In re Christian L.
Filed 5/15/13 In re Christian L. CA2/7
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
>
In re CHRISTIAN L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B238930 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VJ41601) |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTIAN L., Defendant and Appellant. |
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County, Philip K. Mautino, Judge. Reversed.
Courtney M.
Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Baine
P. Kerr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
>
Appellant Christian L.
appeals from the juvenile court’s order placing him on six months probation
without wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a)). Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding he committed the misdemeanor offense of
throwing a substance at a vehicle. We
agree and reverse.
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
A petition filed pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602 alleging appellant, then 14 years old, had
committed misdemeanor vandalism was amended by the People to allege a single
count of throwing a substance at a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section
23110, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor.
B.
At approximately 10:00
p.m.
on June 27, 2011, Scott Dowling was inside
his house in La Mirada, when he heard something
strike his car, which was parked on the street.
Dowling went to the window and saw a Honda driving away towards the end
of his street. Seconds later, the Honda
turned around and drove up next to Dowling’s car. Dowling then “saw eggs come out of the
[Honda] . . . and hit [his] car.â€
Dowling ran outside and memorized the taillight configuration of the
departing Honda so he could follow it in his car. While driving around looking for the Honda,
Dowling noticed broken eggs on the ground near parked cars. Eventually Dowling saw a Honda on the street,
recognized its taillight configuration and telephoned the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department.
Deputy Diego Sanchez responded and
pulled over the Honda. Inside were
approximately five people, including appellant.
Prior to interviewing appellant, Deputy Sanchez advised him of his right to
remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to
appointed counsel. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694], which appellant waived.
Appellant then told the deputy he was sitting in the middle of the
backseat of the Honda, while his friends were throwing eggs at cars.
Deputy Sanchez searched the Honda and
found approximately a dozen eggs in an egg carton.
At the conclusion of the
People’s presentation of evidence, appellant made a motion to dismiss (Welf.
& Inst. Code § 701.1), which the
juvenile court denied, mistakenly believing Deputy Sanchez testified that
appellant had told him “we were throwing eggs at the vehicle.â€
Appellant
testified in his defense that after school, he was with his brother and his
brother’s friends. “We went to the store
and they bought eggs.†Appellant then
rode in the backseat of the Honda, sitting between two passengers. Appellant denied having thrown any eggs.
At the
conclusion of the hearing, the prosecutor argued the evidence established
appellant either had personally been throwing eggs or had aided and abetted
others in throwing eggs at Dowling’s car.
Defense counsel argued there was no evidence appellant had violated
Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (a).
After hearing argument, the juvenile court sustained the petition
without comment.
DISCUSSION
A.
of Review
The same standard governs review of
the sufficiency of evidence in juvenile cases as in adult criminal cases: “[W]e review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to supportâ€â€™ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357; see In re
Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 540.).)
B.
Evidence is Insufficient to Support the Finding Appellant Violated Vehicle
Code, Section 23110, Subdivision (a)
Vehicle Code section 23110,
subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ny person who throws any substance at a
vehicle or any occupant thereof on a highway is guilty of a misdemeanor.â€
There is no doubt that appellant was
a passenger in the Honda when the eggs were thrown at Dowling’s car, and, when
his testimony is considered, was in the store when the eggs were purchased
earlier that day. However, apart from
appellant’s presence, there is absolutely nothing in the record from which the
juvenile court could infer that appellant had been throwing eggs at Dowling’s
car. The testimony of Dowling, the
single percipient witness, merely established that eggs were being tossed out
of both sides of the Honda. There is no
evidence as to whether the eggs were coming from the middle of the back seat,
where appellant was sitting, and/or the front seat of the car. Nor does Deputy Sanchez’s recovery of a dozen
eggs, purchased earlier, from somewhere inside the Honda suggest that appellant
participated in throwing eggs at cars.
Indeed, there is no evidence that appellant, himself, committed any
criminal act.
Nor is there sufficient
evidence appellant violated Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (a), on a
theory of aider and abettor liability. A
person aids and abets the commission of a robbery “when he or she, acting with
(1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator[,] and (2) the intent
or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
offense, (3) by act or advise aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the
commission of the crime.†(
561; see People v. Perez (2005) 35
Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) Neither mere
presence when a crime is committed, nor failure to prevent it, is sufficient,
although those factors, as well as companionship, conduct before and after the
offense, and flight may be considered in determining a defendant’s criminal
responsibility. (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 272-273;
5.)
The People argue appellant aided and
abetted the commission of the crime by his presence when the eggs were
purchased, his presence when the eggs were thrown, and the presence of eggs in
the Honda. Even if it is reasonable to
infer from this evidence that appellant knew the eggs were going to be thrown
at cars, absent evidence that appellant encouraged or facilitated, let alone
directly participated, in the offense, his knowledge alone is not enough. It is a matter of speculation whether
appellant contributed anything to the actual egg throwing. In sum, if nothing else, this case is a
paradigm of mere presence at the scene does not in and of itself constitute
aiding and abetting. To permit a finding
that appellant violated Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (a), based on
aider and abettor liability would, in effect, support a finding of guilt by
association.
While it is certainly possible
appellant either threw eggs himself or aided and abetted others in throwing
eggs, that is not enough.
“‘[R]easonableness [is] the ultimate standard under the substantial
evidence rule. “The appellate court must
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.†. . . [Citation.] “Evidence which merely raises a strong
suspicion of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a
conviction. Suspicion is not evidence,
it merely raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for an
inference of fact.â€â€™â€ (
Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed.
JACKSON,
J.
We concur:
PERLUSS,
P. J.
WOODS, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">
remaining contentions on appeal.
name="_ftn2" title="">
appellant is not directly challenging the juvenile court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss, we include the defense evidence, consisting solely of appellant’s
testimony, in our summary of the evidence.
