In re A.P.
Filed 2/7/13 In re A.P. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
>
In re A.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.P., Defendant and Appellant. | E055068 (Super.Ct.No. J235937) OPINION |
APPEAL
from the Superior Court of
Bernardino County.
Thomas S. Garza, Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne
G. Wrubel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, and
Laura A. Glennon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
On
November 9, 2010, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that minor and
appellant, A.P., had committed two counts of first degree residential burglary
under Penal Code section 459 (counts 1 & 2); and trespass under Penal Code
section 602, subdivision (m) (count 3).
At
a pretrial hearing on November 29,
2010, the district attorney amended the petition to allege that minor had also
committed second degree commercial burglary under section 459 (count 4). Minor admitted count 4; and counts 1, 2 and 3
were dismissed. The juvenile court then
made a true finding as to count 4 and sustained the balance of the petition.
At
the dispositional hearing on December 9, 2010, the juvenile court declared minor a ward,
granted him probation, and placed him in the custody of his mother.
Thereafter,
the district attorney filed four subsequent petitions. First, on January 24, 2011, the petition alleged that minor committed
arson under section 451, subdivision (c) (count 1). Second, on January 31, 2011, another petition alleged that minor
violated probation by failing to return home.
At the detention hearing on February 3, 2011, the district attorney
amended the January 24, 2011, petition alleging that minor unlawfully caused a fire
to a structure or forestland under section 452, subdivision (c) (count 2). Minor admitted count 2, and the court
dismissed count 1. At the dispositional
hearing on February 18, 2011, the court continued minor as a ward, but
detained him in juvenile hall pending placement in a foster care facility. The court also ordered that minor submit to a
psychological evaluation.
On
March 18, 2011,
at a nonappearance review hearing, the probation department noted that minor
was doing “pretty bad†at juvenile hall because he vandalized his room with
food and urine. At another nonappearance
review hearing on April 1, 2011, it was reported that minor continued to
cause problems at juvenile hall.
Specifically, minor was rude and disrespectful to staff, called them
“stupid bitches,†and claimed he did not “give a fuck.†On April 12, 2011, minor was transferred to a placement
facility in Perris, California, called Olive Crest.
On
June 6, 2011,
a third subsequent petition was filed.
It alleged that minor again violated probation by leaving Olive
Crest. At the detention hearing on June 7,
2011, minor admitted
the violation; he was ordered to remain at juvenile hall pending placement in a
different foster care facility. On June 21,
2011, the probation
department reported that minor was screened and accepted by Excell Center, a foster care facility located in Turlock, California.
On
July 7, 2011,
a fourth petition was filed in Stanislaus County. The
petition alleged minor committed an assault with force likely to cause great
bodily injury under section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (count 1). On July 15, 2011, minor admitted the allegation. The matter was then transferred to San Bernardino County. A
contested dispositional hearing was held for three days on November 8, 9, and
15, 2011. On November 16, 2011, the juvenile court committed minor to the
Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for the maximum term of five years four
months.
On
November 17, 2011, minor filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in (1) committing minor to DJJ; and (2) sentencing minor to the maximum
term. For the reasons set forth below,
we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.
II
STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Minor
was born in July of 1997. He lived with
his biological mother, stepfather, and stepsister, also a teenager. Minor suffers from impulse control disorder,
struggles with frustration and tolerance, and has a problem with
authority. In fifth grade, minor began
acting out by running away, smoking marijuana, and stealing from his
stepfather. Minor used alcohol,
marijuana, and Vicodin in the past, and often skipped school to smoke
marijuana. The stepfather would
discipline minor by giving him extra chores and leaving minor at home while the
rest of the family went out to dinner.
Occasionally, the stepfather hit minor and his stepsister as a form of
punishment.
At
one point, minor’s mother had asked her parents to care for minor, but changed
her mind. Mother currently believes that
minor’s grandparents could not provide the best care for him because they would
allow minor to get away with more than he should.
Minor
has committed crimes including animal cruelty, burglary, arson, and
assault. First, minor broke glass in an
area where one of the family dogs slept.
Later, on October 5, 2010, minor broke into two separate homes. In one home, minor consumed food; and in
another home, minor stole video game equipment and traded it either on the
street or in a store for money. Minor’s
stepfather found some of those items and returned them to the residence from
which they had been stolen. Minor
admitted that he committed the burglaries to get money to buy marijuana. Third, on October 14, 2010, minor and his stepsister ran away to a
vacant home and lit a couch on fire to stay warm. The fire spread and eventually caused
substantial damage to the house. Minor
also kicked holes in the walls of the house because he was bored.
