Filed 9/21/17 In re A.L. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed.

Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Julia L. appeals an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1] selecting adoption as the permanent plan for her daughters A.L. and Aurora L. (the children) and terminating her parental rights. She contends the court erred in finding there was not a beneficial parent-child relationship between her and the children within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) that precluded termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed petitions on behalf of seven-year-old A.L. and five-year-old Aurora L. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging the children had suffered, or there was a substantial risk they would suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of Julia's failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect them. The petitions alleged that on February 28, 2015, the children were exposed to violent confrontations in the family home between Julia and her boyfriend Daniel S. "involving the use of physical force in that [Daniel] pulled [Julia's] hair, slapped her face and grabbed her throat causing redness to her face and throat while the [children were] present." The petitions alleged there was an earlier domestic violence incident on February 7, 2015, "where [Daniel] hit [Julia] on the face causing [her] to fall down, which [Julia] denies and minimizes, and [Julia] has a history of being involved in domestic violence with other [men] but refuses treatment which places the [children] at substantial risk of serious physical harm."

The Agency received a report on February 10, 2015, that Aurora stated Julia had kicked her and spanked her, and she had witnessed Julia's boyfriend break Julia's phone by smashing it. When interviewed, Aurora said "my dad choked my mom once and hurt her baby in my mom's stomach[.]"[2] She reported that she saw her dad "choking, kiss[ing], and hurting my mom and he said 'let me stay here' and my mom said 'get off of me.' And she was crying and I heard someone crying in my mom's room and I opened the door and saw something and I hit my dad because he was choking my mom." Aurora said she and A.L. hid together in Julia's closet when Daniel and Julia fought. On February 18, 2015, Julia denied Aurora's allegations and denied she was in a relationship with anyone. She also denied that her children had ever been exposed to domestic violence or that she had experienced domestic violence in her relationships.

On March 3, 2015, the Agency social worker received a police report about the domestic violence incident alleged in the children's petitions that occurred on February 28, 2015. The social worker spoke to Aurora about the incident. Aurora appeared worried and told the social worker she did not want to talk about what happened because if she did, her mother would give her a "pow wow," which Aurora explained was a spanking. Daniel was incarcerated on February 28, 2015, with a projected release date of October 31, 2015.

Julia admitted to the social worker that she initially lied about Daniel's domestic violence because she was afraid of Child Welfare Services (CWS) and had bad experiences in the past. She said she had been trying to kick Daniel out of her home and break up with him, but he refused to leave. She did not want to involve the police or CWS. A criminal protective order was issued on March 4, 2015, protecting Julia and the children from Daniel.

At a detention hearing on March 24, 2015, the court detained the children with Julia, but ordered the Agency to immediately remove them from Julia's custody if she violated any of the following conditions: She was to abide by the criminal protective order, have no contact with Daniel, make sure the children attended school, use no corporal punishment, comply with all court orders, participate in voluntary services, refrain from discussing the dependency case with the children or with others in the children's presence, not blame the children for court intervention, and refrain from telling the children not to speak with social workers or minor's counsel.

The Agency filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on April 10, 2015, recommending that the children be declared dependents of the court but continue to be detained with Julia, and that Julia be offered family maintenance services. When a social worker interviewed the children on March 30, 2015, they both denied that Daniel had ever been mean to them or to Julia, or that Daniel and Julia had ever argued or fought. Aurora said, "Daniel is a nice dad but he moved into a different house."

Julia told the social worker that she and Daniel had been in a good relationship until the last few weeks, and that their last incident was "pretty bad." She admitted that there were a few physical altercations between them during their relationship, but denied that he had ever choked her. She told the social worker she had been in another relationship for about 10 months where there was domestic violence, but the children were not exposed to the violence and she ended the relationship as soon as it got violent. A May 2011 police report taken at a hospital where Julia was being treated for injuries described a domestic violence incident that occurred in that relationship. Julia's boyfriend punched her with a closed fist and caused her to fall to the floor. Julia got up and ran to the bedroom. Her boyfriend followed her, put his arm around her neck from behind, and choked her. He then went to the kitchen for a knife and threatened to kill her.

