In
re Devin T.



















Filed
12/10/12 In re Devin T. CA3













NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED







California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

----




>

In re DEVIN T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
EL DORADO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.H., Defendant and Appellant.	C070721 (Super. Ct. No. PDP20110028)

T.H., mother of the minor, appeals
from orders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395;
statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise designated.) Appellant
reasserts her challenge to the order denying her services which she first
raised in an extraordinary writ that
was denied in case No. C068854. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.450.) Appellant
also argues the court erred in failing to apply the sibling and beneficial
relationship exceptions to avoid termination of parental rights and in failing
to order an updated bonding study.
Appellant contends the court erred in denying her petition for
modification and that there was a failure to comply with the notice provisions
of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.). We affirm the
orders of the juvenile court.

Facts and Proceedings

In April 2011, the El Dorado County
Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition to detain
20-month-old Devin T. due to the parents’ substance abuse and failure to
protect him. The minor was placed with a
paternal aunt and his eight-year-old half sibling was placed with the maternal
grandmother.

The reports provided an extensive
review of appellant’s substance abuse and child welfare history. Appellant had been the subject of 22
referrals and 16 investigations with four substantiated referrals.

The half sibling’s father told the
social worker he saw appellant using drugs prior to the half sibling’s birth in
2003 and found bags of white drugs under the mattress. In 2005, petitioner successfully completed a voluntary
family maintenance plan to address her substance abuse. During this period, petitioner was ordered by
the family law court to complete a 26-week substance abuse treatment
program. In 2008 there were continued
reports of neglect and substance abuse without intervention. In August 2010, appellant disclosed she was
drinking to the point of passing out.

In January 2011, appellant tested
positive for methamphetamine, admitted
ongoing use of methamphetamine and again agreed to a voluntary family
maintenance plan for the minor and his half sibling. In March 2011, the minor was placed with his
father, under the family maintenance program, following appellant’s
hospitalization for ingesting pills and her subsequent arrest for href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">possession of a controlled substance for
sale. Appellant admitted
methamphetamine use during this time period and felt her drug use was
increasingly out of control around the end of February 2011. Within a month of appellant’s
hospitalization, a petition was filed removing the minor from his father’s
custody as a result of domestic violence and father leaving the minor in
appellant’s care knowing appellant admitted continued drug use.

In May 2011, the court sustained the
petition and set a disposition hearing. At the pretrial hearing appellant requested a
bonding study to address the best interest exception to bypassing reunification
services. The court ordered Dr. Roeder
to perform the study.

Appellant was in an inpatient drug
treatment program and admitted she had an addiction to methamphetamine. The Department recommended denial of services
because appellant was a chronic drug user who had resisted prior court-ordered
treatment within three years of filing the petition. The Department assessed that services were
not in the best interests of the minor due to appellant’s failure to benefit
from prior services, the numerous child welfare referrals and appellant’s high
risk for relapse which placed the minor’s stability at risk.

At the disposition hearing in July
2011, Dr. Roeder testified appellant had a strong and positive attachment to
both boys but continued removal was not detrimental as long as they had contact
with her. However, if contact were
broken, it would be detrimental to their development. He further testified that stability was
important to a child’s physical and mental development. Dr. Roeder was unable to give an opinion on
whether services would be in the minor’s best interests.

The social worker testified that
appellant’s visits were appropriate and that the minor did show some separation
anxiety at the end of visits. The social
worker stated that the family law court ordered appellant to drug test in November
2003 and to participate in drug treatment in 2005. The social worker further testified that
appellant had a positive test for methamphetamine in January 2011 and a second
positive test for methamphetamine in May 2011.
The social worker testified appellant had completed her inpatient program
and was engaged in outpatient treatment.


The court denied services for
appellant pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The court did not find that services would be
in the best interests of the minor pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision
(c).