Finally,
while minor was housed at Excell Center, he admitted to the night supervision staff
that he wanted to kill somebody so he could return to juvenile hall. On July 6, 2011, around 2:00 a.m., minor entered an office in juvenile hall,
which was occupied by Teresa V. He
slammed the door behind him, approached Teresa V. with a broken ink pen, and
attempted to stab her. Minor then placed
his hands around her neck and strangled her.
As he did, minor stated, “I’m gonna’ kill you bitch.†Teresa V. sustained scratch marks and redness
consistent with this attack; she was forced to go to the hospital, enroll in
physical therapy, seek psychological counseling, and miss several days of
school and work.
III
ANALYSIS
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Committing Minor to
DJJ
Minor
contends that the juvenile court erred in committing him to DJJ based on
punishment rather than rehabilitation.
Minor also claims that the court failed to properly consider the less
restrictive options of placing him with either his grandparents or in continued
placement at juvenile hall. We disagree.
and Procedural Background
At
the contested disposition hearing held in November of 2011, eight witnesses
testified over the course of four days.
Annette
Ermshar, a clinical psychologist, testified that minor has low social skills
and interpersonal immaturity. Ermshar
had grave concerns regarding minor’s prospects for rehabilitation based on his
attempt to stab a staff member and the number of times he had fled from placement
facilities. Accordingly, Ermshar recommended
that minor (1) should be in a constrained or locked setting; (2) should be
given a psychological evaluation so that appropriate medication could be
prescribed for his impulse control issues; (3) should attend anger management
counseling; (4) should have one-on-one academic counseling; and (5) must enroll
in a gang awareness program. Ermshar
opined that all five of her recommendations could be accomplished at DJJ. Ermshar also observed that DJJ provides more
services than juvenile hall, and DJJ had recently expanded its intervention
opportunities. Ermshar did express her
concern that minor is vulnerable, and due to his age, he might be susceptible
to negative influences if sentenced to DJJ.
When asked whether placement with minor’s grandparents would be
advisable, Ermshar predicted that minor would flee the home if he encountered
any frustration.
Daniel
Macallair testified for minor; he is the executive director of the Center on
Juvenile and Criminal Justice, which offers a range of services and programs
for kids who would otherwise be institutionalized. Macallair testified that rehabilitation is
not easily obtained at DJJ, and that DJJ is a violent place, characterized by
extreme degrees of gang affiliation.
Macallair noted that he prefers county placements, but that he was
unfamiliar with the county facilities in San Bernardino County.
Another
witness who testified for minor was Richard Moscowitz; he was a social service
practitioner for the San Bernardino County Public Defender. Moscowitz testified that minor had the
potential to thrive if he were placed in an environment outside of his own
home. He also reported that 10 different
placement facilities were interested in taking minor; Moscowitz believed that
any of these facilities would be a better placement for minor than DJJ. Moscowitz, however, admitted that none of
these facilities are locked facilities.
Latasha
Coleman testified; she was the probation officer who prepared the disposition
report which recommended minor’s placement in DJJ. Coleman explained that DJJ was the more
appropriate placement facility for minor because the State of California will not license other locked placement
facilities. Moreover, the services minor
needs, which are available at DJJ, would not be available at juvenile hall
because juvenile hall is not designed to accommodate long-term stays. Coleman offered that the severity of minor’s
criminal history had factored into her recommendation. First, the arson incident displayed a level
of dangerousness to the community.
Second, minor admitted that he began setting fires as young as age 12,
and that he participated in other school fights prior to the assault. Third, when asked if he was good at lying,
minor smiled and said that people believed him when he said bad things about
his parents. Finally, minor recently
made threats to spit at the juvenile court judge.
The
juvenile court heard other evidence regarding minor’s psychological evaluation
and his history as a runaway. Dr.
Marjorie Graham Howard prepared a psychological evaluation prior to the assault
on February 26, 2011. The evaluation contained
minor’s admissions that he: (1) made past false allegations of child abuse
against his stepfather; (2) denied being the victim of physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse; and (3) likes to fight because “‘it gets out my anger and
makes me happy.’†At one point, minor
asked his stepsister’s biological mother if he could live with her after he ran
away with the stepsister. Minor’s
stepsister testified that minor ran away because of the way his stepfather
treated him. Minor, however, stated that
he ran away from Excell
Center because he wanted to go back home.
Minor
testified. He stated that he never
attempted to stab Teresa V., or threatened to kill her. Instead, minor claimed that he only pushed
Teresa V. and asked her for the car keys.
