target="A134244_files/props0002.xml">
In re Alexandra Z.
Filed 7/9/13 In
re Alexandra Z. CA1/4
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FOUR
In re
ALEXANDRA Z. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
ALAMEDA
COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DEAN Z.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A134244
(Alameda County
Super. Ct. Nos. HJ10016112,
HJ10016113)
The
juvenile court found that minors
Alexandra and Sydney Z. came within the jurisdiction of that court. On appeal, their father—appellant Dean
Z.—challenges the court’s
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
finding that the minors were at risk of serious emotional damage as a result of
his conduct. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 300, subd. (c).) He contends that
(1) inadmissible evidence was admitted and considered on this issue; (2) his
visitation rights were improperly left to the discretion of a social worker;
(3) he could not be found to be the cause of the minors’ serious emotional
damage; and (4) insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional
findings. We affirm the disposition orders.
FACTS
A.
In April
2002, Dean and Monica Z. became the parents of a daughter, Alexandra. Sister Sydney was born in June 2004. In October 2010, respondent Alameda County
Social Services Agency (agency) received a telephone hotline report that Dean
insisted on bathing with his daughters and refused to allow Monica in the
bathroom during the baths. Dean and
Monica were having relationship problems.
He was said to be drinking to excess, to be verbally intimidating and to
have once committed an act of domestic violence. After Dean spent an hour putting Sydney to bed
one night, the minor left the bedroom in hysterics. Alexandra and Sydney were withdrawn. They said that their father was mean and that
they did not like to be around him. The
reporter also stated that Sydney was touching her genitals. Monica feared confronting Dean about his
conduct, as he was the sole provider for the family, according to the reporter.
Monica
was interviewed about this report. She
confirmed that Dean was verbally abusive to all three females, that the minors
were fearful of him, and that the girls were forced to bathe with him outside
her presence. Dean also used the
bathroom in the minors’ presence. She
corroborated the report that Sydney had been hysterical one night after Dean
tried for an hour to put her to sleep.
Monica was uncertain whether Dean was sexually abusing Alexandra and
Sydney. She felt intimidated by him.
In
October and November 2010, both minors were interviewed.
sometimes made one of them sleep with him in his bed. They confirmed other aspects of Dean’s
inappropriate conduct, but denied any inappropriate touching had occurred. Sydney seemed upset by the questions she was
asked.
Dean
was also interviewed. He denied any
sexual abuse and deemed his bathing, nudity and sleeping arrangements with the
minors to be appropriate. The social
worker explained that Alexandra and Sydney were old enough to bathe themselves. When she recommended that Dean not use the
bathroom in front of the minors and allow them to sleep in their own beds, he
agreed. With this agreed-upon safety
plan in place, the report was deemed to be unfounded and the investigation was
closed.
B.
Subsequent Report
In
early December 2010, Monica reported to the agency that Dean was again bathing
the minors. Dean had discussed a
separation from Monica with the girls.
Concerned about Dean’s sexualized behaviors and Monica’s inability to
protect Alexandra and Sydney from him, the agency reopened the investigation. A protective custody warrant was
obtained. On December 10, 2010,
Alexandra and Sydney were detained and placed in foster care.
On
December 15, 2010, the agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction on failure to protect and sexual abuse
grounds. (§ 300, subds. (b),
(d).) The specific allegations included
that Dean was domineering to his wife and children; had engaged in domestic
violence against Monica; had used excessive physical discipline with the
minors; drank to excess and engaged in chronic, pervasive sexualized behavior
with the minors—including forcing the minors to sleep with him, bathing with
them, and using the bathroom in their presence.
The petition also alleged that the children displayed emotional symptoms
when asked about inappropriate touching; that Monica failed to protect the
minors from Dean; that neither parent had complied with the safety plan; and
the minors feared returning to Dean’s home, so much so that they did not want any
contact with him. Finally, the petition
alleged that Alexandra had stated that she did not want to live with Monica,
either. On December 16, 2010, the
juvenile court approved the detention of both minors.
