In re Frank A.

Filed 6/24/08 In re Frank A. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In this second appeal in this juvenile dependency matter, O.A. and her adopted children, Frank A. and Erica A., separately appeal from a June 4, 2007 order entered at the conclusion of the 12-month review hearing on family reunification. Appellants challenge the juvenile courts findings, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f),[1] that the return of the children to mothers physical custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children, and that mother was provided reasonable reunification services. We affirm.[2]

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The history of this case is described in our opinion of the previous appeal (In re Marc A. (Mar. 28, 2008, A115583 [nonpub. opn.]), in which we affirmed the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders, and the October 5, 2006 order entered after the six-month review hearing.[3] We recite only those facts that are relevant and necessary to resolve the issues raised on this appeal challenging the courts June 4, 2007 order entered after the 12-month review hearing.

1. Jurisdictional Order

At the time of this proceeding, mother had eight adopted children, including appellants Frank and Erica, and nine biological children, who ranged in age from 39 to 56. Mother had been a guardian for another child, T., although the guardianship was later dissolved.

On February 1, 2006, respondent Sonoma County Human Services Department (department) removed 14-year-old Frank and 10-year-old Erica, the youngest children, from their mothers home. The removal was based on reports made by two other adopted siblings, 16-year-old Marc and 17-year-old Lucas, who by then had moved out of the home. According to the older siblings, mother had repeatedly subjected them to excessive corporeal punishment, including whippings, and to emotional abuse, including intimidation, threats, waiting for whippings and being forced to punish their other siblings. Marc and Lucas reported that physical and emotional abuse also happened to Frank and Erica and to other children who had also already left mothers home.[4]

On March 13, 2006, the department filed an amended section 300 petition, alleging that (1) Frank and Erica had suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by mother ( 300, subd. (a)); and (2) Frank had suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage as a result of mothers conduct (id., subd. (c)).[5]

A contested jurisdictional hearing was held over several days in May and June 2006, at which time the court admitted evidence ‑ provided in testimonial form from 16 witnesses, including 9 of mothers biological or adopted children ‑ relating to the allegations of mothers physical and emotional abuse of her children. Frank and Erica did not testify at this hearing. On June 27, 2006, the juvenile court declared Frank and Erica dependents of the court, and the children were placed out of the home pending disposition.

In affirming the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings, we concluded in pertinent part that the testimony of mothers four children, relating to being whipped with household objects such as an extension cord and threatened with other types of physical abuse, provided ample evidentiary support for the courts determination that Frank and Erica were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally if they remained in mothers custody. (In re Marc A., supra, at p. 13.) We noted that [i]ndeed, all of [mothers] children who testified at the hearing with the exception of [one child] admitted, at a minimum, that [mother] had whipped or beaten them with objects when she disciplined them. This fact, considered together with the testimony from [the four children,] leaves us with little doubt that the substantial evidence standard has been met. (In re Marc A., supra, at pp. 13-14.)

We further concluded that the juvenile court properly found that there was a substantial risk of serious future injury to Frank and Erica if they remained in mothers custody. For many years, [mothers] children, including Marc and Lucas, have suffered various acts of physical and emotional abuse at her hands. Moreover, the evidence supports a reasonable inference, based on the long history of [mothers] past abuse, that such abuse is likely to reoccur, placing [Frank and Erica] at a substantial risk of serious harm. That is particularly true given that [mother] has thus far been unwilling to acknowledge her abusive conduct, or to fully utilize the services offered to her. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1657-1658 [harm to minor likely to reoccur where mother is in denial . . . about her [child-endangering conduct] and refuses to cooperate with professionals].) (In re Marc A., supra, at p. 16.)

