In re B.L.

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 1/27/14  In
re B.L. CA2/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
THREE

 

 

 
>

In re B.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. _____________________________________   THE PEOPLE,              Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   B.L.,              Defendant and Appellant.

B245912          (Los Angeles County        Super. Ct. No. KJ37719)

 

 

            APPEAL from orders of the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Phyllis Shibata, Temporary Judge. 
Affirmed.

            Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

            Kamala D. Harris, href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

 

>________________________________

            B.L. appeals after
the court ordered him a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 602) as he had engaged in a battery upon his grandmother and his
cousin (Pen. Code, § 242) and malicious mischief (Pen. Code, § 594,
subd. (a)).  He was ordered removed from
the custody of his grandmother, his href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">legal guardian, and suitably
placed.  The maximum term of confinement
was one year four months, less 24 days.

            He contends the evidence is
insufficient to support the juvenile court’s orders that he committed
battery.  The contention lacks merit.

>BACKGROUND

1.  The People’s case-in-chief.

            On the date of the offenses, October 24, 2012, B.L. (appellant) was 14 years of age.  He lived in Baldwin Park with
his grandmother, E. R. (Mrs. R.), age 64. 


            We view the evidence adduced at the
adjudication in the light most favorable to orders of the juvenile court.  (In re
Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; In
re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372-1373.)

            Mrs. R. was the legal guardian for
her daughter’s children:  appellant,  Dominic, age seven, Alicia, age 13, and
Helena, age 12.  Also, when her
granddaughter S.G. (S.), appellant’s cousin, age 19, was at work, Mrs. R. took
care of S.’s daughter, age three.

                 
a.  S.G.’s testimony.

            On October 24, 2012, appellant was suspended from school.  His cousin, S., left work and picked him up
at school.  Appellant told her that he
was upset Mrs. R. did not come personally to pick him up.  He told S. for that reason, he was “going to
cause a scene” when he got home.

            On S.’s part, this was not the first
time that week that S. had to leave work to go to the school to drive appellant
home.  She was worried about this
affecting her job, and she was annoyed with him.  He had a bad attitude about the
suspensions:  he acted as if being
suspended “was funny.”

            Once
home, appellant sat down at the kitchen table to eat.  He began “cussing” at Mrs. R.  He kept asking her why she did not come to
the school personally to pick him up. 
When he finished eating, he went into the family room.  The other children in the house were watching
television.  He ordered his brother and
sisters and S.’s daughter to leave so he could watch the movie he had chosen.  His sister, Alicia, sat down on the sofa next
to him, and a physical fight broke out. 
He got on top of her on the sofa and began pummeling Alicia with his
fist.

            Mrs. R was on the telephone.  She dropped it and pulled appellant off
Alicia.  Mrs. R. scolded him.  Appellant attempted to take money from Mrs.
R.’s purse.  Appellant then punched a
picture frame and a mirror on the wall, breaking them.  Mrs. R. pushed appellant down on the
sofa.  Appellant put Mrs. R. in a bear
hug and punched her once in the back.

            S. was on the telephone with the 9-1-1 operator.  When she saw
appellant punch Mrs. R., she handed the telephone to one of appellant’s
sisters and intervened.   S. attempted to
pull Mrs. R. from appellant’s grasp. 
Appellant stood up, turned on S. and pushed her up against the
refrigerator.  He punched her five times
on top of her head, then walked out the back door.

            S. testified that she was five feet
tall and weighed about 119 pounds. 
Appellant was five feet two inches tall and weighed 140 or 145 pounds.

                 
b. 
Mrs. R.’s testimony.

            Mrs. R. testified that evening,
appellant arrived home angry.href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
 As he ate, he directed a stream of
profanity at her and was disrespectful. 
She informed him that she could not pick him up as she had no car.  Also, she said that she was not his servant,
nor was she the maid.  When he finished href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">eating, he walked into the
family room. 

            In
the family room, he started fighting with Alicia.  Mrs. R. told him, “Idiot, why are you hitting
the girl” and “Leave her alone.”  Appellant
ignored Mrs. R. and kept on hitting his sister. 
S. intervened by grabbing appellant by the shirt to pull him off.  Mrs. R. was on the telephone with the
doctor.  She dropped the telephone and
pushed appellant down on the sofa, preventing him from going after his
sister. 

            Appellant hugged Mrs. R. to him and
punched her in the back.  He called Mrs.
R. a “f----- b----” among other profanities, and she slapped him.  She slapped him either because he was
disrespectful or to prevent him from going after her granddaughter.  She told him, “Now you are going to pay
for this.  I’m tired.”  She attempted to keep him sitting on the sofa
until the police arrived.  However, he
got up and broke a picture frame that was sitting on a table and a mirror that
was hanging on the wall.  He then went
after S. in the kitchen.  He walked out
of the residence, commenting to Mrs. R. that the police were not going to do
anything to him anyway.