In
reports from the agency, the juvenile court saw evidence that Dean was very
controlling, forcing the minors to adapt in order to accommodate him. Evidence of his bathing, toileting, and
sleeping with the minors, of Sydney’s emotional withdrawal and recurring
masturbation, and of Alexandra’s disturbing emotions was also presented. Dean did not believe he had crossed any
appropriate boundary with the minors.
The minors dreaded bath time when Dean was around and Sydney said that
she wanted a “break†from sleeping with her father. Monica did not believe that Dean had sexually
abused the girls, but agreed that he had inappropriate boundaries with
them. She denied that she had failed to
protect the girls. According to the agency,
both parents demonstrated a lack of insight about the safety issues in their
home.
Alexandra
and Sydney were happier and more outgoing when living together in their foster
home. At first, the girls insisted that
they did not want to live with either parent, particularly Dean. They also declined to speak with their
parents at all. Dean moved to his
parents’ home so that the girls might be returned to Monica’s care.
moved to another home.
By
the end of January, Alexandra and Sydney agreed to have telephone calls with
Monica and had a supervised visit with her.
They continued to show no interest in visits with Dean. All four began seeing individual therapists.
A
jurisdictional hearing was conducted over many sessions from January through
September. The hearing was repeatedly
continued to allow the receipt of additional evidence. Both parents testified. The agency recommended that the minors be
made juvenile court dependents based on findings of sexual abuse and failure to
protect; that the court find that removal was required; that Alexandra and
Sydney be allowed to remain in their foster home; that supervised visitation be
provided to both parents and that the family be provided with reunification
services. In March, the girls were
willing to have overnight visits with Monica, but Alexandra and Sydney still
wanted no contact with Dean. They
continued to be happy living in their foster home.
On
April 13, an amended petition was filed, adding allegations that Alexandra and
Sydney were at risk of serious emotional damage, based on the same specific
allegations raised in the original petition as the basis of allegations of
sexual abuse and failure to protect.
(§ 300, subd. (c).) Dean
sought to strike this amended petition, but his motion was denied.
Dean
repeatedly asked the social worker to arrange visitation. Starting in May, Dean filed several motions
for court-ordered visitation with the minors.
His parents also moved to have Alexandra and Sydney placed with them. These matters were set for hearing. (See fn. 4, ante.)
In
June, the agency was considering the possibility of placing Alexandra and
Sydney with Dean’s parents, and of recommending further
Monica. The minors’ therapist believed
that the minors should be spending more time with Monica rather than with the
grandparents. She also opined that the
girls showed signs of trauma consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder or
syndrome—including being emotionally flat, non-reactive or having startled
responses to emotionally-charged situations or questions. For her part, Sydney told the therapist that
she was not ready to talk about “ ‘bad things’ †that had happened at
her home.
By
mid-June, the parties stipulated that the record showed no evidence of sexual
abuse of either child. Dean put on
expert evidence undermining the therapist’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder. His expert opined that the
girls demonstrated no substantial evidence of sexual, physical, or emotional
abuse.
Six
months after removal, Alexandra and Sydney still expressed no desire to contact
or visit Dean. The therapist recommended
that when contact with the father was appropriate for the girls, it should
begin in a family therapy setting, so that a therapist could evaluate Dean’s
readiness for visitation. The juvenile
court granted Dean supervised visitation, to be held in a therapeutic setting.
By
the end of June, the agency recommended placing Alexandra and Sydney with
Monica. It proposed to reduce the
grandparents’ visitation once Monica was having unsupervised visits with the
minors. Monica was making progress
addressing her issues with co-dependence and passivity. On June 28, the juvenile court approved a
30-day trial visit with Monica beginning on July 3.
On
July 1, the first family therapy session
was to be conducted with Michelle Lane.
Dean’s attorney pressed for a joint session with Dean, Alexandra, and
Sydney on that date. However, Lane—after
consulting with the minors’ therapist and the case worker—concluded that it
would be best to set up an initial session with Dean alone to determine his
readiness for visitation with the minors.