2. Dispositional Order

On August 21, 2006, a dispositional hearing was held. Mother did not contest the departments report or recommendations. In its July 6, 2006, report, the department presented the case plan.[6] Mother indicated a willingness to embrace the case plan, although she did not sign it at that time. The juvenile court followed the departments recommendations: Frank and Erica were continued in an out of home placement, the department was ordered to provide or offer to mother reunification services, and mother was directed to comply with the case plan outlined in the departments July 6, 2006, report. Additionally, without objection from mother, the court granted the departments request that visitation be supervised with the exception that mother could attend a school conference regarding Franks individual educational program without supervision being provided by the department. The matter was continued for a six-month review on October 5, 2006, which was six months after the childrens entry into foster care.

In affirming the dispositional order, we concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that Frank and Erica should remain out of mothers home while mother received services to enable her to reunify with the children. (In re Marc A., supra, at pp. 16-17.) We again noted mothers continued refusal to acknowledge the abusive nature of her conduct. Until such time as [mother] demonstrates a willingness to work with the professionals the [department] has made available to her to change her approach to discipline and to improve her ability to raise children, we agree with the juvenile court that no reasonable means exist to protect [the childrens] physical and emotional well-being without their continued removal from her custody. (Id. at p. 17.)

3. Six Month Review

At the six-month review hearing held on October 5, 2006, mother raised objections to the case plan. In particular, she objected to restrictions placed on her visitation with Frank and Erica, and the case plan requirement that she admit to abusing the children. The juvenile court agreed with the department that mothers challenge to the dispositional order or her case plan should be raised in a section 388 petition based upon new evidence or changed circumstances. The court explained to mother that it was important for her to understand that the matter was past whether or not the allegations were true or not. . . . [T]hat decision has been made. So if you want to reunify with Frank and Erica, you need to work the program sincerely and come to recognize that theres got to be some changes.

The juvenile court also addressed mothers contention that the children were not attending the church they had attended with her. The court asked the department to consider allowing the children to be transported to church by a neutral community person. The court agreed with the department that any person who transported the children would have to provide adequate information for a proper criminal and child welfare background check. In its written order dated October 5, 2006, the court ordered that the department shall secure the childrens attendance at church by investigating proposed individuals who will transport them.

The juvenile court also found that the childrens out-of-home placement continued to be necessary and appropriate, that reasonable services had been provided or offered, and that mother had failed to participate regularly and to make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs and services. The court ordered that mother was to comply with the departments case plan. The matter was continued for a 12-month permanency planning hearing on April 5, 2007, which was 12 months from the time the children entered foster care.

In affirming the October 5, 2006 order, we rejected mothers challenge to the juvenile courts order directing her to comply with the departments case plan on the ground that it was not designed, as dependency law requires, to reunite Frank and Erica with her. (In re Marc A., supra, at pp. 17-18.) In so concluding, we necessarily rejected mothers request that the courts visitation order should be modified, or that the requirement that mother accept the disclosure of her children and acknowledge responsibility for the abuse should be deleted from the case plan.

4. 12-Month Review

On March 23, 2007, the department prepared a report for the 12-month review. The social worker assigned to the case since September 2006, Donna Broadbent, recommended termination of mothers reunification services (excluding visitation based upon the childrens needs). Because Frank and Erica were not adoptable and there was no suitable person available to serve as their legal guardian, Broadbent recommended that the childrens permanent placement should be long-term foster care, now known as a planned permanent living arrangement.

In her report, Broadbent described the familys current circumstances. Mother maintained regular contact via telephone and supervised visits with 15-year-old Frank and 11-year-old Erica, who had been living at a group home since October 20, 2006. Mother and children enjoyed the visits. The visit supervisors reported that mother spent most of the visit focused on Erica and that Frank would often do other things, including riding his bicycle. The social worker reported some concerns regarding the supervised visits at the group home, noting that it had been reported that Erica was either given a cell phone or took a cell phone from her mothers purse. During another supervised visit, Frank told his mother that he would rather play soccer than participate in ballet classes. Mother became upset with the child. The visit monitor spent 45 five minutes after this visit helping the child calm down. When questioned about the incident by the social worker, mother stated that Frank had misunderstood her statements.