During its investigation, the Agency discovered Julia was pregnant by Daniel. The Agency noted that after previous CWS referrals, Julia was counseled on the trauma domestic violence causes children to suffer and given resources. The Agency was concerned that given Julia's history and her current pregnancy, she would continue a relationship with Daniel that would put the children at risk once Daniel was released from jail. The Agency concluded there was sufficient evidence to sustain the children's petitions regarding domestic violence.

At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing on April 21, 2015, the court sustained and made true findings on the petitions by clear and convincing evidence. The court declared the children dependents of the court and ordered them placed with Julia on the conditions set forth at the detention hearing. The court ordered the Agency to provide Julia services.

In a status review report filed on September 30, 2015, the Agency recommended Julia receive six more months of family maintenance services. Julia and the children were living in Julia's grandmother's three-bedroom home, which the grandmother had moved out of so that Julia could live there and "raise her children." Julia was unemployed and received "cash aid." She reported that her grandmother paid the mortgage on the home. Julia was nine months pregnant and Daniel was still incarcerated for the domestic violence incident that brought the family to the attention of the Agency. Although Julia reported she had not been in contact with Daniel, she had recently tagged him on Facebook in photographs of her and the children and in a photograph of a sonogram. A protective order protecting Julia and the children from Daniel was in effect until March 11, 2018.

Julia began attending domestic violence group classes in June 2015, but had missed four groups and had not attended consistently. The group proctor thought Julia would benefit from individual therapy. He was concerned about her cognitive abilities and did not believe she had a domestic violence relapse plan. He thought she would not know how to prevent Daniel from coming back into her life once he was released from jail. The children were working with a therapist on their sibling relationship and were making progress.

At a review hearing on November 5, 2015, the court continued the children's placement with Julia, but ordered that it was "to be immediately notified if the Agency receives any information that [Julia] has contact with Daniel [S.] or if Daniel [S.] is found in [Julia's] home. If Daniel [S.] is found in [Julia's] home, the [children are] to be immediately removed." (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) The court further ordered Julia to become fully compliant with her case plan and that the children were not to have any contact with Daniel. The court directed the Agency to make two unannounced visits per month to Julia's home.

On January 13, 2016, the Agency filed supplemental petitions under section 387 on behalf of the children and a detention report stating the children had been detained at Polinsky Children's Center on January 9, 2016. The supplemental petitions alleged Julia was no longer able to provide adequate care and supervision for the children because she admitted using marijuana while caring for the children and on January 9, 2016, her home was found to contain drug paraphernalia accessible to the children. At the detention hearing on January 13, the court detained the children in foster care and granted the social worker discretion to lift supervision of Julia's visitation.

The detention report stated the Agency received a referral alleging that on November 26, 2015, Daniel ambushed and attacked Julia outside her home. Daniel pulled Julia to the ground, strangled her, and said, "I'm going to kill you. You're going to pay for doing this to me." Julia contacted police and notified the Agency. The police were not able to locate Daniel that day. The next day Julia found Daniel hiding in her garage after discovering her house had been burglarized and ransacked. She called 911 and was on the phone with police dispatch when Daniel snatched the phone from her and ran down the street with it. Police located Daniel several blocks away from Julia's house and arrested him.

The detention report stated that the reason for the children's detention was severe neglect. On January 9, 2016, law enforcement was called to Julia's home in response to a report that three-month-old Ashley was not breathing. When they arrived, they found Ashley deceased on the living room couch. Paramedics evaluated her and determined that she had passed away "some time ago." Julia stated that she awoke in her bedroom and found the baby in that condition. She called 911 at approximately 4:45 p.m. and brought the baby downstairs to the living room and placed her on the couch facing up to be resuscitated. Paramedics responded within a minute and upon arrival, pronounced the baby dead.

