In re A.S.

Filed 2/18/10 In re A.S. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael J. Rushton, Judge. Affirmed.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.S.

Karen J. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant C.C.

Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.G.

Pamela J. Walls, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Maryann M. Milcetic, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors A.S., S.S., and Sa.G.

Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor M.S.

B.S. (Mother) is the mother of 16-year-old M.S., 13-year-old A.S., five-year-old S.S., and almost three-year-old Sa.G.^[1] C.C. (Father C.C.) is the father of S.S. only. S.G. (Father S.G.) is the father of Sa.G. only. The parents appeal from the juvenile courts order terminating parental rights as to their children/child.^[2]

On appeal, Mother contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her Welfare and Institutions Code^[3]section 388 petition as to S.S. and Sa.G.; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petition as to A.S.; and (3) the juvenile court erred when it failed to apply the beneficial sibling relationship exception to adoption.^[4]

On appeal, Father C.C. contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it employed the wrong legal test in determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply; (2) the juvenile court erred when it failed to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption; and (3) the juvenile court erred when it failed to apply the beneficial sibling relationship exception to adoption.

Father S.G. joins in and adopts by reference each and every argument raised by and as set forth in Mother, Father C.C., and minor M.S.s briefs insofar as they benefit his interests.

We reject the above contentions and affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[5]

A. Mother

The children came to the attention of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) in December 2006 after Mother gave birth to Sa.G. and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Mother had a long history of abusing methamphetamine and continued to deny any current usage even when confronted with positive test results. Mother eventually admitted to abusing methamphetamine and also admitted to being diagnosed with depression and anxiety and failing to take the prescribed medication. Mother also had a lengthy prior child welfare history concerning her older children dating back to October 2002 for general neglect and caretaker absence/incapacity. The children were removed from Mothers care and placed in a foster home.

On December 13, 2006, a petition was filed on behalf of the children pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support).

The children were formally removed from Mothers custody at the detention hearing. The court authorized placement of the children in Mothers care once Mother had been in her in-patient drug program for 30 days and was in compliance with her case plan. Mother was provided with supervised visits with her children and services pending the jurisdictional hearing. Mother had been attending individual and group sessions to address her substance abuse problems. It was reported Mother was an active participant in the group sessions and continued to test clean for drugs. However, Mother had failed to enroll in the sober living program due to finances, and there was concern about her current living situation, as there were people in the house who were using drugs. Mother had participated in a medication evaluation and was diagnosed with bipolar I (most recently, depression) and prescribed an antidepressant.

The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on May 16, 2007. The court found the allegations in the petition true as amended and declared the children dependents of the court. The children, who had different fathers, were not determined to be a sibling set. Mother was provided with reunification services, which required Mother to complete general counseling, psychotropic medication monitoring, a parenting course and an in-patient substance abuse program and to randomly drug test. Mother was also provided with supervised visits with her children.

By August 2007, Mother had moved out of her home and was renting a room from a friend of her mothers in Corona. In addition, she had secured employment and had been working at a craft store for about four months and was said to be a good employee. She was actively participating in her substance abuse program, drug testing with negative results, and attending general counseling. However, a warrant check revealed Mother had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants, had missed a recent drug test in August, had been dropped from her parenting program for failing to show up for orientation, and had been taken off her prescribed medication for failing to attend her psychiatric appointments.

In addition, M.S., Mothers eldest child, reported that he was fearful of returning home and had refused to see his mother and grandmother. He liked the stability of his placement and only sought to visit his siblings and maternal grandfather. A.S., Mothers eldest daughter, likewise liked the stability of her placement and was fearful of returning to her mothers lifestyle. However, she had agreed initially to attend conjoint therapy with her mother but had expressed that she wanted what was best for herself and had also refused to attend visits with Mother. M.S. and A.S. reported that Mother continually spoke negatively about their placement, and they felt guilty for being happy in their foster homes. They also reported that Mother did not ask about their well-being and only spoke about her problems. M.S. has since agreed to attend visitations as long as they were appropriately monitored.

By January 25, 2008, the social worker recommended terminating Mothers services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Mother moved back into the maternal grandmothers home, the home from which the children had been removed and in which the maternal uncle, who sold and used drugs, resided. Mother stated she was attempting to find a new home and was planning on marrying Sa.G.s father upon his release from prison. Mother still had not cleared her outstanding warrants, but she continued to be employed by the craft store, earning minimum wage. Further, she continued to participate in her substance abuse program, test negative for drugs with the exception of two occasions, attend her general counseling sessions, take her prescribed medication, and complete a parenting education program.

