  (In re
I.A
., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1491.)  “The many aspects of the
justiciability doctrine in California were summarized in Wilson v. L. A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450
[246 P.2d 688]:  ‘“A judicial tribunal
ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a
moot question or abstract proposition.  . . .  [A]s a general rule it is not within the
function of the court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculative,
theoretical or abstract question or proposition, or a purely academic question,
or to give an advisory opinion on such a question or
proposition. . . .”’  (>Id. at pp. 452-453.)  An important requirement for justiciability
is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy
that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status.  ‘“‘It is this court’s duty ‘“to
decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in
the case before it.”’”’”’ 
[Citations.]”  (>In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1490.) 


            The
juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction over J.G. and R.R. based on the
petition allegations under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).  Father is not a party to this appeal.  Mother’s appeal therefore is
nonjusticiable.  (In re I.A., supra, 201
Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.)

Mother requests that we reach the
merits of her challenge because the findings of jurisdiction as to her could be
prejudicial because they could potentially impact the current or future href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">dependency proceedings and family law
proceedings, including all visitation orders between mother R.R., and future
placement and reunification with mother, as evidenced by the juvenile court’s
removal of R.R. from her.  Mother however
does not challenge the orders removing R.R. from her custody or granting father legal and
physical custody of J.G.  Mother’s
contention is conclusionary and speculative, and she does not develop it
further.  As the court explained in >People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
793, it is not the role of a reviewing court to independently seek out support
for appellant’s conclusory assertions, and such contentions may be rejected
without consideration.  (See also >Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp.
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11 [“It is not our responsibility to
develop an appellant’s argument”]; Paterno
v. State of California
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court
is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for
parties”].) 

 

            >B.        Substantial
Evidence

Assuming the justiciability of
mother’s contention that there is not substantial evidence to support the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that J.G. and R.R. are dependent
children of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b), we alternatively hold that it is not meritorious. 

On appeal, we review the juvenile
court’s finding of jurisdiction for substantial evidence.  (In re
J.K.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) 
“The term ‘substantial evidence’ means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is
evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.  [Citation.]” 
(Ibid.)  “The issue of sufficiency of the evidence in
dependency cases is governed by the same rules that apply to other appeals.” (>In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942,
947.)  An appellate court does not
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.  (>Ibid.; In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564 [issues of fact
and credibility are questions for the trier of fact].)  Instead, the reviewing court draws all
reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s findings, considers
the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirms the order
if it is supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a
contrary conclusion.  (>In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)

            The
juvenile court found that J.G. and R.R. are dependent children of the juvenile
court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).  Section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)
provides in pertinent part: “Any child who comes within any of the following
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge
that person to be a dependent child of the court:  [¶]  (a) The
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s
parent or guardian.  For the purposes of
this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious
future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted,
a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s
siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian
which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical
harm.  [¶]  (b) The child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness,
as a result of . . . the failure or inability of the parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child. . ., or by the
willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due
to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.”

            “In >In re Sylvia R. [(1997)] 55 Cal.App.4th
559, 562, this court joined In re Heather
A.
(1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 195 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 315], in noting the
obvious: Domestic violence against a spouse is detrimental to children.  Indeed, a few years earlier, in >In re Benjamin D. [(1991)] 227
Cal.App.3d 1464, 1470, this court declared that evidence of spousal abuse could
properly be considered by a juvenile dependency court in determining whether to
bring children within its jurisdiction.” 
(Guardianship of Simpson
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 914, 940.) 
“Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis of a
jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b).  Our colleagues in Division One of this
appellate district have thoroughly explained the relationship between section
300, subdivision (b) and domestic violence: ‘“[D]omestic violence in the same
household where children are living . . . is a failure to protect [the
children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering
serious physical harm or illness from it.’ 
[Citation.]’”  (>In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930,
941.)

            Mother
contends the children were not at risk of harm from the allegations of domestic
violence because she denied the allegations, the children did not witness it,
and there were no other reports of domestic violence.  She relies on In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713.  Mother’s reliance on that case is misplaced.  In In re
Daisy H
., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th
713, the court found that an incident of domestic violence that “happened at
least two, and probably seven, years before the [Department] filed the
petition,” without evidence that the children were “physically exposed to the
past violence between their parents or of any ongoing violence between the
parents” who were then separated, did not place the children at risk of
harm.  (Id. at p. 717.) 

            Here,
unlike in In re Daisy H., the
incident of domestic violence specifically referred to in the petition occurred
six months before the petition was filed. 
Mother informed a nurse that R-father pushed her to the ground causing
her to hit her mouth on the ground. 
Sheriff’s Department deputies observed that several objects in mother’s
home appeared to have been “thrown around. 
The injuries were sufficiently serious as to require mother to seek
treatment at a hospital, and she received multiple stitches to her lip.  In addition, the maternal great aunt reported
having seen mother with two “black eyes” in the past, and mother almost left R-father but then changed
her mind.  Although mother
ultimately denied being a victim of domestic violence concerning the injuries
to her lips—claiming that she slipped and fell— and did not admit being abused
when she suffered the two black eyes—claiming that “a door hit her or she was
working with a dog,” and
R-father denied there had been any incidents of domestic violence with mother
reasoning that his parole officer would have violated his parole had he
physically abused mother, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer
that mother was a victim of domestic abuse.

            In addition
to the domestic violence, mother and R-father had created a detrimental home
environment for the children.  The
federal agents who conducted a search of the family home found ammunition and a
gun case, but “mother reported not knowing where the gun was located . . .
.”  J.G. said he saw “shooting
rounds.” 

            The FBI
followed R-father and mother’s drug transactions and communications for 21
months, and Detective Cordova believed there were drugs in the family home, but
R-father “flushed them” when law enforcement arrived to serve the search
warrant.  Mother exposed the children to
R-father who had an extensive criminal history. 
R-father was a known gang member, and like mother, was federally
indicted on drug trafficking charges. 
Father also informed the Department that he shared custody of J.G. with
mother but she did not follow the custody agreement, and he believed this was
because mother was cognizant that her home environment was not suitable for
J.G.

There is substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s order.

 




>DISPOSITION

The juvenile
court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

 

 

 

                                                                                    MOSK,
J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

 

                        TURNER,
P J.

 

 

            KUMAR,
J.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">*





id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]           All
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise
indicated. 

 

id=ftn2>

href="#_ftnref2"
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]           Mother
appealed the “September 4, 2012 jurisdiction and disposition findings . . . .”
An appeal cannot be taken directly from a dependency court’s jurisdictional
order; the jurisdictional order is “appealable by way of a challenge to a
dispositional order made subsequent to it.” 
(Blanca P. v. Superior Court
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1754.)  We
grant mother’s request that we liberally construe her notice of appeal to
include the September 6, 2012, custody order. 
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.405(a)(3), 8.406.(d); In re Madison W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450-1451.)

id=ftn3>

href="#_ftnref3"
name="_ftn3" title="">*           Judge
of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.








Description D.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings in connection with the jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding her minor children, seven-year-old J.G. and one-year-old R.R., whom the juvenile court held to be dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).[1] Mother contends that there is not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings. We affirm.
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