Filed 4/12/17 In re J.B. CA5




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re J.B., JR., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

F074462

(Super. Ct. No. JJV069291A)


OPINION

THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Anthony Fultz, Judge.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
J.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now 21-month-old son, J.B., Jr., and selecting adoption as the child’s permanent plan. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father submitted a letter in which he takes responsibility for being incarcerated and therefore not available to parent his son. However, he does not believe adoption is the only alternative because his sister and his son’s maternal great-grandmother are willing and able to take custody of him. Father wants his son raised by family and would ultimately like to assume custody of him and be a good father to him. Father asks that we consider his sister and this son’s maternal great-grandmother for placement.
We conclude father failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
In September 2015, the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency) took then two-month-old J.B., Jr. (the baby) into protective custody after his 14-year-old mother, Brittany, left him with a stranger and did not return. At the time, father, then 21, was incarcerated and charged with several sex offense crimes, including lewd and lascivious acts with a child, as a result of his relationship with Brittany.
Father appeared in custody at the detention hearing and the juvenile court appointed counsel for him. Father informed the court that he was awaiting sentencing. Brittany testified she and father were living together at the time of the baby’s birth and that father was present at the birth and signed the birth certificate. Father acknowledged being the baby’s father and stated he had undergone paternity testing but did not have the results. The court deferred ruling on paternity, ordered the baby detained and set a hearing in October. Meanwhile, father was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to register as a sex offender.
The agency recommended the juvenile court exercise its dependency jurisdiction over the baby and order reunification services for Brittany only. The agency informed the court that relatives, including father’s sister and the baby’s maternal great-grandmother, expressed an interest in taking custody of the baby. However, there were impediments to placing the baby with either relative at that time. The great-grandmother lived in Texas, which prevented Brittany from regularly visiting the baby and jeopardized her ability to reunify. Father’s sister was not a placement option because the agency considered him the baby’s alleged father, which made his relatives ineligible for placement.
In October 2015, at the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found father was the baby’s presumed father, removed the baby from Brittany’s custody and ordered six months of reunification services for her. The court denied father reunification services because of his sex offender status and the length of his prison term. (§ 361.5, subds. (b)(16) & (e)(1).) Father did not appeal from the court’s dispositional findings and orders. Two months later, the agency placed the baby in the home of an identified adoptive parent.
In March 2016, at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated Brittany’s reunification services for noncompliance. The following August, the court conducted the section 366.26 hearing. Neither father nor Brittany personally appeared and Brittany’s whereabouts were unknown. The court terminated their parental rights and ordered adoption as the permanent plan.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court’s focus at the section 366.26 hearing is the selection of a permanent plan for the child. (In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides that if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely that the child will be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless one of the exceptions of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) applies.
We have reviewed the transcript for the August 31, 2016, permanency planning hearing, which reflects that father and Brittany’s attorneys submitted on the agency’s recommendations the juvenile court find the baby likely to be adopted and terminate parental rights. Thus, father did not raise any of the critical issues pertinent to the termination of his parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing. Nor does he raise them on his appeal. Rather, he seeks to reopen the issue of placement, which was also not raised at the hearing. Consequently, the record is devoid of any arguable issue of reversible error.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.