However, M.S. reported that his mother had not changed, that he did not want to return to her care, and that he did not want his siblings returned to her care either. In fact, M.S. wrote a letter indicating he did not want to return to Mothers care and believed his Mother was merely participating in services to get the children back. M.S. was very attached to his foster mother and had worked very hard to return to her home after temporarily being placed in his sisters foster home. A.S. also continued to state that she was fearful of being returned to Mothers care and that she was comfortable in her placement and liked the stability. She too wrote a letter noting she did not want to return to Mothers care; she wanted to stay with her foster family, who cared about her and her schooling. Her conjoint therapy sessions were stopped after A.S. continued to cry during the therapy. S.S. stated she liked visiting with her mother and father but that she would only stay overnight at their homes if her older sister, A.S., stayed with her.

Even though Mother regularly visited her children, the social worker noted that she continued to make her two older children cry during visitation by badgering them about issues such as appearance and sexual activities. Moreover, Mother had little or no interaction with her two younger children during the visits and focused her time with the older children. Because of these actions by Mother, the older children continued to request no visits with her. The social worker opined that Mother did not show that she had benefitted from her parenting program as evidenced by her continual neglect of the two younger children, who were one and three years old at the time, and her asking the older children to take care of the younger ones. The social worker also concluded Mother had not taken responsibility for her actions and had failed to benefit from her services as evidenced by her failure to complete substance abuse treatment, her unstable living environment, the negative quality of and limited amount of visitation, and her failure to address her warrants. The social worker also noted that Mother had tested positive for opiates on October 31, 2007, and had admitted to using methamphetamine in August 2007.

Mother continued with her services and had begun attending a second parenting course. However, M.S. and A.S. refused to visit with Mother or contact her on the telephone; and when she visited the two younger children, she spent time with one while neglecting the other instead of engaging both children. She appeared not to know how to redirect the children when they began to fight. In addition, S.S. stated she did not want to visit with Mother or return to her care and, during one visit, S.S. pretended she was sick so she could go home.

The contested 12-month review hearing was held on March 19, 2008. At that time, the court found that DPSS had provided Mother with reasonable reunification services and that Mothers participation had been adequate but incomplete. The court continued Mothers services, finding that a substantial probability the children would be returned to Mothers care within six months existed. The court ordered conjoint counseling between the two older children and Mother, and play therapy for S.S.

By the 18-month review hearing, Mother still had not benefitted from her services, despite her participation in and completion of a substance abuse program and continued negative drug testing. She continued to reside in the home of the maternal grandmother, who recently had been arrested for possession of controlled substances, and where the maternal uncle, who also used and sold drugs, still resided. In addition, Mother had failed to clear her outstanding warrants, and her visits with her children had not gone well. M.S. attempted conjoint therapy with Mother, but Mother was not receptive to therapy and was in denial. The therapist cancelled the conjoint therapy, finding it unbeneficial to the child. A.S.s conjoint therapy sessions with Mother were cancelled after Mother continued to bad-mouth the foster mother and the social worker, make inappropriate remarks concerning the case, and attempt to change A.S.s mind about returning to her care. The counseling center administrator reported that Mother did not appear to show any remorse and was just taking steps to get the children back. He opined Mother had not benefitted from services. S.S. refused to visit Mother or talk to her on the telephone; she desired to remain in her foster home. Sa.G. was also bonded to her foster family. Mother had cancelled four of the nine visits with the younger two children and had missed the majority of her telephone calls with S.S. Additionally, on May 29, 2008, after an upsetting visit with Sa.G., Mother followed the car of Sa.G.s caregiver. Sa.G. and two other adults were in the caregivers car. They entered the freeway, where Mother tailgated the caregivers car, cut in front of it and slammed on her brakes, and otherwise drove recklessly, almost causing an accident. In addition, after two parenting courses, Mother still did not know how to redirect Sa.G.s negative behavior.

The contested 18-month-review hearing was held on June 25, 2008. At that hearing, Mother testified and admitted that she had been receiving and participating in services and visitation from the inception of the case. She further stated that she had recently taken steps to clear her outstanding warrants and had recently moved into a two-bedroom apartment with her father, who had passed a criminal background check. Mother denied following Sa.G.s caregivers car. M.S. testified that he did not want to be returned to Mother and did not want his sisters returned, either, as he felt Mother would revert back to her old ways after they were returned to her care. After the court considered the evidence in the case and arguments from counsel, it found that reasonable services had been provided to Mother and the extent of progress by Mother had been adequate but incomplete. The court also found that Mother had not benefitted from her services and that there was a substantial risk of detriment to the children if they were returned to Mothers care. The court then terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

Since the termination of services, Mother continued to be employed at the craft store and reside with her father in a two-bedroom apartment. In addition, she still had an active warrant.