            When appellant left, Mrs. R. was
also angry.  This was not the first time
something like this had happened.  Appellant
had lashed out when he had no reason to be angry. 

            Mrs. R. testified frankly that
appellant had been addressing Mrs. R. with profanities, and that evening they
were both “saying things to one another.”

            Appellant returned home several
hours later, and he was taken into police custody.

2.  The defense.

                 
a. 
The investigating probation officer’s testimony.

            In defense, appellant called the
investigating probation officer.  The
probation officer testified that during his investigation, he had contacted
Mrs. R. by telephone to record her version of the batteries and malicious mischief.  Mrs. R. spoke only Spanish so S. spoke to the
probation officer over the telephone, translating Mrs. R.’s statements to
him.  S. told him that Mrs. R. said
appellant had arrived home that day. 
Appellant immediately started pushing and shoving the younger children
around.  Mrs. R. had to strike appellant
twice in the face with her fist to get him to stop.  Appellant responded by striking Mrs. R. twice
in the back.  As the probation officer
understood it, during the telephonic interview, Mrs. R. was standing right by S.
as S. spoke to him.  He believed
that during the interview, S. was translating his questions for Mrs. R. and
then relaying to him Mrs. R.’s replies. 

                 
b. 
Appellant’s testimony.

            Appellant testified on his own
behalf.  He claimed that S. arrived at
school that afternoon and “gave him attitude” concerning his suspension.  She called him a “dumbass.”  When he arrived home, Mrs. R. was angry.  Mrs. R. kept after him, asking why he had
been suspended.  She called him, “You
stupid,” and “Dummy.”  He was upset
because Mrs. R. did not come to the school. 
Apparently, that made his situation more difficult as the school had
telephoned the police.  He implied that
things would have been better if Mrs. R. personally had been present to speak
to the school authorities.

            After dinner, appellant went into
the family room, and Alicia gave him a hard time about the suspension.  They scuffled over a DVD of a movie, and she
hit him and kicked him, starting a socking match.  Mrs. R. grabbed appellant by his shirt to pull
him off Alicia.  Then S. pulled on his
shirt to pull him off his sister and hit him. 
Mrs. R. threw appellant down on the sofa.  Mrs. R. and S. were trying to keep him in the
house.  He tried to get up.  His sister was punching him on the head.  He closed his eyes, and all three of them
were hitting him.  Alicia and S.
scratched him on the back.

            He claimed during the melee, all he
did was block blows and try to defend himself. 
He did not break any personal property: 
Alicia or S. hit the mirror and broke it.  When the women had him on the sofa, S. socked
him on the chest and cheek, and Mrs. R. hit or punched him in the face three or
four times.

            Appellant
claimed that the broken mirror belonged to him.  He said the melee happened in the living room,
not in the family room.  Appellant denied
that he was angry when he arrived home that evening.  He did not raise his voice or use profanity.  He admitted that prior to the evening in
question, he had been suspended from school a number of times, and either Mrs.
R. or S. had to come and pick him up at the school.

            The juvenile court sustained the
petition, finding true the two incidents of battery and malicious mischief.

DISCUSSION

1.  >Standard of review.

Recently, in People
v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, the California Supreme Court
summarized the well-established standard of review.  “ â€˜In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves.  Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”  [Citations.]  We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.  [Citation.]  [¶] 
The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution
relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance
allegations.  [Citation.]  “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify
the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”  [Citation.] 
We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.  [Citation.]’ 
[Citation.]”  (>Id. at p. 200.)

“ ‘ “Although an appellate court will not uphold a judgment or
verdict based upon evidence inherently improbable, testimony which merely discloses
unusual circumstances does not come within that category.  [Citation.] 
To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has
been believed by the [trier of fact], there must exist either a physical
impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without
resorting to inferences or deductions. 
[Citations.]  Conflicts and even
testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal
of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
upon which a determination depends. 
[Citation.]”. . . .’ 
[Citation.]”  (>People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284,
303-304, 306.) 

The uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction unless it
is physically impossible or inherently improbable.  (People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) 
Indeed, “ ‘[t]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a
judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as
to other portions.  [Citations.]’ ”  (In re
Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 815, 821.)

            The law regarding appellate review
of claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in the juvenile context
is the same as that governing review of sufficiency claims generally.  (In re
Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.)