Additionally, Erica reported that she frequently spent time with her mother before and after school, and saw her mother at the childs dance studio. Mother admitted that on one occasion she had spent time with Erica when she happened to drive by the school and saw the child waiting for a bus in the rain. Additionally, mother coincidently had seen Erica at her dance studio when mother was picking up a friends granddaughter at the same place. On February 28, 2007, mother reported that she was unaware that she was not allowed to contact the children if she was at their school and saw them. The social worker told mother that she could say hello to the child, but requested that mother not have lengthy unsupervised interactions and that should mother happen to cross paths with the children, she should report the incident to the social worker.

Broadbent addressed mothers concern about the childrens attendance at church, noting that the issue of the childrens transportation to church had been resolved. Broadbent also reported that the children had no known mental health concerns. Before their placement at the group home, the children were located at an emergency shelter facility where they did not receive therapeutic services. In late December 2006/early January 2007, the social worker unsuccessfully attempted to locate therapists that were willing to work with the children.

As to mothers compliance with her case plan requirements, Broadbent reported that mother had signed the case plan at the end of February 2007. Mother met with the social worker on a monthly basis. Mother signed releases so that the social worker could secure information from mothers therapist, and certain parenting and anger management programs. But, mother refused to sign a release so that the department could acquire information about Franks progress at a regional center. Mother also remained adamant that she had done nothing wrong and that there was no legitimate reason for the removal of Frank and Erica from her home.

Mother participated in both group therapy and individual counseling. She completed a six-week parent education course, titled Handling Anger: Mine and My Childs. After an initial cancellation, in February 2007, mother promptly re-enrolled in another three week parenting course, titled Positive Parenting. On February 28, 2007, Broadbent also referred mother to an anger management program, for which mother had scheduled an intake appointment.

Since the end of August 2006, mother had weekly individual counseling sessions with her therapist, whose particular expertise was domestic violence.[7] By March 7, 2007, mother had seen the therapist for 30 weeks. The therapist was asked to work with mother to help her accept responsibility for her actions that the court found to be true, and to listen and show acceptance and support of the disclosures made by her children. Broadbent regularly consulted with the therapist regarding mothers progress in therapy. The therapist routinely stated that mother had made little or no progress in addressing the issues that brought her family to the attention of the court. In fact, the therapist reported that mother did not believe there were any issues of concern regarding Frank and Erica; that mother had little to no insight; and that mother believed she had not done anything wrong and was therefore unable and/or unwilling to explore how her child rearing discipline techniques might be considered abusive.

In the analysis section of her report, Broadbent concluded that mother loved Frank and Erica and was concerned about their care in their current placement and their performance at school. Additionally, the children loved their mother and routinely asked if and when they could go home. However, Broadbent could not ignore the circumstances that brought the family to the attention of the court. The court had found that removal was warranted because of mothers routine use of excessive physical discipline and emotionally abusing parenting techniques. To reunify with her children, it was expected that mother would acknowledge the truth of her childrens disclosures, drastically change her parenting techniques, and create a safe, stable, appropriate home for the children. Unfortunately, mother had not yet begun to do this. Mother was unable to acknowledge that the abuse of some of the children in her home would create a negative, abusive home environment for all of the children. Further, there was no evidence that mothers behavior would spontaneously change despite her failure to acknowledge the inappropriate manner in which she previously disciplined her children. Broadbents recommendation that the children remain in placement and that mothers services be terminated was based upon mothers lack of progress in addressing the issues that brought the children to the attention of the court. Although mother had participated in many services in her case plan, including therapy and parent education, it appeared that she had done so merely to jump through the necessary hoops, not in an effort to effect real change. Mother had not used her participation in services to do anything other than satisfy a requirement. Mother took no responsibility for the familys current circumstances, she lacked any understanding of why her children were removed, and she showed no remorse or desire to change. Broadbent opined that if Frank and Erica were returned to mothers home, it would be to the same exact environment that they left when detained with their mother asserting her authority by utilizing physical and emotional abuse to control her children.

