In re Jeremy B.
Filed 6/20/08 In re Jeremy B. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re JEREMY B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B199785 (Los Angeles County |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEREMY B., Defendant and Appellant. | Super. Ct. No. FJ39959) |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Shep Zebberman, Referee. Reversed.
Allison K. Simkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Robert S. Henry, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Jeremy B. appeals from an order continuing wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he committed a second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211). He was placed on probation in the home of his grandmother and contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that he committed second degree robbery. For reasons stated in the opinion, we agree and reverse the order continuing wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On November 17, 2006, at approximately 11:00 a.m. at Crenshaw High School, appellant and approximately 10 other individuals approached Jesus O. and said they were from Sixties. Appellant ripped a chain from O.s neck and then dropped it on the ground. When O. tried to pick it up, appellant socked him in the ear. Appellant walked away without taking the chain. O. acknowledged that he told the police that when appellant approached the only thing appellant said was, why did you hit [me]?
In finding appellant had committed a robbery, the court stated, the evidence was that he came up to [O.] and basically grabbed and ripped the necklace off his head, it fell to the ground, when the witness tried to recover it he punched him in the ear. The court stated it believed appellant intended to steal the necklace and when in fact, when the victim tried to pick it up he punched him in the ear.
The defense argued there was no specific intent to permanently deprive when its thrown on the floor and its picked up by somebody else. . . .
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in finding appellant committed robbery where there was no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that appellant intended to permanently deprive O. of his necklace. Appellant further claims the evidence failed to unequivocally demonstrate he actually took possession of the necklace or transported the necklace for purposes of the robbery statute.
The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.] [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.] [Citations.] (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.) This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
Although it is the duty of the [finder of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [finder of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] [Citations.] (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)
To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish the defendant took property from the victim by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him of that property. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176-1177; People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1058; Pen. Code, 211.) [T]he intent required for robbery . . . is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.] (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643.) [A]n intent to permanently deprive someone of his or her property may be inferred when one unlawfully takes the property of another. (People v. Morales (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391.)
[T]he felonious intent required for conviction of robbery is the same as that required for larceny. [Citation.] It has long been recognized in the law of theft by larceny that the felonious intent of the party taking need not necessarily be an intention to convert the property to his own use . . . . [Citations.] More particularly, Despite early suggestions that the taking must have been for the purpose of gain (lucri causa), it is settled both at common law and under modern statutes that the intent to deprive the owner permanently is enough, even though the object of the taker is to destroy rather than to appropriate the property to his own use. (Italics added.) [Citations.] (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1, 57.)
In the present case, there was no substantial evidence that appellant intended to permanently deprive O. of the necklace when appellant ripped it from O.s neck and dropped it to the floor. There was no indication appellant accidentally dropped it while attempting to gain possession of it or that he attempted to retrieve it after it was dropped. Further, we cannot infer that in dropping the necklace appellants intention was to destroy it, which could support the finding of a felonious intent. (Cf. People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 57-58.)
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MANELLA, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
WILLHITE, J.
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