The assessment for the section
366.26 hearing stated the two-year-old minor remained in the care of the
paternal aunt who was also the prospective adoptive parent. The minor was bonded to the paternal aunt and
thriving emotionally, physically and psychologically in her care. The minor had some respiratory illnesses due
to smoke in his parent’s home and needed major dental work. He was developmentally on target and was in
preschool. He no longer had night
terrors and was not in therapy but did have anxious behaviors after visits with
his half sibling and the maternal grandmother.
The minor had twice weekly supervised visits with appellant and the half
sibling. The visits were going well and
appellant was appropriate and effective in interacting with the minor. The minor was assessed as highly
adoptable. He was young, able to attach
to his current caretaker and showed healthy boundaries with strangers. He was transitioning from visits with
appellant more easily but showed anxious behaviors after visits with the
maternal grandmother and his half sibling.
The paternal aunt felt it was important to continue contact between the
siblings and was open to contact with the parents provided they remained clean
and sober. The Department recommended
adoption as the permanent plan to provide the maximum permanence and stability
for the minor.

At the section 366.26 hearing on
January 19, 2012, appellant requested a contested
hearing and an updated bonding study, noting that the prior study was to
address a different issue. Minor’s
counsel argued that appellant had many months to request a bonding study but
did not do so and the current request was merely for delay. The Department agreed the request was untimely. The court set a contested hearing but
declined to delay the proceedings for a bonding study.

Appellant filed a petition for
modification in January 2012 alleging as changed circumstances, the existence
of a conflict in the minors’ counsel’s representation of both minors because it
was not in the half sibling’s interest to implement the permanent plan of
adoption for the minor. The minors were
each placed with relatives who would not be able to ensure a continuing
relationship and the half sibling’s caregiver said that it would be detrimental
for the half sibling to lose contact with the minor. The petition sought an order for separate
counsel for the minors because the minors had “potentially conflicting interests.” The petition alleged the change would be in
the half sibling’s best interest because he felt like his voice was not being
heard. The half sibling’s caregiver
information form was attached to the petition.
At the hearing, minor’s counsel said there was no conflict in
representing both minors, pointed out that the minors would not be placed
together in any case because they had been on different tracks since the
disposition hearing and argued that the petition was brought for purposes of
delay. The court stated it was “hard
pressed” to find an actual conflict and denied the petition.

At the selection and implementation
hearing in February 2012, the social worker testified that, although the minor
missed his mother initially, he had settled and was happy in his current
placement. The social worker saw no
reason why adoption would not occur. The
minor was able to attach to the paternal aunt and was developing normally in
her care.

Appellant testified she and the half
sibling visited the minor regularly and described a typical visit in which the
minor wanted time with her but also wanted attention from the half
sibling. Appellant testified that
sometimes the minor was upset at the end of visits and sometimes he was not. She further testified about services she had
participated in since the disposition hearing to improve her skills and
stability. She said her drug tests for
January 2012 were negative but admitted she was charged in December 2011 with
possession of paraphernalia after a search warrant was executed at her
residence. Appellant also testified she
was charged with being under the influence in December 2011 but that was due to
prescription medication for dental work.


The maternal grandmother, who was
the half sibling’s caregiver, supervised their weekly visits. She testified the minor was very excited to
see his half sibling and that the half sibling looked forward to the minor’s
visits.

The paternal aunt testified that the
minor saw his half sibling at visits with appellant and in separate weekly
visits and that she would allow sibling visits in the future. She also testified that the minor had no
behavioral problems after visits with appellant.

At appellant’s request, the court
admitted Dr. Roeder’s testimony from the disposition hearing as an
exhibit. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that the minor was likely to be adopted in a reasonable
time and that appellant had not met her burden to establish either the sibling
or the beneficial relationship exception to adoption. The court terminated parental rights and
selected a permanent plan of adoption.

Discussion

I

>Issues Raised in Prior Petition

Appellant first contends that she
may reassert the issues raised in her prior petition for extraordinary writ
which was summarily denied in case No. C068854.


“Subsequent appellate review of
findings subsumed in an order setting a section 366.26 hearing is dependent
upon an antecedent petition for writ review of those findings having been
‘summarily denied . . . .’ ” (Joyce
G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1513; see also
§ 366.26, subd. (l).) Appellant did file a petition arguing the
court erred in denying her services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(13) because the evidence did not show she “has a history of extensive,
abusive, and chronic use of drugs” and further did not show she “failed or
refused to comply with a program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the
case plan . . . on at least two prior occasions
. . . .” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(13).) Appellant also argued that,
even if the bypass conditions were established, the court should have found
that reunification was in the minor’s best interests and ordered services. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) The petition was summarily denied September
15, 2011. When “the denial is summary,
the petitioner retains his or her appellate remedy (§ 366.26, subd. (>l)(1)(C)) but is limited to the same
issue on the same record (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(B)) and thus is destined on appeal to receive the same
result.” (Joyce G., at p. 1514.)

