Filed 2/23/18 G.W. v. Superior Court CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



G.W.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,

Respondent;

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.


E069601

(Super.Ct.No. J265283)

OPINION


ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Annemarie Pace, Judge. Petition denied.
Margaret K. Hogenson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, Michael A. Markel, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner G.W. (Father) has filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, claiming that the juvenile court erred at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 hearing in finding that returning A.W. (Minor) to Father’s care would be detrimental and that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) provided reasonable services. For the reasons set forth below, we deny Father’s writ petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2016, CFS received a referral that Minor’s mother (Mother) was surrendering her daughter—“Baby Girl 007,” later identified as Minor—under the Safe Haven Law. At a detention hearing on May 4, 2016, the juvenile court detained Minor and gave CFS authority to place Minor in a concurrent planning home. At the time, Father’s identify was unknown. The next day, on May 5, Mother called the social worker and told the social worker that she had spoken with Father; Mother wanted Minor to be with Father and the paternal grandmother (PGM).
On May 6, 2016, Mother and Father came to the social worker’s office. Mother stated that she wanted Minor to be cared for by PGM. One hour after the meeting ended, PGM called the social worker to ask why Father did not come home with Minor. After the social worker explained the juvenile court process, PGM told the social worker that Father was under PGM’s care as a Board and Care recipient, and received Social Security Income. PGM also explained that Father was diagnosed as being developmentally delayed and unable to care for himself. When Father turned 18, he was placed in PGM’s care by the Department of Behavior Health due to his mental health issues.
On May 9, 2016, Father and PGM met with the social worker. At the meeting, PGM clarified that Father was diagnosed with mental health issues when he was either seven or eight years old. She reported that Father had developmental delays that affect his ability to read, manage money, and live independently. When asked if Father could care for Minor on his own, PGM responded, “he is not mature enough and one day he might be ready.” Regarding herself, PGM reported that she received Social Security income due to health issues that arose in 2009. She also reported that she had a mental breakdown and was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and severe anxiety. She was under the care of a psychiatrist and was prescribed Zypraxa. Regarding criminal history, PGM indicated that Father admitted to fondling a family member in 2004. PGM stated that she encouraged Father to plead guilty to avoid a lengthy court process. Father was placed in juvenile hall and served one year on probation.
On May 25, 2016, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Father appeared in court and the court appointed him counsel, appointed a guardian ad litem, and ordered a paternity test. The court then continued the matter to June 23, 2016.
On June 22, 2016, CFS filed an amended petition, alleging that: (1) Father had diminished mental capacity, which severely impacted his ability to provide care and supervision of Minor, which placed Minor at substantial risk of harm and/or death; and (2) Father was unable to provide for his own basic needs, which severely impacted his ability to provide appropriate care and supervision of Minor, which placed Minor at substantial risk of harm and/or death.
In addition to the amended petition, the social worker also filed an addendum to the jurisdiction/disposition report. The social worker believed the prognosis for Minor reunifying with Father was poor. Nonetheless, the social worker recommended reunification services as Father was established to be Minor’s biological Father. The social worker indicated that Father, in order to reunify, would need to complete a parenting program, life skills training, and participate in a mental health exam to determine his diagnosis. The case plan included a psychiatric/psychological evaluation, general counseling, and a parenting education class. The report noted that Father had a number of extended family members who were willing to assist Father in caring for Minor.
Father set the matter for short cause and the juvenile court continued the hearing to July 7, 2016. On that date, Father’s counsel argued that the allegations should not be found true because Father did not believe Minor would be at risk in his care. Counsel also stated that she had reviewed the case plan and Father was willing to participate in reunification services. Regarding “any sort of interactive parenting” that is required or “more extensive hands-on training,” counsel requested that the referral be given sooner rather than later. The court made the findings and orders, and set the six-month hearing for January 9, 2017.
The six-month review report indicated that Father had completed his psychological evaluation as well as a parenting class. In addition, Father was regularly visiting Minor. Father submitted on the recommendation of an additional six months of services and the four hours a week visitation. Father also requested that the social worker be authorized to initiate one-hour unsupervised visits per week in addition to the four hours of supervised visits. No additional services were suggested or ordered for Father.