Lane planned to have an initial session with the two girls a week later,
so that they could meet her and she could become more familiar with the family
circumstances before the girls had their first visit with Dean in many
months. Dean was advised that the July 1
session would be conducted without Alexandra and Sydney.
On
July 1, Dean’s parents had picked up the girls from Monica for a visit. When Dean met with Lane, he did not discuss
the issues that led the minors to be removed from the family home. Instead, he painted himself as a victim, accusing
the agency of mismanaging the case and of alienating him from his children. He had arranged for his mother to bring the
girls to the session, hoping that he could see the girls that day. After fifteen to twenty minutes, Dean left
the session and a few minutes later, his mother brought the girls in.
advised Dean that she was unable to facilitate a joint meeting at that time.
Lane
was surprised by this turn of events. As
a result of this initial session, both Lane and the minors’ therapist concluded
that family therapy should be postponed and that visitation with Dean was not
in the best interests of the minors at that time.
When
the social worker learned that Dean’s mother had brought Alexandra and Sydney
to Dean’s session, she attempted to cancel the remainder of the girls’ visit
with the grandparents. Dean’s parents
were out of communication with the agency for several hours and the whereabouts
of the minors were not known for some time.
Local police were involved. About
noon on July 2, Alexandra and Sydney were returned to the foster mother. The following day, the girls were placed in
Monica’s home.
On
July 11, the social worker concurred with the therapists’ recommendation that
visitation with Dean and the minors should be postponed because visitation at
that time would be detrimental to the minors.
The social worker opined that Dean continued to lack insight or take
responsibility for his role in the issues that led to the minors’ removal from
his home. She also faulted Dean’s mother
for failing to appreciate the severity of the issues her son needed to
address. The social worker asked the
juvenile court to order only supervised visitation with the grandparents.
Dean
asked that the social worker be removed from the case, citing her interference
with his visitation. He also sought
enforcement of the order allowing visitation, with the grandparents’ support.
On
July 14, the juvenile court ordered the social worker to make a referral to a
second family therapist so that family therapy could begin. Visitation with the grandparents was left to
Monica’s discretion. On July 29, a
second family therapist, Marc Campos, met with Dean about the advisability of
family therapy involving the minors.
Dean was reluctant to discuss the issues that led to the removal of the
minors. Campos also met with Alexandra
and Sydney in a separate session. He
also concluded that the minors were not ready for family therapy with Dean. This conclusion led the agency again to
recommend that the court order for family therapy be vacated.
At
this time, the social worker learned that Dean may not have told his individual
therapist that Alexandra had stood on his lap while he sat on the toilet.
believe this had occurred—only that Dean had accidentally left the door open
while using the toilet. In court, Dean
had admitted that that he allowed Alexandra to stand on his knees while he used
the toilet. He testified that she asked
to do this, although Alexandra said that he made her do it. Dean minimized this event when he discussed
it.
Monica
reported to the social worker that Sydney had begun having traumatic nightmares
shortly after learning that the social worker would be meeting with both girls
to discuss visiting with Dean. Alexandra
and Sydney were anxious about meeting Dean in person. Sydney also appeared to be more uneasy when
she was parted from Monica.
In
August, the agency recommended that Alexandra and Sydney be declared dependents
of the juvenile court, that they remain in Monica’s care, and that she be given
formal family maintenance services. It
recommended that the agency be given discretion to offer informal child welfare
services to Dean. His visitation with
the minors should be by court order only, it recommended. After a hearing on this request, the juvenile
court found that it could not determine if visitation was detrimental to the
minors because it did not have clear and convincing evidence that visitation
would be harmful to them. It ordered the
agency to find yet another family therapist to meet with Dean and the girls.
The
agency did so. The third family
therapist, Shalini Dayal, had a session with Dean and another with Alexandra
and Sydney. Dean did not believe that he
had done anything inappropriate with his daughters. He accused the agency of brainwashing them
and blamed Monica for ending their marriage.