> A. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13)

To support an order bypassing
services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), the evidence must
establish two elements. The first is a
history of drug use. On appeal, appellant
renews her argument that the evidence did not show she had a history of
extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs as required by section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(13). That section
provides in relevant part: “(b)
Reunification services need not be provided to a parent . . .
described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence . . . :
[¶] (13) That the parent . . . of the child
has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and
has resisted prior court-ordered treatment for the problem during a three year
period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child
to the court’s attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of
drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan required by section 358.1
on at least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were
available and accessible.” (361.5, subd.
(b)(13).)

When the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard
of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must
determine if there is any substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible and of solid value--to support the conclusion of the trier
of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981)
28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206,
1214.) The reviewing court may not
reweigh the evidence and must resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing
party. (In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; Jason L., at p. 1214; In re Steve
W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16; .)

The evidence showed that the half
sibling’s father observed appellant’s drugs and drug use in 2002. Appellant was ordered to drug test in 2003
and entered a voluntary treatment plan for substance abuse in 2005. Appellant also was subject to a court-ordered
drug treatment plan during that time.
While there are reports of possible substance abuse in 2008 and alcohol
abuse in 2010, appellant claims she was clean and sober from 2006 until her
positive drug test in January 2011. At
that time appellant admitted monthly use prior to the test and then had nearly
continuous drug use over the next three months up to her hospitalization for
overdose and her arrest for possession for sale of a controlled substance.

Appellant asserts that the statutory
condition of extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs cannot be shown
because there was a five-year period when she was clean and sober. The statute does not require any particular
set of facts to establish the first element of the bypass provision. A showing of continuous use or a lengthy
period of use may suffice, but the court is required to assess whatever facts
have been adduced to determine whether the condition for bypass of services
exist.

There is no solid evidence of
appellant’s drug use from 2006 to 2011.
However, even assuming appellant was not abusing drugs or alcohol during
that period, the remaining evidence constitutes substantial evidence of extensive,
abusive and chronic use of drugs.
Appellant was using drugs in 2002 and 2005. After a successful treatment program and five
years clean and sober, appellant engaged in polysubstance abuse of pills which
led to an overdose and admitted ongoing and increasing methamphetamine
use. She was arrested for possession for
sale of a controlled substance. The
juvenile court did not err in finding that the first prong of the section
361.5, subdivision (b)(13) bypass circumstance was satisfied.

The second element of the bypass
provision can be satisfied in either of two ways, i.e., by resisting prior
court ordered treatment within three years of filing the petition or by failing
to comply with at least two treatment programs ordered as a part of the case
plan. We agree with appellant that the
evidence did not show she had failed or refused to comply with a treatment
program ordered as a part of a case plan because appellant had never been
ordered to participate in such a treatment program. Her prior services had been voluntary with
the exception of the court-ordered drug treatment program in the family law
court.

Appellant’s petition for
extraordinary writ did not address the resistance to treatment element for
establishing the bypass provision and she cannot now assert that the evidence
did not establish it. (>Joyce G. v. Superior Court, >supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1514.) However, even assuming
that the issue was raised in the petition, appellant’s argument fails. The evidence showed she participated in a 26-week
drug treatment program ordered by the family law court and that she resisted
that treatment in the months prior to filing the petition by resuming
methamphetamine use. Contrary to
appellant’s argument, only the resistance to treatment, not the court-ordered
treatment itself, must occur within the three-year period prior to filing the
petition. (Laura B. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 776, 780.)

> B. Section 361.5, subdivision (c)

Appellant argues that, even if
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) was established, the court should have
ordered services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c) because she had
completed inpatient treatment and the minor had a positive bond with her.

That subdivision provides, in
part: “The court shall not order
reunification for a parent . . . described in paragraph
. . . (13) . . . of subdivision (b) unless the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of
the child.” A
juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether further reunification
services would be in the best interests of the
child. (In re Angelique C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 509, 523.) An appellate court will reverse that
determination only if the juvenile court abuses its discretion. (Id.
at pp. 523-524.) It is the parent’s
burden to “affirmatively show that reunification would be in the best interest”
of the child. (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 66.)