The psychological evaluation, which was completed on August 12, 2016, concluded that Father had both distinct cognitive and functional deficits that would make it difficult for him to parent a child. The psychologist noted that Father had never lived independently and was never left alone for more than five hours. The psychologist also concluded that Father could provide minimal care for a child if directed, but only for a limited time. The psychologist further indicated that even PGM recognized that Father does not have the ability to care for an infant or an older child on his own. The psychologist concluded that Father does not have the skills and cognitive ability to parent a child on his own. If Father “is left to care for [Minor] solely by himself, with no outside assistance, it is opined that the risk to Minor would be great.”
The 12-month review report filed for the June 16, 2017, hearing indicated that Father had completed his parenting class and CFS was providing transportation assistance for Father to participate in visitation with Minor. The social worker noted that Father continued to live with PGM and had no plans to move out. The social worker also noted that Father had an extensive support system but that she was unable to speak to any of the extended family members. Furthermore, the social worker noted that due to PGM’s mental issues, PGM had been referred for a psychological evaluation. After the parties submitted, the juvenile court set two court dates: (1) July 16, 2017, for the receipt of the 12-month review report; and (2) July 30, 2017, for the 12-month review hearing.
On June 16, 2017, the juvenile court indicated that it had signed the order that allowed father to have Minor’s birth certificate reissued, which established Minor’s name as A.W. Minor’s attorney indicated that she had spoken to the parties to determine how to proceed with the case. She stated: “Well, I talked to all parties this morning about, sort of, where we’re going with the case, because based on the psychological evaluation and Dad’s limitations and—I don’t see how we’re ever going to do family maintenance with Dad. [¶] He is not his own [Social Security income] payee. He can’t—per [PGM], he can’t be left alone for very many hours. So returning full custody to him just really doesn’t seem like a good plan.” Minor’s counsel then suggested putting the case over to see about establishing a guardianship with PGM.
In response, counsel for CFS indicated that a guardianship was problematic because PGM could not be assessed while Father was living in her home and without approval under the Resource Family Approval Program (RFA); PGM would receive no funding for Minor because of Father’s criminal history. Father’s counsel suggested that they either confirm the July 30 date for the 12-month review hearing, or make the finding and orders that day, and then set an appearance review in 90 days. Counsel also requested “that the Court consider ordering PCIT [parent-child interaction therapy] for the family, so that Grandmother and Father, maybe, can work together to see what his abilities are to parent [Minor] on his own. And PCIT will allow a parenting coach, of sorts, to watch Dad, to see how he does on his own, to make a better assessment whether family maintenance is going to be an option in this case.”
Counsel for CFS stated that he would call the social worker, and that PCIT sounded like a good idea. He stated, “I’ll call her and see if that’s a possibility, given the circumstances of this case. [¶] Usually PCIT requires where the child—the parents almost getting the child back, but I think that might help. Although, to be frank, looking at the psychological evaluation, I think that any benefit would be somewhat limited, and it wouldn’t all of sudden lead to family maintenance, but it might be helpful at some point in the future.” In response, Father’s counsel agreed, and stated: “I think as an assessment, tool more than anything. I mean, eventually I would anticipate if there is family maintenance recommendation, that there would be some kind of Wrap services in place, that that could happen. I mean, I don’t think that could happen without that. I mean there would need to be a lot of services continued to be in place at that point in time.”
Minor’s counsel then pointed out that Wrap services were not available to Father; Wrap services are for Minor based on a diagnosis by Inland Regional Center (IRC). Minor’s counsel noted that Father would need adult services through IRC but was unaware whether Father was an IRC client. When asked by the juvenile court whether counsel would object to continuing services and the court ordering PCIT, Minor’s counsel responded: “I guess my only comment is, yes, I have an objection to continuing services, because I don’t see the point of where we’re going. We have a psych eval that says he cannot do this. And we have a grandmother that hopefully can, but we need a psychological evaluation back to show that everything is fine, because of Dad’s psychologist that has the worries about grandma.” Minor’s counsel went on to state: “So I’m not very inclined to agree with overnights at grandma’s house with the psychological evaluation pending. It’s a lot of ‘in the air,’ when we seem like we’re going to end up with the exact same issue. [¶] I want Dad to keep getting help, that’s the only reason I say I’m just objecting. I don’t’ think PCIT is going to hurt him, and it will help during that hour that he is by himself with the child, if he has that.”
After listening to the parties, the juvenile court adopted the findings and orders, and reiterated the order for PGM to undergo a psychological evaluation. The court also ordered PCIT, if available.
The status review report filed on October 20, 2017, indicated that Minor was referred to SART services through a Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) in order for Father to receive PCIT. The report also indicated that an assessment of Minor was completed on October 2, 2017, and that at the time of the report, PCIT had not been initiated. The social worker signed the report on October 2, and her supervisor signed the report on October 4.