Police told an Agency social worker who responded to the home that the home appeared to be in disarray. On Julia's bed, officers found two methamphetamine pipes with residue, two bongs, a dirty diaper, and a sex toy. A detective asked Julia if she would test positive for methamphetamine if she were drug tested right then. She answered, "Yes," but stated the children did not have access because they slept downstairs.

Julia told another detective that she fell asleep around 2:00 to 3:00 a.m. with the baby on her shoulder after feeding the baby 12 ounces of formula. She awoke at 4:45 p.m. and noticed the baby was unresponsive and then used a neighbor's phone to call paramedics. She told the detective she had used methamphetamine a few days before with a friend, but she did not like it and "only may have tried it twice." She reported that she used the methamphetamine because of anxiety and that she smoked marijuana routinely due to anxiety. Police later notified the Agency that the medical examiner ruled Ashley's cause of death was sudden unexplained infant death while bed sharing, with methamphetamine exposure being a contributing factor and the cause of death being undetermined.

Julia told a social worker she had a medical marijuana card and had been using medical marijuana for about 12 to 13 years. She had lost her card but could obtain a replacement. The children were at school when she smoked marijuana and she did not typically smoke it on the weekends because she and the children would be busy doing various activities. She reported that smoking marijuana did not impede her ability to care for her children because she had been using it for so many years. She said she no longer drank alcohol because it was a depressant, and she denied using methamphetamine the day of Ashley's death or the days preceding her death. She also denied using marijuana the evening of January 8, 2016. She said the two meth pipes found in her room belonged to her ex-roommates. The social worker asked Julia to drug test.

Aurora told the social worker on January 9, 2016, that Julia smoked "pot" by "putting it in the thingy." When asked what "pot" was, Aurora said, "It's something my mom uses to calm down because she gets angry." A.L. denied knowing about drugs or alcohol and denied that anyone in the home smoked. When asked what Julia does when she gets sad, A.L. said, "She just goes to her room for a few minutes and then she's happy."

The Agency filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on February 2, 2016, recommending the children remain in out-of-home care and Julia be offered reunification services. The children had been placed in a licensed foster home and Julia initially reported she was relieved and happy with the placement. However, she later reported various concerns about the caregiver. The children appeared to be comfortable in the caregiver's home. The court appointed a CASA (court appointed special advocate) for the children.

Julia tested positive for marijuana on January 12, 2016. She had completed intakes with a substance abuse specialist and Parent Care, a treatment program. However, she asked the social worker if she could attend a different treatment program, stating Parent Care was too much of a time commitment because it was five days a week and she had to return to work to pay the mortgage on her house. Julia was referred to a 15-week program known as the Incredible Families Program, which included visitation with the children and was set to begin on February 18, 2016. She did not attend her scheduled intake with the program because she was feeling overwhelmed. She had been participating in therapy since November 2015.

Julia began supervised visitation with the children in January 2016 and the first two visits went well. Julia and the children were happy to see each other and showed mutual affection, and Julia responded appropriately to the children's questions. The children also saw Julia when they attended viewing and funeral services for Ashley. The Agency recommended Julia be provided reunification services to continue to address "domestic violence dynamics that originally brought the family to the attention of the Agency, as well as for [Julia] to participate in a substance abuse treatment program to address her substance abuse."

An addendum report filed on March 3, 2016, reported that a substance abuse specialist had referred Julia to a less intensive substance abuse program known as MHS Mid Coast Regional Recovery Center (MHS). When Julia appeared for her intake appointment on February 16, 2016, she appeared very emotional, distraught, and anxious, and was unable to complete the intake. The intake was rescheduled twice¾for February 23 and March 1¾but Julia did not appear for her appointment on either date. The intake was again rescheduled for March 8, 2016. The Agency asked Julia to drug test on four separate dates, but Julia did not test.