M.S. and Sa.G. had been placed together in collateral foster homes since December 2006, as had A.S. and S.S. M.S. was reaching his developmental milestones, but had begun to rebel from school and his foster mother. M.S. was receiving bimonthly therapy. M.S.s counselors reported that he was generally a good child but did not like authority and had a difficult time following directives. He had built up tension and anger due to issues with his mother. M.S. was later diagnosed as bipolar and was taking psychotropic medication for his mood swings and emotional outbursts. The combination of therapy and medication appeared to stabilize M.S. Despite M.S.s negative behavior, his caretaker described M.S. as caring and warm. She relished having M.S. in her home and considered him to be her son.

A.S. was developmentally, emotionally, and educationally doing well. She was well established in her foster home, appeared emotionally happy, and was maintaining a 3.5 grade point average (GPA). However, later in the dependency, A.S.s GPA slipped to a 2.0. A.S. was also receiving bimonthly individual therapy. In counseling, she was setting goals for her future, beginning to focus on her own well-being as opposed to being parentified, and coming to terms with her relationship with her family. Due to her success, her therapist reported that A.S. was no longer in need of individual counseling.

S.S. was also developmentally, emotionally, and educationally doing well. She was greatly bonded to her foster parents and appeared comfortable in their home. She was receiving weekly counseling and working on addressing her fears. Although S.S. liked her visits with her father, she was scared she would be placed with her father and did not want to be removed from her foster parents.

Sa.G. was also developmentally and emotionally doing well, and was extremely bonded to her foster mother. She appeared happy and tended to become jealous when her foster mother held another child for a long period of time. Sa.G. has been with her foster mother since she was a couple weeks old, and her foster mother was the only mother she has known. Sa.G. referred to her foster mother as mommy, and sought her out for attention and affection.

Mothers visits with her children continued to be sporadic and at times inappropriate. She had failed to demonstrate that she had benefitted from her parenting classes. She was unable to redirect the two younger children when they fought with each other or administer appropriate and effective boundaries. However, from November 2008 to January 2009, Mother was on time for three scheduled visits with the younger children. As of October 2008, Mother had not participated in any additional services on her own.

M.S. and A.S. desired to remain in their respective foster homes with their siblings and be adopted. They did not understand why the process was taking so long. They also did not mind that they were living in separate homes because they saw each other every day. It was evident that the siblings were attached to each other. A.S. described her prospective adoptive parents as wonderful and considered them to be her parents. S.S. also wished to be adopted by her prospective adoptive parents, but also requested that she be able to visit her father every week.

The childrens prospective adoptive parents also desired to adopt the children, and provide them with a stable, loving, and permanent home. The prospective adoptive mother of M.S. and Sa.G. was very open to M.S. having visits with his parents and extended family members if that made him content. Regarding Sa.G., she was willing to arrange visits between Sa.G. and her parents when she requests those visits. M.S. and Sa.G.s prospective adoptive mother also indicated that she would ensure that M.S. and Sa.G. maintained visits with their siblings who were placed with the prospective adoptive mothers daughter. The prospective adoptive parents of A.S. and S.S. were also willing to maintain relative and sibling contacts. They explained that they were willing to arrange unsupervised visits between S.S. and her father, as well as continue to include him in their family outings. They would also arrange visits between S.S. and her mother when S.S. was emotionally healthy and made the request to visit. A.S. did not want to have any contact with her mother or father at that time.

On December 17, 2008, Mother filed a petition to modify the court order ( 388 petition), requesting that the court return the children to her care on family maintenance or that the court reinstate her services with liberal visitation. Mother claimed that the children had a strong bond with her and that she had been clean and sober for over a year. She further asserted that she could provide the children with a stable and permanent home. In response, DPSS reported that Mothers circumstances had not changed since services were terminated in June 2008. She had not completed additional classes and had a strained bond with her children. Her two oldest children refused to visit her, and her younger two saw her once a month. In addition, Mother continued to be inappropriate during visits, and repeatedly asked the children if they wanted to return home to her care.

Around Christmas 2008, M.S. reported that he missed his maternal relatives and desired to be placed with a family member, but maintain full contact with his caregiver. He never strayed from feelings of being positively bonded to his caregiver, but appeared to have mixed and confused emotions. By February 2009, he preferred to be placed with his mother. On four different occasions, M.S. would leave his friends home and go visit his mother. Mother and M.S. had participated in two conjoint therapy sessions, and they both reported to the therapist that M.S. wanted to return home. M.S.s therapist noted that they appeared comfortable with each other and that M.S. was positive toward his mother.