Minor admitted that he thought his previous placements were a joke, but
he is now taking these opportunities seriously because of the threat of being
sent to DJJ. Furthermore, minor stated
that he was not certain whether he would have the same motivation to reform his
conduct if he was not facing detention in DJJ.
Finally,
a stipulation was read stating that minor’s maternal grandparents and aunt were
willing to accept minor into either of their homes.
At
the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court made the following
findings: (1) minor has no mental heath
issues, but does have an impulse control disorder; (2) probation and placement
have been attempted and have proven unsuccessful; (3) minor needs to be
detained in a locked facility; (4) anger management courses are necessary for
minor’s rehabilitation; (5) minor has a long history of extensive drug use and
criminal offenses consisting of burglary, arson, trespass, and animal cruelty;
(6) minor has run away from home numerous times; and (7) the current incident
of attempting to stab a staff member is disturbing because it displays an
escalation of troubling offenses.
Moreover,
the juvenile court declined to hear testimony from minor’s grandparents, aunt,
or uncle; and ruled against placing minor with his maternal grandparents. The court explained that its paramount
concerns were what was in the best interest of minor and the community. The court also noted that it was acting as a
delinquency court, not as a dependency court, and because minor’s mother did
not want minor living with his maternal grandparents, the juvenile court did
not have the power to affect mother’s guardianship. The court acknowledged the rehabilitative
purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, but also noted the
importance of forcing minor to take accountability for his actions. Accordingly, the court did not believe
placement with minor’s grandparents was a viable option at that time.
At
the hearing, the court took minor’s youth into account. The court, however, noted that “minors as
young as 12 years old go to the Department of Juvenile Justice.â€
Furthermore,
the juvenile court addressed the inappropriateness of juvenile hall as a
long-term placement:
“And
I would for at least the family’s benefit have them understand juvenile hall is
not a de facto placement. It was not
built and designed to have minors here for extended periods of time. Yes, there are minors that do serve detention
time here. But that was not its intent
and purpose[ ]. It is here to try to
transition them either back on to formal probation or alternatively send them
to placement and at times send them to the Department of Juvenile Justice.â€
In
sentencing minor to DJJ, the juvenile court noted minor’s lack of desire to
reform his conduct:
“The
concern is . . . that [minor] by virtue of what he has done in the
past and refuses or at least chooses not to learn from his mistakes continues
to make them and makes them having getting worse at the same time. [¶] . . . [¶] The Court would prefer that the minor be sent
home with his family and hope that he would learn from his mistakes and choose
to make better decisions in the future.
But in addition to balancing what is in the minor’s best interest, the
Court is also duty bound to do what’s in the best interest of the community as
well.â€
The
juvenile court then found under Welfare and institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (b), that minor had admitted an allegation to an offense that made
placement in DJJ appropriate.
Taking
into consideration all of the above, the court ordered minor be committed to
DJJ for the maximum term of confinement—five years four months—over minor’s
objection.
Background
Our
review of a juvenile court’s commitment decision is highly deferential: “We review a [DJJ] commitment decision only
for abuse of discretion, and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the
decision of the juvenile court.†(
Cal.App.4th 467, 473 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two]; see also In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) “There is no abuse of discretion where the
commitment is supported by substantial evidence on the record.†(In re
Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 178, 186; see also In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.)
In determining placement in a
juvenile delinquency case, the court focuses on the dual concerns of the best
interests of the minor and the need to protect the public. In arriving at a disposition, the court
considers the probation officer’s report and any other relevant and material
evidence that may be offered. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (d); In
re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) The court may consider a commitment to DJJ
without first having tried less restrictive placements. (In re
Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th
at p. 473.) “Finally, the 1984
amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased emphasis on
punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the safety of the
public. [Citation.]†(Ibid.) “Nonetheless, there must be evidence in the
record demonstrating both a probable benefit to the minor by a [DJJ] commitment
and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives. [Citations.]â€
(In re Angela M.,
3. Analysis
Here, there was adequate
evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s determination that, in
minor’s interest and the interest of public safety, a DJJ commitment was the
best available option.
As
provided ante, Ermshar believed five
components were essential to minor’s rehabilitation: anger management classes;
one-on-one academic counseling; enrollment in a gang awareness program; an
evaluation to medicate minor’s impulse control disorder; and a locked
facility. All five are available at DJJ.
A
secure, locked facility provides the greatest rehabilitative benefit to minors
who have a long history of failure in alternative placements, such as
minor. For example, In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, involved a
14-year-old minor who was committed to DJJ.