2.  Self-defense and parental discipline.

            “[A] defendant acts in lawful self-defense
if ‘one, the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of
suffering bodily injury . . . or was in imminent danger of being touched
unlawfully; two, the defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of
force was necessary to defend against that danger; and three, the defendant
used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself against that
danger.’ â€  (People v. Clark (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 235, 250 (Clark), quoting from
CALCRIM No. 3470.)

            “A parent has a right to reasonably
discipline by punishing a child and may administer reasonable punishment
without being liable for a battery. 
[Citations.]  This includes
the right to inflict reasonable corporal punishment.  [Citation.]” 
(People v. Whitehurst (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050.)

            The right to parental discipline
allows the use of reasonable force to discipline a child.  (Clark,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 250.) 
“[T]he use of physical force against a child is justified ‘if a
reasonable person would find that punishment was necessary under the
circumstances and that the physical force used was reasonable.’  [Citation.] 
Thus, ‘corporal punishment is unjustifiable when it is . . . not
necessary, or when such punishment, although warranted, was excessive.’
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 250, in part quoting from CALCRIM No. 3405.)

            The
court in Clark, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at page 251,
footnote 12, also explained:  “When a
parent engages in reasonable corporal discipline, the child does not have the
right to resist that discipline by use of force against the parent.  Consequently, it does not matter who is the
initial aggressor when a parent exercises the right to discipline and the
discipline employed is reasonable.  Also,
the rules concerning mutual combat have no applicability when a parent
justifiably disciplines a child.  Nor is
the parent necessarily required to stop disciplining a minor just because a
minor who initially resists with force stops using force against the parent,
whereas self-defense rules require the defendant to stop using force when the
danger of an attack or unlawful touching no longer exists.”

3.  The analysis.

            Appellant’s contention misapprehends
the nature of appellate review for substantial evidence.  An appellate court presumes in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.)  It is not the function of a reviewing court
to reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses or redetermine
factual conflicts, as those functions are committed to the trier of fact.  (People
v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548.) 
Even if a reviewing court might make contrary factual findings or draw
different inferences, it is not permitted to reverse the judgment if the
circumstances reasonably justify those found by the trier of fact.  (People
v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126.)

            Here, by implication, the juvenile
court found appellant came home angry and then started taking it out on
everyone present.  He was impertinent and
directed profanities at his grandmother, Mrs. R., age 64, while eating his
dinner.  Then, in the family room, he
started in on the younger children.  He
precipitated a physical fight with Alicia, age 13, and he was getting the
better of her, lying atop her, pummeling her, when Mrs. R. intervened.  Then appellant turned on Mrs. R., giving her
a bear hug and punching her on the back.  
Appellant addressed more profanity to Mrs. R., including calling her a
“f----- b----,” and she slapped him.  S.
was already on the telephone to the 9-1-1
operator.  She intervened to prevent Mrs.
R. from getting hurt, and to help Mrs. R.’s efforts to keep appellant at
the residence until the police arrived. 
But appellant got up and walked out the back door.  As he walked out, he punched S. in the
kitchen five times in the head.  At some
point in the melee, he also punched a picture frame and mirror belonging to
Mrs. R., breaking them both. 

            The above evidence amply supports
findings of battery on Mrs. R. and S. 
At the adjudication, appellant claimed that he acted in
self-defense and by implication that Mrs. R. acted with excessive force in
disciplining him.  But the juvenile court
did not believe his adjudication claims insofar as they differed from those of
Mrs. R. and of S.  It found no evidence
of excessive force during parental discipline.

            Mrs. R. was appellant’s
guardian.  Apparently, this was not the
first time appellant had become upset and attempted to work out his anger by
being verbally and physically abusive to his family.  As appellant’s guardian and the guardian of
the other children in the household, Mrs. R. was entitled to prevent appellant
from using his superior strength to push the other children around and to beat
them up.  Furthermore, Mrs. R. was
not acting unreasonably when she slapped appellant once in the face for
directing disrespectful and abusive language at her. 

            S. was justified in stepping in to
protect appellant’s 13-year-old sister and Mrs. R., age 64, from injury.  (See People
v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 894-1000 [a person with grounds to
reasonably believe that great bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon
another may protect that person from attack].) 
Appellant was not acting reasonably in self-defense when he pushed S. up
against the refrigerator and punched her in the head five times.

            The juvenile court did not misapply
the law of self-defense or the defense of others and thereby deny appellant due
process at the adjudication.

DISPOSITION

            The
orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                    KLEIN,
P. J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

 

                        CROSKEY, J.

 

 

 

 

                        ALDRICH, J.