The report went on to summarize the “current family circumstances.” With regard to PGM, the social worker reported that due to PGM’s history, PGM’s home could not be approved for placement of Minor. PGM was (1) arrested for battery on a peace officer/emergency personnel and loud/unreasonable noise, and served 30 days in jail and was sentenced to 36 months of probation; (2) was arrested for obstruction/resisting an officer with no disposition; (3) arrested for a warrant misdemeanor; (4) arrested for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse; (5) arrested twice for battery for with no disposition; (6) arrested for battery which was dismissed due to furtherance of justice; (7) convicted and served 45 days in jail with 36 months of probation for another battery arrest. Although PGM’s criminal history made it unlikely she could receive RFA approval, the fact that Father failed to move out of her home prevented the social worker from starting the assessment process of PGM.
In light of these issues, the social worker spoke to PGM regarding other family members Father could reside with. PGM thought Father could reside with his sister. The social worker noted, however, that there had been no attempts by other family members to assist Father with his living situation. The social worker then asked PGM about IRC but she indicated that Father was going to begin “Rolling Start,” which was a program that assists with money management, job-seeking skills, housing and adult education. Although the social worker noted that the program would be beneficial for Father, it would not assist him in caring for Minor.
Under the “detriment and prognosis of returning children home” section of the report, the social worker again referred to Father’s psychological evaluation and the conclusion that Father lacked the capacity to safely and effectively care for Minor, and if Minor were left in Father’s care without assistance, the risk to Minor would be great. Regarding PGM and her psychological evaluation, the social worker was concerned because she vacillated between her belief that Father could care for Minor on his own and her belief that Father would be unable to care for Minor. Regardless of her doubts, PGM stated that she intended to leave Minor alone in Father’s care: “[PGM] was asked if [Father were] awarded custody of the child[,] who would do the primary parenting of Minor and take care of most of Minor’s needs and she responded, ‘Well I’m gonna help him but like I told him he gotta do his part and he said he would.’ She was asked what ‘his part’ would entail and she responded, ‘Well he have to watch her, keep her, feed her while I’m gone. We would shift back and forth.’ ”
In addition to the foregoing, the social worker pointed out that Minor had been placed in her current foster home since she was two weeks old. As of October 2016, Minor was 16 months of age. During this time, Minor formed a strong bond and attachment to the foster family. The social worker opined that it “would be detrimental to her developmental milestones and possibly her ability to attachment, if removed from her foster family. It is not in the best interest of [Minor] to disrupt her from the only family she has known.”
On October 30, 2017, the initial date for the 18-month review hearing, Father set the matter for trial as the recommendation was to terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court set a trial date of December 5, 2017. At the trial, no other evidence other than the October 20 status review report and attachments were submitted into evidence. During closing arguments, Father’s counsel noted that Father was receiving eight hours of visitation per week—seven hours supervised by PGM and one hour unsupervised. Regarding visitation, Father’s counsel stated: “We are asking, at a minimum, that irrespective of what the Court does today, that the Court have that visitation stay the same.” Father’s counsel went on to state that Father would like Minor “placed with him with the paternal grandma.” Counsel stated that Father believed that with his support system, he could meet the needs of Minor. Father disagreed with termination of his services and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing.
After hearing from all the attorneys, the juvenile court asked Father’s counsel if the court were to consider offering Father more services, what services would she suggest. Counsel responded: “As reflected in the report, Father was going to be referred to PCIT and that referral didn’t go through. That was, like, October—the end of October; I don’t remember the exact date. And that never started. And I think that is a huge—would be hugely important because that’s the interactive therapy where someone is watching him interact and giving him directive, et cetera.”
Later in the hearing, Father’s counsel argued: “But I do think—the Court doesn’t have to take my word for it. I think if we see through PCIT and we have a professional involved and observing Father with the minor, that’s the most telling, because I think that’s also lacking from Dr. Brody’s assessment. He didn’t see them interacting. [¶] And while a person could have cognitive deficits, I just feel that there’s more that we can do. And that interactive, watching the child with Father together, is going to be hugely telling to see whether or not he can do this. And I think having a professional do it, versus Grandma telling the Court, would also be significant.”