At a settlement conference on March 3, 2016, the court sustained and made true findings on the section 387 petitions and placed the children in their foster home. The court granted Julia supervised visitation and continued her reunification services.

The CASA filed a report in August 2016 noting that the children had been placed in a foster home occupied by the foster mother and her sister. The children both reported that they liked the foster mother and enjoyed living in her home, although Aurora often stated that she missed Julia and wanted to return to her care. The CASA felt the children were doing well in their placement and agreed with the Agency social worker's recommendation that they remain there. The CASA noted Julia's visitation with the children was going well, but agreed with the social worker that it remain supervised.

In a status review report filed in August 2016, the Agency noted that Julia was behind on mortgage payments and the water to her home had been shut off, although she had been provided with resources for food, housing, and utilities. Julia's relationship with her maternal grandmother had apparently soured after the children's removal in January 2016. The children were both diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance emotions and conduct.

Julia failed to show for her rescheduled March 8, 2016 intake appointment at the MHS drug treatment program and for a March 22 intake appointment. Her drug treatment counselor reported that Julia had enrolled in a program in June 2016 and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, although she said her drugs of choice were marijuana and alcohol. Between May 9 and July11, 2016, Julia tested positive once for marijuana metabolite, tested positive three times for methamphetamine/amphetamine, tested positive three times for THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), failed to show for two tests, and had one negative test result. In July 2016, Julia completed an intake for the Vista Hills Bridges Program but attended the program only two days. She completed a 15-week parenting education class but was reminded by the social worker that she needed to engage in therapy to address domestic violence as part of her case plan. Julia completed 15 visits with the children through the Incredible Families program and the visitation went well.

In September 2016, the children's counsel filed section 388 petitions requesting that the court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The petitions alleged that other than completing the Incredible Families program, Julia had "failed to meaningfully engage in any other service that would address her domestic violence and substance abuse issues that led to the Agency's involvement and the children's removal." The petitions also alleged that since completing the Incredible Families program, Julia's visitation became less consistent and her supervised visitation at the Family Visitation Center was discontinued because she missed scheduled visitation more than three times. The petitions further alleged: "[Julia] is no closer now to having [the children] returned to her care than she was in March 2016. The only evidence [Julia] has provided is directly to the contrary¾that is, that her desire to use methamphetamine and marijuana is stronger than that of her ability to take action that would facilitate return of her children to her care."

The Agency filed an addendum report in September 2016 recommending the court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The Agency noted that Julia needed to address the protective issues of substance abuse and domestic violence, and that she continued to struggle to consistently attend a substance abuse treatment program. She had not yet completed a domestic violence treatment program. Her visitation with the children remained supervised and, during some of her visits, she had to be redirected to not speak to the children about the case or make promises about their returning to her care or having unsupervised visits with her. Julia was struggling with financial issues and the Agency was concerned about her housing stability. The CASA filed a report expressing agreement with the Agency's recommendation to terminate Julia's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

At a six-month review hearing on October 11, 2016, the court granted the children's section 388 petitions, terminated Julia's reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for February 22, 2017.

Social worker Valeria Peña prepared the Agency's assessment report filed on February 7, 2017, for the section 366.26 hearing. The Agency recommended the court terminate Julia's parental rights and order a permanent plan of adoption. The children had been in their foster home for over a year and were in good physical health. On December 7, 2016, Peña learned that Julia was incarcerated at Las Colinas Detention Facility (Las Colinas) and had been booked on December 1 on charges of vandalism and theft.

Peña reported on seven scheduled visits that occurred between Julia and the children between December 19, 2016, and March 10, 2017. Generally, Julia and the children enjoyed the visits and were affectionate with each other during the visits, but the children did not cry or show emotional distress when the visits ended. When Julia failed to appear for a visit on December 28, 2016, the children became upset and asked where she was. Aurora cried on the drive home. Julia later called the children on the caregiver's phone and apologized, explaining that she had fallen asleep late and her alarm was not properly set. The children arrived early for the next visit before Julia arrived. Aurora asked how late she was and A.L. said her stomach gets worried when Julia was not coming.

