In re A.R.
Filed 1/26/09 In re A.R. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.R., Defendant and Appellant. | E045340 (Super.Ct.No. J216354) OPINION |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Knish, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant A.R. (minor) committed the offense of public intoxication.[1] (Pen. Code, 647, subd. (f).) A juvenile court found the allegation to be true. The court declared minor a ward and placed her on probation in her parents home. The court also ordered that minors drivers license or the privilege to obtain her drivers license be delayed/suspended for one year. (Veh. Code, 13202.5, subd. (d)(3).) On appeal, minors sole contention is there was insufficient evidence to support the courts true finding that she was intoxicated in public, since she was not in a public place of her own volition. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2007, minor asked to go to a family party with her friends. Her mother (mother) gave her permission to go despite mothers concern that minor would drink alcohol. Minor had participated in rehabilitation twice for her drinking problem. Mother told minor that if minor came home drunk, she (mother) would take her to the police station. After minor left for the party, mother did not speak with her again until approximately 9:00 p.m., when minor called home to check in. At that point, minor seemed fine. Just before midnight, minors friends called mother. They then drove minor home and parked the car on the street on the right side of her house. Mother observed minor stumbling out of the car. She observed that minor was having trouble walking and that she was holding onto the fence. Minor stumbled to the front door of the house. She smelled like alcohol, and her friends told mother they brought her home because she was drunk. Mother asked minor why she had been drinking, and minor responded that she only had one drink. Mother immediately took minor to the police station.
Officer Cynthia Gourlay met mother at the front counter of the police department. Mother told the officer that minor had been drinking, that she was on probation,[2]and that she was out of control. Officer Gourlay observed that minor was obviously intoxicated and helped her walk out to the parking lot because minor could not stand on her own. The officer asked how much she had been drinking, but minor would not answer.
ANALYSIS
There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Courts True Finding
Minor contends there was insufficient evidence to support the courts true finding that she was intoxicated in a public place. She does not dispute that she was inebriated but argues only that she was not voluntarily drunk in public. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
[I]n considering a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, appellant has a heavy burden in demonstrating that the evidence does not support the juvenile court findings. [Citation.] An appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment in order to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1136.) We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] . . . . (In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In addition, we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.] (Ibid.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict, we will not reverse simply because the evidence might reasonably support a contrary finding. This standard applies to cases based on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible. [Citation.] The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts. . . . On appeal, we must accept that part of the testimony which supports the judgment. [Citation.] (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.)
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient
A person violates section 647, subdivision (f) by being found in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or any drug . . . in a condition that he or she is unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or the safety of others . . . . ( 647, subd. (f).) A public place includes the area outside a home that is open to general use, whether it be the driveway, lawn or front porch . . . . (People v. Olson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 592, 598.)
Minor claims she was initially involuntarily and unwillingly placed in the vehicle by her friends and involuntarily and unwillingly driven home. She further claims that her friends got her out of the car and walked her to the front door of her house. The record belies her claims. Mother testified that she saw [minor] getting out of the car that she was in, and that she was stumbling to the front door. Mother further said that [minor] was holding on to the fence, because she was having trouble walking. Thus, the evidence clearly shows that minor stumbled out of the car and walked on her own to the front door of her home. Contrary to minors claims, there is simply no evidence that she was taken to a public place unwillingly or involuntarily.
Minor asserts that, like the minors in In re David W. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 689 (David W.) and In re R.K. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1615 (R.K.), she was not voluntarily in violation of section 647, subdivision (f). Those cases are distinguishable. In David W. and R.K., the minors were originally found in private places and only came to be in public places because they were taken there by the police. In David W., the minor was in his bedroom at home when the police found him, handcuffed him, and transported him to the hospital. (David W., supra, at p. 692.) The appellate court found the minor was compelled by the police officers to go to a public place (ibid.) and thus reversed the finding that the minor violated section 647, subdivision (f). (Id. at p. 694.) Similarly, the minor in R.K. was inside a private woodshed when a police officer requested him to come out to a public place. (R.K., supra, at pp. 1622-1624.) In the instant case, there is no evidence that minor was compelled to go to a public place.
In her reply brief, minor concedes there is no exact statement that [minors] friends escorted her into the car or up the walkway to her home but argues that in light of common sense and common reality, there is a strong inference thats what occurred. However, we cannot reverse simply because the evidence might reasonably support a contrary finding. (Daniel G., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) We must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment . . . . (Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) In doing so, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the courts true finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P.J.
GAUT
J.
Publication courtesy of San Diego free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Santee Property line attorney.
San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com
[1] A.R. has since turned 18 and is no longer a minor. However, for purposes of clarity, we will still refer to her as minor in this opinion.
[2] Minor was previously given a grant of informal probation.
