In re Jason L.
Filed 1/21/14 In re Jason L. CA4/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re JASON
L., JR., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D064390
(Super. Ct. No. J518614)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Kenneth J. Medel, Judge.
Affirmed.
Monica
Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas
E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E.
Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.L.
appeals the judgment entered following the jurisdiction and disposition
hearings in the juvenile dependency case of her minor son, Jason L., Jr. (Jason
Jr.). She contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the court's jurisdictional
finding under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (e),
and the court's denial of reunification services to C.L. under section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(5) and (c). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
January 26,
2013, C.L. called 911 and requested medical
assistance for her son, Jason Jr. C.L.
said that Jason Jr. had suffered from flu-like symptoms and a high fever for
approximately 24 hours, and then he became unresponsive. When paramedics arrived at C.L.'s home in
Jason Jr. to the paramedics, returned inside, and shut the door quickly behind
her. During their brief glimpse through
the doorway, the paramedics noticed that C.L.'s home was filthy, full of trash,
and foul-smelling. C.L. was Jason Jr.'s
primary caregiver, and she was the only adult in the home. Jason L., Sr. (Jason Sr.), C.L.'s husband and
Jason Jr.'s father, had been on deployment for several months with the United States
Navy (Navy).
Jason
Jr., then two years old, was covered in vomit and feces. The paramedics transported him to the hospital
for treatment, where he
was admitted in serious condition. Jason
Jr. was severely dehydrated, in an altered mental state, with sunken eyes, poor
skin tone, visible ribs, and a yellow crust covering his face. He was very thin, and his extremities
appeared to be those of a one year old. The
skin on his genitals and groin area had broken down from lack of care and
infrequent diaper changing. The hospital
determined that Jason Jr. had acute
his liver and pancreas resulting from severe dehydration. Jason Jr. had also suffered a stroke and lack
of oxygen to the brain from the dehydration.
If Jason Jr. had not received medical attention, he may have died within
days.
At
the hospital, C.L. herself was unkempt and her strong odor was distracting to
medical personnel. She was directed to
take a shower and clean herself up. When
medical personnel and social workers
attempted to interact with C.L., she was largely unresponsive. She cried, rocked back and forth, and could
only answer a few questions. She did not
attend to Jason Jr. without prompting.
She said that she knew that her home condition was "pretty bad"
and that she had not cleaned or taken out the trash since her husband had left
on deployment months earlier. She said
she only changed Jason Jr.'s diapers twice per day, though she said she knew
she should do so more often. She said
that she left Jason Jr. in his crib because her home was so filthy.
C.L.
has a history of depression, and she cited "feel[ing] sorry for [herself]"
as a reason for her lack of care of Jason Jr.
She said that she did not leave the house much and spent most of her
days on her computer "looking at stuff." She was not under psychiatric care, but she
admitted she needed help. She denied any
drug use or alcohol abuse. When asked
about Jason Jr.'s condition, C.L. claimed that she fed him and gave him liquids
regularly. She maintained that his
symptoms came on suddenly, either the night before the paramedics were called
or that morning. However, medical
personnel reported that it was unlikely that Jason Jr. could have reached such
an "extreme condition" within 24 hours.
Jason
Sr. was granted emergency leave from his deployment and returned to San Diego. Jason Sr.'s mother and sister also travelled
to San Diego from their homes in Chicago, Illinois to help take care of Jason Jr. in the hospital. Jason Sr. admitted that he knew C.L. was
depressed before he deployed. However,
he said he did not know about C.L.'s neglect of Jason Jr. or the condition of
their home.
While
Jason Jr. was in the hospital, the San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency (the Agency) petitioned the juvenile court under section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (e), on his behalf. The Agency alleged that Jason Jr. had suffered
or was at substantial risk of suffering severe physical harm or illness based
on his parents' inability to care for him.