On January 26 and again on February 13, 2009, M.S. requested to be immediately returned to his mothers care. However, he did not believe that his sisters should be removed from their respective foster homes.

A combined hearing on the petition for modification and selection and implementation began on February 24, 2009. At that hearing, M.S. testified that he believed Mother had truly changed because she was able to hold a steady job, had an apartment and car, and was off drugs. He also explained that he was now able to talk to her, have a mother/son relationship, and feel more comfortable with her. M.S. wished to live with Mother because he missed her and missed living with her. M.S. admitted that he had left his foster mothers home to secretly visit his mother, who lived pretty far, but claimed to do so because he did not want supervised visits. He also acknowledged that on one of those visits, he had stayed overnight at his mothers apartment. Also, M.S. testified that his mother had, in violation of the courts order, picked him up around seven times. He further stated that his sisters were happy in their respective homes and that their caretakers truly loved them. He therefore was undecided on whether he wanted his sisters to be returned to Mothers care.

On March 11, 2009, the childrens attorney declared a conflict of interest and new counsel was appointed for the children.

The hearing on the section 388 petition was reconvened on April 1, 2009. At that hearing, M.S., Mother, the social worker, and A.S. testified. M.S. testified that he had changed his mind about his sisters remaining in their caregivers homes, explaining that Mother deserved a second chance with his sisters. He further stated that he was really close to his sisters and that he saw them on a daily basis. However, since March 2009, he no longer had a close relationship with A.S. They had stopped talking to each other because M.S. wanted A.S. to return to Mothers home, but she did not want to. M.S. said that he would miss his sisters and would be sad if they were adopted, but essentially acknowledged that their caretakers would not prevent him from having contact with his sisters.

In support of her section 388 petition, Mother testified that since reunification services were terminated in June 2008, she had enrolled into a fourth parenting class two weeks prior and that she was attending counseling with M.S. She believed that she had benefited from her current parenting class and changed completely. She explained that she had maintained a job, continued to reside with her father in a two-bedroom apartment, and had attended visits and counseling. Mother acknowledged that she had about four or five unauthorized visits with M.S. and that it was in violation of a court order. Mother believed that A.S., S.S., and Sa.G. should be given a chance to see how much she had changed, just like M.S. had seen the change.

The social worker essentially testified that Mother had not shown any changed circumstances since services were terminated, and noted that DPSS had provided Mother with conjoint therapy with M.S. and a parenting class for teenagers for M.S.s benefit. The social worker acknowledged that a change in circumstances would be that M.S. wanted to return to his mother and that Mother had suitable housing. The social worker also conceded that Mother had resolved her substance abuse problem through family preservation and had financial resources. However, Mothers interactions with her two younger children were inadequate and she still lacked parenting skills. The social worker believed it was in A.S.s, S.S.s, and Sa.G.s best interests to be adopted by their caretakers. In addition, the social worker said that even though M.S. and his sisters had a sibling relationship, which was worth preserving, she believed that if M.S. was returned home, the caretakers would facilitate sibling visits and the visits would be preserved in a postadoption agreement.

A.S. testified that she loved her brother M.S. and wanted to maintain her relationship with him, but that she did not currently want a relationship with her mother. She did not believe Mother had changed and desired to be adopted by her current caregivers.

At the end of A.S.s testimony, the hearing was continued to April 2, 2009. At that hearing, following arguments from all parties, the juvenile court denied Mothers section 388 petition, finding no changed circumstances and contrary to the childrens best interests. The juvenile court then proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing. As to M.S., the court continued M.S.s section 366.26 hearing for three months and ordered M.S. and Mother to have unsupervised day or overnight visits once a week. As to A.S., S.S., and Sa.G., the court found them to be adoptable, that no exception to adoption applied, and ordered parental rights terminated.

B. Father C.C. (Father of S.S.)

On May 16, 2007, Father C.C. was offered reunification services. However, those services were terminated on June 25, 2008.

Father C.C. had been residing with the paternal grandmother since January 2008 in a two-bedroom house. He reported that he sleeps on the couch, as one bedroom is for his mother and the other is [S.S.s] room. In June 2008, he began working for a cable company. He continued to have weekly unsupervised visits with his daughter S.S., but initially had problems getting her to go with him. S.S. informed the social worker that she did not want to go to the visits with her father because she did not want to live with him. It appeared S.S. enjoyed seeing her father every week and was working on her fears of being returned to his care. S.S. desired to remain with her current caregivers.