In exercising its discretion, the
court assessed all the evidence before it, including appellant’s long drug abuse
and child welfare history, appellant’s recent and serious relapse after years
of sobriety and the likelihood of her success in treatment given the severity
of her relapse. The court also
considered Dr. Roeder’s testimony regarding the bond between appellant and the
minor, the lack of detriment in continued removal, the importance of stability
for a child, the difficulty in overcoming an addiction of long standing and
that he was unable to say whether services were in the minor’s best interest. In reviewing the record, we cannot conclude
the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that providing
appellant services was not in the minor’s best interests.

II

>Termination Detrimental to the Minor

Appellant asserts that she
established that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
minor both because the minor would benefit from continued contact with her and
because there would be a substantial interference with the minor’s relationship
with his half sibling.

At the selection and implementation
hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must choose one of
the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child.
. . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption.’ If the court finds the child is adoptable, it
must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re
Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368, citations omitted.) There are only limited circumstances which
permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination
[of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The party claiming the exception has the
burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances which constitute an
exception to termination of parental rights.
(In re Melvin A. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; In re
Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.725(e)(3); Evid. Code, § 500.)

> A. Benefit Exception

Termination of parental rights may
be detrimental to the minor when: “The
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) However, the benefit to the child must
promote “the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the
well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive
parents. In other words, the court
balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a
tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family
would confer. If severing the natural
parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive
emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the
preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Even frequent and loving contact is not
sufficient to establish this benefit absent a significant positive emotional
attachment between parent and child. (>In re Teneka W. (1995)
37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re
Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; >In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th
904, 924.)

It is undisputed that appellant
maintained regular visitation and that she and the minor had a positive
bond. However, to establish the
exception the bond must outweigh the benefit of a stable permanent placement. The evidence showed that the minor was
thriving in the paternal aunt’s home and no longer had night terrors. The minor did not have anxious reactions
following the supervised visits with appellant.
To the extent that Dr. Roeder’s prior bonding study was applicable, the
study said only that as of July 2011, it would be detrimental if the minor’s
contact with appellant were severed.
However, the minor was transitioning between appellant and his caretaker
more easily as time went on and needed permanence and stability. Appellant did not establish that the minor
would be greatly harmed if the parent-child relationship was severed or that
the relationship outweighed the benefit to the minor of a permanent, secure and
stable home.

> B. Sibling
Exception

A second circumstance under which
termination of parental rights would be detrimental is when “[t]here would be
substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into
consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including but not
limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home,
whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close
and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s
best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared
to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The court must consider the interests of the
adoptive child, not the siblings in determining whether termination would be
detrimental to the adoptive child. (>In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 49-50; In re Daniel H. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 804, 812.)

“To show a substantial interference
with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant
sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the
child. Many siblings have a relationship
with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship
ended. If the relationship is not
sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no
substantial interference with that relationship.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952, fn. omitted.)

The minor and his half sibling had
lived together since the minor was born and to the extent possible, shared
experiences although there was a significant disparity in ages. However, since removal the minor and his half
sibling were placed in separate homes and were unlikely to be reunified in a
single home due to their separate placements and plans. Moreover, there is nothing in the record
which shows that there was anything other than a normal sibling relationship
between the two boys. There is no basis
to suspect that the minor felt such a bond with his half sibling that he should
be denied the permanence and stability of adoption. The court properly concluded the sibling
relationship was not so significant that termination would cause detriment to
the minor.

III

>Updated Bonding Study

Appellant argues the court erred in
denying her request for an updated bonding study.

A bonding
study, whether inter-sibling or parent-child, is not required prior to
termination of parental rights. (In
re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195; In re Lorenzo C.
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)
Bonding studies after termination of services often require delays in
permanency planning. (Richard C.,
at p. 1197.) While the court does
have discretion to order a bonding study late in the process, denial of a
belated request is consistent with the dependency statutes and due process. (Ibid.)

There was a good deal of evidence in
the reports about the nature of the bonds between the minor and appellant and
the minor and his half sibling. The
previous bonding study was still relatively fresh, although the focus was
somewhat different. Appellant’s request
was late in the process. Because the
court set a contested hearing, the parties had the opportunity to explore any
changes in the relationships which could affect the termination decision. The court did not abuse its discretion in
choosing not to delay the proceedings to secure a marginally useful bonding
study.

