In re E.H.
Filed 8/27/13 In re E.H. CA4/3
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re E.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
G048329
(Super. Ct. Nos. DP023533,
DP023534, DP023535)
O P I
N I O N
Appeal from an order of
the Superior Court
of
County, Jacki C. Brown, Judge.
Affirmed.
Daniel G. Rooney, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos,
County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Debbie Torrez, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the
Minors.
* * *
The children in this
matter were declared dependent children of the court as a result of their
parents’ no contest pleas to a petition alleging Jonathan R., the presumed
father (father), disciplined one of the children in an excessive manner. The court did not remove the children from
their home, but ordered the children to remain with their mother on the
condition father not live in the residence or have unsupervised contact with
the children. The court ordered the
(SSA) to provide father with enhancement services. Father appeals, contending the court erred in
failing to order “reunification services†for him. We affirm.
I
FACTS
Father and A. H.
(mother) are the parents of three young children. The family was living together when the
children became the subject of a dependency petition filed in the juvenile
court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. (All statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.) According to the
petition, father tied six-year-old J.H.’s legs together and struck him twice
with a sandal. The petition further
alleged father has used this as a regular means of discipline. (§ 300, subds. (a), (b).) The initial detention report recommended the
children remain with mother and that father receive monitored visitation. Father was arrested as a result of the
incident and was in custody during the juvenile court proceedings.
The court appointed
counsel for mother and father at the first court appearance, found father to be
the presumed father, and ordered the children’s temporary care and placement
with mother. The court issued a
restraining order against father, restraining him from contacting the children
other than during court-ordered visitation, and directing that he remain at
least 100 yards from the family residence.
The court also directed SSA to prepare a case plan pursuant to sections
358 and 358.1. Lastly, the court ordered
twice a week monitored visitation while father remained in custody.
Mother and father
entered no contest pleas to the allegations of the amended petition. The court declared the children to be
dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to section 360, subdivision
(d) and found by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to
the children to vest custody with father.
(§ 361, subd. (c).) The court
continued custody with mother. The court
rejected father’s request for reunification services and approved the case plan
calling for father to participate in “individual, conjoint, family, and/or
group therapy with a therapist approved by Social Services Agency to address
development of coping skills to manage impulse/anger when disciplining
children, development of parenting roles and skills, family communication, and
the issues in the petition,†and to complete an approved parenting class.
II
DISCUSSION
In fashioning
disposition orders, “‘[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion to determine
what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a
dispositional order in accordance with this discretion. [Citations.]
The court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of discretion.’
[Citation.]†(
532.) Judicial discretion “‘implies
absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical
thinking. It imports the exercise of
discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. [¶] To exercise the power of judicial discretion
all the material facts in evidence must be both known and considered, together
also with the legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent and just
decision.’†(In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 85-86, fn. omitted.) Defendant contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his request for reunification services. We rejected a similar argument in
and we see no reason to reconsider that decision.
“If
a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court, on the ground that the
child is a person described by Section 300, and the court orders that a parent
or guardian shall retain custody of the child subject to the supervision of the
social worker, the parents or guardians shall be required to participate in
child welfare services or services provided by an appropriate agency designated
by the court.†(§ 362, subd. (c).) When a child remains with one parent, the court
orders enhancement services provided to the parent who no longer has custody. “Enhancement services are child welfare
services offered to the parent not retaining custody, designed to enhance the
child’s relationship with the parent.
[Citations.]†(
Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497, fn. 1.) Thus, enhancement
services to father were appropriate here, where the children remain in the
family home with mother. (
Reunification services
are provided to a parent or parents when the child is removed from the family
home and “‘needs temporary foster care.’†(In re
A.L., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
p. 145, citing § 16501.) The purpose of
reunification services is to facilitate permanent placement of a child with one
or both parents after a child has
been removed from the home. (188
Cal.App.4th at p. 145.) As the children
in this case remain in the home, there was no need to provide reunification
services to father.
Moreover, even were we
to assume the court had discretion to order reunification services to father
notwithstanding the fact that the children remain in the family home with
mother, father conceded below that the services ordered by the court would not
be any different whether labeled “enhancement†or “reunification†services. Thus, he does not complain about the
reasonableness of the services provided, only their appellation. Father’s complaint is that in labeling the
services “enhancement†instead of “reunification,†he is in a less advantageous
position than he would be in if, at the six-month review, he has complied with
the services, but mother has failed in connection with the services provided
her. This is a speculative contingency
the court had no reason to anticipate, much less prepare for by ordering the
same services to the father, but designating them as reunification services.
We find the services
provided father were reasonable, a fact he does not contest. Additionally, we find the court did not abuse
its discretion in providing father the enhancement services and not designating
the very same services as reunification services.
III
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court
is affirmed.
MOORE,
ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
ARONSON, J.
IKOLA, J.