Broadbent attached to her report a March 7, 2007 letter from mothers therapist, who reported that mother refused to show acceptance and support of the disclosures made by her children. In therapy, mother spent time explaining and defending herself and said she could not admit to what she knew she had not done. Mother saw herself as a responsible parent who would not physically, emotionally or psychologically abuse her children. She explained why the allegations were not true and believed that there never was a plan to return the children to her. Mother was able to accept the therapists suggestions about how she might relate to the children during visits, including how to be empathic and ask the children questions to gather information before telling them what she thought, and to setting appropriate boundaries with her emancipated children. Mother gave reasons why she would not consider talking to her two daughters who had testified against her. Mother was aware that reunification with Frank and Erica would not happen without her taking responsibility for her actions.[8]

The 12-month review hearing was held on May 22 and 25, 2007. The court admitted into evidence Broadbents March 23, 2007, report and the therapists March 7, 2007, letter. The court also heard testimony from mother, the children Frank and Erica, Broadbent, mothers therapist, a licensed family and marriage therapist who had treated two of mothers other teenaged children, and one of mothers friends. [9]

Following the hearing, the juvenile court issued a written order filed on June 4, 2007, addressing the issues at the 12-month review hearing. The court retained the children as dependents of the court and determined that out-of-home placement was necessary and appropriate. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the children to mothers custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The finding of detriment was based on the social workers report, including that mother failed to make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs and services. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable services had been provided or offered by the department. The court terminated reunification services to the mother based upon findings that there was no substantial probability that, with the continuation of services, the children would be safely returned to mothers physical custody during the extended service period. The finding of lack of substantial probability of return was based upon the social workers report, including the facts stated in the analysis section. The court also found that the extent of progress which mother had made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement had been minimal. The court advised mother that future visits would be based upon the childrens needs which might result in a reduction of visitation.

The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that scheduling a section 366.26 hearing was not in the childrens best interests because they were not likely to be adopted and there was no suitable guardian to accept placement. The court determined that the childrens permanent plan was a planned permanent living arrangement, and a specific goal of a less restrictive foster care setting was appropriate.[10]

Both mother and the children timely appeal from the June 4, 2007, order.

DISCUSSION

Appellants argue that the evidence does not support the juvenile courts order after the 12-month review hearing. As to the courts finding of detriment, they essentially contend that there was no substantial evidence that mother failed to make substantive progress in meeting her case plan objectives, and the court improperly relied upon a presumption of detriment. Additionally, they contend the record does not support the courts finding that the department provided reasonable services designed to reunify the family. We conclude that appellants arguments do not warrant reversal.

A. Applicable Law

Under the statutory scheme for juvenile dependency proceedings, at the 12-month review hearing, [t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. . . . The court shall also determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian. . . . The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination at the 12-month hearing, the court shall review and consider the social workers report and recommendations . . ., shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent or legal guardian and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself of services provided; and shall made appropriate findings pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 366. ( 366.21, subd. (f).) Section 366, subdivision (a), requires that at each periodic status review, [t]he court shall consider the safety of the child, and determine, among other things, [t]he continuing necessity for . . . placement, [] [t]he extent of the agencys compliance with the case plan in making reasonable efforts . . . to return the child to a safe home, and [t]he extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care. ( 366, subd. (a)(1).)

If the juvenile court does not return the child to parental custody at the 12-month hearing, the court shall either: (1) continue the case for up to another six months for a permanency review hearing; (2) order a section 366.26 hearing to terminate parental rights; or (3) order that the child remain in long-term foster care, now known as a planned permanent living arrangement. ( 366.21, subds. (g)(1), (g)(2) and (g)(3).) After the hearing in this case, the juvenile court chose the third alternative.

B. Juvenile Courts Finding of Detriment

The juvenile court found that the childrens return to their mother would be detrimental based upon mothers failure to make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs and services. ( 366.21, subd. (f): see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.715(c)(1).) Relying on isolated portions of the record, appellants argue that there was no substantial evidence to support the courts finding of detriment. However, appellants fail to adequately address the testimony of the witnesses that supported Broadbents report and recommendations from which the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that mother had not made substantive progress that would allow the return of the children at the time of the 12-month review hearing.