In her assessment/evaluation, Peña summarized Julia's supervised visitation as follows: "[Julia's] supervised visits have always remained in a controlled setting and have never graduated to unsupervised visits. The visits have varied from once to twice a week in two hour duration. The limited contact in the last year has affected the children's existing relationship and has prevented a significant parent-child relationship to continue to develop. The relationship between [Julia] and [the children] could be described as one of a 'relative' as demonstrated by the children appearing to enjoy their time 'playing' together but is not parental in nature. [Julia] has been unable [to] maintain a consistent and safe presence, [and] the children have learned to seek their current caregiver for comfort, safety, and nurturance. Additionally, the children have come to rely on the caregiver for their daily needs.

"Furthermore, in the absence of [Julia, the children] have continued to progress medically and developmentally in their home of care. The children have learned to adapt to a routine, are not experiencing disruptive behaviors in the classroom, and are overall doing well. In addition, Aurora's kidney problems resulting from post-surgery neglect have improved and are receiving the necessary medical care. The children have become accustomed to the absence of [Julia] and currently do not exhibit any negative behaviors upon their return home from visits. Therefore, one can infer that due to [Julia's] ability [sic] to safely parent, it would not be detrimental to the children if parental rights were terminated."

The CASA also filed a report for the section 366.26 hearing. She reported the children were doing well in their foster home and the foster mother ensured that their needs were met. The children had expressed their desire to remain with the foster mother in her home, and the foster mother had indicated she would like to adopt them. The CASA recommended the children remain in their current placement, Julia's parental rights be terminated, and adoption be the children's permanent plan.

On April 10, 2017, Peña filed an addendum report describing a number of visits between Julia and the children between January 27 and March 10, 2017. The visits went well, but Julia was 20 minutes late for a visit on February 3. She repeatedly said she had just woken up from a nap. The children did not cry or show emotional distress at the end of the visits. Peña reported that on March 23, 2017, Julia was incarcerated at Las Colinas on charges of theft, vandalism, and solicitation of criminal acts. The addendum report also noted that on February 28, 2017, the Agency received a referral alleging general neglect and emotional abuse of the children. The referral was being investigated.

Peña reported that there were 24 possible families in San Diego County approved to adopt a child matching A.L.'s characteristics, and 38 possible families approved to adopt a child matching Aurora's characteristics. There were 15 possible families approved to adopt a Caucasian/Hispanic sibling set of two girls matching the children's characteristics.

At the contested section 366.26 hearing on April 13, 2017, the court received in evidence Peña's reports for the hearing and her curriculum vitae, and the CASA's report for the hearing. The court also received as stipulated testimony a handwritten statement by Peña stating: "As to Aurora: The caretaker and the other potential adoptive homes noted in the report are all aware that Aurora has a 'controlled medical condition' because she is being followed by a kidney specialist. [¶] As to the reference to the referral on the caretaker[:] The first referral is still open and it is in reference to the cockaroches [sic] in the home. As to the second referral, that has been evaluated out."[3]

The court found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were likely to be adopted and were both specifically and generally adoptable, and that none of the circumstances specified in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) that would make termination of parental rights detrimental to them existed. The court terminated parental rights and ordered the Agency to consider only adoptive homes in which the children could be placed together.

DISCUSSION

Julia contends the court erred in finding that there was not a beneficial parent-child relationship between her and the children within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) that precluded the termination of her parental rights. "Section 366.26 establishes a detailed procedure for terminating parental rights. Subdivision (c)(1) states that a prior order under section 361.5 terminating reunification services 'shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.' If the court determines under a 'clear and convincing standard' that it is 'likely the child will be adopted,' the court 'shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The goal is to provide 'stable, permanent homes' for children who are dependents of the juvenile court, and the first choice to achieve that goal is adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); [citation].) [¶] This procedure recognizes that '[b]y the time of a section 366.26 hearing, the parent's interest in reunification is no longer an issue and the child's interest in a stable and permanent placement is paramount.' [Citation.] Thus, to terminate parental rights under section 366.26, the court 'need only make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.' [Citation.] Under these circumstances, 'the court shall terminate parental rights' unless certain exceptions apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)" (In re Logan B. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1009-1010 (Logan B.).)