IV

>Conflict Counsel

Appellant argues the juvenile court
erred in denying her petition for modification which sought appointment of
conflict counsel for the minors.

A parent may bring a petition for
modification of any order of the juvenile court pursuant to section 388 based
on new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances.

Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent . . . may, upon grounds
of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action
in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside
any order of the court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the
court. . . . [¶] . . . If it appears that the best
interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order,
. . . recognition of a sibling relationship, termination of
jurisdiction, or clear and convincing evidence supports revocation or
termination of court-ordered reunification services, the court shall order that
a hearing be held . . . .”

“The parent requesting the change of
order has the burden of establishing that the change is justified. [Citation.]
The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]”
(In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.) Determination of a petition to modify is
committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and, absent a showing
of a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the juvenile court must be
upheld. (In re Stephanie M., >supra, 7 Cal.4th at
pp. 318-319; In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057,
1067.) The best interests of the child
are of paramount consideration when the petition is brought after termination
of reunification services. (Stephanie
M., at p. 317.)

The Supreme Court in In re Celine
R., supra, 31 Cal.4th
45, held “that the court may appoint a
single attorney to represent all of the siblings unless, at the time of
appointment, an actual conflict of interest exists among them or it appears from
circumstances specific to the case that it is reasonably likely an actual
conflict will arise. After the initial
appointment, the court must relieve counsel from the joint representation when,
but only when, an actual conflict of interest arises.” (Id. at p. 50.) Further, “error in not appointing separate
counsel for a child or relieving conflicted counsel” requires reversal only if
it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been different but for the error. (Id. at p. 60.)

Minor’s counsel has a duty to
represent the minor’s interests notwithstanding the minor’s preferences, thus
conflicting preferences do not necessarily give rise to a disqualifying
conflict. (In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1270-1271.) The fact that siblings have different
permanent plans does not necessarily demonstrate an actual conflict. (In re
T.C. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1391.) Because the sibling relationship exception
did not apply and the minors were not living in the same home, advocating for
the minor’s adoption had no adverse consequences to the half sibling’s interest
which was in reunification with his father.
No actual conflict existed. The
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for
modification.

V

>The Indian Child Welfare Act

Appellant contends reversal is
required to comply with the notice requirements of the ICWA, specifically, she
argues that the notices which were sent were defective because they did not
include the available information about the maternal great-great-grandmother.

At the outset of the proceedings,
the maternal grandmother informed the Department that the minor may have Indian
heritage in the Cherokee tribes. The
maternal grandmother provided the names of the maternal great-grandmother and the
maternal great-great-grandmother. Notice
of the proceedings was sent to the three Cherokee tribes but did not include
the name or any information about the maternal great-great-grandmother. The court found the ICWA did not apply.

The ICWA protects the interests of
Indian children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by
establishing minimum standards for, and permitting tribal participation in,
dependency actions. (25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901, 1902, 1903(1), 1911(c), 1912.)
If, after the petition is filed, the court “knows or has reason to know
that an Indian child is involved,” notice of the pending proceeding and the
right to intervene must be sent to the tribe.
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(b).)

State statutes, federal regulations
and the federal guidelines on Indian child custody proceedings all specify the
contents of the notice to be sent to the tribe in order to inform the tribe of
the proceedings and assist the tribe in determining if the child is a member or
eligible for membership. (§ 224.2;
25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a), (d), (e); 44 Fed.Reg. 67588 (Nov. 26, 1979).) If known, the agency should provide name and
date of birth of the child; the tribe in which membership is claimed; the
names, birthdates, and places of birth and death, current addresses and tribal
enrollment numbers of the parents, grandparents and great-grandparents as this
information will assist the tribe in making its determination of whether the
child is eligible for membership and whether to intervene. (§ 224.2; 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a),
(d), (e); 44 Fed.Reg. 67588 (Nov. 26, 1979); In re D.T. (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1454-1455.)

While the better course of action is
to provide all known information on the minor’s ancestry to the tribes when
providing notice of the proceeding, the statutes and regulations do not require
that the Department provide information on great-great-grandparents. There was no error in failing to provide the
information. Absent any indication from
the tribes that such information was needed, failure to include the information
was harmless.

Disposition

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.







HULL , J.







We concur:







BLEASE , Acting P. J.







MAURO , J.