The Agency alleged that C.L. has a mental illness or other condition
that renders her unable to provide Jason Jr. with proper care and that Jason
Sr. was deployed and unable to protect Jason Jr. The Agency further alleged that Jason Jr. had
suffered severe physical abuse, including severe dehydration caused by
neglect. Jason Jr.'s severe dehydration
resulted in acute kidney injury and stroke, among other harms. At the court's detention hearing, it found
that the Agency had presented a prima facie case under section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (e), and ordered that Jason Jr. be detained in out-of-home
care when he was well enough to leave the hospital.
Jason
Jr. was eventually discharged after 19 days in the hospital, including several days
in a pediatric intensive care unit.
Jason Jr. was placed in the care of his paternal grandmother, who was
staying temporarily at a relative's home outside of San Diego. C.L. and Jason Sr. expressed ambivalence about
their future with him. While they
requested reunification services, they also stated that they might consider a
plan of guardianship or adoption with a relative. Both Jason Jr.'s paternal grandmother and
aunt expressed their desire to provide him with long-term care. Jason Jr.'s aunt specifically stated that she
would like to adopt Jason Jr.
C.L.,
Jason Sr., Jason Jr.'s paternal grandmother and aunt, and Agency social workers
participated in a team decision making session where they discussed Jason Jr.'s
future. At the session, C.L. stated that
she did not believe she could take care of Jason Jr.'s needs or keep him
safe. She was in favor of adoption by a
relative. Jason Jr.'s parental grandmother
and aunt were also in favor of adoption.
Jason Sr. was upset by C.L.'s admission that she could not care for
Jason Jr. Jason Sr. stated that he could
not care for Jason Jr. himself, given his obligations to the Navy, and expected
C.L. to do so. However, at the end of
the session, Jason Sr. agreed that a permanent plan of adoption was best for
Jason Jr. C.L. and Jason Sr. agreed that
Jason Jr. would return to Chicago with his paternal grandmother as soon as practicable.
The
juvenile court held a contested document trial on jurisdictional issues. After considering the evidence, the court
sustained the Agency's allegation under section 300, subdivision (b). The court dismissed the Agency's allegation
under section 300, subdivision (e), because the court found that the water was
not "food" for purposes of that statute.
amend its petition to add a section 300, subdivision (a) allegation to conform
to proof. The court then sustained that
allegation. The court later reconsidered
its finding on the Agency's section 300, subdivision (e) allegation and
interpreted "food" to include liquid nourishment. With that interpretation, the court sustained
the Agency's section 300, subdivision (e) allegation as well.
The
court continued its first scheduled disposition hearing to allow the Agency
time to set up an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC)
evaluation in Chicago. In the meantime, Jason Jr.
and his paternal grandmother were allowed to leave San Diego and
reside in Chicago. Another scheduled
disposition hearing was continued to allow further time to resolve issues
related to ICPC. Four months after the
court's initial jurisdiction hearing, the court held a contested disposition
hearing for Jason Jr.
During
this time, C.L. started taking medication for depression and began
therapy. She reported that her life was
easier without Jason Jr. and that her mood was improving. C.L. kept in contact with Jason Jr. and his
paternal grandmother through daily telephone calls and Skype video
conferences. Despite C.L.'s improvement,
her therapist reported that she still had not expressed a great deal of remorse
for her neglect of Jason Jr. Her
therapist also said that she "has not shown any sympathy for the child." C.L. still felt under stress, and she had a
self-described "breakdown" that led her to visit the emergency room a
few days before the disposition hearing.
C.L.
did not initially pursue Agency services such as parenting classes. However, in the weeks leading to the contested
disposition hearing, C.L. attended classes through the Navy and a local
provider. An official from the Navy
program reported that C.L. appeared "[i]mmature and lacks understanding of
parenting skills." C.L. also had a "[b]lunted
affect." Despite their earlier
statements in favor of adoption, both C.L. and Jason Sr. stated that their goal
was to regain custody of Jason Jr. and participate in whatever services were
necessary to achieve that.
