Huynh v. Le

 

 

 

Filed 1/23/14  Huynh v. Le
CA6

 

 

>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN
OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

 
>

SONNY VAN HUYNH et al.,   Plaintiffs and Appellants,   v.   DANNY THIEN LE et al.,   Defendants and Respondents.

H038238      (Santa Clara County       Super. Ct. No. CV196883)

>I.  INTRODUCTION

            Appellants Sonny Van Huynh and Lai
T. Huynh Tran (hereafter, sometimes collectively the Huynhs) purchased a convenience
store business from respondent Danny Thien Le dba D.L. Investment, Inc. (Danny
Le) and elected to lease the business premises. 
Several years later, respondent Linda Le, the property owner, filed an
unlawful detainer action against the Huynhs in which she alleged that they had
violated the lease agreement.  The
judgment in the unlawful detainer action
awarded Linda Le possession of the premises and holdover damages and costs.

            The Huynhs subsequently filed the
instant civil action against defendants
Danny Le and Linda Le alleging that defendants were liable for contract and
tort damages because the unlawful detainer action was based on a href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">lease agreement on which the Huynhs’s signatures
were forged.  Defendants brought a motion
for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the action was barred under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel because the forgery issue had been litigated in
the unlawful detainer action.  The trial
court granted the motion and entered judgment in defendants’ favor.

            On appeal, the Huynhs contend that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because they did not have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of fraud, forgery, and breach
of contract in the unlawful detainer action. 
For the reasons stated below, we find no merit in their contentions and
we will affirm the judgment. 

>II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            A.  The
Unlawful Detainer Action

                        1.  The Pleadings 

            In November 2008, Linda Le filed an unlawful detainer action against
the Huynhs in which she asserted that she was the owner of the premises located
at 1684 South Seventh Street in San Jose that the Huynhs had agreed to lease on March 1, 2004.  (Le v. Huynh (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, 2008, No. 127446).)  The unlawful detainer complainthref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
stated that she had served a three-day notice to quit and sought possession of
the property, forfeiture of the lease agreement, and costs on the grounds that
the Huynhs had “made physical modification to property & are operating an
auto repair shop in violation of the lease and without permission of the
landlord.” 

            The lease agreement attached as
Exhibit 1 to the unlawful detainer complaint was dated October 6, 2003, and stated
that the lease period for the business, land, and building at 1684 South Seventh
Street, San Jose was March 2004 to March 2013 with a monthly rent of $3,000 and
an optional five-year extension with rent according to market rates.  Among other things, the lease href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">agreement required the Huynhs
to “use this business as Retail store, Mini market only” and to pay all taxes
related to the property. 

            The Huynhs’s answer to the unlawful
detainer complaint asserted the following affirmative defenses:  (1) “Defendants have initiated legal
proceedings against Plaintiff and/or her relatives and agents”; (2) “Fraud-The purported
lease was not properly executed”; (3) “Unclean Hands-Prior breach of contract
by Plaintiff and/or her partners and agents”; and (4) “Plaintiff . . . filed
the complaint to retaliate against defendant.” 


                        2.  The Court Trial and Judgment

            A court trial was held in the
unlawful detainer action on December 10, 2008.  Linda Le testified that it was her intention
that the Huynhs use the leased premises only as a retail store, and she had not
been aware that they were operating an auto repair shop on the premises.  She had served the Huynhs with a three-day
notice to quit.  Luu Le, the father of
Linda Le, testified that he had previously served three notices to correct the
problem and had taken recent photographs of the auto repair shop (also
described as a “smog kit shop”).  Luu Le
also testified that when he handed the third notice to correct the problem to
Sonny Huynh, his response was “I don’t care.”   


            Sonny Huynh testified that “[a]t the
beginning” he received a lease telling him to pay $3,000 per month for 10 years
with a three percent increase for the next five years.  He believed that his lease agreement was with
Danny Le, to whom he paid rent.  The auto
repair shop was not present at the beginning of the lease period and is
currently being rented by a friend.  He
did not know that he needed permission to rent out the location for an auto
repair shop because the lease agreement did not say anything about the use of
the premises. 