The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies where "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent bears the burden in the juvenile court of showing the exception applies. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529 (J.C.).)

Regarding the requirement of regular visitation, the juvenile court found "that one is closer to the line. [Julia] has at times had regular visitation, and . . . there [were] other times that she has not." However, the court concluded that "even assuming [Julia] has met this prong, there is no evidence that she's established the second prong . . . which is establishing that [her] relationship [with the children] promotes the well-being of . . . the children . . . to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the children would gain in a permanent home with new adoptive parents." Accordingly, the sole issue in this appeal is whether the court erred in determining that Julia had not met her burden of showing that her relationship with the children provided them sufficient benefit to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

"The 'benefit' prong of the exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child 'promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (K.P.).) In other words, "to establish the exception a parent must prove that the benefit of continuing a parental relationship outweighs the child's interest in the stability and permanence of adoption." (Logan B., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012.) " 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' " (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 594.)

The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies only in exceptional circumstances. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) " 'The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs.' " (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 (Bailey J.).)

Appellate courts have applied different standards of review to the parent-child beneficial relationship exception. (See K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) Most courts initially applied the substantial evidence standard. (See ibid.; J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.) However, this court has applied a "hybrid standard," under which "[w]e apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) We will apply the hybrid standard.[4]

Under the hybrid standard, we view the juvenile court's determination of whether a beneficial parental relationship exists as a factual finding that we review for substantial evidence. "On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) "Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

"The second determination in the exception analysis is whether the existence of that relationship or other specified statutory circumstance constitutes 'a "compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental" ' to the child. [Citation.] This ' " 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption," is appropriately reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.' " (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) " ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)

Julia's argument that the court erred in not applying the beneficial parental relationship exception is based mainly on the quality of her supervised visitation with the children. Although visitation between her and the children was generally positive and reflected a close relationship between them, visitation is only part of the total picture the court must consider. Even where the juvenile court finds the existence of a positive relationship between a parent and child, to apply the beneficial relationship exception the court must also find that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1165.) In other words, the evidence must support a finding that "severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed . . . ." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added.)

The juvenile court acknowledged the "lengthy period of time that [the children] spent in [Julia's] care[,]" and recognized that there was a positive bond between Julia and the children. However, the court found it was not a parental bond, and that severing the parent-child relationship would not cause the children to be greatly harmed. The court noted that "the children arrived at the beginning of this case with post-traumatic stress disorder, and with other issues related to, quite frankly, the chaos [of] being exposed to domestic violence and other issues in the home, and then ultimately, later, drug use that affected, quite frankly, [Julia's] parenting ability, and her ability to meet their particular needs."

The court articulated the standards set forth in case law for application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception and stated: "[Julia] does not serve in a parental role. . . . I don't think we need to put a label on [her relationship with the children], whether it be akin to a friendly visitor or a friendly relative. And certainly, there's no doubt that there are precious moments and fun moments when Mom visits, and that she attempts to be engaging with her children and do age-appropriate activities. [¶] But, overall, the relationship, based on what the court has reviewed, and all of the evidence, it's not a parent-child relationship. [Julia] has difficulty, quite frankly, meeting sometimes the emotional needs of her children, and as well, making discipline and order during visitations[.] [B]ut more importantly, [the children] have been out of her care for a significant period of time.