At
the contested disposition hearing, the Agency recommended that Jason Sr.
receive reunification services, but that C.L. not do so. The Agency did not believe that reunification
services were likely to be successful in addressing the reasons for C.L.'s
abuse and neglect of Jason Jr. because C.L. lacked engagement in Jason Jr.'s
care and she failed to express responsibility or remorse for Jason Jr.'s severe
neglect. The Agency opined that C.L. had
never formed a serious bond with Jason Jr.
The Agency also recommended that Jason Jr. remain in Chicago with his
paternal grandmother and that the court approve an ICPC evaluation with his
paternal aunt.
C.L.
opposed the Agency's recommendation that she not receive services. She testified that her depression had been
greatly reduced by medication and therapy.
She said that she had remorse for what happened to Jason Jr. and was
committed to becoming a better parent.
She had also started taking classes to obtain her general equivalency
diploma (GED), and her teacher reported that she was an excellent student and
active participant. Her psychiatrist and
psychologist provided letters in which they attested to C.L.'s improved mood
and motivation to improve herself. On
cross-examination, C.L. admitted that she had been inattentive to Jason Jr.'s
needs even before the severe neglect that led to this case. She also admitted that she had resisted her
mother-in-law's efforts to improve her parenting.
Because
the court made a finding that section 300, subdivision (e) applied,
reunification services could not be provided to C.L. unless the court found
that reunification services were "likely to prevent reabuse or continued
neglect of the child or that failure to provide reunification will be
detrimental to the child because the child is closely and positively attached
to that parent." (§ 361.5,
subd. (c).) At the disposition hearing,
the court noted that C.L. had made some effort to improve her life, but it was
not persuaded that reunification services were likely to prevent reabuse or
continued neglect. The court expressed
its view that C.L. had deep-seated psychological issues, including her recent "breakdown"
and visit to the emergency room, that were unlikely to be addressed
sufficiently by reunification services.
The court noted that C.L. herself had expressed doubt about her ability
to care for Jason Jr. The court also
found that no evidence had been presented of a close and positive attachment
between C.L. and Jason Jr. such that failure to provide reunification would be
detrimental to the child. Accordingly,
the court adopted the Agency's recommendation and denied reunification services
to C.L. The court ordered services for
Jason Sr., however, and approved the Agency's case plan for him. C.L. appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
C.L. contends that the evidence does
not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (e). That statute provides
for jurisdiction where "[t]he child is under the age of five years and has
suffered severe physical abuse by a parent . . . ." (§ 300, subd. (e).) As relevant here, " 'severe
physical abuse' " includes "the willful, prolonged failure to
provide adequate food." (
C.L.
first argues that the word "willful" in the statute requires proof
that "[C.L.]'s acts or omissions were deliberate and intentional, with an
intent to cause harm." C.L.'s
argument presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review independently. (In re
Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 725.)
"Our
goal is to determine the Legislature's intent and adopt a construction that
best effectuates the purpose of the law. [Citations.] We begin with the statutory language because
it generally provides the most reliable indication of legislative intent. [Citations.] ' "If the statutory language is
unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the statute controls. [Citation.]" [Citation.] We consider extrinsic aids, such as
legislative history, only if the statutory language is reasonably subject to
multiple interpretations.' " (
52.)
The
only authority cited by C.L. in support of her argument that the word " 'willful' "
requires an intent to cause harm is Torres
v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995 (Torres). In that case, our
Supreme Court considered a provision of California's
workers' compensation statutes that excepts a " 'willful and
unprovoked physical act of aggression' " by a coworker from the
exclusive scope of the workers' compensation system. (
the term 'willful,' the Legislature has underscored the need for an intent to
bring about the consequences of that expression, i.e., an intent to inflict
injury or harm." (
emphasized that the word " 'willful' " only had such a
connotation when it modified "an already intentional or deliberate act,"
i.e., a "physical act of aggression."