For their part, the girls remained consistent about not wanting to have
any contact with their father. Dayal
observed that when she discussed the possibility of visiting with Dean, both
minors were fearful and Sydney was anxious.
She concluded that both were very frightened of Dean.
Dayal
recommended that neither girl have any contact with Dean for at least two
years, at which time another visitation assessment could be made. She opined that the two-year period would
allow Alexandra and Sydney to continue their own emotional healing until visits
could be considered. The girls could ask
for contact with Dean before that time,
but Dayal cautioned against making repeated inquiries of the minors about
visitation with him. In her opinion,
these assessments were taking an emotional toll on Alexandra and Sydney. Again, the agency recommended that the family
therapy visitation order be vacated and that Dean be allowed to visit the
minors only with the court’s permission.
In
late October, the grandmother had a visit with the minors. She gave the girls presents and whispered to
Alexandra that they were from Dean. This
was a secret, the grandmother told Alexandra, who was uncomfortable about
this. Alexandra told Monica about this
incident later, and Monica reported it to the social worker.
In
November, the juvenile court found grounds for jurisdiction over both minors
based on amended allegations they were suffering or at risk of suffering
serious emotional damage. (§ 300,
subd. (c).) It rejected the allegations
of sexual abuse and failure to protect the minors. (§ 300, subds. (b), (d).) Specifically, the court upheld allegations
that Dean was domineering toward Monica and the minors, that he was emotionally
abusive toward Alexandra and Sydney and that the girls had emotional
difficulties because of Dean’s inappropriate conduct and Monica’s failure to
protect them from Dean. The juvenile
court declared both Alexandra and Sydney to be dependents of the court. By clear and convincing evidence, it found
that the minors had to be removed from Dean’s custody. Their placement with Monica was to continue
and she was to be provided with family maintenance services, while the agency
was ordered to provide informal child welfare services to Dean.
The
juvenile court did not issue a visitation order, but set an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of whether visitation with Dean would be detrimental to Alexandra
and Sydney. Dayal was expected to
testify at that hearing about that issue.
At the time of Dean’s appeal from the jurisdictional order, the
visitation issue was unresolved.
In
December, the agency filed a second amended petition citing only those
allegations that the juvenile court had found to be true.
JUSTICIABILITY
On
appeal, Dean challenges the juvenile court’s finding that Alexandra and Sydney
came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The agency argues that because Monica did not
appeal the determination that the children came within the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction, Dean does not raise a justiciable controversy and his challenge
should be dismissed.
name="_ftnref12" title="">[12]
This
question bears on the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction—its power to
hear and resolve the issue before it. (
35 Cal.4th 503, 512.) Subject matter
jurisdiction requires an actual, justiciable controversy—one that will result
in a judgment offering relief to the parties.
(Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar
Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179; Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
1101, 1111.) In a juvenile dependency
matter, the court takes jurisdiction over the minors, not their parents. A juvenile court has jurisdiction over those
minors if the actions of either
parent bring the children within the statutory criteria set out in section
300. (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202;
393, 397.)
In
the matter before us, the juvenile court concluded that the minors suffered
serious emotional damage as a result of Dean’s conduct and as a result of
Monica’s failure to protect them from him.
(§ 300, subd. (c).) Monica
has not challenged the jurisdictional finding.
The minors have been returned to her custody and she is living apart
from Dean. A jurisdictional finding
against either parent is sufficient to bring the minors within the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction. (
at p. 397.) The agency’s theory is that
even if we assume arguendo that the juvenile court erred in taking jurisdiction
based on Dean’s actions, it would still have jurisdiction over the minors based
on its findings related to Monica. As we
cannot offer Dean the relief that he seeks—to reverse the juvenile court’s
order taking jurisdiction over the minors—the agency reasons that the issues he
raises on appeal are not justiciable.
We
are reluctant to make such a finding, for two reasons. First, no case law expressly rejects a
jurisdictional challenge from one parent because the other stipulated to that
same basis of juvenile court jurisdiction.