Specifically, appellants ignore the testimony of mothers therapist that mother was not successful in addressing the goals set forth in her case plan, which required mother to accept the disclosures of abuse by her children and acknowledge responsibility for the abuse that had led to the removal of Frank and Erica. Mother was only willing to discuss and accept the therapists suggestions regarding specific situations that mother was confronting in her current relationship with Frank and Erica while they were in placement and during visits. Mother confirmed during her testimony that she had not complied with the case plan objectives of acknowledging responsibility for the circumstances that led to the removal of Frank and Erica, and that she only discussed and accepted the therapists suggestions regarding specific situations that mother was confronting while the children were in placement and during visits.

By the time of the 12-month review hearing, mother participated in 40, 50‑minute therapy sessions. Mother was then at a point in therapy when her therapist would expect to see a breakthrough regarding mothers denial of abuse, but the therapist did not believe any such breakthrough was imminent. There was nothing that would lead the therapist to believe that further therapy would assist mother in acknowledging her responsibility for the removal of the children from her home. In the absence of such an acknowledgement, the therapist believed that mother might still be in a position to abuse the children with excessive punishment if they were then returned to her care. Although the therapist would like to see the children reunified with their mother, the therapist did not testify that the children should be returned to mother at the time of the 12-month hearing.

Appellants also ignore the testimony of mothers expert witness, a licensed family and marriage therapist. The witness testified that although it was not necessary for an abuser to acknowledge the abuse in order to make progress addressing the issue, it was definitely preferred that an abuser acknowledges his or her conduct. The likelihood an abuser would change is definitely lower if that person will not admit that anything happened or that he or she did not do anything. If an abuser remained in denial, there is definitely a higher chance that the behavior would be repeated and there was less motivation to change. The witness opined that an abuser would not be making good progress if the goal was to help him or her acknowledge the credible allegations of abuse.

On appeal, we must defer to the factual determinations of the juvenile court. It is the juvenile court that hears the testimony, makes determinations of credibility, and resolves conflicts in the evidence. As the trier of fact, the juvenile court properly may reject part of the testimony of a witness, though not directly contradicted, and combine the accepted portions with bits of testimony or inferences from the testimony of other witnesses thus weaving a cloth of truth out of selected available material. (Nevarov v. Caldwell (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 762, 777.) In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile courts protection, the court may consider past events. [Citation.] (In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.) Here, the juvenile court had ample cause to question mothers willingness and determination to meet the objectives of the reunification plan, and her progress toward eliminating the conditions that led to the dependency. Further, the focus of the statutory scheme is to avert harm to the children; a parent need not be dangerous and the [children] need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) Based upon Broadbents report, and the testimony of the therapists, the juvenile court could reasonably find that mothers progress was minimal. Mothers argument effectively asks us to reweigh the evidence. We decline to do so. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 812.)

Appellants also argue that the juvenile courts reliance on the statutory presumption of detriment was erroneous. According to appellants, once the court found that mother had participated regularly in the services offered to her, the court could not rely on the departments evidence that mother had failed to make substantive progress to support its finding of detriment. Appellants argument fails.