In that case, the minor argued that DJJ was inappropriate because the
programs were allegedly subpar to others in the county. (Id. at
p. 486.) The court held that the
commitment was not an abuse of discretion and was appropriate because the
“minor will benefit from commitment to DJJ, in part, because it will provide
him with a secure environment. In other
words, it is not merely the programs at DJJ which provide a benefit to minor,
but the secure setting as well. Minor
requires a secure setting for his rehabilitative care, because at the age of
14, minor violently attacked another person, ran away from home, and acted in a
hostile, disrespectful, and aggressive manner with staff at juvenile
hall.†(Id. at p. 486.)
Minor
argues that the juvenile court neither discussed minor’s rehabilitative needs
nor made any finding that the commitment would be beneficial to him. However, there is no requirement for the
court to specify the precise manner in which minor will benefit from DJJ. (In re
Jonathan T., supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) Moreover, the
court had a lengthy explanation as to its findings, which led to its decision
of what would be beneficial to minor.
Specifically, the court noted minor’s history as a runaway, and thus
found that a locked facility would be highly valuable to minor. “And Dr. Ermshar on behalf of the defense
testifying for [minor] had clearly indicated that because of his runaway and
AWOL history, he needs a locked facility.â€
Moreover, minor’s mother testified that she had lost control of minor,
felt she was unable to provide adequate supervision, and thus, was not opposed
to minor being placed in DJJ. Similar to
In re Jonathan T.,
represented a probable benefit because it not only provided the programs
necessary for minor’s rehabilitation, but also a secure facility.
Minor
also contends that the commitment to DJJ poses a grave danger to him because of
his young age and the possibility he would be victimized by older, more
sophisticated youths. In support, he
cites In re Carrie W. (1979) 89
Cal.App.3d 642, 646; this case, however, is distinguishable.
In
In re Carrie W., supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 642, the minor was sentenced to the California
Youth Authority (CYA) after making unauthorized long distance phone calls. (Id.
at p. 644.) The appellate court held
that it was inappropriate to sentence the minor to the CYA based on that
conduct alone, where the minor had not committed any further delinquent conduct
in the five months she had spent at juvenile hall. (Id.
at pp. 647-648.) Here, unlike the minor
in In re Carrie W., minor committed a
serious and violent crime, and had a demonstrated history of delinquent
activity with no showing of remorse or any desire to reform his behavior.
Furthermore,
minor’s age did not prohibit the juvenile court from ordering a DJJ
commitment. Courts have found that
14-year-old minors could be committed to DJJ based on the severity of their
crime, runaway status, and unsuccessful detentions at juvenile hall. (See In
re Jonathan T., supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) Here, minor was
14 when he was committed to DJJ—after
he attempted to stab an Excell Center staff member and threatened to kill her;
displayed a significant and extensive runway history; and exhibited a pattern
of disrespectful behavior toward staff, teachers, and the court.
Based
on the above, we find that substantial evidence supports the court’s implied
finding that minor and the public could benefit from his commitment in DJJ.
Next,
we address whether substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding
that alternative placements would be inappropriate. Evidence was presented as to three less
restrictive placements: (1) juvenile hall; (2) other placement facilities; and
(3) minor’s grandparents’ home.
First,
juvenile hall was inappropriate for minor because it was unable to meet all of
Ermshar’s recommendations. While
juvenile hall was a locked facility, it did not provide a gang awareness
program and was limited in other services.
Moreover, there was evidence that juvenile hall was designed for an
interim stay, not a long-term placement for rehabilitation. Furthermore, minor was unsuccessful during
his previous placement at juvenile hall; he vandalized his room and was
disrespectful to staff.
Second,
the other proposed placement facilities were found to be inappropriate because
they lacked significant features essential to minor’s rehabilitation. Moscowitz, who testified on behalf of minor,
claimed that he contacted 10 different facilities which were interested in
taking minor. Moscowitz, however,
admitted that none of these facilities were secure facilities. Hence, these facilities were inappropriate
for minor’s rehabilitation where he needed a locked facility. Moreover, although Macallair testified that
DJJ is a violent place, he recognized that it would be reasonable to leave
minor in a secure facility until he could demonstrate behavior indicating he
could be transferred to a less restrictive setting. Keeping minor near his family was another
concern for Macallair, but he admitted that he was not familiar with any of the
placement facilities in San Bernardino County.
Hence, he was unable to testify as to their appropriateness. Therefore, there was no evidence presented
that those facilities provided both the range of service minor needs and the
secure setting he requires.
Third,
placement with minor’s grandparents was also inappropriate for the same reasons
the other placement facilities were found to be ineffective. Although minor argues that the court erred in
precluding him from presenting evidence as to the viability of placement with
his grandparents, his argument has no merit.
