Hill v. So. Cal. Edison Co.
Filed 5/10/13 Hill v. So. Cal. Edison Co. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SHIRLEY HILL,
Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
Defendant
and Respondent.
E054748
(Super.Ct.No.
CIVRS910480)
OPINION
APPEAL
from the Superior Court
of
Bernardino County. Ben
T. Kayashima, Judge. (Retired judge of
the San Bernardino Super. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.) Affirmed.
The
Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Law Offices of Stephen L. Belgum and Stephen
L. Belgum for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Long
& Delis, John A. Delis and Warren B. Campbell for Defendant and Respondent.
Shirley
Hill (Hill) sued Southern California Edison Company (SCE) and others for the
wrongful death of her adult son, James Bean (Son). The trial court found Hill lacked standing to
bring the wrongful death lawsuit because she was not financially dependent on
Son. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, subd.
(b).)
dismissed Hill’s complaint as it pertained to SCE. Hill contends the trial court erred by
entering summary judgment against her because she was financially dependent on
Son, and therefore had standing to bring her lawsuit. We affirm the judgment.
Hill
was born in April 1942. When she filed
her complaint in September 2009, she was 67 years old. In April 2009, Son was involved in a solar
panel construction project on a rooftop leased by SCE in Chino. While working on the rooftop, Son slipped and
fell through a skylight. Son fell 37
feet onto a concrete floor. Son died as
a result of the fall. Son is survived by
(1) his mother, Hill; (2) his son (Sheeler), (3) his two sisters, (4) two
brothers, and (5) his “common law†wife.
Sheeler also filed a wrongful death lawsuit concerning Son’s death.
In
1998, Hill was unemployed and going through a divorce. Hill moved into Son’s home and lived with him. A few months after moving into Son’s home,
Hill obtained a job working at a gas station.
Hill lived with Son and worked at the gas station until sometime in
2001. In 2002, Hill moved into the home
of her daughter, Rhonda Adams (Adams). Adams was employed as
a manager at a retail establishment.
Hill continues to reside with Adams.
In
2003, Hill obtained a job working at a movie theater. At the time of Son’s death, Hill was employed
as a supervisor at the movie theater.
Hill worked 40 hours per week and earned $9.75 per hour. Also at the time of Son’s death, Hill was
receiving $1,400 per month from social security for “widow’s benefits.†Hill received health coverage through
Medicare. Hill stopped driving in 2001
and did not have car expenses; she was able to walk to her job at the movie
theater.
Over
the years, Son gave Hill money or small gifts.
For example, Son would “buy [Hill] cigarettes.†Son also gave Hill a watch, a computer, and
perfume. “[A] couple of times†Son took
Hill out to restaurants for breakfast and dinner. “[T]wo or three times a month,†Son would
give Hill $20 to “$100 or more.†Hill
would use Son’s money for “living expenses,†such as the electricity bill and
to purchase clothes and shoes for work.
Hill was not expecting any money from Son at the time he died.
Son
worked on the solar panel project for two weeks before his death. Prior to those two weeks of employment, Son
had been unemployed for four months.
During those four months of unemployment Hill gave Son money for food
and rent “a couple of times.†Hill also
made “at least three or four payments of $500 on [Son’s] car.â€
In
February 2010, Hill’s lawsuit was consolidated with Sheeler’s lawsuit. On April
6, 2011, another defendant, Potter Roemer, LLC, filed a motion for
summary judgment against Hill. Potter
Roemer asserted Hill lacked standing to pursue the wrongful death claim. The following day, SCE joined in Potter
Roemer’s motion, asserting Hill lacked standing.
Hill
opposed the summary judgment motion.
Hill asserted she produced sufficient evidence to create a triable issue
of fact as to whether she was financially dependent on Son. Hill set forth the proposition that in order
to have standing she only needed to show she depended on Son for items such as
shelter, clothing, food, and medical treatment.
Hill reasoned that she met this burden by showing (1) she used Son’s
money to pay her electricity bill and buy clothes, and (2) Son took her to eat
at restaurants.
In
July 2011, Potter Roemer settled with Hill out of court. Potter Roemer agreed to pay Hill and Sheeler
$100,000 each for a release of all claims.
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the trial court stated it
believed the law required Hill to be financially dependent on Son at the time
of Son’s death, as opposed to some earlier time. The trial court acknowledged the standing
statute did not reflect any language concerning financial dependence at the
time of death, but the trial court gleaned the “at the time of death†rule from
case law. Hill’s trial attorney argued
the law did not support the “financial dependence at the time of death†rule
the trial court was applying in this case.
In
its written ruling, the trial court set forth the rule that Hill “must have
been actually dependent on the decedent, at least in part, for the ‘necessaries
of life,’ at the time of his death.
