In re E.M.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 11/19/13  In re E.M. CA2/5

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.

 

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
FIVE

 

 
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In re E.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B245227       (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.        No. CK92399)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,               Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   H.M.,               Defendant and Appellant.

 

            APPEAL from
the orders of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County, Stephen Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee.  Affirmed.

            Jesse F. Rodriguez,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

            John F.
Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen
Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

____________________________________

            H.M. (mother) appeals from the dependency
court’s orders declaring E.M. a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (c),href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1]
and removing E.M. from mother’s custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision
(c).  Mother contends substantial
evidence does not support either the jurisdictional findings that E.M. was at
substantial risk of harm and at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional
damage, or the court’s disposition order removing E.M. from mother.  Mother also contends the dependency court
violated due process by declining to
appoint an expert witness on her behalf. 
We conclude substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings
and dispositional orders, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
mother’s requests for an expert witness appointment.  We affirm. 


 

>STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE

 

            Mother and
R.M. (father)href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"
title="">^[2] are the divorced parents of E.M., a
nine-year-old girl.  Father has a history
of schizophrenia but has been compliant with his medications and in good mental
health for the past six years.  Father
filed for divorce in 2004.  After
initially reuniting, the couple permanently separated in 2006 and their divorce
was finalized in 2008.  Mother was
granted sole custody of E.M., with monitored visitation rights for father.  In March 2010, the family law court gave
father joint legal custody and modified the visitation schedule to permit
monitored visits on alternate weekends. 
Father lives in New Jersey. 

            In March
2007, Mother took E.M. to the hospital at UCLA, for treatment of headaches and
sleeplessness caused by altitude sickness from visiting her father on Mt.
Baldy.  The doctor prescribed medication for altitude
sickness but also suggested the symptoms could be caused by stress and referred
E.M. to counseling.

            Mother took
E.M. to the doctor after smelling gas in her apartment in April 2007.  She took E.M. for follow-up examinations in
November 2007 and February 2008.  Doctors
opined E.M. was recovering normally from possible carbon monoxide
exposure.  Mother asked about giving E.M.
treatment in a “hyperbaric chamber,” but the doctor reassured her such
treatment was not necessary and carried certain risks.  The doctor cautioned mother not to discuss her
medical concerns in front of E.M. because of the potential negative impact on
E.M.

            Mother took
E.M. to an urgent care facility when she was experiencing “flu-like symptoms”
in December 2009.  She discovered mold in
her apartment a month later near the kitchen sink.  She moved out of the apartment in January
2010 and claims she and E.M. have been suffering from mold exposure ever since.
 She has taken E.M. to multiple doctors,
repeatedly faxing lists of medical tests that she wants the doctors to run on
E.M. to explain symptoms such as frequent urination, dark and pungent diarrhea,
black bruises appearing on hands only at night, and difficulty breathing.  Doctors observed that E.M. had a flat affect
and would usually repeat verbatim the symptoms described by mother.

            Dr. Mona
Shah was E.M.’s treating physician for over a year.  In Dr. Shah’s opinion, “Mother believes that
she has the exact same thing as her daughter.  Mother is paranoid or obsessive compulsive.  She types out a manifest and a check list of
lots of blood tests she wants done.  She
has been offered therapy at the clinic but she has not accepted.  She believes she is dying f[rom] mold and
something in her computer keyboard and that she has cancer.  We believe that mother needs a mental health
evaluation.  The child is a[t] risk
because of mother’s delusions.  The child
has no signs of mold exposure, she’s a healthy child.  We can’t keep poking and prodding this child
because her mother believes she is sick.”  


            Dr. Lidia
Alonso saw E.M. several times and found nothing wrong.  She described mother as “obsessive” and “relentless”
in insisting that E.M. was ill and seeking multiple tests for E.M.  Dr. Alonso and UCLA tried referring mother
for mental health treatment, but she did not go. 

            Letters
between Mother and the insurance company list numerous physical complaints and criticize
the doctors’ lack of a response.  According
to a children’s social worker (CSW), “mother’s writings alone are extremely
concerning.  The mother appears
relentless in her pursuit of labeling her daughter as ill, which will then
result in unnecessary medical tests and treatment, let alone emotional damage
that stems from one being told repeatedly that they are not well and possibly
very sick.”

            Dr. Paula
Kuhlman wrote a letter to mother dated January
20, 2012, expressing concern that mother was suggesting symptoms to
E.M. and subjecting her to unnecessary testing and doctor visits.  Dr. Kuhlman notified the Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) of her concerns for E.M.’s safety.  The Department commenced an investigation.