            Sonny Huynh further testified that the
lease agreement dated October 6, 2003, that was
attached to the unlawful detainer complaint did not contain the signature of either
himself or his wife, Lai T. Huynh Tran, as shown in the following direct
examination:

            “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Mr. Huynh, I’m going to show you Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1, real property lease agreement. 
It says San Jose, October
6, 2003. 
[¶]  Directing your attention to
page 2, the signature page.  Can you
review that, please?  Does that page
contain your signature?

            “[SONNY HUYNH]:  No.

            “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . .  Does it contain the signature of your wife?

            “[SONNY HUYNH]:  No. 
It’s not her signature.” 

            On cross-examination, Sonny Huynh
testified as follows regarding his signature on the lease agreement dated October 6, 2003:

            “[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  You testified earlier this is not your
signature, correct?

            “[SONNY HUYNH]:  Right.

            “[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]:  Is it your theory that someone forged your
signature on this lease?

            “[SONNY HUYNH]:  I don’t know.  It was sent to me.  [¶]  . .
. [¶]  I just receive[d] it
recently.” 

            At the conclusion of the court
trial, the court ruled as follows: 
“Number one, I do not believe the Defendant [Sonny Huynh] that there is
another lease agreement.  [¶]  Number two, I do not believe the Defendant when
he says that that’s not his signature. 
I’m looking at his original signature on his answer and . . .
I’m not an expert, but they are the same^{.[href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]]}  Okay. 
[¶]  That lease agreement provides
for the operation of a mini market only. 
. . . I really don’t believe also that this business isn’t his; that
even if I would believe him, he’s in effect subleased out a portion without
obtaining the prior approval of the landlord. 
A further violation.  [¶]  What I tend to believe is what [Luu Le] said
that when he gave him the notices about ceasing the operation, that he
basically told him, ‘I don’t care.’ 
Well, he’s in violation of the lease. 
He’s given three notices.  The
lease is terminated.  [¶]  So, consequently, I’m going to award judgment
for possession of the premises, forfeiture of the lease agreement.”

            Judgment in Linda Le’s favor was
entered on December
11, 2008. 
The judgment provides that the lease agreement is forfeited and Linda Le
is awarded possession of the premises, $2,940 in holdover damages, and $255 in
costs. 

                        3.  Motion for New Trial and
Appeal

            After judgment was entered in the unlawful detainer action, the
Huynhs filed a motion for new trial. 
They argued that the proceedings in the unlawful detainer trial were
irregular, the trial judge was not impartial, their original trial counsel had committed
prejudicial misconduct, an examiner of questioned documents had subsequently
concluded that the signatures of Sonny Huynh and Lai Tran were forged, the
damages awarded were excessive, and the trial court had erroneously concluded
that subleasing the premises violated the lease and that the notice to quit was
proper.  The record reflects that the
motion for new trial was denied in March 2009. 


            The Huyhns appealed the December
2008 unlawful detainer judgment and the March 2009 order denying their motion
for new trial to the appellate division of the superior court.  In its October 13, 2009
order the appellate division ruled as follows: 
“Many of the issues Appellants are now raising on appeal were not
properly raised at the trial.  To the
extent Appellants’ counsel at trial did not raise certain arguments or present
certain evidence, those arguments and evidence cannot be presented now as
reasons to reverse the December 2008 Judgment.  Regarding the notice to quit, although it was
possible for Appellants to remove the auto repair shop after receiving notice,
Appellants could not undo the violation of the lease that had already
occurred.  Under these circumstances, the
notice to quit was not required to be framed in the alternative.  [Citation.] 
Accordingly, the December 2008 Judgment is AFFIRMED.  [¶]  As
for the motion for a new trial, Appellants have not demonstrated an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. 
Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial is
AFFIRMED.”     

