target="G047204_files/props0002.xml">
In re F.P.
Filed 1/22/13
In re F.P. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
>
In re F.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.P., Defendant and Appellant. | G047204 (Super. Ct. No. DL040527) O P I N I O N |
Appeal
from an order of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Douglas Hatchimonji, Judge.
Affirmed.
Sylvia
Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
1. Introduction
In the dispositional order, the juvenile court sustained the
allegation charging F.P. with one count of misdemeanor href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">battery (Pen. Code, § 242). Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 725, subdivision (a), the court placed F.P. on probation,
with terms and conditions, for a period of six months without adjudging him to
be a ward of the court.
F.P. timely appealed from the dispositional
order. Appointed counsel filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting
forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire
record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel suggested we consider two issues, which
we address in section 4. F.P was
granted 30 days to file written arguments in his own behalf, but did not file
anything.
We have examined the entire record and counsel’s >Wende/Anders brief. We looked for
issues other than those raised by counsel, but after considering the entire
record, we have found no reasonably arguable
issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.
2. Procedural History
In June 2011, a petition to declare F.P. a ward of the court was
filed. The petition alleged F.P.
committed one count of misdemeanor assault and one count of misdemeanor battery
against “Jane Doe†(some capitalization omitted), identified in the detention
report as F.P.’s mother (Mother). The
juvenile court denied F.P.’s request to be released on home supervision program
(HSP), and ordered that F.P. be removed from Mother’s custody and detained in
juvenile hall in the custody of the probation department.
In July 2011, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing
pursuant to In re Dennis H.
(1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 350, at the conclusion of which the court released F.P. to
Mother’s custody. Later that month, the
court placed F.P. on informal probation for six months pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 654.
Probation was made subject to terms and conditions, including attendance
at school unless excused. The court
stated that “[a]s long as you are attending school on a regular basis and there
[are] no new law violations then this case will be dismissed on
January 18th[, 2012].â€
On January 18, 2012, the juvenile court terminated F.P.’s
informal probation on the ground F.P. had not complied with the terms and
conditions of probation. After several
continuances, a hearing on the petition was set for May 24, 2012. F.P. did not appear on that date and a
warrant was issued for his arrest. F.P.
turned himself in to the court on June 14, and the court recalled the
warrant. The court found that F.P. was
in urgent need of protection and likely to flee the jurisdiction, and that
continued residence with Mother was contrary to his welfare. The court placed F.P. in the custody of the
probation department but released him to Mother’s custody on HSP pending a
hearing on the petition. HSP was
terminated on June 25, and F.P. was ordered detained in juvenile hall
pending a hearing on the petition.
The hearing on the petition was conducted on June 27, 28, and
29, and July 9, 2012. On
June 29, the juvenile court ordered F.P. released to Mother’s custody on
HSP. At the conclusion of the hearing on
July 9, 2012, the juvenile court sustained the petition only on the count
for misdemeanor battery and found the maximum term of confinement to be six
months. Pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a), the court placed F.P.
on probation, with terms and conditions, without adjudging him to be a ward of
the court. HSP was terminated.
3. Facts
On June 25, 2011 at about 7:00 a.m., Mother was sitting on
a couch at her home in Orange County when F.P., then age 13, returned after
being out all night. Mother asked F.P.
where and with whom he had been. F.P.
did not respond and went into his bedroom.
Mother followed him and continued to ask where he had been. F.P. still did not respond.
As F.P. was falling asleep, Mother took away his blanket and told
him he was not going to sleep. F.P. sat
on the bed, and Mother asked him yet again where he had been. F.P. told her it was none of her
business. Mother got close to F.P. and
slapped him on the cheek. F.P. jumped
off the bed, told Mother he was going to go “back to the street,†and tried to
leave the bedroom. Mother blocked the
door, pulled F.P. by his T‑shirt, and told him he was not going out
again. F.P. turned around and grabbed
her wrist for a few seconds. As Mother
tried to pull away, F.P. grabbed her just below the neck with both hands and
told her to move out of the way and leave him alone. Mother let go of F.P.’s T‑shirt and sat
down on the bed.
As F.P. packed clothing into his book bag, he threw a shirt at
Mother and called her a “pendejo†(translated as “idiotâ€). She became angry and struck F.P. two to four
times with a plastic hanger. F.P. took
the hanger, broke it, and threw it down away from Mother.
F.P. dialed 911 and slid the telephone to Mother to speak with the
operator. Mother refused the
telephone. Instead, F.P.’s older brother
spoke with the 911 operator. Police
officers arrived and spoke with Mother and F.P, who had several reddish marks
on his left forearm from being struck with the hanger. The marks were two to four inches in length
and slightly raised.
4. Analysis
of Suggested Issues in Counsel’s Wende/Anders
Brief
Appointed counsel suggests two potential issues: (1) “Did the minor have the right to use
force in self‑defense of his mother’s slapping him and blocking the
door?†and (2) “Did the Juvenile Court err in the disposition of declaring
the minor a non-ward and placing him on formal probation for a period of six
months?†We conclude neither potential
issue has merit.
a. Potential Issue No. 1
A defendant is not guilty of an offense if the defendant uses force
against the other in lawful self‑defense.
(Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693; see also CALCRIM No. 3470.) To invoke self‑defense, the defendant
must reasonably believe the use of force was necessary to defend against
imminent danger and may use no more force than was reasonably necessary to
defend against that danger. (>People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th
733, 747; People v. Humphrey (1996)
13 Cal.4th 1073, 1083; CALCRIM No. 3470.)
The juvenile court found that F.P. did not reasonably respond when
Mother slapped him. The court stated,
“the reasonable response . . . to his mother’s initial slapping him
was to remain at home†and F.P. had “a general obligation to obey his
parents.†The evidence supported those
findings. By slapping F.P. and seeking
to confine him to his room, Mother was imposing reasonable discipline and
punishment. (People v. Checketts (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194 [reasonable
acts of discipline may include confinement to a particular location, such as
sending a child to his or her room]; People
v. Whitehurst (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050 [“A parent has a right to
reasonably discipline by punishing a child and may administer reasonable
punishmentâ€].) F.P.’s use of force in
grabbing Mother’s wrist and neck was not a reasonable response under the
circumstances and was far greater than necessary for F.P. to defend himself.
b. Potential Issue No. 2
We review a juvenile court’s dispositional order in a delinquency
proceeding for abuse of discretion. (>In re Robert H. (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329‑1330; In re
Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416.) In determining the appropriate disposition,
the juvenile court must consider the circumstances and gravity of the offense
and the minor’s previous delinquent history.
(In re G.C. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 405, 409.)
The juvenile court placed F.P. on probation for a period of six
months without adjudging him to be a ward of the court. Welfare and Institutions Code
section 725, subdivision (a)href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] authorizes this disposition.
The terms and conditions of F.P.’s probation are lawful and include
those required by section 725, subdivision (a). Nothing in the record suggests the juvenile
court did not consider all of the appropriate circumstances. We find no abuse of discretion.
5. Disposition
The dispositional order is affirmed.
FYBEL,
J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
BEDSWORTH, J.