If there are alternative bases of jurisdiction and the appealing parent
raises only one, we could find that the appeal was not justiciable because the
alternative, unchallenged bases are sufficient alone to render a challenge to
other bases of jurisdiction moot. (See
1037, 1045; In re Jonathan B. (1992)
5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876.) In the case
before us, there is only one basis of juvenile court jurisdiction—that the
minors were at risk of serious emotional damage.
We
are also concerned because jurisdiction was based in part on Monica’s failure
to protect the minors from Dean—a ground that is inextricably intertwined with
jurisdiction based on Dean’s actions causing the girls’ serious emotional
damage. If Dean is correct that his
conduct cannot form the basis of jurisdiction, then we could not uphold
juvenile court jurisdiction based on Monica’s failure to protect the minors
from that conduct, either.
When
the issues of two parties are intertwined, either party has standing to
litigate an issue that has an impact on their related interests. (In re
Caitlin B. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1193.) Although Dean did not expressly challenge the
jurisdictional finding relating to the emotional damage caused by Monica’s
initial failure to protect the minors from him, such a challenge is implied in
the challenge he makes to the sufficiency of evidence of his misconduct leading
to serious emotional harm to the minors.
We conclude that Dean’s express and implied jurisdictional challenges
are sufficiently intertwined to allow him to proceed with his challenge to the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding against him.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
On the
merits,
Dean argues that allowing the agency to admit evidence that the minors suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder or syndrome violated his due process
rights. If that evidence was considered
in the juvenile court’s ruling, he reasons that this consideration also denied
him due process.
Based
on our review of the record on appeal, we are convinced that Dean overstates
the significance of the challenged evidence.
Even if we were to assume arguendo that the evidence
as the result of post-traumatic stress disorder or syndrome should have been
excluded, the juvenile court could still consider the underlying evidence that Alexandra and Sydney were often withdrawn,
fearful and anxious, particularly when confronted with the possibility that
they might have contact with Dean.
The
erroneous admission of evidence violates due process and warrants a new hearing
only if admission of that evidence rendered the hearing fundamentally
unfair. (See Estelle v. McGuire (1991)
502 U.S. 62, 70; Spencer v. Texas
(1967) 385 U.S. 554, 563-564; People v.
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913; People
v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439; see also Evid. Code,
§ 353.) Dean’s expert countered
this evidence at the hearing with his contrary view of the minors’ emotional
condition. For this reason and in light
of the other evidence of the minors’ emotional state, we are satisfied that no
fundamental unfairness resulted from the admission of the challenged evidence.
Absent
any unfairness, Dean is entitled to a reversal only if it is reasonably
probable that a different result would have occurred if the evidence had been
excluded. (See People v. Earp (1999)
20 Cal.4th 826, 878; see People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Our review
of the record convinces us that there is no reasonable probability that the
juvenile court would not have found that the minors suffered from serious
emotional damage if the challenged evidence had been excluded.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Dean
contends that the evidence does not support a finding that Alexandra and Sydney
suffered from serious emotional damage.
A child may be declared to be a dependent of the juvenile court if the
child suffers serious emotional damage or is at substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional damage, as evidenced by such conditions as severe anxiety,
depression, or withdrawal. (§ 300,
subd. (c).) The juvenile court found
both Alexandra and Sydney were dependent children based on this ground. In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of
evidence supporting this finding, we view the entire record in the light most
favorable to the juvenile court’s finding, indulging in all legitimate and
reasonable inferences to uphold that finding.
If substantial evidence supports the finding, we have no power to
disturb the juvenile court’s judgment. (
1463, 1472; In re Misako R. (1991) 2
Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
As
the party challenging the juvenile court’s finding, Dean bears the burden of
proof on this issue. (See, e.g., In
re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) In his claim of error, Dean cites only
evidence favorable to him and ignores the ample evidence of his daughters’
emotional distress resulting from his conduct.
