In re Francisco P.
Filed 5/23/13
In re Francisco P. CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
In re FRANCISCO P., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FRANCISCO P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062272
(Super. Ct. No. J223598)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Richard R. Monroy, Judge.
Affirmed as modified.
Libby A.
Ryan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Theodore M.
Cropley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following a
contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court made true findings on
allegations of threatening a victim by force (Pen. Code,
§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); grand theft from the person (§ 487, subd.
(c)); battery (§ 242); and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11364.1, subd. (a)).
The court determined the maximum confinement potential was eight years.
Francisco
P. (the Minor) was placed on probation, subject to a commitment to the Camp
Barrett program for a period not to exceed 365 days and certain other
conditions.
The Minor
appeals contending the juvenile court incorrectly calculated his
pre-disposition custody credits and that the court erred in declining to strike
one of the probation conditions. The
respondent properly concedes the custody credits were incorrectly
calculated. We will order the juvenile
court to correct the disposition order to award the Minor 57 days of
predisposition custody credits. Otherwise we will affirm the juvenile court's
decision.
STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Since the
Minor does not challenge the admissibility or sufficiency of the evidence to
support the true findings, we will only summarize the underlying offenses.
The Minor,
who is affiliated with the Varrio Fallbrook Locos Sureno gang, physically
assaulted another boy and took items of property from him. He also threatened the victim with physical
harm if he reported the offenses.
DISCUSSION
I
The Minor
contends, and the respondent concedes, he is entitled to additional
pre-disposition custody credits. He
contends he is entitled to 57 days of such credit.
Juvenile
offenders are entitled to receive credit for all time in physical custody prior
to disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 726; In re Randy J. (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504-1505.) An appellate
court may correct the amount of custody credits where the record is clear that
the juvenile court erred in its calculation.
(In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 350.)
The Minor
was arrested and placed in juvenile hall on May 11, 2012 and remained there
until the disposition hearing on July
6, 2012. Thus he is entitled to 57 days
of custody credit. We will direct the
juvenile court to amend the disposition order to correct the award of credits.
II
At the time
of the disposition hearing the court considered a series of proposed conditions
relating to the Minor's ability to drive a vehicle. (Conditions 17-24.) The Minor was not then licensed to drive a
vehicle, but was otherwise eligible to be licensed. He objected to three of the proposed
conditions: Condition 17 delaying
licensing for one year; condition 18 requiring an abstract to be issued to the
condition 19 requiring that the Minor not have a driving privilege until he
gives proof of financial responsibility.
The Minor's objection to the three conditions was that he did not have a
driver's license.
The court
struck conditions 17 and 18 but denied the request to strike condition 19. The Minor contends the trial court erred in
denying his request to strike condition 19.
He argues the offense had nothing to do with driving and thus the
condition does not have a relationship to the offense. He further contends the condition prohibits
legal conduct and is not related to any rehabilitative purpose. We conclude the imposition of condition 19
was well within the very broad discretion of the juvenile court and does serve
a legitimate purpose to attempt to avoid future unlawful behavior.
A. Legal Principles
Juvenile
courts have broad discretion to impose any reasonable conditions of probation
that may properly enhance the reformation and rehabilitation of the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd.
(b); In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 963, 968.) The juvenile
court "stands in the shoes of the parents" when providing guidance to
wards of the court. (
Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033-1034.)
A condition
of probation, which limits conduct that is otherwise not criminal, will be
valid if the limitation is reasonably related to the crime or preventing future
criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486; In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1016.)
Vehicle
Code section 16028 requires all drivers to show proof of financial
responsibility when demand is made by a peace officer.
Thus the
question presented here is whether condition 19 relates to the Minor's
reformation and rehabilitation.
B. Analysis
The
probation conditions the court imposed, which are not challenged here, include
not driving unless licensed and insured (condition 22). The challenged condition merely augments the
requirement by also requiring the showing of financial responsibility, which
can be shown with valid proof of insurance.
Thus, condition 19 does not burden the Minor's exercise of any lawful
activity. It is merely one of a group of
conditions, most of which are unchallenged, requiring the Minor to only drive
lawfully.
In this
case the Minor was on probation when he committed the current offenses, which
included violent and threatening behavior.
He has been actively involved with a criminal street gang and has
continued to behave in an irresponsible manner even where there has been
juvenile court intervention. Given the
pattern of irresponsibility, it was reasonable for the court to attempt to
prevent future irresponsible behavior in the driving of vehicles. The fact he was not yet licensed to drive
does not detract from the court's legitimate desire to correct the behavior
underlying his offense, i.e., acting in an unlawful and potentially harmful
manner.
In our
view, requiring the Minor to fully comply with the law before he is permitted
to drive a vehicle is entirely consistent with the quasi-parental role of the
juvenile court in dealing with a young person who could well end up in the
adult criminal justice system if his behavior is not corrected. Condition 19 was lawfully imposed.
DISPOSITION
The
juvenile court is directed to amend the dispositional order to reflect 57 days
of predisposition custody credit. In all
other respects the adjudication and dispositional orders are affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD,
J.
O'ROURKE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.
