Hoppe v.
School Dist.
Filed 2/27/12 Hoppe v. Compton Unified School Dist. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
RONALD HOPPE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
COMPTON
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant
and Appellant.
___________________________________
B231282
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. BS130051)
APPEAL
from an order of the Superior Court
of
County.
Rolf M. Treu, Judge.
Affirmed.
Littler Mendelson,
Barrett K. Green, Brady J. Mitchell, Courtney S. Hobson and Michelle Holmes,
for Appellant.
Schwartz,
Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Sommers, Henry M. Willis and Amy M. Cu, for
Respondent.
__________________________
The Compton
Unified School District
appeals from the trial court’s order quashing its subpoena of district
schoolteacher Ronald Hoppe’s employee records from another school district
where Hoppe once worked. The trial court
quashed the subpoena because it was overbroad in relation to the district’s administrative
proceeding to terminate Hoppe for improper sexual conduct with students. We agree and affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This
appeal arises from the Compton Unified
School District’s attempt to fire
teacher Ronald Hoppe based on allegations that he sexually molested several
schoolchildren. Hoppe was first tried on
criminal charges of two counts of lewd
conduct on minors under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288(a)) and one count of annoying
or molesting a minor (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)(1)), but the jury was
unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared in June 2010.
during that period, but once the mistrial was declared, and before the criminal
charges were refiled, the district decided to fire Hoppe under the
administrative procedures provided by Education Code section 44932, et seq.
In
December 2010, the district issued a subpoena to the Fontana
Unified School District,
where Hoppe used to work, seeking a wide variety of documents. These included: his employment application, resume, and notes
from his job interview; anything related to the job offer that was made to
Hoppe, along with anything Hoppe wrote in reply; documents that reflected his
job titles and duties, and compensation;
benefits for which he is eligible; reports, performance reviews,
evaluations, warnings, disciplinary notices, commendations, charts, data,
calendar entries, and/or diary entries that refer to Hoppe; all investigations
that refer to Hoppe; the complete contents of his personnel file; all releases,
including waivers of rights or claims, that refer to Hoppe or were signed by
him; any documents that reference Hoppe’s attendance records, including
vacation and sick days, and approved and unapproved absences; any payments to
Hoppe for any reason, including salary, compensation, commission, or bonuses;
any documents related to reasons for Hoppe’s termination or resignation; any
civil, administrative, or internal complaints that refer to Hoppe; and any settlement
terms, agreements, or memos of understanding that refer to Hoppe.
The
termination proceedings against Hoppe were subject to the administrative
procedures established by Education Code section 44932, et seq. The parties to such proceedings have the same
discovery rights as those allowed in ordinary civil actions pursuant to the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Educ. Code,
§ 44944, subd. (a)(1).)
Jurisdiction to hear discovery disputes in such proceedings is vested in
the superior court. (Educ. Code,
§ 44944, subd. (a)(2).) Hoppe
therefore brought a verified petition in superior court to quash the subpoena
on the ground that it was so overbroad that it unnecessarily violated his
privacy rights.
The
trial court agreed, and quashed the subpoena.
The district appealed, contending that the trial court erred.
DISCUSSION
1.
The
Subpoena Was Overbroad
Even
in the face of the serious charges against him, Hoppe has a constitutionally
protected privacy right in his employment
records. (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1250 [136 Cal.Rptr.3d 395] (Marken).) However, if items
in those records are directly relevant to, and essential to the fair resolution
of, the district’s dismissal, then those privacy rights give way if there is a
compelling and countervailing state interest.
(Lantz v. Superior Court
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1839, 1853-1854.)
Evidence of
similar past conduct by Hoppe certainly appears probative on the issues of
intent, design, or plan in regard to the current allegations of lewd
conduct. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd.
(b).) A factor that may also support the
district’s decision to dismiss Hoppe is whether he is unfit to teach, not just
because he might have committed lewd conduct on other students in the past, but
because he is also likely to do so again.