(Id. at p. 1006.) The Supreme Court distinguished other
provisions in California's workers' compensation statutes that used " 'willful' "
in a way that did not require an intent to inflict injury or harm. (Id.
at pp. 1005-1006.)
As
an initial matter, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court's analysis of a
workers' compensation statute has any application to the juvenile dependency
statute at issue here. "Given the
complexity of the statutory scheme governing dependency, a single provision 'cannot
properly be understood except in the context of the entire dependency process
of which it is part.' " (
1235.) Even assuming that
use of "willful" in section 300, we conclude that the Supreme Court's
analysis is inapplicable to the statute at issue here. The word "willful" modifies the "failure
to provide adequate food."
(§ 300, subd. (e).) A "failure"
may plainly be intentional or unintentional.
Thus, because the word " 'willful' " here does not
modify "an already intentional or deliberate act," it does not have
the connotation the Supreme Court found in Torres. (See Torres,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1006.)
The
ordinary meaning of "willful" is "[v]oluntary and intentional,
but not necessarily malicious." (
1737, col. 2.) Similarly, the Penal Code
states that the word "willfully" "implies simply a purpose or
willingness or commit the act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate
law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1.) C.L. has provided no reason to depart from
this ordinary meaning, and we conclude that it applies here.
Applying
this interpretation to the facts here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court's finding under section 300, subdivision (e). (See In
re E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 669.)
Under the substantial evidence standard, we do not "reassess the
credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.]
Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the juvenile
court's findings, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the judgment, accepting every reasonable inference that the court could have
drawn from the evidence.
[Citations.] Thus, we must uphold
the juvenile court's factual findings if there is any substantial evidence,
whether controverted or not, that supports the court's conclusion." (In re
S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 415.)
"The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the court's findings or orders." (In re
Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 147.)
Jason
Jr. was admitted to the hospital with severe dehydration, in an altered mental
state, with sunken eyes, poor skin tone, visible ribs, and very thin
extremities. Jason Jr.'s doctors
described his condition as the result of "severe neglect." C.L. was Jason Jr.'s sole caregiver and
responsible for providing him with adequate food and water. C.L. admitted that she was neglectful of
Jason Jr., stating that "I wasn't taking care of him (minor) how I should
have."
C.L.
argues that her failure to provide Jason Jr. with adequate food was not willful
because she suffers from depression. We
disagree. C.L. has provided no evidence
that her depression prevented her from acting voluntarily. To the contrary, C.L. was able to feed
herself and undertake other intentional activities when she wished. She simply did not direct her attentions to
her son. C.L. admitted that "I knew
I needed help and I didn't want to ask."
Under these circumstances, C.L.'s depression does not preclude a finding
of willful failure to provide adequate food.
C.L.
further argues that there is no support for the court's finding that her
failure to provide adequate food was "prolonged." C.L. points to comments by Jason Jr.'s
doctors that Jason Jr. suffered a "rapid deterioration" and that his
stroke was "an acute event." However,
Jason Jr.'s doctors stated that "the severe dehydration wouldn't have
happened overnight and the mother should have known that the child was severely
dehydrated." When he was admitted
to the hospital, Jason Jr. was very thin, with sunken eyes, poor skin tone, and
visible ribs. The doctors determined
that Jason Jr.'s stroke, which was caused by severe dehydration, occurred "anywhere
from [five-seven] days ago and up to [two] weeks ago," i.e., several days
to a week before Jason Jr. was admitted to this hospital. The fact that Jason Jr.'s stroke itself was "an
acute event" does not mean that his dehydration was not prolonged.