He argues that his expert saw no signs of serious emotional damage from
Alexandra and Sydney. His evidence
suggested that his children were doing well and were fond of him. In essence, he asks us to find his evidence
to be more credible than the conflicting evidence that supports the juvenile
court’s ruling. This reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of our role as an appellate court reviewing a
juvenile court finding for substantial evidence. We have no authority to substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court on these credibility issues. (See In
re Precious J., supra, 42
Cal.App.4th at p. 1472; In re Misako R.,
supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.)
The
evidence before the juvenile court was clearly sufficient to support the
juvenile court’s finding that Alexandra and Sydney suffered from or were at
risk of suffering from serious emotional damage. The record is replete with evidence that both
girls were terrified at the very idea of seeing Dean. The record is not clear what Dean did to
prompt those feelings, but it does clearly demonstrate that Alexandra and
Sydney suffered serious emotional damage because of his conduct and were at
risk of additional suffering if returned to his custody. The law requires no more before the juvenile
court may bring these minors under its jurisdiction.
VISITATION
Dean
also contends that the juvenile court erred by leaving visitation to the
discretion of the agency, without making a finding of detriment. He cites no legal authority to support his
claim that this was improper. His
failure to articulate any legal argument in an opening brief may be deemed an
abandonment of that aspect of the appeal.
(See Badie v. Bank of America
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Berger
v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119; see also 9 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 701, pp. 769-771.) Thus, we deem this claim of error to be
abandoned.
REMOVAL
Dean
also argues that the juvenile court could not properly find him to be the
source of the minors’ emotional damage because they had no contact with him
during the removal period and because there were no legitimate signs of
emotional abuse before or immediately after the minors’ detention. To properly declare jurisdiction over the
minors based on a finding of serious emotional damage, the juvenile court was
required to find that this damage resulted from the conduct of a parent. (§ 300, subd. (c).) At the November 2011 hearing, the juvenile
court found by clear and convincing evidence that removal of the minors from
Dean’s custody was required. It placed
the minors with Monica. Thus, the
juvenile court necessarily found that Alexandra and Sydney’s emotional damage
was the result of Dean’s conduct rather than that of the mother.
We
find substantial evidence supporting the finding that Dean caused serious
emotional damage to his children. His
contrary argument flies in the face of the record of the serious emotional
damage that Alexandra and Sydney suffered before their detention. It is clear that events occurring while the
minors were living in Dean’s home have had a lasting, detrimental effect on
these girls. Almost a year after being
out of contact with their father, the minors were still terrified at the
prospect of even seeing him. Clearly and
consistently, the minors have told various persons—their foster mother, their
therapist, and three different family therapists attempting to determine if
visitation with Dean was wise—over many months that they did not want to see
Dean. Of her own accord, Alexandra wrote
him a letter stating that she was not ready to see him yet. The record is clear that the minors were and
still are suffering the effects of past emotional abuse inflicted during the
time that they lived in Dean’s home.
Dean
also contends that he addressed the juvenile court’s concerns, such that he
posed no current risk of harm to minors.
The record is replete with evidence to the contrary. The minors have been clear and consistent
about their aversion to Dean and their strong desire not to have any contact
with him. The strength of their
assertions is particularly telling, given the young age of the minors. Alexandra and Sydney’s visceral negative
reaction to the mere suggestion that they might be compelled to have contact
with their father makes it clear that he poses a current risk of harm to their
emotional wellbeing.
Finally,
Dean asserts that the minors were doing well at the time that the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional and disposition orders were made. This assertion ignores the obvious—that
Alexandra and Sydney are suffering emotional harm, but were improving
custody. Once they were no longer
required to live with him or to have any contact with him other than that which
they initiated, the girls’ emotional condition improved. The juvenile court’s finding that Dean caused
the minors’ serious emotional damage and its finding that removal is required
are clearly supported by the evidence in the record before us.
The
disposition orders are affirmed.
_________________________
REARDON,
ACTING P. J.
We concur:
_________________________
RIVERA, J.
_________________________
HUMES, J.
A challenge to a jurisdictional finding is properly made on appeal from the
dispositional order. (
1339, 1342.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless
otherwise indicated.