Father C.C. was conflicted about wanting his daughter with him and wanting her to remain with her siblings. He had informed the social worker that he wanted S.S. to be part of his life but acknowledged that S.S. remaining in a legal guardianship with her current caregiver and siblings was in S.S.s best interest. However, after Father C.C. learned in November 2008 that he would be responsible to pay child support for S.S., he changed his mind and reported that he wanted full custody of his daughter. Nonetheless, when he was contacted on December 30, 2008, he had no plans for his daughters return and reported that he would figure it out when it happened. He was unclear as to what school S.S. would be attending and stated that his mother would care for the child while he was working, despite her health problems.^[6] He also had no plans for sibling visitations. Moreover, despite having S.S.s caregivers telephone number for the past 18 months, he had not maintained weekly telephone contact with her, which would have increased the bond between them.

In November 2008, the court ordered conjoint therapy between S.S. and her father. Father C.C., however, failed to follow through with the therapy, claiming he did not need therapy because his relationship with S.S. was fine. Upon his attorneys advice, Father C.C. eventually enrolled in the therapy, and his first conjoint therapy session with S.S. was held on February 6, 2009. The therapist reported that S.S. stated she did not want to return to either parent and desired to remain with her current caregivers. S.S. looked up to her foster parents and appeared very happy in their home. S.S. also expressed that she did not want overnight visits with her father because she had no friends there and there was nothing to do at his home. However, S.S. began having one overnight visit per week beginning on November 7, 2008. Even though S.S. reported that she did not want to attend the overnight visits, once she arrived at the meeting site, S.S. willingly went with her father. Later, on January 6, 2009, S.S. informed the social worker that she was scared to spend the night, did not like to go there because there were no children her age, and she was not able to go outside, unless it was for her father to smoke. Due to S.S.s fear, overnight visitation had ceased and the conjoint therapist was asked to address the issue.

On January 28, 2009, A.S. informed the social worker that S.S. throws a fit and cries when she has to go to her fathers home. S.S. confirmed this information, and explained that she did not like spending time with her father. S.S. again repeated her disagreement over attending visits with her father on February 13, 2009.

On March 4, 2009, the conjoint therapist reported Father C.C. and S.S.s relationship was strained. The therapist further found that Father C.C. lacked techniques of good discipline, but that once he learned those techniques, there would be minimum concern to continue overnight visitation. Once the visitations were limited to only day visits, S.S. had no difficulty going to her fathers house and stated that the visits were fun. The social worker recommended that Father C.C.s parental rights be terminated with a postadoption agreement with weekend visitation, holidays, and summers. S.S.s caregivers had been open thus far to including Father C.C. in S.S.s life, and they had a good relationship with each other. The social worker acknowledged that S.S. had been having visits with her father for the last two years every Saturday and that there was a bond between S.S. and her father. However, the social worker did not believe it would be in S.S.s best interest to return the child to her father, explaining that S.S. did not want to live with him and that it would be detrimental to S.S. if she were returned to her father.

C. Father S.G. (Father of Sa.G.)

In August 2006, Father Sa.G. was convicted of several felonies and sentenced to state prison. His anticipated release date was October 4, 2009. On May 16, 2007, Father S.G. was denied services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1).

Following a long period of not seeing Sa.G., Father S.G. finally saw his daughter on March 11, 2009, in court and while in custody. Father S.G. was excited to see his daughter and was appropriate. He thanked the foster mother for taking care of her and tried playing with Sa.G., but she was not receptive. The visit ended after about 15 minutes with Father S.G. saying goodbye and requesting a picture of her and permission to send letters to Sa.G.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Section 388 Petition

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition. In her view, the evidence established that she had made significant changes in her parenting skills, attitude, character, and sobriety, and that it was in the childrens best interests for them to have further opportunities to develop and maintain a relationship with her.

A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new or changed circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The parent bears the burden to show both a legitimate change of circumstances and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.] (In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959-960 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. [Citation.] (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.), original quote marks corrected.)

Here, the juvenile court could reasonably find that there were no material changed circumstances. By the time of the section 388 hearing, the only changed circumstances that the court could reasonably find were that Mother had participated in unsupervised visits with M.S., that M.S. wanted to be returned to Mothers care, and that M.S. and Mother had participated in conjoint therapy. However, M.S. is not the subject of this appeal. The juvenile court recognized the permanency and suitability of Mothers residence as a changed circumstance, but found that was not the greater issue in the mothers past. The court further noted that since services had been terminated, Mother had continued to live with her parents, had maintained her employment, and had continued to visit S.S. and Sa.G. However, as the court noted, Mother continued to have a strained relationship with her daughters, especially A.S., who had repeatedly refused to see Mother. In addition, Mothers recent consistent visits with S.S. and Sa.G., as the court stated, is not a sufficient change in circumstance. The evidence, as set out above, demonstrates that there was little that had changed in Mothers life since her services were terminated in June 2008.