[Citations.]†The trial court
found Hill was not financially dependent on Son at the time of Son’s death
because (1) Hill did not live with Son; (2) Hill had a monthly income of
approximately $3,000; (3) Hill resided with Adams; (4) Hill did not drive a
car; (5) Hill had her own health insurance; and (6) for approximately four
months prior to Son’s death, Son was financially dependent on Hill. Thus, the trial court concluded Hill lacked
standing to pursue a wrongful death claim.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of SCE and dismissed
Hill’s complaint in its entirety as it pertained to SCE.
Hill
contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
SCE. We disagree.
“The
standard of review for an order granting or denying summary judgment is de
novo. [Citation.] We are not bound by the trial court’s stated
reasons for granting summary relief, as we review the trial court’s ruling, not
its rationale. [Citation.] In determining whether the parties have met
their respective burdens, we consider ‘all of the evidence the parties offered
in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded)
and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports.’ [Citation.]
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] as the
part[y] opposing summary judgment, strictly scrutinizing defendant[’s] evidence
in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff[’s]
favor. [Citation.]†(Dammann
v. Golden
Gate
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 335, 340-341.)
Section
377.60, subdivision (b), provides: “A
cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent’s
personal representative on their behalf:
[¶] . . . if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children
of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or parents.†“For purposes of this subdivision, dependence
refers to financial support,†as opposed to emotional support. (Chavez
v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445 (Chavez).)
“Financial
dependence generally presents a question of fact, which ‘should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.’
[Citation.] ‘No strict formula
can be applied nor did the Legislature suggest a formula[.]’ [Citation.]â€
(Chavez, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1445-1446.) Nevertheless, cases have provided guidance
for determining financial dependence. A
parent may be considered financially dependent when “‘at the time of a child’s
death, [the parent was] actually dependent, to some extent, upon the decedent
for the necessaries of life.’
[Citation.]†(
clothing, food and medical treatment, which one cannot and should not do
without.†(Ibid.)
A
parent will not be considered
financially dependent “‘if they receive financial support from their children
which merely makes available to them some of the niceties of life they might
not otherwise be able to afford.†(
A parent needs to show that the child’s death “‘results in a distinct
pecuniary loss to the parent which requires the parent to find aid elsewhere
for the basic things we all need.’
[Citation.]†(
The
evidence presented reflects Hill was financially dependent on Son from 1998
through sometime in 2001, when she lived with Son and did not pay any rent
while living with him; thus Son was providing Hill with shelter. The record does not reflect financial
dependence after 2001. The record shows
Son provided Hill with cigarettes, perfume, and a computer.
The
record further reflects Son gave Hill cash, which she used to purchase clothes
for work and pay an electrical bill or gas bill. Son also purchased restaurant meals for
Hill. While this evidence reflects Hill
took money from son to pay for necessities, it does not show financial
dependence. As set forth
needing the money the child provides, such that when the child dies the parent
suffers “‘a distinct pecuniary loss[,] which requires the parent to find aid
elsewhere for the basic things we all need.’
[Citation.]†(
Hill
may have used the money from Son to purchase necessities, but she has failed to
provide evidence reflecting she needed the money to make those payments and purchases. Hill testified she was not expecting any
money from Son at the time of his death.
Hill further testified she had been providing financial support to Son
for four months prior to his death, while he was unemployed. This evidence reflects Hill was financially
independent from Son—Hill may have accepted money from Son, but she did not
need that money. Hill has not shown “a
distinct pecuniary loss†due to Son’s death.
As Hill herself testified, she was not expecting any money from Son at
the time of his death. Thus, she did not
rely on Son for financial support in life—she was not expecting son to bring
her groceries or pay her utility expenses.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err, because Hill has
not provided evidence she was financially dependent on Son.
Hill
contends summary judgment was not properly granted because she only needed to
show she was financially dependent on Son “‘to some extent.’†Hill asserts she did not need to provide
evidence of “total and complete financial dependence.†We agree Hill does not need to show she is
completely dependent on Son, but she needed to provide some evidence his death
created a distinct pecuniary loss that would require her to seek financial aid
from another person for basic life necessities.
(Chavez, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446.)
Hill did not meet this burden.
Hill’s own testimony reflects she was not expecting any money from Son
at the time of his death. Thus, there
cannot be any financial loss requiring Hill to seek money or aid from another
person, and there has been no showing of financial dependence to any
extent—Hill appears to be financially independent.
In
addition, Hill cites Chavez for the
proposition a parent can earn a paycheck but still be financially dependent on
a child. In Chavez, the deceased adult child lived with his parents. (Chavez,
supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p.
1436.) The child paid his parents $100
per week to defray the parents’ cost of housing and utilities, he also provided
groceries and grocery money, cleaned windows, maintained the parents’ four
vehicles, performed yard work, helped pay for the parents’ truck, and
occasionally worked for his father’s cleaning business when his father was
shorthanded. (Id. at p. 1447.) The
respondent in Chavez argued the
parents’ income was sufficient to sustain them without the child’s
assistance. The appellate court
disagreed with the respondent, finding the parents had greatly relied on the
adult child for financial support in 1994—the child died in 1996. (Id.
at pp. 1436, 1447.) Thus, the appellate
court concluded there was evidence reflecting the parents needed the child’s
money to defray their own living expenses.