(Morrison v. State Board of
Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 229-230.) Given the egregious nature of the charges
brought against Hoppe, we conclude that the district clearly has a right to
discover items from the files of his previous employer that bear on this issue.
supra, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 416-417 [disclosure of school
district’s investigation of allegations that teacher sexually harassed student
was warranted under California public records act because public interest in
knowing how school district handled such matters outweighed teacher’s privacy
rights]; In re The Clergy Cases I
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1235-1236 [where sex abuse case settlement
called for public disclosure of offending priests’ employment files showing
treatment they received for pedophilia, the priests’ privacy rights were
outweighed by public’s right to know what that treatment was and whether it had
been effective].)
However, even when
a compelling interest permits discovery of records otherwise protected by the
right of privacy, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed. (Britt
v. Superior Court of San Diego County (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-864
[even plaintiffs could not be compelled to provide information about all their
political activities, or their entire medical histories, in action against
airport authority for harm allegedly caused by aircraft noise and air
pollution]; Life Technologies Corp. v.
Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652-653.)
As Hoppe suggested
below, records relating to allegations of misconduct by him, and their
resolution, appear to be within the proper scope of a subpoena in this case.
the district’s subpoena was overbroad.
For instance, items such as charts, calendars, data entries or diary
entries that “refer” to Hoppe, documents that “refer” to his attendance
records, including vacation and sick days, or documents that “refer” to any
payments made to Hoppe for any reason, appear to have little or no relevance,
and the district has offered no explanation why it believes such records are
discoverable. We therefore hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena. (Life
Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at
p. 649 [abuse of discretion standard governs our review].)
To sum up,
certainly some of the items sought by the district’s subpoena were proper. However, others appear outside the scope of
proper discovery in this case, and the district has offered no item-by-item
analytical breakdown in support of the numerous documents included within the
reach of the subpoena. Nor did the
district do so in the trial court.
Because the subpoena was overbroad, we need not define for the parties
or the trial court those documents that are properly discoverable and those
that are not. Instead, we offer our
comments concerning the documents that appear to fall into either category
solely for the guidance of the parties and the trial court should the district
issue another subpoena more closely tailored to fit the issues raised by its
dismissal proceeding. We also note that
in such cases, an in camera review of the documents by the trial court may be
proper before it determines whether disclosure is proper. (El
Dorado Savings & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1987)
190 Cal.App.3d 342, 346.)
2.
Hoppe’s
Employment Application Did Not Waive His Privacy Rights
In the Dismissal Proceeding
When Hoppe applied for his job with the district in July 2003, he signed
an application form that included a statement that the application “authorizes
the [district] to conduct a background investigation and authorizes release of
information” from various sources, including his previous employers. A “VERIFICATION OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT” form
that he submitted around the time of his August 2003 hiring by the district
included a statement that he gave permission for the district “to seek any and
all information from my previous employers and references.” The district contends these releases
continued to apply even when it began dismissal proceedings seven years later.
First, it appears
that the ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply when construing
provisions such as these (See Crab
Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 958, 972-973
[analyzing contract language of employees’ release forms concerning disclosure
of their contact information for class action lawsuit]; Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990)
218 Cal.App.3d 1, 25 [applying contract principles to jury’s implied
finding that employee did not consent to continued random drug testing as part
of job application]), but the district has cited no relevant authorities on
that issue and has made no effort to analyze the release terms under the
principles of contract law. We therefore
deem the issue waived. (
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.)
We alternatively
hold that the release authorizations do not apply here. Both were made in the context of Hoppe’s
initial employment application, and the language of the application itself
states that the release was made in connection with that application. It is unreasonable to construe that language
to give an employer the open-ended right to obtain an employee’s background
information throughout the term of his employment, sometimes years later.
The order quashing
the subpoena is affirmed. Respondent
shall recover his appellate costs.
RUBIN,
ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
FLIER,
J.
GRIMES,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">
jury was split evenly on two of the counts, and voted 7 to 5 in favor of
conviction on the other count.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The district has asked us to take judicial notice of the
trial court docket and felony complaint, which show that the criminal case was
later refiled and is still pending. (
No. TA116984.) We hereby grant that
request.