            On February 15, 2012, a CSW interviewed
E.M. at school.  She reported feeling
fine at school but having nausea and frequent urination at home.  A school staff member reported that when she
walked E.M. back to class after E.M. spoke with the CSW, E.M. said “I always
knew this day would come.”  Mother faxed
a letter to the CSW several days later stating that E.M. “forgot to mention a
few things” during the CSW’s visit to the school.  Mother said E.M. had “too many symptoms,”
which she forgot to include.  Mother
claimed E.M. had “Diarrhea, Stomach ache, Headache, Runny and Itchy Nose, Leaky
gut feeling (her left side), Bruise on her hands, Pain in her heel, Frequent
Urine and change in color of urine, Blurry Eyes, Coughing, Nausea, Vomiting (8
times), Itchy Skin, Skin Rash, Short Breath, Chest Pain.”

            On February 28, 2012, father reported to
a CSW his feeling that mother overreacted to possible altitude sickness and
carbon monoxide poisoning.  He said “the
sad part about all of this is that Mother really believes that she and [E.M.]
are ill.”  He reported that when mother
is under a lot of stress, she dreams of these types of illnesses and then
researches them.  He is concerned because
mother said she is going to have surgery to remove the mold from her body, and
he feared that mother will find someone to do surgery on his daughter as well.

            On February 29, 2012, the dependency
court issued a warrant to remove E.M. from her home.  E.M. was removed and placed in a foster
home.  At the March 5, 2012
detention hearing, the court ordered monitored
visitation for mother twice a week and reasonable monitored visitation for
father.  Around April 30, 2012, the foster parents complained of
harassing behavior by mother, and E.M.’s counsel requested that mother’s
monitored visits take place at the Department’s offices only.

            Three different attorneys filed
motions to be relieved as mother’s counsel between May 16 and July 18.  Between May 16 and May 22, mother sought to,
and did, represent herself without the assistance of counsel.  The dependency court denied mother’s, in
propria persona, oral request for
appointment of an expert on May 16,
2012.

            The
Department’s May 22, 2012
reporthref="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[3] states E.M. “is at very high risk of
harm.  Since the mother continues to
believe her child is ill, it is likely the mother will continue to seek out
unnecessary invasive medical examinations for her child as well as emotional damage
that stems from one being told repeatedly that they are not well and possibly
very sick.”  During the course of the
dependency proceeding, mother sent numerous e-mails to the Department, father,
and paternal grandparents describing E.M.’s purported illnesses and urging
further medical treatment.

            After
repeatedly complaining to CSWs about the “poor quality of air” in the
Department’s offices, mother sent 12 e-mails between May 26 and July 10, 2012,
detailing her own and her daughter’s illnesses. 
A June 14, 2012 e-mail attaches a document referred to as “Exhibit 33”
with an extensive list of symptoms and prescribed medications for both mother
and E.M., ranging from Azithromycin for Sore and Itchy Throat to Itroconazole
for Ovaryian Cysts and Diverticulitis. 
The e-mail stated:  â€œAs you know
from my Exhibit 33, we have been taking a total of 24 prescribed medications to
treat our allergy and asthma symptoms for 2 years before your office took my
child away from me.”  After complaining
again about the air quality in the Department’s offices, the e-mail threatens “Our
further health damage from this point will become the whole responsibility of
your office.”

            In August 2012, mother violated
the dependency court’s orders to not discuss health matters during visits with
E.M several times, telling her daughter she smelled and needed to shower and
brush her teeth more often.  E.M. was
increasingly uncomfortable during visits with mother and would go to the
restroom to give herself a break from mother’s presence.  She no longer wanted to visit mother and
preferred to live with father in New Jersey instead.  The court ultimately suspended mother’s
visits with E.M. on September 4, 2012, pending the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">jurisdiction hearing.

            In early
September, the dependency court also granted the Department’s request to
appoint Dr. Steve Ambrose, a
psychologist, as an expert to evaluate mother and father and make
recommendations for E.M.’s placement and parent’s visitation rights at
disposition.  The court order directed
Dr. Ambrose to opine on the mother’s ability to use services, her current
psychological condition, and her ability to remain symptom free.  Mother objected to the appointment and never
returned Dr. Ambrose’s calls to arrange an evaluation.

            The
jurisdiction hearing was five days long, taking place on September 20, 21,
October 4, 23, and 24.  The dependency
court sustained three allegations under subdivision (b) of section 300 and one
under subdivision (c).

            At the
October 30, 2012 disposition hearing, the dependency court ordered E.M. to
remain removed from mother and placed with father in New Jersey. 

