In re Gary C.
Filed 7/30/08 In re Gary C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re GARY C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GARY C., Defendant and Appellant. | D052278 (Super. Ct. No. J216556) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.
After a contested hearing, the juvenile court sustained allegations of burglary (Pen. Code,[1] 459) and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)) against Gary C. The court declared Gary a ward of the court and placed him on probation in his parent's custody. Gary appeals, contending the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 11, 2007, San Diego Police Officer Lorri Nelson responded to an alarm activation at the Encanto teen center. Approaching the center, Nelson saw the center's director waiving her arms to attract attention. She also saw a group of three boys hustling away from the center. The boys saw the marked police car and continued walking quickly away from Nelson. After making eye contact with the officer, one of the boys tossed something onto the ground. Nelson and another officer caught up with the boys and told them to stop. Patting Gary down for weapons, Nelson felt something in Gary's pocket. Gary consented to a search. Nelson found wall tacks like those at the teen center in Gary's pocket.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He argues Nelson had no reasonable suspicion to detain him. He asserts the tacks found during Nelson's search were the product of an unlawful detention.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact. We independently determine the reasonableness of the search based on the facts as found by the trial court. (People v. Murphy (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 496.)
Here, the court found Nelson had been alerted "an alarm has gone off. When she responds, she sees the reporting party waiving. The alarm is still going off. She sees three juveniles hustling away from the location where the alarm was going off. She sees one of them throw something away and sees them looking back." We apply these facts to determine whether Nelson's search was based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The United States Supreme Court held the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity " 'may be afoot.' " (U.S. v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [109 S.Ct. 1581].) Reasonable suspicion exists when specific facts, considered with objective and reasonable inferences form a basis for particularized suspicion. (United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 [101 S.Ct. 690].) There are two elements to the particularized suspicion requirement. First, the assessment must be based on the totality of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 418.) Second, the assessment must arouse a reasonable suspicion that the particular person being stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Ibid.) An officer may use certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Id. at p. 417.)
The detention here was reasonable. The officer responded to a scene where the reporting party was waiving her arms trying to get the officer's attention. An alarm was ringing. The officer saw three boys hustling away from the building where the alarm had gone off. When she made eye contact with one of the boys, he threw something onto the ground and kept quickly walking away. Taken independently, any one of these acts may not constitute a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, our inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances. (United States v. Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 417.) Innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for reasonable suspicion because in making a determination of probable cause, the inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts. (U.S. v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 10.)
The combination of factors present here satisfied the "minimal level of objective justification" required to stop appellant and investigate his involvement in the break in at the teen center. (U.S. v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 7.) The court correctly denied Gary's motion to suppress evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.
Analysis and review provided by San Diego County Property line attorney.
San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com
[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