Moreover, Mother did not establish that resumption of reunification services would be in their best interests. Once services have been terminated, the juvenile courts focus shifts from family reunification to the childs permanent placement and well-being, and the burden accordingly shifts to the parent to show that a termination of parental rights is not in the childs best interests. [Citations.] (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235.) We reject Mothers claim that her sobriety alone is a sufficient change in circumstance warranting return of S.S. and Sa.G. to her care. Neither S.S., Sa.G., nor A.S. had stated that they wanted to return to Mothers care. In fact, these children were adamant in remaining with their respective caregivers. Both S.S. and A.S. reported that they wished to be adopted by their respective caregivers. There was also no evidence to show that these children were bonded with Mother. On the other hand, there was substantial evidence demonstrating that the children were bonded to and thriving with their respective caregivers. In fact, the foster mother was the only mother Sa.G. had ever known.

Mother focuses on factors advanced by the appellate court in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532 (Kimberly F.), to evaluate S.S.s and Sa.G.s best interests. In that case, the Court of Appeal rejected a trial courts use of a simple best interest testof comparing the household and upbringing offered by the natural parent or parents with that of the caretakersin analyzing a section 388 petition. (Id. at pp. 526-530.) The appellate court then determined a list of factors, not meant to be exhaustive, which should be considered: the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency and the reason that problem was not overcome by the time of the final review; the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond; and, the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Id. at pp. 530-532.)

These factors, however, appear to focus primarily on the parent, not on the childs need for permanency and stability. (Compare Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) In any event, Mother cannot prevail under any of the Kimberly F. factors. First, the problems that led to dependency in this case were serious: drug abuse, homelessness, and neglect. This is not a case of simply a dirty house. (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 522, 532 [a rare case in which denial of a section 388 petition merited reversal].) Second, the bond between Mother and S.S. was not strong. The bond between Mother and Sa.G. was also not strong. Mother did not play a parental role in the childrens lives and had problems redirecting the children during visits. Mother also had difficulty disciplining the children and had left them to play by themselves instead of interacting with them. The relationship between Mother and the children was not typical of a successful parent-child relationship. In fact, as noted earlier, neither S.S., Sa.G., nor A.S. had stated that they wanted to return to Mothers care. These children were adamant in remaining with their respective caregivers. Third, the evidence showed that the bond between the children and their respective caregivers was much stronger than that between the children and Mother. Finally, Mother had not shown that she had ameliorated the problems that led to the dependency and the removal of the children. Although Mother had made progress, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the progress was insufficient to show she could provide the children with the stability and permanency they had with their respective caregivers.

Furthermore, Kimberly F. is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Kimberly F. is a case involving entirely different factsa cluttered, unsanitary home that was later cleaned up, rather than years of drug dependency, poor parenting skills, and children who refused to see Mother. (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 526.) Conditions in the home in Kimberly F. were improving by the time of the 18-month review hearing; by the time of the permanency planning hearing, the home was safe and clean. Moreover, there was a strong bond between the mother and the children, and the mother had a substantial amount of unsupervised visitation. In reversing the juvenile court, the court in Kimberly F. noted that the reasons for the dependency were not severe, the mother showed she could maintain a clean and safe home, and the children were closely bonded to her. (Id. at pp. 532-533.) The court also noted the decision to deny the section 388 petition was based largely and improperly on the juvenile courts adoption of the narcissistic personality rationale, which the lower court applied to the mother there. (Kimberly F., at pp. 526-527, 532-533.) The appellate court also suggested it was less likely a parent who lost custody because of a drug problem could prevail on a section 388 petition, whereas in a dirty house case, which was present in Kimberly F., the chances of success were greater. (Kimberly F., at pp. 531, fn. 9, 532.)

Parent and child share a fundamental interest in reuniting up to the point at which reunification efforts cease. (In re R.H. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 678, 697.) By the time of a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a childs permanent plan, however, the interests of the parent and the child have diverged. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Indeed, children have a fundamental independent interest in belonging to a family unit. They have compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect, to have a stable and permanent placement, one that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306 (Marilyn H.).) Adoption gives a child the best chance at a full emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)

Therefore, after reunification efforts have terminated, the courts focus shifts from family reunification to promoting the childs needs for permanency and stability. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued out-of-home placement is in the best interests of a child. (Id. at p. 310.) A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)

Here, Mother made no attempt to rebut the presumption that continued out-of-home placement was in the best interests of the children. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 302.) Neither in the juvenile court nor on appeal has Mother addressed the childrens needs for permanency and stability and how those interests would be advanced by resuming reunification. Mother merely concludes the strength of the relative bond weighs in favor of granting [her] section 388 petition and allowing all four children and their mother to be a family again.