            B.  The
Instant Civil Action

                        1. 
The Pleadings

            In March 2011 the Huynhs filed a civil action against defendants
Danny Le, Steve S. Lopes, Linda Le, and Luu Thien Le.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]
 In their complaint, the Huynhs alleged
that in 2003 they entered into a business purchase agreement for the purchase
of a convenience store located at 1684 South Seventh Street in San Jose.  They further alleged that
“[i]ncluded within the terms of the Agreement was a lease for the Premises to
plaintiffs at the rate of $3,000 per month, and an option for plaintiffs to
either purchase the Premises within one year from the date of the Agreement, or
in the alternative, to lease the Premises with rent payable at $3,000 per month
for the first 10 years, and increased by 5% per year for the following 5
years.” 

            The Huynhs elected to lease the
premises for $3,000 per month and “made payments to defendant Linda Le, as
directed.”  However, “[i]n or about
October 2008, defendants presented plaintiffs with a purported Real Property
Lease Agreement (‘Forged Lease’) purportedly executed by Plaintiffs, Lopes and
Linda Le.  Plaintiffs did not execute the
Forged Lease, and in fact, plaintiffs’ signatures on the Forged Lease were
forged. . . .  [¶]  Purportedly relying on the terms . . . of the
Forged Lease, commencing in October 2008, defendants made demand on plaintiffs
for payment of real property taxes, and further demanded that plaintiffs cease
operating an auto repair shop on the Premises, in purported violation of the
terms of the Forged Lease.  [¶]  When plaintiff refused to acknowledge the
validity of the Forged Lease, and refused to comply with defendants’ demands,
defendants served plaintiffs with an unlawful detainer proceeding, and subsequently
evicted plaintiffs from the premises in or about February 2010.”  

            Based on these factual allegations,
the complaint included causes of action against all defendants for breach of
contract, forgery, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200,
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, conversion, civil
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and a cause of action against defendant Danny
Le for fraud.  Defendants demurred on the
grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, was uncertain, and was time-barred.

            The record reflects that in October
2011 the trial court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend as to the
causes of action for fraud, violation of Business and Profession Code section
17200, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.  Plaintiffs did not amend the complaint.  As a result, the causes of action that remained
to be litigated were breach of contract, forgery, intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, and conversion.

                        2.  Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings

            In December 2011 defendants filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure section 438.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]  They argued that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, since
the remaining causes of action all depended upon the allegation that defendants
had forged the lease agreement and the forgery issue had been fully litigated
in the unlawful detainer action.

            In support of their motion,
defendants filed a request for judicial notice of the following documents from
the unlawful detainer action (Le v. Huynh,
supra, No. 127446):  (1) the Huynhs’s answer;  (2) the December 11, 2008 judgment;  (3) the Huynhs’s notice of motion for new
trial and supporting memorandum of points and authorities; (4) the appellate
division’s October 13, 2009 order;  and
(5) the December 10, 2008 reporter’s transcript of the court trial.        

            In opposition, the Huynhs argued that the motion for judgment on the
pleadings should be denied because the doctrine of collateral estoppel was a
defense that did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.

                        3. 
The Trial Court’s Order

            The
trial court entered its order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings
without leave to amend and granting the request for judicial notice on March 5, 2012.  The order states:  “[T]he judicially noticeable documents make
clear that all remaining claims are barred by collateral estoppel.  [Citation.] 
Plaintiffs’ first, second, fifth, and sixth causes of action are based
upon the premise that Plaintiffs’ signatures on the Lease Agreement were
forged.  However, the issue of whether
the Lease Agreement was forged was previously raised and fully litigated by
Plaintiffs in the unlawful detainer action, [citations].  Moreover, it is clear that
the unlawful detainer action resulted in a final judgment on the merits and
that the parties against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted
(Plaintiffs) were parties to the unlawful detainer proceeding.  [Citation.]” 


            Judgment in defendants’ favor was
entered on March
5, 2012, and the Huynhs filed a timely
notice of appeal.    