When added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, and as amended through 1998, section 366.21, subdivision (f), read, in pertinent part: The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485,  43, at p. 5632; Stats 1998, ch. 1056,  15.1, 34, at pp. 6483-6484, 6518.) In 1999, the Legislature amended section 366.21, subdivision (f), to provide (as it currently does), in pertinent part: The failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. (Stats. 1999, ch. 805 (A.B. 740), 4, subd. (b), p. 4677, giving effect and incorporating the amendments of section 366.21, subd. (f), by ch. 399 (S.B. 1226), in the form set forth in ch. 805,  2.2, p. 4670.) The purpose of the amendment was to clarify that the failure to make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs, regardless of regular participation in such programs, shall be prima facie evidence that return of the child to the parent shall be detrimental to the child. (Ass. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1226 (1999 Reg. Sess.) as proposed to be amended and as amended June 21, 1999, p. 1.) The author of Senate Bill No. 1226 explained: This bill sends a message to parents that attendance in court[-]ordered programs is not enough ‑ they need to learn how to correct their problems and learn proper parenting skills. . . . [M]ere participation in court-ordered treatment programs does not necessarily mean that the parent is adequately addressing the problems that led to the abuse or neglect of the child and the courts order to remove the child from that parents home for fear for the childs safety. . . . [T]his bill will give the juvenile dependency court greater authority to terminate parental rights and order a safe, permanent placement for a child, when the childs parent or guardian fails to comply with both the spirit and the letter of the courts order to seek needed treatment. (Id. at pp. 2-3.) In effect, the amendment codified existing case law that a parents compliance with the reunification plan by attending the required therapy sessions and visiting the children is to be considered by the court; but it is not determinative. The court must also consider the parents progress and their capacity to meet the objectives of the plan; otherwise the reasons for removing the children out-of-home will not have been ameliorated. (In re DustinR. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.)

Consequently, the application of the presumption of detriment was not dependent upon evidence of mothers nonparticipation in services. Instead, the juvenile court properly found that the presumption of detriment applied in the absence of any convincing evidence that mother had made substantive progress in meeting the objectives of her case plan requirements. In any event, even without the presumption, a finding of detriment is supported based upon the previously noted substantial evidence of mothers failure to make substantive progress and her unwillingness to meet the objectives of her case plan.[11]

We are also not persuaded by appellants arguments that the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to consider the childrens current emotional states and in failing to balance the risk of possible detriment in mothers home under the departments supervision against the detriment the children had and would experience in foster care if the court terminated efforts to reunify them with mother and placed them permanently in long-term foster care. The court was aware that the children wanted to return to mothers custody, but their wishes were not determinative. Rather, the court was required to consider the best interests of the children, which would necessarily involve eliminating the specific factors that required placement outside the parents home. [Citation.] (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463-464.) Additionally, the juvenile court could consider Broadbents concern that given the childrens acceptance of their mothers position that the older children were lying about the abuse, and their strong desire to leave placement and return to mothers home, it was likely that if the children were returned, they would not report if any abuse was committed against them by mother.

At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court appropriately focused on whether the children could be safety returned to mothers home. As noted, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that mother did not make substantive progress in meeting the objectives of her case plan. That same evidence supports the conclusion that mother did not make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the childrens removal. Consequently, we see no reason to disturb the juvenile courts finding of detriment at the 12-month review hearing.

C. Juvenile Courts Finding of Reasonable Services

Appellants also argue that by the time of the 12-month review, the department had not made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services to mother. We disagree. In evaluating the juvenile courts finding that mother was offered reasonable services to reunify with her children, our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile courts finding that reasonable services were provided or offered. [Citations.] (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) We must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the [courts finding]. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed. [Citations.] (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)

The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the departments efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.) Here, the department prepared a detailed case plan with various requirements to reunify the family. Contrary to appellants contention, the conditions of the reunification plan were properly designed to prevent a recurrence of the circumstances that led to the removal of Frank and Erica from mothers custody. Before the 12-month review hearing, the department referred mother to various services, including individual counseling and parenting classes, and supervised visitation was arranged on a weekly basis.

Relying on isolated portions of the record, appellants argue that services were inadequate because mothers individual therapist started by treating her with inappropriate insight‑oriented techniques, there was a delay in referring mother to a formal anger management course, mother was not referred to family therapy or a support group specifically for parents with teenagers or adopted children, and visitation was unduly restricted by the court and the department. Appellants arguments are unavailing.

