In re B.C.
Filed 3/5/13 In re B.C. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
In re B.C., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SACRAMENTO
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
C071627
(Super. Ct. No.
JD230196)
C.H.,
mother of the minor, appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating
her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26,
395.)
discretion in granting the
County Department of Health and Human Services’ (Department) petition for
modification seeking placement of the minor in her prospective adoptive
relative’s home. She also contends the
evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding the minor is generally
adoptable. As to the first contention,
mother does not have standing to raise this
is substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding
that the minor is generally adoptable.
Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2009, the
Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the then five-year-old
minor based on mother’s failure to protect the minor due to her mental health
issues. The minor was detained. The Department’s subsequent investigation revealed
the minor may have been subjected to past sexual abuse. The juvenile court sustained the petition
and, at a March 12, 2010,
dispositional hearing, adjudged the minor a dependent and ordered reunification
services for mother.
In June
2010, the minor was noted to be doing well in her foster home and making
progress in treatment with her therapist.
She was identifying emotions and expressing them, and opening up about
past trauma and anxiety. The minor’s
foster family, however, was not willing to provide permanency for the minor if
mother failed to reunify. After three
months, the minor had to be moved to a higher level of care because of
behavioral problems. The minor refused
to follow house rules, had tantrums when she did not get her way, and displayed
sexualized behavior during bath time.
The minor
was moved to a new foster home on September 9,
2010. In its 12-month review
report, the Department reported the minor was adjusting to the structure and
routine of her new foster home.
In October
2010, the Department filed a petition for modification, requesting a referral
under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for a relative
in Oregon who was willing to
provide permanency.
Mother
failed to reunify and, on January 25,
2011, reunification services were terminated. In its May 2011 report prepared for the
selection and implementation hearing, the Department noted the minor’s behavior
issues had subsided in her new placement.
Over the Christmas holiday, the minor visited her previous foster
parents and had quickly fallen back into problematic behaviors. The social worker concluded it was apparent
the minor benefited from a highly structured environment with clear
expectations and consequences. An
approved homestudy had been completed for the minor’s relative in Oregon
and visits between the relative and minor were being initiated.
The
Department filed an addendum report on September 22,
2011. A new ICPC referral
for the relative in Oregon had
been requested. The minor’s current
caregiver was willing to provide permanency in the form of guardianship, but
not adoption. The social worker opined
that, while the minor was “hard to place due to behavioral issues, it is likely
that she can be placed for adoption.†In
fact, she was in receipt of three homestudies of families interested in adopting
the minor.
The
Department filed a final addendum just prior to the May 21, 2012, selection and implementation
hearing. The new ICPC referral for the
relative in Oregon had been
approved and the Department had filed a section 388 petition for modification
seeking placement of the minor in her prospective adoptive relative’s home in Oregon. At this hearing, the social worker opined the
minor was likely to be adopted.
The
juvenile court granted the Department’s petition for modification seeking placement
of the minor with her prospective adoptive relative in Oregon. The juvenile court then found the minor
“generally adoptable†and likely to be adopted by
terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
of Minor
Mother
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the Department’s
petition for modification seeking placement of the minor in her prospective
adoptive relative’s home in
raise this contention on appeal.
Only a
person aggrieved by a dependency order may appeal it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902;
731, 734.) “An aggrieved person, for
this purpose, is one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the
decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote
consequence of the decision.†(
236.) “‘[T]he mere fact a parent takes a
position on a matter at issue in a juvenile dependency case that affects his or
her child does not alone constitute a sufficient reason to establish standing
to challenge an adverse ruling on it.’â€
(Id. at p. 239.)
Once
reunification services are terminated, as they were here, a parent’s interest
in the care, custody, and companionship of the child is no longer
paramount. Instead, the focus shifts to
the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re
K.C., supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 236.) The issue of appropriate
placement of the minor is not before the court at a section 366.26
hearing. The issues before the juvenile
court at a section 366.26 hearing are:
(1) whether the minor is adoptable; and (2) whether any
exceptions to adoption apply.