>III.  DISCUSSION

            On appeal, the Huynhs argue that the trial court erred in granting
the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the issue of whether their
signatures on the lease agreement were forged was not fully and fairly
litigated in the unlawful detainer action, and therefore the doctrine of
collateral estoppel does not apply.  We
will begin our analysis with the applicable standard of review.   

            A.  Standard
of Review

            “Since 1994, motions for judgment on the pleadings have been
authorized by statute.  (Stats.1993, ch.
456, § 5, pp. 2524–2527, adding [§] 438; Stats.1994, ch. 493, § 2,
amending [§] 438.)  Previously, they were
allowed by common law.  [Citations.]  Generally, as such motions were, so they
remain.”  (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. >Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 482, fn.2.) 


            “In an appeal from a motion granting
judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint
and review the legal issues de novo.  â€˜A
motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a general demurrer, tests the
allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint, supplemented by any matter of
which the trial court takes judicial notice, to determine whether plaintiff or
cross-complainant has stated a cause of action.  [Citation.]  Because the trial court’s determination is
made as a matter of law, we review the ruling de novo, assuming the truth of all
material facts properly pled.’  [Citation.]” 
(Angelucci v. Century Supper Club
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166 (Angelucci);
see also Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
592, 602.) 

            B.  Collateral
Estoppel

            A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought on the ground
that the complaint is barred by the affirmative defense of collateral
estoppel.  (See Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 223-224.)

            The
California Supreme Court set forth the elements of collateral estoppel in >Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 (Lucido):  “Collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior
proceedings.  [Citation.]
 Traditionally, we have applied the
doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled.  First, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.  Second, this issue must have been actually
litigated in the former proceeding.  Third,
it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding.  Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding
must be final and on the merits.  Finally,
the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity
with, the party to the former proceeding.  [Citations].”  (Id.
at p. 341, fn. omitted; see also Coscia
v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1201, fn. 1.)  The correctness of the prior decision is not
material to the application of collateral estoppel, since, as this court has
stated, “ ‘collateral estoppel may apply even where the issue was wrongly
decided in the first action.’ 
[Citations.]”  (>Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1270.) 

            In
Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251
(Vella), our Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether an unlawful detainer judgment may have preclusive effect
in a subsequent civil action.  The court in
Vella observed that an unlawful
detainer action is “summary in character,” with the issues ordinarily limited
to “the right of immediate possession.”  (Id.
at p. 255.)  Consequently, “a judgment in
unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not
prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve
questions of title [citations], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable
claims between the parties [citations.]” 
(Ibid.) 

            However,
the Vella court determined that “ ‘full
and fair’ litigation of an affirmative defense—even one not ordinarily
cognizable in unlawful detainer, if it is name="SDU_257">raised
without objection, and if a fair opportunity to litigate is provided—will
result in a judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense.”  (Vella,
supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 256-257;
see also Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage
Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 976 [determination in unlawful detainer
judgment that Wells Fargo had valid title collaterally estopped homeowner’s subsequent
civil action challenging validity of title]; Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371-1372 [ruling
in unlawful detainer action that rent stabilization ordinance applied was
conclusive in tenant’s civil action against landlord for violation of the
ordinance]; Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht
Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557 [collateral estoppel was not
applicable in civil action for retaliatory eviction where prior unlawful
detainer judgment was stipulated and therefore retaliation defense was not
litigated in an adversary hearing].)

            Having reviewed the rules governing
the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the context of a
prior unlawful detainer judgment, we turn to the merits of the Huynhs’s
contentions on appeal.

            C.  Analysis

            The
Huynhs contend that collateral estoppel should not apply in this case because
they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of fraud
and forgery.  They explain that the
unlawful detainer hearing was very brief, there was no pretrial discovery, and
“[t]he ‘quality’ of the evidence presented . . . was inferior.”  The Huynhs also claim that the attorney who
represented them at the unlawful detainer hearing was incompetent, the unlawful
detainer judge was not impartial, and they “were not allowed to introduce into
evidence the Agreement, containing the Controlling Lease [citation], or to
introduce expert testimony to establish that their signatures on the Forged
Lease were not genuine.” 