Appellants challenge to the counseling mother was offered does not support their contention that services were inadequate. Before the dispositional hearing, mother was evaluated by a psychologist, who determined that insight‑oriented therapy might not be appropriate for mother. Mothers therapist read and considered the psychologists two reports.[12] Before receiving the psychologists reports and then for a short time afterwards, mothers therapist attempted to use insight‑oriented therapy to see if that type of therapy would assist mother in meeting her case plan requirements of accepting the disclosures of abuse by her children and acknowledging her responsibility for the abuse. However, the therapist ultimately agreed with the psychologist that insight‑oriented therapy was not appropriate. When mother steadfastly refused to admit that she was responsible in any way for the circumstances that led to the removal of Frank and Erica, her therapist shifted focus to address mothers current situation regarding her concerns about her relationship with Frank and Erica during visits. Specifically, the therapist would make suggestions as to how mother could handle a specific concern, and mother reported as to the success of such suggestions. Because mother refused to admit she had any responsibility for her situation, the therapist could not use cognitive behavior therapy and she knew of no other therapy that would be more effective in assisting mother to meet her case plan requirements.

By the time of the 12-month review hearing, mother had attended three or four sessions of an anger management program. Broadbent explained the delay in referring mother to an anger management program. The social worker had mistakenly assumed that mothers therapist was addressing the anger management component of the case plan. On a regular basis, Broadbent was informed that mothers therapist was providing all the services that were laid out in the case plan. However, Broadbent was concerned that the therapist also reported that mother was not making progress. In February 2007, when mother reported that her therapist was not discussing anger management issues, Broadbent referred mother to a formal anger management program. Broadbent explained why mothers enrollment in the anger management program had been delayed for a few weeks.

Although Broadbent did not refer mother to support groups specifically for parents of teenagers, mother was referred to parenting courses that concerned children of all ages; and Broadbent did not know of any support groups for parents of adopted children that were available for mother. By the time of the 12-month review hearing, the children had been seeing individual therapists for a month. Broadbent explained the delay and difficulty in referring the children to individual therapists. Broadbent had not referred the family for joint therapy because she felt that it would be most beneficial for the children to have individual therapy before family therapy. On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably determine that in light of mothers case plan objectives, the delays and failure to make certain referrals by the 12-month review hearing were reasonable under the circumstances.

We also reject appellants contentions that visitation restrictions exceeded any that the juvenile court deemed necessary to secure the childrens safety, constituted an effective delegation of judicial authority to the department, and infringed upon the fundamental rights of mother and the children. To the extent appellants rely on the juvenile courts rulings or failure to address visitation at earlier hearings, those rulings and proceedings are not before us on this appeal. By the time of 12-month review hearing, the department was providing supervised visits three times a week; twice at the group home and once after church service. Having granted supervised visits, the juvenile court could delegate to the department the responsibility of managing the details of those visits, including the frequency and length of visits. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374-1377.) At the 12-month hearing, mother testified that her visits with the children at their current placement were very limited, unproductive, and uncomfortable because they took place in a small room, and conversation was worse. However, she did not ask the juvenile court for any specific relief regarding visits or her contacts with the children at that time.

In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) On this record, we see no reason to disturb the juvenile courts finding that the department provided reasonable services under the circumstances.

DISPOSITION

The June 4, 2007 order is affirmed.

_________________________

Jenkins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.

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[1] Further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

[2] Appellants also challenge the juvenile courts March 29, 2007 order denying mothers section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. However, appellants have not filed a timely notice of appeal from the March 29, 2007 order, which is separately appealable. (In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1832.) Nor can we construe appellants notices of appeal from the June 4, 2007 order to include the earlier order because those notices do not mention the earlier order and were not filed within the time in which a notice of appeal could have been filed from the summary denial of the section 388 petition. Consequently, we are without jurisdiction to review the March 29, 2007, order. (SteveJ. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811 [A challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.].)

[3] In a November 26, 2007 order, we granted the childrens request that we take judicial notice of the record in the earlier appeal. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 451, we also take judicial notice of our opinion in In re Marc A.

