In re A.C.
Filed 5/29/13 In re A.C. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.C., a
Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN
BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
E055744 /
E056638
(Super.Ct.No. J240265)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court of
Bernardino County.
Barbara A. Buchholz, Judge.
Dismissed.
Matthew
I. Thue, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jean-Rene
Basle, County Counsel,
and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
In
two dependency appeals, consolidated for purposes of
father of A.C., challenges the orders made by the juvenile court denying
father’s three requests to represent himself and father’s additional request
for gas vouchers so that he could conduct visitation in Landers in San Bernardino County rather than Cabazon in Riverside County.
A.C.
was returned to the custody of father and mother in October 2012 and the
dependency case was dismissed by the juvenile court in January 2013. (E057405; Evid. Code, § 459.) After reviewing the record, we have
determined that the issues raised by father no longer present a justiciable
controversy. Therefore, the appeals are
DISMISSED as moot.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
We
have briefly summarized the proceedings below to illustrate why father’s
present appeals are moot.
A.C.
was born in August 2011. She was
immediately detained by CFS (San Bernardino County Children and Family
Services). Father was disruptive at the
hospital and had to be removed by the police.
Father had a criminal record and a history of
failure to protect A.C. because of mental illness, substance abuse, and
domestic violence.
Throughout
the dependency proceedings father was often uncooperative and
confrontational. Between August 2011 and
February 2012, although father participated in reunification services, he also
tried to intimidate the social workers by threats and menacing behavior.
asserted his conduct directed at CFS was protected by his constitutional rights
of free speech and association.
Nevertheless, the court granted a restraining order against father in
February 2012.
On several occasions, father
asked to represent himself because he believed there was evidence that CFS was
biased against him and he thought his two appointed attorneys were not
adequately representing his positions to the court. Father admitted he was confused about the
dependency process although he had taken some courses in criminal justice. The court ultimately determined it was in the
best interests of father and child for father to be represented by legal
counsel well-versed in dependency law.
Between February and July
2012, father’s reunification efforts improved significantly although there
continued to be conflict between father and CFS. In April 2012, a psychotherapist concluded
that, in spite of father’s personality disorder—impaired judgment and impulsive
behavior—father “has the willingness and ability to be a virtuous parent.â€
At the six-month review
hearing in July 2012, when A.C. was still in foster care, the court ordered
father to have unsupervised visitation for six hours to occur in Cabazon. Father objected to having visitation with
A.C. in Cabazon because he wanted to have visitation in the high desert in
Landers where he lived. Father preferred
to drive A.C. back to Landers where he believed it would be cooler in the
summer and A.C. would be more comfortable at his residence and where father
would avoid the possibility of being harassed or arrested in a public place
because of his extensive tattoos. Father
also needed gasoline vouchers so he could drive the child back and forth
between Cabazon and Landers. The court
did not order visitation in Landers but authorized returning A.C. to the
parents’ care with family maintenance
services by information packet.
On October 11, 2012, the
juvenile court conducted the 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, §
366.21, subd. (f)) and ordered A.C. returned to father and mother’s custody,
under family maintenance services, and authorized CFS to request dismissal of
the case by approval packet if appropriate.
On January 22, 2013, the
juvenile court ordered A.C. returned to her parents’ custody, discharged the
child as a dependent of the juvenile court, and dismissed the dependency
action. (E057405; Evid. Code, § 459.)
III
MOOTNESS
Father has filed three
appeals. This court dismissed his most
recent appeal (E057405) on March 15, 2013, as moot, citing In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488: “As a general rule, an order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the
In
his two earlier appeals (E055744 and E056638), father argues the juvenile court
committed reversible error when the court denied his three requests to
represent himself so he could subpoena various witnesses and pursue his claims
of bias involving the CFS social workers.
Father contends there could have been a more favorable outcome if he had
been allowed to represent himself. In
his second appeal (E056638), father also argues the juvenile court erred in
ordering father to have six-hour unsupervised visits in Cabazon for three
months between July and October 2012, when father preferred to conduct
visitation at his residence in Landers—a round trip of 100 miles—and father
required gas vouchers to make the trip.
In
September 2012, all the appellate briefing had been completed in E055744 and
father had filed his opening brief in E056638.
In October 2012, the parents regained custody. The juvenile court dismissed the dependency
case in January 2013. Consequently
respondent argues in the second appeal that both appeals should be deemed
moot. Father makes various arguments
about why the appeals are not moot.
Based on the following analysis, we find the issues raised in the
appeals are moot.
An appellate court’s
jurisdiction extends only to actual controversies for which the court can grant
effective relief. An action no longer
presents a justiciable controversy if the questions raised in the appeal have
become moot because of subsequent events.
(In re Christina A. (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158.) If a reversal
would have no practical effect, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re
Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402.)
Where there is no danger of
error infecting the outcome of subsequent
proceedings in the case, an appeal is moot.
Because of the dismissal of the dependency case involving A.C., there
are no subsequent proceedings to be affected.
In two cases relied upon by father—In
re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 and In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769—there were continuing
issues, including visitation, in ongoing dependency cases which kept the
appeals from being moot. In this case,
however, there is no ongoing case and no subsequent proceedings. Issues about self-representation and
visitation have no continuing viability because father has regained custody of
A.C. and the dependency has terminated.
For the same reason, no
negative findings on the record have the potential to cause prejudice to father
in any future proceedings. (
1431-1432 [finding of sexual abuse]; In
re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1488 [order denying
visitation].) Even if another dependency
proceeding should commence, the issues of self-representation
and visitation would be specific to that case and the juvenile court’s
previous ruling on these matters would have no bearing on a new and different
dependency case. If father should seek
to represent himself in some later dependency proceeding, the court’s decision
necessarily will be based on the factual circumstances then, not on the court’s
rulings in 2011 and 2012. Certainly, the
unique question of whether the court should have ordered father to be given
gasoline vouchers to facilitate visitation in Landers instead of Cabazon for
three months is now moot and cannot be resolved on appeal
We reject father’s
characterization of the issues he raises as being of continuing public interest
and capable of repetition while evading review.
(In re Miguel A. (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 389, 392 [the effect of adoption on sibling relationships].) The visitation order in July 2012 was well
within the juvenile court’s discretion and ultimately offered no obstacle to
father regaining custody of A.C. in October 2012. Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests
the court may have erred in denying father’s requests to represent himself or
that father suffered any prejudice whatsoever.
More likely, father was able to regain custody of A.C. in part due to
the efforts of the two lawyers who successfully represented him despite his
protests against their efforts.
IV
DISPOSITION
We conclude there no longer
exists any justiciable controversy and any reversal of the orders involving
self-representation or visitation in the dismissed dependency case would be
meaningless.
Father’s appeals are
DISMISSED.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN
OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
McKINSTER
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] We
will spare the parties a fuller recitation of father’s actions, which also
involved harassing, spying on, and surveiling the CFS social workers.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] We
grant respondent’s request for judicial notice filed November 6, 2012. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 454, and 459.)