 

>DISCUSSION

 

A.  Substantial Evidence

 

            We examine the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders under the
substantial evidence standard of review. 
“[W]e look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them. 
[Citation.]  In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations[.]”  (In re Heather A. (1996) 52
Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)  Issues of fact
and the credibility of witnesses are questions for the trial court.  (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733.)  “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court. 
[Citations.]”  (In re Matthew
S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)  The
pertinent inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the findings, not
whether contrary findings might have been made. 
(In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

 

B.  Jurisdictional Findings

 

            A court may
exercise jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), if “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .”  In order to establish jurisdiction under
subdivision (b) of section 300, there must be evidence of (1)  neglectful conduct by the parent; (2)  causation; and (3)  serious physical harm or illness to the minor,
or a substantial risk of such harm or illness.  (In re
Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

            The dependency court found two
allegations against mother true under subdivision (b) of section 300 and one
against father.  Mother only appeals the
orders sustaining the allegations against her. 
The sustained allegation against father alone would be sufficient to
affirm.  Where a court exercises section
300 jurisdiction based on multiple allegations, we may affirm “if the evidence
supports the decision on any one of
several grounds[.]”  (>In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
873, 875, italics added.)  Nonetheless,
we examine both allegations against mother and conclude they are supported by
substantial evidence.

            The petition alleged mother “placed
the child in a detrimental and endangering situation by repeatedly insisting
that the child suffered from numerous href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">physical ailments . . . .”
 The first sustained allegation stated
mother took E.M. to the doctor repeatedly, demanding invasive medical tests,
unnecessary medical treatment, and medicines for fictitious illnesses, thereby
endangering her physical safety and placing her at risk of physical harm.  The second sustained allegation stated mother
has a five-year history of mental and emotional problems, including delusional
behavior, and she has failed to obtain treatment for those problems, placing E.M
at risk of harm and damage.

            The dependency court heard
testimony from numerous witnesses and considered voluminous documentary
evidence at the jurisdiction hearing.  The court recognized parents
appropriately seek medical care and treatment when their children have
problems, but “after reviewing the voluminous medical records and testimony, it’s
clear to me that at some point in this mother’s life with this child, she went
over the line; that the numbers of doctors and physicians and care and
treatment and complaints that have occurred over the life of this child exceed
any normality and have caused this child -- it’s patently obvious to me that
this child has suffered from the conduct of mother’s continual, constant use of
physicians.”

            Substantial
evidence supports the dependency court’s determination.  Mother has requested at various points in
time that E.M. receive a blood test for ovarian cancer, an ultrasound for a
pelvic infection, antifungal medication, and a CAT scan, all of which doctors
have found to be unnecessary.  She also
insists that E.M. must be examined by Dr. Roger M. Katz, a mold expert, and
receive tests recommended by Dr. Ritchie C. Shoemaker, the author of a book
entitled, Surviving Mold.  Mother refuses
to believe the various doctors who have confirmed that E.M. is healthy and
presents no symptoms of mold poisoning, fungal infection, or other medical
problems.  She shows no signs of
accepting responsibility for her actions and instead continues her relentless
pursuit of labeling her daughter as ill and in need of medical testing and
treatment. 

            Mother
contends that because she never demanded
E.M.’s doctors to conduct tests, but merely suggested
the necessary tests to prove that E.M’s illnesses were mold related, there
cannot be substantial evidence that her conduct harmed E.M. or placed E.M. at
substantial risk of harm.  The proper
characterization of mother’s communications with E.M.’s doctors is best left to
the trial court.  “[I]ssues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.  [Citation.]” 
(In re Heather A. supra,
52 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.)  The
evidence before the dependency court supports a reasonable inference that
mother was demanding action from the doctors. 
E.M.’s doctor reported mother requested 30-40 tests and was sending 5 to
6 faxes per day to the clinic with a
laundry list of medical complaints.

            In contending her conduct was a reflection of a genuine concern about
E.M.’s health and well-being, not abuse or neglect, mother asks this court to
reweigh the evidence, which is not within our province.  Our role is to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the findings.  The
record contains ample evidence of mother’s troubling behavior, and the dependency
court could reasonably infer that mother’s actions put E.M. at substantial risk
of harm.