[4] The social workers report prepared for the jurisdictional hearing, indicated that in December 2005, when a social worker first questioned Frank and Erica about what happened if they misbehaved, Frank replied,  We get whipped.  When asked to elaborate, Frank said that his mother gets an extension cord,  folds  it over and whips them. Erica stated that the children had not been whipped for a long time, not since the summer 2005. When later questioned at school in January 2006, Erica denied any whippings had happened, but eventually said that a long time ago she was spanked, but not with an extension cord or belt. She also denied ever seeing her mother hit any of the other children. Similarly, when Frank was later reminded of his earlier statements, he replied he did not know what being whipped meant, and he asserted he had previously lied to the social worker. When the children were removed from their home on February 1, 2006, the social worker again asked Erica if she remembered their earlier discussion when Frank had said that when they were really naughty, they would get whippings. Erica replied that Frank did not understand what a whipping was. When questioned at the emergency shelter, Frank said he was there because  some people were telling some stuff that wasnt true ‑ lies and making up stuff. (Why did they do that?) I have no clue ‑ guess theyre going crazy. Erica said she was at the shelter  [be]cause my brother said mom beat us which is not true.

[5] The petition also included allegations of abusive acts by mother against Marc and Lucas. After the court sustained the allegations concerning Marc and Lucas, they were declared dependents. Mother waived reunification services, and Marc and Lucas were placed in permanent living arrangements outside of mothers home. Marc and Lucas were not parties to the earlier appeal and are not parties to this appeal.

[6] The July 6, 2006, case plan required mother to meet regularly with the departments social worker; sign all necessary releases of information; [a]ccept the disclosure of her children and acknowledge responsibility for the abuse; participate in weekly individual counseling; complete a parenting education program; and accept any other referrals necessary to achieve the objective of having Frank and Erica return home, including but not limited to anger management, parent support group, and family therapy. Additionally, all visitation was to be supervised until the social worker, in consultation with treating clinicians, deemed that unsupervised visitation would not be detrimental to the physical and/or emotional well-being of the children. The departments request for supervised visits was explained by the social worker: Initially, [mother] had supervised visitation with Erica and Frank, which was then changed to unsupervised contact. Supervised visitation was reinstated when the [social worker] became alarmed at the emotional tone which [mother was exhibiting], including vehement assertions that T. [mothers former ward], who had recently been admitted to [the childrens group home], was going to hurt Frank.

[7] At the 12-month review hearing, mothers therapist explained that although she operated an alternative batterers program, which was basically an anger management program, anger management was actually a very small component of her batterers program. The therapist testified she had not been asked to discuss anger management issues with mother. In any event, the therapist had not considered using any anger management techniques with mother because mother had denied she was angry and gave no indication that she felt angry; anger management techniques would have not have been an effective use of the therapy sessions; and it was fair to say that someone could be an abuser and not have an anger management problem.

[8] After mother received the departments 12-month review report and attachments, she first filed a section 388 petition, to change the court-ordered case plan requirements and to request unsupervised visits. On March 29, 2007, the court denied the petition without a hearing on the ground that the request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances. As noted in footnote 1, ante, appellants have not timely appealed from this denial, and therefore, any challenge to the order is not before us.

[9] To the extent necessary, the witnesses testimony is set forth, post, in connection with our discussion of appellants arguments on appeal.

[10] At the request of the department, the court did not limit mothers right to make educational decisions for the children.

[11] This case is factually distinguishable from In re Heather P. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1228-1229, disapproved on another ground in In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857, 866, fn. 5, in which the Court of Appeal set aside a finding of detriment based solely on a social workers recommendation. In that case, the social worker had reported that Heathers mother had changed her attitude toward the need for treatment and had made good efforts and some progress in addressing the problems that had resulted in the child becoming a dependent, but the social worker had recommended that the child not be returned based upon an outdated psychological evaluation by mothers therapist prepared for an earlier review hearing. (Id. at pp. 1227, 1229.)

[12] Mother requests that we take judicial notice of the two psychological assessment reports, which were not admitted as exhibits at the 12-month review hearing, or otherwise made a part of the official court file, but were discussed by the court and witnesses. Because the reports are not necessary to resolve the issues raised herein, we deny the request as moot.