            Alternatively,
the Huynhs argue that they raise issues in the present action that were not
actually litigated in the unlawful detainer action, including whether “the
Forged Lease constituted a novation, a modification, or supplement to the terms
of the Agreement.”  Finally, the Huynhs argue
that application of collateral estoppel here would be contrary to public policy
because they “were victims of unfairness” in the unlawful detainer trial. 

            Defendants
respond that their motion for judgment on the pleadings established the
elements of collateral estoppel and therefore relitigation of the the forgery
issue is barred.  They emphasize that the
Huynhs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their unsuccessful forgery
claim in the unlawful detainer trial.  As
to the Huyhns’s contention that their breach of contract claim was not fully
litigated, defendants point out that the complaint in the instant civil action
only alleges the forged lease as the basis for their cause of action for breach
of contract.  Further, defendants disagree
that application of collateral estoppel in this case would violate public
policy since they believe that the Huynhs had a full and fair opportunity to present
evidence that the lease was forged in the unlawful detainer trial.

            We
have independently reviewed the complaint and the documents that have been
judicially noticed in order to determine whether the motion for judgment on the
pleadings establishes the elements of the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel
and the remaining causes of action (breach of contract, forgery, intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, and conversion) are therefore
precluded.  (See Angelucci, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 166.)  As we will discuss,
we conclude that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly granted
because the allegation that the Huynhs’s signatures were forged on the October 6, 2003 lease attached to the unlawful detainer complaint is the sole basis
for the instant action and the issue was previously decided in the unlawful
detainer action.  (See >Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 257.) 
 

            Under
the first element of the collateral estoppel, we determine that the issue of
whether the Huynhs’s signatures on the October 6, 2003 lease were forged, as
alleged in the complaint in the instant action, is identical to the forged
lease issue decided by the trial court in the prior unlawful detainer
proceeding.  (See Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d
at p. 341.)  The Huynhs have asserted
in both cases that they did not sign the October 6, 2003
lease and the signatures on the lease are not theirs.

            Second,
under Lucido, we determine that the
record in the unlawful detainer action shows that the forged lease issue was
actually litigated in the unlawful detainer action.  “ â€˜When an issue is properly raised, by
the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is
determined, the issue is actually litigated. . . . ’ ”  (Barker,
supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p.
226.)  Here, the Huynhs’s answer in the
unlawful detainer action stated the allegation of “[f]raud-The purported lease
was not properly executed,” and Sonny Huynh testified that the signatures on
the October 6,
2003 lease were not the signatures of
himself and his wife.   (Lucido,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341.)  In finding that the Huynhs had violated the
lease agreement, the trial court in the unlawful detainer action determined
that signatures on the lease were not forged.

            Third,
the forged lease issue was necessarily decided in the unlawful detainer
proceeding, since the unlawful detainer complaint was premised on the validity
of the October
6, 2003 lease that the Huynhs had allegedly
violated.  

            Fourth,
there can be no dispute that the unlawful detainer judgment is final and on the
merits, since the judgment was upheld by the appellate division in its October 13, 2009 order.  

            Finally,
the parties against whom preclusion is sought in the instant case—the Huynhs—are
the same as the parties to the unlawful detainer action.  (See Lucido,
supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341.)  

            We
are not convinced by the Huynhs’s contention that they did not receive a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the forged lease issue in the unlawful
detainer trial and therefore collateral estoppel should not apply.  In Vella,
our Supreme Court instructed that “ ‘full and fair’ litigation of an
affirmative defense” in an unlawful detainer action “[would] result in a
judgment conclusive upon issues material to that defense” where (1) the
defense was raised without objection; and (2) “a fair opportunity to litigate
is provided.”  (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d
at p. 256-257.)  Here, the judicially
noticed record of the unlawful detainer proceeding shows that the Huynhs raised
the issue of whether the October 6, 2003 lease contained forged signatures
without any objection and they were provided with a fair opportunity to litigate that defense in the unlawful detainer
action.