Relying on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 (Hunter S.), and claiming her case is similar to that case, Mother also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition as to A.S. Mothers reliance on Hunter S. is misplaced. There, a five-year-old child was removed from his mothers custody and returned to the mother six months later. A month later, the child was again removed after his mother was incarcerated. (Id. at p. 1501.) The mother maintained a loving close relationship with the child by sending monthly letters. (Ibid.) The same month the mother was released from prison, the court terminated her reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at p. 1501.) The court also ordered the department to arrange visitation, but the child steadfastly refused to visit his mother or have any contact with her. (Id. at pp. 1501-1502.) For more than two years, the mother persisted in her efforts to get the court to enforce its visitation order and to order conjoint therapy. Although the court never made a finding that continued visitation would be detrimental to the child, it neither rescinded nor enforced its orders conditioning visitation and conjoint therapy on the childs willingness to participate and his therapists approval. (Id. at pp. 1502-1503.) When the mother brought a section 388 petition seeking reinstatement of reunification services, the lower court denied it and later terminated her parental rights. The appellate court reversed, finding that the juvenile court erred by not enforcing its orders and by delegating discretion of whether visitation and therapy occurred to the child and his therapist. (Id. at pp. 1505-1508.) The failure of the juvenile court to enforce its visitation order prejudiced the mother by effectively precluding her, through no fault of her own, from establishing the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), which requires a showing of consistent contact and visitation. (Hunter S., at p. 1508.)

In contrast, the juvenile court here did not violate any visitation order by failing to enforce it. From the inception, the juvenile court ordered A.S. to have supervised visitation with Mother and also ordered conjoint therapy between the two. In fact, A.S. had initially visited with her mother and had participated in three sessions of conjoint counseling with Mother. But, A.S. ceased contact with Mother after believing Mother was not responsive to the therapy. Also, Mother caused great emotional distress to A.S. during visitation and conjoint therapy. Thereafter, Mother did not make any requests to the juvenile court for further visitation or complain about A.S.s lack of contact with her. Furthermore, the record does not establish that Mother had a warm, loving relationship with A.S. To the contrary, A.S., who was almost 14 years old at the time of the section 388 hearing, testified that she did not want to have a relationship with her mother and desired to be adopted by her caregivers. A.S. had been out of Mothers custody and placed with her prospective adoptive family since December 19, 2006. There is no reason to believe, and no evidence to support, that forcing A.S. to visit with Mother would have been in A.S.s best interest.

We also reject M.S.s argument that the juvenile court failed to consider his sisters best interests in denying the section 388 petition, instead focusing primarily on Mothers unauthorized visits with him. Although the court noted its disapproval with Mothers unauthorized visits with M.S., that was not the deciding factor in denying the section 388 petition. The record amply shows that the court considered the childrens best interests in denying Mothers section 388 petition.

Unfortunately, Mothers attempts to reunify with her girls were too little and too late. In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mothers section 388 petition. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that S.S.s, Sa.G.s, and A.S.s best interests lay in the permanence they would gain from adoption, rather than in delaying that permanence in the sentimental hope that the children could be reunited and bond with Mother.

B. Sibling Relationship Exception

Mother and Father C.C. argue the juvenile court erred in finding that the sibling relationship exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v), did not apply, and Father Sa.G. joins this argument. This subdivision provides an exception to the termination of parental rights if the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to a substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

The juvenile court undertakes a two-step analysis in evaluating the applicability of the sibling relationship exception. First, the court is directed to determine whether terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by evaluating the nature and extent of the relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. [Citation.] If the court determines terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the court is then directed to weigh the childs best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952.) [T]he concern is the best interests of the child being considered for adoption, not the interests of that childs siblings. (In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 822.)

Reflecting the Legislatures preference for adoption when possible, the sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a compelling reason for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to substantial interference with a sibling relationship. [Citation.] Indeed, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption. [Citation.] (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) We review the courts finding on this issue for substantial evidence. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017, disapproved on another ground in In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 531, fn. 5.)

Here, arguably, even though there was evidence demonstrating a sibling relationship between M.S. and his sisters, which was so strong that its severance would cause them detriment, there remains substantial evidence that the benefits of adoption outweigh the benefits of maintaining the sibling relationship. The children have suffered years of uncertainty while family reunification was attempted. The reunification efforts failed. Now, the needs of the child[ren] for permanency and stability are paramount. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 52.) Adoption will provide a permanent home and stability. They have lived with their respective caregivers since December 2006, are emotionally attached to them, and have repeatedly indicated their desire to be adopted by their caregivers. In fact, Sa.G.s prospective adoptive mother is the only mother she has ever known and considers her caregiver to be her mother.

