In re Christopher A.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 8/26/13  In re Christopher A. CA4/3

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

In re CHRISTOPHER A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,         Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   CHRISTOPHER A.,         Defendant and Appellant.	G047228            (Super. Ct. No. DL043034)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Jacki C. Brown, Judge. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part for reconsideration of probation
condition.

                        Lynelle K. Hee, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

                        Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood and Marilyn L. George,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

*               
*                *

 

After
sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Codehref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
section 602 petition, to declare minor Christopher A. a ward of the court, the
juvenile court ordered Christopher to participate in a 52-week batterer’s
program pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(6).  Christopher contends the court misinterpreted
Penal Code section 1203.097 to apply to juvenile court href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">delinquency adjudications.  We agree and remand to the juvenile court so
it may decide whether to impose the disputed probation condition under section
730, subdivision (b).

 

FACTS

 

Christopher
was 16 years old on July 9, 2012.  On that day, Christopher “unlawfully
assaulted and battered” his two brothers. 
He admitted to the police, “I have a really bad temper.  I get easily provoked.” 

Based
on Christopher’s signed waivers and admissions, the court found the four counts
alleged in the petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. > The
court declared Christopher a ward of the court and placed him on supervised
probation.  The court committed
Christopher to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer.  The court also ordered Christopher released
to his parents upon termination of commitment, and to obey various probation
conditions. 

Only
one of the probation conditions is at issue here.  The court required Christopher to participate
in a 52-week batterer’s program, expressing its belief that this order was
mandatory:  “I find and rule that the
provisions of Penal Code section 1203.097 apply in juvenile court.  This is a domestic violence matter. . . .  [¶] 
Therefore, I do require that he complete the functional equivalent of a
batterer’s treatment program of 52 weeks of duration.”  The court stayed the
performance of this probation condition to allow an effective appeal on the
issue. 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Penal
Code section 1203.097, subdivision (a), reads, in relevant part:  “If a person is granted probation for a crime
in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family Code, the
terms of probation shall include” 
“[s]uccessful completion of a batterer’s program . . . for a period not
less than one year . . . .”  (>Id., subd.
(a)(6).)  It is undisputed that
Christopher’s brothers were victims of domestic violence as defined by Family
Code section 6211.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"
title="">[2]  Were Christopher an adult granted probation
after convictions for assault and battery against family members in his
household, Penal Code section 1203.097 undoubtedly would require Christopher’s
participation in a batterer’s program. 
But, as a minor, Christopher falls within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, which is generally guided by the Welfare and Institutions Code
in determining appropriate orders after a minor is adjudged to be a ward of the
court.  Thus, the question presented is
whether Penal Code section 1203.097 requires Christopher to participate in a
52-week batterer’s program.

 

Penal Code Section 1203.097 Does Not Apply to
Juvenile Dispositions

The
interpretation of a statute is subject to de novo review.  (Kavanaugh
v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911,
916.)  “In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  [Citation.] 
In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute
because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  [Citation.] 
If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of
the statute governs.”  (>People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051,
1056.) 
“[W]e consider the statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part.”  (Molenda
v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 992.) 

Here, the plain language of Penal Code
section 1203.097 indicates that only those who are “granted probation” for a href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">domestic violence offense are subject to
the terms of the statute.  Penal Code
section 1203.097 does not differentiate between adult and juvenile perpetrators
of domestic violence.  Without
considering anything other than the language of Penal Code section 1203.097,
one might reasonably conclude Christopher must complete a 52-week batterer’s
program because he was “granted probation” for a domestic violence offense.

But Penal Code section 1203.097 must be
considered in the context of other Penal Code and Welfare and Institutions Code
provisions.  “As used in [the Penal
Code], ‘probation’ means the suspension of the imposition or execution
of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the
community under the supervision of a probation officer.”  (Pen. Code, § 1203, subd. (a).)  Thus, the interpretive question is not
whether Christopher was “granted probation” in some general, dictionary
definition sense of these words, but whether the juvenile court (1) suspended
the imposition or execution of a sentence and (2) ordered conditional and revocable
release in the community under the supervision of a probation officer.

Viewed in this way, it becomes apparent that
Christopher was not “granted probation” under Penal Code section 1203.097.  Juvenile courts do not “sentence” juveniles;
they therefore do not suspend the imposition or execution of sentence when
granting probation.  (See >In re Tony S. (1978) 87
Cal.App.3d 429, 432-433 [“A juvenile court declaration of wardship is not
a criminal conviction [citation], and a dispositional order following such
declaration is not a sentence”].) 
Instead, the “place[ment]” (§§ 727, subd. (a), 730, subd. (b)) of a
juvenile on “probation” is just one possible “disposition” (§ 702) for the
juvenile court to consider in ensuring “‘that juvenile offenders who have
not yet become hardened criminals receive treatment and rehabilitation.’”  (In re
Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1542.)href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]  Even the most restrictive dispositions in the
juvenile justice system are deemed “commit[ments],” not sentences.  (§ 730, subd. (a) [“commit the minor to
a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp”], § 731, subd. (a)(4)
[“[c]ommit the ward to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities”].)

The Welfare and Institutions Code does not
explicitly define the word “probation.” 
But even without an explicit statutory definition, it is clear that
juvenile delinquency “probation” does not amount to the same thing as adult
criminal “probation.”  “‘“[J]uvenile
probation is not, as with an adult, an act of leniency in lieu of statutory
punishment; it is an ingredient of a final order for the minor’s reformation
and rehabilitation.”’”  (>In re Francisco S. (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 946, 953.)

With
regard to a ward of the court “placed under the supervision of the probation
officer” (like Christopher), “[t]he court may impose and require any and all
reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that
justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward
enhanced.  (§ 730, subd. (b).)  The Legislature has demonstrated its ability
to restrict a juvenile court’s discretion in imposing probation
conditions.  For example, minors who
commit battery on school property under Penal Code section 234.5 must, as
a mandatory condition of probation in specified circumstances, “make
restitution to the victim of the battery.” 
(§ 729.)  Minors who use controlled
substances must perform community service and complete substance abuse programs.  (§§ 729.8, 729.10.)  The Legislature has provided no such language
in the Welfare and Institutions Code for acts of domestic violence. 

In
sum, a careful consideration of relevant Penal Code and Welfare and
Institutions Code sections leads us to conclude the Legislature did not intend
to limit the discretion of juvenile delinquency courts in cases of domestic
violence by way of Penal Code section 1203.097. 
The court was mistaken in its belief that it was required to impose the
batterer’s program condition and we therefore reverse this portion of the
judgment.

 

>The Court had Discretion to Require
Christopher to Attend a Batterer’s Program

>                        As
previously explained, a juvenile court may “impose and require any and all
reasonable [probation] conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to
the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the
ward enhanced.”  (§ 730, subd.
(b).)  The foregoing analysis does not
suggest it was inappropriate to order Christopher to participate in a
batterer’s program as a condition of probation. 
We simply hold that the court was not required to impose such a
probation condition by Penal Code section 1203.097.  We
therefore remand this case to the juvenile court so it may exercise its
discretion on this point.  (See >In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95,
100 [“An appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court’s broad
discretion over probation conditions absent an abuse of discretion”].) 

 

DISPOSITION

 

We
reverse the judgment with regard to the court’s imposition of a 52-week
batterer’s program pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.097.  We remand to the juvenile court to allow it
an opportunity to exercise its discretion under the Welfare and Institutions
Code as to whether to require Christopher to participate in a batterer’s
program.  The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.

 

 

 

                                                                                    IKOLA,
J.

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

O’LEARY, P.
J.

 

 

 

MOORE, J.