"And going to the benefits . . . of adoption in a new home or a permanent home with new adoptive parents, I find the benefits for these two girls are extraordinary. . . . [T]hey have made significant strides and have done very well in a home that affords them permanence . . . , regular schedules, meeting their needs, being attentive to physical, emotional, and academic needs. They have blossomed. They are happy, little girls. And the happiness is, quite frankly, in response to having this predictability and this permanence in their lives.

"With respect to the issues that they presented with when they came into this home, they have done very, very well in terms of addressing things related to stress, post-traumatic stress disorder, et cetera, with the support of the services and the caregiver. [¶] And based on their ages, their particular individual characteristics, as well as the good track records that they've had while being out of [Julia's] care and in this caregiver's home, the benefits of adoption and permanency and knowing where they're going to be, and who is going to be meeting their needs is exceedingly high. [¶] And balancing that against . . . the nature of their relationship with their mother, I find that the benefits of adoption greatly outweigh maintaining the parent-child connection and bond. [¶] There is no evidence that severing the parent-child relationship, as to either Aurora or A.L., would deprive either of them of such a substantial positive emotional attachment . . . that they would be greatly harmed."

Even assuming there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of a beneficial parent-child relationship between Julia and the children, we conclude the court reasonably determined that severing the relationship would not cause the children to be greatly harmed. Julia's contact with the children for over a year preceding the section 366.26 hearing was limited to her supervised visitation with them. Her visitation was generally consistent but she did not show up for five visits between April and August 2016, and she missed visitation in March and April 2017 when she was incarcerated. The children sometimes expressed anxiety over whether Julia would show for a visit.

The children also expressed concern over Julia's well-being in a parental way. At one visit, A.L. repeatedly asked Julia how her week was going and Julia responded that she had been tired and had gotten fired from her job. A.L. expressed empathy, telling Julia she was sorry for what happened. When Julia greeted the children at another visit, A.L. said, "I was really worried; we looked all over for you!" Aurora told a social worker at the beginning of the dependency case that she made breakfast for Julia, cleaned dishes for her, brushed and styled her hair, and "clean[ed] up." At the section 366.26 hearing the court reasonably found that "one of the things that has happened in this relationship has been essentially that the tables have been turned a little bit. And the children¾which is generally uncharacteristic of children this young, is that they are very concerned about [Julia]. [¶] During the course of visitation the children are asking about a job, asking about why she's late, . . . essentially almost being parentified, wanting to make sure that she is okay."

The evidence showed that Julia had domestic violence issues and substance abuse issues that included use of amphetamine and methamphetamine after the children were removed from her care, but she was unwilling or unable to consistently attend a substance abuse treatment program or complete a domestic violence program. Peña reported that Julia "has a history of substance abuse, criminal activity, and continued involvement in unsafe domestic violence relationships which have impacted her ability to parent." Thus, the evidence reasonably supported the court's finding that domestic violence and drug use affected Julia's parenting ability.

As noted, in her assessment for the section 366.26 hearing, Peña concluded that Julia's limited contact with the children over the preceding year prevented the development of a significant parent-child relationship. Peña noted the children had come to rely on their caregiver for their daily needs and had continued to progress medically and developmentally in her home care. She further noted in her visitation reports and assessment that the children did not cry or show emotional distress when their visits with Julia ended and they returned to the caregiver's home. She concluded "it would not be detrimental to the children if parental rights were terminated." The court was entitled to find Peña's opinion credible and give great weight to her assessment. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) The CASA agreed with Peña's assessment and reported that the children had expressed their desire to remain with the foster mother in her home.

We conclude Julia has not met her burden of showing the juvenile court erred in determining that termination of her parental rights would not cause the children to be greatly harmed. The evidence in the record supports the court's determination that, notwithstanding the positive aspects of the relationship between Julia and the children, the benefit the children would gain from adoption outweighed any detriment that would result from termination of parental rights. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining there was no compelling reason to find that termination would be detrimental to the children. (In re Anthony B., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.)

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the children's permanent plan are affirmed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.