            Section 300, subdivision (c) applies to a child who is suffering serious
emotional damage or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional
damage, despite positive aspects of the home environment.  (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1320 [child with a warm, close relationship with mother was
still at risk of suffering serious emotional damage where mother’s delusions
about child’s health render her unable to provide a stable and non-threatening
home environment].)href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title="">^[4]

            Mother
acknowledges “disconcerting” facts about her behavior during supervised
visitations but contends the problems stemming from visits after the initial
detention do not support a finding under subdivision (c) of section 300.  We reject Mother’s argument.  “‘[T]he question under
section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject
the minor to the defined risk of harm.’ 
[Citation.]”  (>In re A.J. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1095,
1104 [child was at risk of suffering serious emotional harm from mother’s
actions both pre- and post-detention].) 

            The
dependency court sustained allegations under section 300, subdivision (c), that
mother “emotionally abused the child by repeatedly insisting that the
child suffered from numerous physical ailments . . . .”  The petition also alleges mother caused the
child to mimic the fictitious symptoms and the child exhibited dissociated
behavior to medical professionals.

            Substantial
evidence again supports the dependency court’s order sustaining the allegations
under subdivision (c) of section 300. 
The court drew specific attention to its conclusions about mother’s
emotional problems and their effect on E.M.: 
“This poor child was so nervous, she was washing her hands before the
visits just to make sure she was going to be okay for mom.  That’s a problem. . . .  [M]other is anxious and nervous and needs some
mental health assessments and has not done so. 
She continues to refuse.  And
there’s no question that -- in this court’s mind, that this is an emotional
problem that she needs to deal with. . . .  [T]his is a child who is -- if not now
suffering, there is a substantial risk of this child suffering from serious
emotional damage, evidenced by the problems she was having.  The flat affect that she displayed is clearly
one of a psychological nature which causes, if not now, in the future, some
severe problems.” 

            Mother repeatedly
expressed unfounded concerns about her daughter’s health with little or no
insight into how her statements were causing emotional harm to her
daughter.  Mother more recently brought
medical books and discussed health concerns with E.M. during monitored visits
in violation of court orders to refrain from doing so, repeatedly criticizing
E.M.’s hygiene and warning her of the dangers of fungus.

            The
evidence considered by the dependency court included medical literature about
Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy or Factitious Disorder, and the opinion of an
expert that mother’s actions as reflected in court documents were consistent
with such a diagnosis.  Mother never saw
a psychiatrist, but the court could reasonably infer her statements and actions
are consistent with someone suffering from a psychological disorder.  Because mother continues to refuse therapy,
the risk to E.M. remains significant. 
The Department noted E.M’s increasing discomfort during visits with her
mom, which again supports a reasonable inference that mother’s emotional
problems were placing E.M. at risk of emotional harm.  Mother’s statements and behavior,
and E.M.’s response, constitute solid, credible evidence that E.M. is at
substantial risk of suffering “serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior.”  (§ 300, subd. (c).)

 

Removal Order

 

            Mother
contends the order removing E.M. under section 361,
subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(3)href="#_ftn5"
name="_ftnref5" title="">^[5] must be
reversed.  She argues substantial
evidence does not support the finding E.M. was at substantial risk of harm in mother’s
custody and the dependency court did not consider reasonable alternative means
to protect E.M.  We disagree.

            Before a child can be removed from
parental custody, the Department must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here
is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection,
or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned
home” and removal is the only reasonable means of protecting her physical
health.  (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)  â€œâ€˜The parent need not be dangerous and the
minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The
focus . . . is on averting harm to the child.  [Citations.]’”  (In re
Miguel C. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) 
We review a dispositional order removing a child from a custodial parent
for substantial evidence.  (>In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th
1117, 1126.) 

            The ample evidence of mother’s past
and continuing efforts to obtain unnecessary medical testing and treatment for
E.M. is sufficient to support the finding E.M. was at substantial risk of harm
in mother’s custody.  (§ 361, subd.
(c)(1).)  E.M.’s statements and her
actions during monitored visits with mother also support the finding E.M. would
suffer severe emotional damage in mother’s custody.  (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).)  The court-appointed expert opined that he had
little reason to believe that mother could provide a safe and stable home
environment for E.M., in light of mother’s reported failure to attend therapy
and her behavior with E.M. during monitored visits.  Based on his interviews with E.M. and a
social worker, mother “continues to display poor judgment, emotional volatility
and a severe lack of insight” and E.M. “clearly does not feel safe and
comfortable with [mother] even when their visits are monitored.”

