In re E.P.
Filed 2/4/10 In re E.P. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re E.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant. | F058761 (Super. Ct. No. 08CEJ300116-1) OPINION |
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jane A. Cardoza, Judge.
Amy Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant R.C. was the biological, but not presumed father of E.P., a dependent child, whom the Fresno County Superior Court recently freed for adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26).[1] He appealed from the order terminating parental rights and was appointed appellate counsel by this court to represent him. His court-appointed appellate counsel subsequently informed this court by letter that counsel was not filing an opening brief for lack of any arguable issue (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). In turn, this court extended time for appellant to personally file a letter brief which he has since done.
In his letter brief, appellant argues he is prepared to do what it takes to be a father and it seems premature to terminate my parental rights. His arguments, however, do not amount to claims that the juvenile court committed an error affecting the outcome of this case (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994). Consequently, we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In this case, E.P. was detained at birth when both she and her mother tested positive for cocaine. Appellant was neither married to the childs mother nor present at the childs birth. Instead, he was incarcerated. While the mother was pregnant with E.P., appellant had reportedly raped and impregnated the mothers teenage daughter. During the rape investigation, appellant was imprisoned on a parole violation.
In June 2008, the Fresno County Superior Court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over E.P. and removed her from her mothers custody. It also denied appellant reunification services with the child. The court found appellant was only the childs alleged father and therefore was not entitled to reunification services ( 361.5, subd. (a)). Appellant never appealed that decision. Although later paternity testing led to a finding that appellant was E.P.s biological father, he never made any subsequent effort to elevate his paternity status to that of a presumed father.
When the mother failed to reunify with E.P., the court set a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the child ( 366.26). By this point, appellants whereabouts were unknown.
Respondent Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (department) later reported that E.P. was likely to be adopted and recommended the court find the child was adoptable and order termination of parental rights. Appellant attended the section 366.26 hearing in October 2009, but submitted the case on the departments report without any argument. The court in turn found E.P. adoptable and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is up to appellant to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.) With no error or other defect claimed against the orders appealed from, we have no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. (Ibid.)
Although appellant characterizes the courts decision as premature, his claim is not even arguable. As E.P.s alleged father throughout these proceedings, appellant may have established his biological paternity. However, he never sought nor achieved achieved presumed father status. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15.) As a result, he was not entitled to placement nor reunification services with regard to E.P. (Id.at 451.)
In addition, appellant overlooks E.P.s need, by this late stage, for permanence and stability which could best be achieved through adoption. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) A section 366.26 hearing is designed to protect a childs compelling rights to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (Id. at p. 306.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) There was nothing premature about the courts decision.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
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* Before Vartabedian, A.P.J., Wiseman, J., and Hill, J.
[1] All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