Moreover, there is no evidence to support Mothers and M.S.s contentions that the sisters would not maintain contact with their brother if they were adopted. The record belies this contention. Throughout the dependency, the respective caregivers have been willing to maintain sibling relationships and have indicated a willingness to allow sibling visitation. The respective caregivers are two related families: a mother and her daughter, who live close to one another. There is no indication in the record to suggest that the respective caregivers would no longer maintain the sibling relationships. The record shows that the caregivers have an amicable relationship with each other, with M.S., as well as the parents, and that M.S. remained close to his caregivers.

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts conclusion that the benefits of adoption outweigh the benefits of continuing the relationships with their brother.

C. Legal Test of Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception

Father C.C. argues the juvenile court applied the wrong legal test in determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. He asserts that the court erred by failing to make separate findings as to him and his daughter S.S.; that the court improperly lumped his parent-child beneficial relationship with that of S.S.s half sisters.

The record belies Father C.C.s argument. There is no indication in the record to suggest that the juvenile court believed that S.S., A.S., and Sa.G. shared the same father. Indeed, at the combined hearings held on April 2, 2009, prior to terminating parental rights, the court stated, Okay. I do have three different fathers for each of the three different young ladies, dont I? Okay. All right. The court then made separate findings as to A.S. and her parents. The court specifically stated that A.S.s father had not been provided reunification services. The court also explicitly distinguished S.S. and Sa.G.s fathers, noting that Sa.G.s father had not been offered reunification services. The court also permitted each attorney to make closing argument. In pertinent part, counsel for Father Sa.G. argued that the sibling exception to adoption applied, but never mentioned the parent-child relationship. Father C.C.s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the court should apply the parent-child relationship exception to adoption because Father C.C. had a bond with his daughter S.S. The record does not support Father C.C.s claim that the juvenile court misunderstood the scope of its discretion in finding that the parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply regarding Father C.C. and S.S. or that the court applied the wrong legal test.

D. Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception to Adoption

Father C.C. argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. He contends substantial evidence showed he occupied a parental role in S.S.s life, resulting in S.S.s significant, positive, emotional attachment to him, and severing the parent-child relationship would greatly harm S.S. He thus asserts a guardianship should have been initiated for S.S. instead of adoption.

At a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, the court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (In re Taya C. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over alternative permanency plans. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 808-809.)

After the court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345; but see 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), provides an exception to termination of parental rights when [t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.

[C]ourt[s] ha[ve] interpreted the phrase benefit from continuing the relationship to refer to a parent-child relationship that promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.) Where the parent has continued to regularly visit and contact the child, and the child has maintained or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment to the parent, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).)

The exception does not require proof that the child has a primary attachment to a parent or that the noncustodial parent has maintained day-to-day contact with the child. [Citations.] (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 300.) However, [a] parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from the day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the childs life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.] (In re Mary G., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 207, fn. omitted.) In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.] (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

We must affirm a trial courts rejection of these exceptions if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) We . . . review[] the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the courts ruling. [Citation.] (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1235.) Because the parents had the burden of proof, we must affirm unless there was indisputable evidence [in their favor]evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected . . . . (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.)

On review, under the substantial evidence standard, our task is not as difficult as that of the trial court. We do not reweigh the evidence. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Substantial evidence supports the decision to terminate parental rights here. The record shows that to the extent S.S. derived some benefit from her relationship with her father, the quality and strength of that relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Id. at p. 575.) The beneficial relationship exception must be considered in light of the Legislatures preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed. The exception does not allow a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to stymie an adoption simply because there is evidence that the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship with the parent. Although Father C.C. argues at great length regarding his bond with his daughter, he does not attempt to show why this bond outweighs the benefits of adoption. S.S.s needs, wishes, her age, and the fact she would be raised together in the same home as her sister A.S. weigh in favor of adoption. S.S. consistently and repeatedly stated that she wished to be adopted by her caregivers, and that she did not want to return to her parents. S.S. was five years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, and had lived with her caregivers for about two and a half years through the dependency action. The length of time S.S. had been in the foster care system and her need for a permanent, stable home also supports the juvenile courts finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption did not apply.

Although the record shows that S.S. essentially enjoyed her visits with her father and arguably had a bond with him, she also was bonded to her caregivers and felt comfortable in their home. She looked