            Mother contends the dependency court
did not consider reasonable alternative means to protect E.M, arguing E.M.
could have remained with mother under strict limitations preventing mother from
taking E.M. to a health care practitioner or other medical professional without
the court’s approval, except in a medical emergency.  Such an arrangement is not realistic in light
of mother’s prior actions violating court orders.  (In re
John M., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1127 [juvenile court reasonably decided not to place minor in mother’s
home with “strict supervision” where mother has already twice violated court
orders].)  Mother repeatedly refused or failed to
follow court-ordered restrictions on her visits with E.M.  She brought medical texts to the visits and
asked E.M. questions about her health even after the court ordered her not to
do so.  Mother’s inability to adhere to
the court’s restrictions ultimately led the court to suspend visitation until
the jurisdictional hearing.  Substantial
evidence supports the court’s finding 
that “there is no reasonable means to protect without removal.”

 

County-Funded Expert Witness

 

            Mother contends the dependency court violated her right
to due process when it denied her May 16, 2012 and October 4, 2012 requests to
appoint a mold expert.  She argues the
expert appointment is a reasonably necessary ancillary defense service and the
court should have granted the requests. 
Both rulings were well within the court’s discretion and did not deny
mother due process.

            We review
the dependency court’s orders for abuse of discretion.  (Coronevsky
v. Superior Court  (1984) 36 Cal.3d
307, 321.)  “In analyzing a due process
claim, we apply a ‘flexible balancing standard’ that considers (1)  the private interest that the official action
will affect; (2)  the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; (3)  the dignity interest in informing individuals
of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to
present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official; and
(4)  the governmental interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  [Citations.]” 
(In re Walter E. (1992) 13
Cal.App.4th 125, 137 [rejecting claim that juvenile court denied appellant due
process by refusing to appoint a second psychologist chosen by appellant to
examine child].)

            A parent
has substantial private interests at stake in a dependency proceeding, but the
state has an equal if not superior countervailing interest in protecting the
safety of the child, his or her best interests, and in providing “an expedited
proceeding to resolve the child’s status without further delay.  [Citations.]” 
(In re Walter E., >supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 138)  We are satisfied that both times the dependency
court denied mother’s request to appoint an expert, the court acted within its
discretion, balancing the mother’s interest against the interests of the minor
and the need to keep the dependency proceeding moving forward.  (Ibid.)

            The
dependency court denied mother’s May 16, 2012 request for county funding for an
expert witness on the same day it granted counsel’s motion to be relieved and
agreed to permit mother to represent herself. 
Mother made no factual showing the expert was reasonably necessary to
her defense and instead simply stated in conclusory form, “Since I’m
representing myself in [propria persona], I wonder whether this court can cover
the expense for expert witness fees.”  Mother
did not explain why an expert was necessary, and therefore did not establish
how denial of her request would result in a denial of due process.  We presume that where the record is silent,
the facts would support lower court’s order, and appellant must affirmatively
demonstrate any error.  (>Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.)  Mother has failed to show how
the court abused its discretion by denying her May 16, 2012 request for county
funding for an expert witness.

            Mother’s
counsel did not make her second request for appointment of an expert witness
until the third day of a five-day jurisdiction hearing.  Mother filed a “Motion for Dr. Katz’s 730
evaluation for the child’s mold allergy, asthmas” on October 4, 2012.  The motion does not describe how Dr. Katz’s
appointment would assist the dependency court in determining whether jurisdiction
under section 300 was proper, but presumably mother hoped to show that E.M.
suffered from mold allergies, and therefore, her insistence on further testing
was not irrational.  E.M.’s counsel
objected to the appointment stating, “The crux of this case is excessive
medical testing of my client.”  E.M.’s
counsel argued it would be ridiculous for the court to order additional testing
in the midst of adjudicating the veracity of the Department’s petition.  The Department objected to the motion as
untimely because it had just been served on counsel and because evidence
already before the court showed E.M. had been screened for mold allergies and
was found to have none.  The court denied
the request “for the reason stated by counsel, including not timely and
excessive.”

            Mother
argues the denial for untimeliness constitutes an abuse of discretion, because
her original May 16, 2012 request was well in advance of trial.  We disagree--mother could have renewed her
request for appointment of the expert in advance of trial but failed to do
so.  The untimeliness of the mid-hearing
motion is a sufficient basis alone to find no abuse of discretion in the ruling
of the dependency court.  Moreover, by
the time the motion was made, the court already had before it significant
evidence about mold, its effects, and Dr. Katz’s report finding mother was
allergic to mold.  The court could
reasonably conclude the limited value of any testimony from Dr. Katz did not
justify any further testing of E.M. or the continued delay of proceedings that
had already taken eight months.

 

>DISPOSITION

 

            The orders are affirmed.

 

 

                        KRIEGLER, J.

 

 

We
concur:

 

 

                        TURNER, P. J.

 

 

                        MOSK, J.