Filed 6/14/22 In re Alexander H. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Susan M. Gill, Judge.

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

Appellant, M.S. (mother), mother of now three-year-old Alexander H., appealed from the juvenile court’s January 5, 2022, order terminating her parental rights. After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844.)

Mother filed a letter listing various ways in which her trial attorney was ineffective, and her rights were violated but does not allege the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights.

We conclude mother failed to set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the termination hearing. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

In March 2021, the juvenile court adjudged, then two-year-old, Alexander a dependent child and removed him from parental custody after sustaining allegations he fell outside his home at approximately 12:30 a.m., while in mother’s care, sustained a broken femur and tested positive for amphetamine while receiving treatment at the emergency room.[1] Mother was present with her attorney at the hearing and waived her right to a hearing on the allegations. The court ordered mother and Alexander’s father to participate in reunification services. Mother’s reunification plan required her to participate in a 14-week parenting/neglect counseling program and submit to random drug testing. The Kern County Department of Human Services (department) placed Alexander in foster care and then transitioned him to the home of a relative in May 2021.

Mother enrolled in the “Nurturing Parenting and Child Neglect” class, however, did not attend any of the classes and was dropped from the program on July 28, 2021. She failed to appear for drug testing, resulting in presumptive positive results, and admitted using methamphetamine “ ‘sporadically.’ ” The father had not enrolled in any of his court-ordered services.

On September 7, 2021, at the six-month review hearing, mother’s attorney objected to the department’s recommendation to terminate reunification services but offered no evidence or argument. The juvenile court found mother made minimal progress toward resolving the problem requiring Alexander’s removal, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 5, 2022. Neither parent sought writ review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450−8.452.)

Mother appeared with her attorney on January 5, 2022, at the section 366.26 hearing and made a statement to the court. She believed Alexander should stay with her, not with his grandmother. He recently sustained a bruise, and no one told her it happened. She had been trying to contact the social worker for two months, but her calls were not returned. She did not know what to do. She was still participating in parenting/neglect classes and wondered if Alexander could be placed in her care with monitoring.

The juvenile court found that Alexander was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.

DISCUSSION

An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant’s burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If the appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)

By the time a case reaches the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court has determined based on extensive evidence that the dependent child cannot be safely returned to the parent’s custody and there are very few issues left to resolve. The juvenile court’s sole focus at that point is determining whether the child is likely to be adopted. If the court finds the child is likely to be adopted, it must terminate parental rights unless the parent proves there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child under any of the circumstances listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B).

No evidence was presented that any of the exceptions to adoption applied and mother does not claim any of them do in her letter. She simply claims her trial counsel was ineffective in areas which she listed without any explanation, such as “non mediation, non challenge of the NAT report,[2] … of the urinalysis test, … of civil rights violation, … of insurance and Medicare fraud, … of malpractice, … of jurisdiction, … of [the] [c]ourt’s disposition, … [and] of false statements in … police reports and petitions.” In a similar manner, mother listed violations she claims raise arguable issues, but she did not explain how her rights were violated. Among the violations she listed are the right to a speedy trial, the right to be heard, the right to mediation, the right to due process and to cross-examine witnesses.

Although we are not required to, we reviewed the appellate record and find no basis for requesting further briefing in this case. Mother was represented by counsel at all times and participated in the court hearings. If she objected to any of the juvenile court’s decisions, she could have appealed or filed a writ petition. However, she did not. Consequently, she forfeited any claims of juvenile court error predating the section 366.26 hearing. Further, she does not challenge the significant cognizable issues, i.e., whether Alexander was likely to be adopted and whether any of the exceptions to adoption applied.

With regard to the effectiveness of mother’s trial counsel, there is no evidence he did not perform in a manner expected of a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate in a juvenile dependency proceeding. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667−1668.) Given mother’s failure to make more than minimal progress in her services plan and given Alexander’s tender age, there was very little mother’s trial attorney could do to dissuade the juvenile court from ruling as it did.

We conclude mother has not raised any arguable issues stemming from the section 366.26 hearing and dismiss the appeal.

DISPOSITION

This appeal is dismissed.

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J.

[1] The medical staff determined he had not been given any medication during treatment that would account for his positive result.

[2] “NAT” appears to be an acronym for “non-accidental trauma.”