Testimony by the grandparents or other relatives would not have provided
evidence that services comparable to anger management classes, academic
counseling, a gang awareness program, or a psychopharm evaluation were
available at a relative’s home. Moreover,
a major concern in this case was minor’s history as a runaway. The grandparents’ home is not a locked
facility, and for this reason alone it would have been an inappropriate
placement for minor. In fact, Ermshar
testified that minor would flee from his grandparents’ home if he experienced
any frustration. Furthermore, even
minor’s mother felt minor’s conduct would escalate if he were placed with her
parents. She stated:
“I
believe my parents don’t think my son can do any wrong. And at this point in his life with all the
legal trouble he is in, he doesn’t need someone to pat him on the back and say
. . . let’s go to church and things will be all hunky-dory. That’s not life.†Therefore, because the grandparents’ home did
not have the recommended services and setting necessary for minor’s
rehabilitation, it was also an inappropriate placement.
Nonetheless,
minor argues that the juvenile court erred in refusing to consider placement
with his grandparents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 727,
subdivision (a)(1). That section
authorizes a court to place a minor who has been adjudged a ward of the court
with a relative. As discussed above, the
court noted that it did not believe that the grandparents’ home was a viable
option. Therefore, assuming arguendo
that the court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, there is no
possibility that the court would have placed minor with his grandparents. Therefore, any alleged error in refusing to
consider placement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 727 was
harmless.
We
further note that in finding that less restrictive alternatives would be
inappropriate, the juvenile court properly took into account the need to
promote public safety as well. The
probation officer acknowledged this consideration when she wrote her report:
“[Minor]
appears to lack remorse, and the seriousness of his current and past offenses
are brutal with potential for fatal consequences. . . . The minor’s behavior has progressively gotten
worse in the past year, and his lack of remorse is concerning to this
officer. [¶] The minor has been given the opportunity to
complete two different placement homes, which he chose to leave willingly. If the minor had left the placement with out
[sic] going out of his way to harm
staff, this officer would have considered
replacement. . . .
[¶] Due to his failure to comply
with his terms and conditions of probation, his run away [sic] history, and violent prior and current history, Probation
supervision or placement no longer appears appropriate. It appears that his delinquent behavior is
escalating in severity. This officer
believes the minor is not remorseful for his actions, and further precautions
need to be taken for his protection as well as the protection of the community. The minor is in need of definite long-term
rehabilitation; therefore, a recommendation to the Department of Juvenile
Justice is appropriate at this time.â€
In
addition, minor’s own mother testified that, based on minor’s attack on Teresa
V., mother was concerned for the family’s safety.
Based
on minor’s actions—his recidivism, escalating offenses, extensive runaway and
drug history, and the inappropriateness of other placements—we find that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that committing minor
to DJJ was the best solution available to serve minor’s needs and secure the
safety of the public.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Sentencing Minor to
the Maximum Term
Minor
argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the
maximum term of confinement at DJJ because it failed to consider the relevant
facts and circumstances of minor’s case.
Minor also argues that the court ordered the maximum term based on
nothing more than speculation regarding the length of time minor would actually
spend in DJJ. We disagree.
When
a juvenile court sentences a minor to DJJ, the court must set a maximum term of
confinement “based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters
that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court.†(Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 731, subdivision (c).) The court
considers factors about the offense and the offender’s history that would be
comparable to those employed for the sentencing of adults. (In re
Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1185.)
Further, a juvenile court may consider whether the minor committed
perjury in determining the appropriate disposition. (In re
Lawanda L. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 423, 430 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Finally, the court is not required to orally
pronounce the maximum period of confinement or state its reasons. (In re
Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
In
this case, the juvenile court sentenced minor to the maximum term of confinement. Before pronouncing the sentence, the court
spoke at length about its decision to commit minor to DJJ. The court noted minor’s lengthy criminal
history, his lack of remorse, and his dishonesty. The court also stated that the attack on
Teresa V. was not refuted, as minor admitted the allegation, and yet, “[minor]
had a different version when he testified on the stand and has reportedly a
history of being less than truthful, which is troubling.†In accordance with In re Sean W., supra, 127
Cal.App.4th at page 1185, and In re
Lawanda L., supra, 178 Cal.App.3d
423, the juvenile court properly took minor’s criminal history, his current
conduct, and his inability to take responsibility for his actions into account
in sentencing him to the maximum term.
We discern no abuse of discretion.
IV
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MCKINSTER
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting
P. J.
RICHLI
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All statutory references are
to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