Jason
Jr. was at risk of death if his deprivation of food had been only a few days
longer. That is, if his deprivation had
been any more "prolonged," he may have died. Contrary to C.L.'s assertion, Jason Jr.'s partial
recovery over the following month is not evidence that he was not subjected to
prolonged deprivation. It merely shows
that Jason Jr.'s doctors were effective in treating him. Considering all of the evidence, we find sufficient
evidentiary support for the court's order, including its finding that C.L.'s
failure to provide adequate food was prolonged.
II
C.L.
next contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to order reunification
services for her. Because the court made
a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (e), the court could
not order reunification services for C.L. "unless it finds that, based on
competent testimony, those services are likely to prevent reabuse or continued
neglect of the child or that failure to try reunification will be detrimental
to the child because the child is closely and positively attached to that
parent." (§ 361.5, subd. (c);
see also In re
"Thus, once [the Agency] proves by clear and convincing evidence
that a dependent minor falls under subdivision (e) of section 300, the general
rule favoring reunification services no longer applies; it is replaced by a
legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of
governmental resources." (
Cal.App.4th 159, 164.) This situation is
often referred to as a " 'bypass' " of services. (In re
A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1074.)
We review the juvenile court's order for substantial evidence. (In re
Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216.)
C.L.
contends that the court's failure to find that reunification services are
likely to prevent reabuse or continued neglect of Jason Jr. is not supported by
substantial evidence.
name="_ftnref5" title="">[5] Stated another way, her argument is that
there is no substantial evidence supporting the court's view that reunification
services were unlikely to be successful.
We disagree. From the outset of this
juvenile dependency case, C.L. was unsure whether she wanted to pursue
services. She was inattentive to Jason
Jr. in the hospital and disengaged from subsequent meetings regarding his care
and custody. C.L. admitted that her life
was easier without him. At the Agency's
team decision making session, C.L. stated that she did not believe she could
take care of Jason Jr.'s needs or keep him safe. She allowed Jason Jr. to travel back to Chicago with his
paternal grandmother and expressed her support for his adoption by a relative. C.L. did not pursue services, through either
the Agency or the Navy, until shortly before the court's contested disposition
hearing.
While
the evidence shows that C.L. was able to make some positive steps in her own
life, including taking medication for her depression and beginning GED classes,
these facts do not compel a finding that reunification services would likely be
successful. C.L.'s therapist reported
that C.L. still had not shown "a lot of expression of remorse. She has not shown any sympathy for the
child. Just no significant remorse." C.L. showed "a serious lack of attachment
and bond" with Jason Jr. Though he
recognized that C.L. had made progress, the Agency's social worker expressed
his opinion that reunification services would not be successful. C.L. did not present any expert testimony
regarding the likelihood that reunification services would succeed in her case.
C.L.
argues that substantial evidence does not support the court's order because
none of the factors listed in section 361.5, subdivision (c) are present
here. Those nonexclusive factors provide
guidance to courts in determining when reunification services are unlikely to
be successful. Here, however, the
juvenile court's finding under section 300, subdivision (e), creates a
presumption that services should not be offered. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5) and (c).) "While [the Agency] has the statutory
duty to investigate and present the court with information about the prognosis
for a successful reunification, it is not required to prove the services will
be unsuccessful." (
Cal.App.4th at p. 164.) It was C.L.'s
burden to show that reunification services were likely to prevent reabuse or
continued neglect on the record provided by the Agency and any evidence that
she chose to offer.
title="">[6] (Ibid.;
see also § 361.5, subd. (c).)
Although
C.L. has cited evidence of her positive progress, she has not shown the absence
of substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's order denying services. "We do not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]
The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence,
even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial
court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence." (In re
Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court's order denying reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (c).)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD,
J.
IRION, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The provision in
question establishes jurisdiction where there is a "willful, prolonged
failure to provide adequate food" to a child under the age of five
years. (§ 300, subd. (e).) In this appeal, C.L. does not argue that
liquid nourishment is not "food" within the meaning of this
provision. For purposes of this appeal,
we assume without deciding that "food" as used in this provision
includes liquid nourishment.
