In re Andrea U.

Filed 1/27/09 In re Andrea U. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed.

Alma U. appeals orders at a six-month review hearing continuing her children, Andrea U., Christian U. and E.U., as dependents of the juvenile court and continuing their placement out of her care. She contends the findings the children would be at a substantial risk of detriment if returned home and reasonable reunification services had been provided were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The children became dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d)[1] based on allegations their father (the father) was a registered sex offender and had not complied with registration requirements. The petition additionally alleged the father had stated he could not always control his sexual urges regarding children, and there was no information to show he had successfully completed counseling.

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) had earlier petitioned on the children's behalf based on allegations they were at risk because of the father's previous convictions of sexual abuse and 13-year-old Andrea had disclosed he had sexually abused her. However, Andrea subsequently recanted and she and Alma said they made up the story about the father molesting her because Alma was angry with him. The court dismissed these allegations and found the second allegations true as modified. It declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from Alma's care and placed them out of the family home. The court ordered Alma to participate in services, including general and sexual abuse counseling, a psychological evaluation and parenting education.

Alma's first therapist reported Alma had problems focusing during therapy, was angry at the Agency for removing the children and denied the father had molested Andrea. Her second therapist reported Alma continued to complain about the Agency during therapy sessions, rather than to acknowledge any danger to the children.

In April 2008 the social worker reported Alma was complying with the provisions of her case plan. She had completed a parenting education program, and her therapist said she was making progress. The social worker recommended the court grant the Agency discretion to expand Alma's visits.

At the six-month review hearing on May 27, 2008, the social worker recommended Alma and Andrea participate in conjoint therapy and Alma have unsupervised visits with Christian and E.U. He said Andrea's therapist did not recommend unsupervised visits for Alma and Andrea. He opined the children would be at risk if returned to Alma because of her inability to incorporate into her life what she had learned in therapy. He was concerned that Alma had told Andrea about problems the father was having in jail and that Andrea would not report any future abuse.

Alma testified she had completed a parenting class and was learning from therapy not to share adult problems with children and how to protect her children. She was willing to have family therapy.

After considering the documentary evidence, testimony and argument, the court found reasonable services had been offered, but returning the children to Alma's care would create a substantial risk of detriment. It continued services and continued the children's placement with nonrelative extended family members.

DISCUSSION

I

On December 2, 2008, subsequent to the filing of briefs in this appeal, the Agency moved to augment the record with additional evidence and to dismiss Alma's appeal as moot. The Agency argues the minute orders from the September 30, 2008, 12-month review hearing show the court ordered the children would begin a 60-day trial visit with Alma as of that date, the visit is now more than 60 days old, and it thus has become a placement. The Agency claims because the children are now with Alma, there is no relief this court can offer her and we should dismiss the appeal.

We grant Agency's unopposed motion to augment the record with the minute orders of the September 30, 2008 hearing, but do not dismiss the appeal. Although at the hearing the court authorized 60-day trial visits, it also found that out-of home placements were necessary and appropriate and ordered continued placement of the children with nonrelative extended family members. The order does not expressly provide and the record does not show whether, as the Agency claims, the children are now placed with Alma. We deny the motion to dismiss the appeal.

II

Alma contends insufficient evidence supports the court's finding that returning the children to her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment. She argues she did everything asked of her in services, including completing a parenting education program, participating and progressing in individual therapy, and having weekly positive supervised visits with the children and for the past one and one-half months daily unsupervised visits with Christian and E.U.

A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) Determinations of credibility of witnesses and resolutions of conflicts in the evidence are for the trier of fact. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '. . . view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)

Under the required standard of review, we hold substantial evidence supports the court's finding that at the time of the six-month review hearing in May 2008, returning the children to Alma's custody would have created a substantial risk of detriment. At that time Andrea's therapist had not yet recommended Andrea should have unsupervised visits with Alma and was concerned that Alma had spoken to Andrea about problems the father was having while he was incarcerated. Andrea was upset and felt guilty that she had caused her father to be in jail by telling of the sexual abuse. Although Alma said she had learned not to discuss adult problems with the children, her telling Andrea about the father's problems in jail raised concern she was not fully putting into effect what she had learned.

Also, although Alma's therapist reported Alma was making progress in therapy, in February 2008, the therapist was recommending Alma have increased and unsupervised contact with the children, but did not say they should be returned to her. In addition, it was not known how long the father would be incarcerated. The court did not err at the six-month review hearing by finding the children would be at risk of harm if they were returned to Alma's custody.

III

Alma also asserts insufficient evidence supports the court's finding reasonable services were provided. She faults the Agency for not providing family therapy and for not ensuring that Andrea began therapy promptly after the dependencies began or that the three children be placed together during the six-month reunification period.

Alma, however, never objected to the quality of her reunification services during the review period. "A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court." (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) A "reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] . . . [] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. omitted.) Alma appeared in court with counsel during the reunification period, but never argued the services being provided were not reasonable. She has thus forfeited her claim.

In any event, the record shows she received reasonable reunification services. In determining the sufficiency of reunification services the role of the appellate court is to decide "whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) The standard is not that the best possible services were provided, but that reasonable services were provided under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)

Substantial evidence supports the finding Alma received reasonable services. Her argument regarding family therapy is misplaced. The need for family therapy had only lately become apparent. At the six-month review hearing, the social worker said Andrea's therapist had recently informed him that issues had arisen during Andrea's therapy indicating the need for family therapy, and arrangements were being made for this to begin. Regarding the delay in Andrea's therapy, although it is unfortunate that Andrea's caregiver did not take Andrea to therapy, Christian and E.U.'s caregiver had begun driving her there, making certain that she attended. As for Alma's argument the Agency should have made certain the three children were placed together during the review period, earlier in the case the caregiver for Christian and E.U. did not have adequate space for all three children. At the six-month hearing, however, the social worker testified Andrea's caregiver had recently given notice asking that Andrea be removed from her home, and Christian and E.U.'s caregiver was moving to a larger home that could accommodate all three children. The inability to place the three children together during the review period does not constitute ineffective services. Alma has not shown she was not provided with reasonable services.

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.

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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.