(Id. at pp. 1447-1448.)
Hill
asserts the Chavez case is useful
because it shows there does not need to be complete financial dependence. We do not find the Chavez case to be persuasive because Hill was last dependent on Son
in 2001—eight years before his death—and in the interim, Hill had financially
supported Son so he could afford necessities.
In Chavez, the son was
actively paying rent and providing groceries to his parents—here we have the
opposite. Hill was paying Son’s rent and
car payment, and had no expectation of receiving money from Son at the time of
his death. The record in the instant
case reflects Hill was financially independent from Son.
While
Hill has shown she accepted money from Son, she has not shown she was
financially dependent on him in the eight years before his death.
Hill
asserts she did not need to show she was financially dependent on Son at the
time of his death. Hill contends it is
sufficient she showed she was financially dependent on Son “prior to his
death.†We infer Hill is asserting the
evidence reflects she was dependent on Son prior to his four-month period of
unemployment. As explained
been dependent on Son since 2001. Hill
does not appear to be asserting the standing statute should reach back eight
years in order to afford a person standing, thus, we find the “at the time of
death†argument to be unpersuasive.
Also,
Hill asserts standing is a threshold issue that should not require a rigorous
evidentiary showing. Hill’s argument is
not persuasive because she has not presented any evidence that she was financially
dependent on Son in the eight years prior to his death—she has only shown that
she took money from Son, not that she required it. Thus, assuming Hill is correct and a very
minimal level of evidence is required to satisfy the standing issue, she has
still failed to meet that minimal level.
Hill
argues that the four months of financial support she gave to Son prior to his
death should not limit Hill’s standing because when Son was employed he
consistently provided financial support to Hill. Hill asserts SCE is taking advantage of this
four-month window to create an “unjustified windfall†to SCE. Hill appears to mistakenly be asserting that
the four-month window, in and of itself, is preventing her from obtaining
standing, but this is not the case.
The
evidence of Hill financially supporting Son reflects Hill’s financial
independence. This evidence shows Hill
accepted money from son, but did not need
or require the money to pay for the
necessities of life. In other words, the
evidence helps to show Hill was not going to suffer a distinct pecuniary loss
requiring her to find aid elsewhere for the basic things we all need after
Son’s death, because Hill did not need Son’s support even when he was alive—his
support may have been nice, but it was not necessary. (Chavez,
testimony she was not expecting any money from Son at the time of his
death. Hill does not lack standing
solely because there was a four-month gap in Son’s long history of giving money
to Hill; rather, there is nothing reflecting Hill required money from Son for
the last eight years of his life, and the “four month evidence†compounds this
by reflecting Hill was, without a doubt, financially independent from Son.
Hill
asserts the evidence she financially supported Son does not show she is
financially independent as there is nothing in the record indicating Hill did
not sacrifice her own necessities in order to support Son. This argument is not persuasive because if
Hill had evidence she had to sacrifice her own necessities in order to support
Son then she should have presented that evidence. (Garibay
v. Hemmat (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 735, 741 [after defendant meets its burden
on motion for summary judgment, burden shifts to plaintiff to establish triable
issue of fact exists].) Speculation
about whether Hill had to make sacrifices to support Son will not support
reversal of a judgment. (
Cal.App.4th 654, 657 [reversal not warranted where plaintiff’s evidence “raises
nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjectureâ€].)
Hill
argues the evidence supports an inference that when she grew too old to work,
then Son would have provided her with financial support and “more substantial
financial contributions.†Hill’s
argument is not persuasive because the statutory language reflects the phrase
“were dependent on the decedentâ€â€”it does not contemplate future financial
dependence as a means of obtaining standing.
(§ 377.60, subd. (b).)
Moreover, Hill’s argument is problematic because it would require the
court to speculate that she will live to an age when she is unable to work;
speculation is not evidence. (
735.)
Lastly,
Hill asserts the trial court erred by judging the witnesses’ credibility,
weighing the evidence, and resolving issues of fact. Hill highlights the trial court’s comment
that the declarations submitted in support of Hill’s case were “cookie
cutter-type†declarations. Hill’s
argument is not persuasive, because the trial court’s comment was merely an
explanation of why it concluded Hill failed to meet her burden of
production—why she failed to establish a triable issue of fact existed. (Garibay
v. Hemmat, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th
at p. 741 [after defendant meets its burden on motion for summary judgment,
burden shifts to plaintiff to establish triable issue of fact exists].)
The
judgment is affirmed. Respondent is
awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RICHLI
Acting P. J.
KING
J.
subsequent statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