(§ 366.26; In re Christopher
M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 160.)
Thus, “[a] parent’s appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights
confers standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child’s placement
only if the placement order’s reversal advances the parent’s argument against
terminating parental rights.†(
Mother
complains about the suitability of the relative with whom the minor was placed,
but she does not identify how the relative placement order impacted the
juvenile court’s termination order. She
does not articulate how her interests
would be advanced by a reversal of the placement order. For example, she does not assert that she
would have retained her parental rights if the minor had remained in foster
care.
At the
section 366.26 hearing, mother’s counsel entered a general objection to a
finding of adoptability, without any specification as to why the minor was not
adoptable. The minor was found to be
generally adoptable. This finding is
unaffected by the placement of the minor.
Thus, because the relative placement order did not affect the juvenile
court’s termination order, mother does not have standing to raise the juvenile
court’s order granting the Department’s request for relative placement on
appeal.
Mother
contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding the minor
is generally adoptable. We disagree.
“If the
court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other
relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the
child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the
child placed for adoption. The fact that the child is not yet placed in a
preadoptive home nor with a relative or foster family who is prepared to adopt
the child shall not constitute a basis for the court to conclude that it is not
likely the child will be adopted.†(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
Determination
of whether a child is likely to be adopted focuses first upon the
characteristics of the child. (In
re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) The existence or
suitability of the prospective adoptive family, if any, is not relevant to this
issue. (Ibid.;
13 Cal.App.4th 839, 844.) “[T]here must be convincing evidence of
the likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time.†(
99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.) The fact that a prospective adoptive
family is willing to adopt the minor is evidence the minor is likely to be
adopted by that family or some other family in a reasonable time. (
79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.)
When the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding is challenged on appeal, even
where the standard of proof in the juvenile court is clear and convincing
evidence, we must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact. (
908, 924.) In making this determination,
we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Issues of fact and credibility are questions
for the trier of fact, and we do not reweigh the evidence when assessing its
sufficiency. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 415.)
The
Department’s May 23, 2011, report stated the minor had no physical health
concerns, was on track developmentally, and was performing above average in
school with no behavioral problems. She
had been referred for mental health services and had successfully graduated
from the program. Although the minor had
demonstrated behavior problems in the past, her emotional development and
adjustment to her September 2010 placement was positive, and she was benefiting
from a highly structured environment with clear expectations and
consequences. By September 26,
2011, the social worker had three homestudies of families interested in adopting
the minor. In the September 26,
2011, addendum report, the social worker opined that the minor was hard to
place due to behavioral issues but was likely to be able to be placed for
adoption. At the May 21, 2012, hearing,
the social worker concluded the minor was likely to be adopted. The evidence supports this conclusion.
Although
the minor may better thrive in a structured environment with clear expectations
and consequences, her needs were not so demanding as to necessitate specialized
placement, nor was her behavior, even before it resolved, so severe as to pose
an obstacle to adoption. On this record,
the juvenile court reasonably could find, as it did, that the minor is
generally adoptable and likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
Because we
find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding the minor is
likely to be adopted, i.e., is generally adoptable, we do not reach mother’s
final contention that the minor is only specifically adoptable and the
prospective adoptive relative is not a suitable caretaker. It is only if the characteristics of the
child make it so difficult to find a family willing to adopt the child that the
child is likely to be adopted only if the prospective adoptive parents are
willing to do so that any inquiry into the existence of a legal impediment to
adoption by the prospective adoptive parents may be relevant at the section
366.26 hearing. (In re Sarah M.,
supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650; Fam. Code, § 8600
et seq.) As the juvenile court
concluded, the minor does not have such characteristics in this case.
DISPOSITION
The orders
of the juvenile court are affirmed.
HOCH , J.
We concur:
BUTZ , Acting P. J.
MURRAY , J.
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Undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