            Contrary
to the Huynhs’s argument, they were not precluded from presenting either a
different lease agreement or testimony by an examiner of questioned documents as
evidence at the unlawful detainer trial. 
The record reflects that the Huynhs sought to present a document
evidencing a different lease agreement and an expert witness only by way of
their motion for new trial.  â€œ[T]he
existence of ‘new evidence’ normally does not bar the application of collateral
estoppel.  [Citation].”  (Roos
v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 888 (Roos).)  

            Although
the Huynhs have contended, both in their opposition to the motion for judgment
on the pleadings and in their motion for new trial in the unlawful detainer
action, that collateral estoppel should not apply because their unlawful
detainer attorney was incompetent in presenting their defense, that contention
has no merit.  “The failure of a litigant
to introduce relevant available evidence on an issue does not necessarily
defeat a plea of collateral estoppel.
 [Citation.]”  (People
v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 481.)              As to the contention that they did
not have a fair opportunity to litigate their defense in the unlawful detainer
trial because the trial judge was not impartial, we disagree.  Our review of the reporter’s transcript for
the unlawful detainer trial shows that the trial court provided the Huynhs with
a full and fair opportunity to litigate their defense; failure to name="SR;5452">take full advantage of the opportunity does not bar the
application of collateral estoppel.  (See
Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 873.)  Moreover,
“[c]ollateral estoppel may apply even where the issue was wrongly decided in
the first action.  â€˜ “An erroneous
judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.” ’ [Citations.]”  (Roos,
supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 887.)

            The
decisions relied upon by the Huynhs in support of their claim that they did not
have the opportunity for a full and fair hearing in the unlawful detainer trial
predate the California Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Vella and do not compel a contrary conclusion in this case.  In Wood
v. Herson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 737, the appellate court determined that the
doctrine of res judicata applied to bar relitigation of the issue of title in
an action for specific performance because the title issue had been determined
in an prior unlawful detainer proceeding. 
(Id. at p. 745.)  The appellate court noted that the unlawful
detainer trial had lasted several days and that pretrial depositions had been
taken, and stated that the plaintiffs “have had their day in court.”  (Ibid.)  However, the appellate court did not rule
that pretrial discovery and a lengthy trial were necessary for a litigant to
have had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing in an unlawful detainer
action.  “ â€˜ â€œIt is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is
to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court.  An opinion is not
authority for propositions not name="SR;11671">considered.” [Citation.]’ 
[Citation.]”  (May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1335.)  

            In Gonzales v. Gem Properties,
Inc. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, the defendants in an action to cancel a
trustee’s deed and redeem property contended that the action was barred under
the doctrine of res judicata because the matter had already been litigated in a
prior unlawful detainer proceeding.  (Id.
at pp. 1031, 1033.)  The appellate court
rejected their contention, ruling that “the record does not establish that
plaintiff received a full adversary hearing on all the issues involved in his
subsequent suit, such as the trustee’s practice of discouraging competitive
bidding at a foreclosure sale in order to help obtain the property for the
corporation, in which he had an interest. 
It does not appear that the unlawful detainer court, in the exercise of
its limited power to inquire, properly could have received and considered
evidence of the fraud.  We conclude that
the subsequent suit was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  [Citation.]” 
(Id. at p. 1036-1037.)  The
present case is distinguishable since evidence relating to the forged lease
issue was received and considered by the unlawful detainer court.  Moreover, we reiterate that our Supreme Court
in Vella subsequently ruled that “ ‘full and fair’ litigation of
an affirmative defense—even one not ordinarily cognizable in unlawful
detainer,” will prevent relitigation of the issue under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.  (Vella, supra,
20 Cal.3d at p. 256-257.)

            For these reasons, we conclude that
the motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly
granted and we will affirm the judgment.




 

IV.  DISPOSTION

            The
judgment is affirmed.  Costs on appeal
are awarded to respondents.

 

 

 

 

 

                                                            ___________________________________________

                                                            Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________________

Márquez, J.

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________________

GROVER, J.