Thereafter, the parties discussed the fact that Minor had to be referred to SART by SELPA for her own assessment before Father could be referred to PCIT, and that the initial assessment of Minor was not completed until October 2, 2017. The parties also discussed the extended family members and the need for assessments. The juvenile court was surprised, however, regarding the need for relative assessments. When the court indicated that it was surprised how relative assessments were being discussed at this late juncture, counsel for CFS reminded the court that the only extended family member that requested to be assessed was the paternal great-grandmother. The request came while the great-grandmother was caring for a sick relative in New Orleans, and she did not know when she would be returning to California. Although she considered caring for Minor, she was not willing to commit to anything.
The juvenile court then ruled as follows:
“Unfortunately this is a really kind of a sad case. [Father’s counsel] is right. This isn’t the typical case by any stretch that we see. And I believe that the Father is loving and wants to be a good Father. I just—in light of all the services that have been provided and the psychological evaluation, I just don’t think that he has the ability to be an independent parent with this child. And his main source of support is not able to have the child placed with her.
“And I don’t think that PCIT would change any of those issues. So, unfortunately, I’m going to have to follow the recommendation of [CFS], I just don’t know what services [CFS] can provide to change this situation.
“So I will adopt the findings and orders and set the matter April 4th for a .26 hearing.”
The juvenile court then advised Father of his writ rights. On January 16, 2018, Father filed his writ.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that Minor should be returned to Father because the “evidence did not support that custody by father continues to be detrimental to [Minor]” and because “CFS failed to provide reasonable services.” For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and deny Father’s writ.
A. RELEVANT LAW
Section 366.22, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “After considering the admissible and relevant evidence, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.”
“Appellate justices review a respondent court’s decision after a section 366.22 ruling as follows: ‘Evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding “must be ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’ ” [Citation.] “Where, as here, a discretionary power is inherently or by express statute vested in the trial judge, his or her exercise of that wide discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] In the presence of substantial evidence, appellate justices are without the power to reweigh conflicting evidence and alter a dependency court determination.” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.) In other words, this court “[does] not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT’S FINDING OF DETRIMENT
Father argues that the juvenile court committed reversible error in determining that it would be detrimental to return Minor to Father’s care. We disagree and find that the court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, the social worker noted in her 18-month review report that Father completed his court-ordered case plan. During this time, he received eight hours of visitation per week—seven hours were supervised by PGM and one hour was unsupervised. The social worker then quoted the psychologist who stated that if Father “ ‘is left to care for [Minor] solely by himself, with no outside assistance, it is opined that the risk to [Minor] would be great.’ ” The psychologist noted that Father “ ‘does not have the capacity to safely and effectively care for his child.’ ” The psychologist further opined that Father could provide minimal care for Minor if directed. But, even then, only for a limited time. The psychologist concluded that Father’s cognitive abilities were severely compromised and his deficits were found to be across all cognitive domains. According to the psychologist, Father might be able to learn minimal, basic information; however, it would take a great deal of time and patience. Father’s comprehension and problem-solving abilities were likewise severely impaired.
In this case, there was substantial evidence of the risk of requisite detriment if Minor were returned to Father. The evidence showed that Father did not have the ability to care for Minor. First, even Father admitted that he “would not be able to care for [Minor] and would prefer to have his mother around,” when the psychologist asked Father if he would be able to take care of Minor. The psychologist reported that “[a]s we discussed the topic further [Father] stated it would be hard to care of [Minor].” The psychologist concluded that Father “can provide minimal care for a child if directed; but only for a limited time. [PGM] said [Father] does watch his six year old cousin for a few hours but she also stated she would not feel comfortable leaving [Father] alone with [Minor] for multiple days. Babysitting a child for a few hours is much different than the rigors of raising a child on a daily basis.” The psychologist went on to state that Father “does not have the skills and cognitive ability to parent a child on his own. He said the ideal situation would be for him to have [Minor] with his mother and/or sisters there to assist. If [Father] is left to care for [Minor] solely by himself, with no outside assistance, it is opined that the risk to [Minor] would be great. [Father] does not have the capacity to safely and effectively care for his child.”
Moreover, PGM could not be approved for placement because, not only did she have a criminal record, but Father was living in her home, which precluded the grandmother from even being assessed for placement. Had Father moved out of his mother’s home, then PGM could have been assessed to determine whether a criminal exemption was possible or appropriate. If PGM had been approved, Minor could have been placed in her care; thereafter, Father could have moved into the home after PGM assured the juvenile court that Father would not be left alone with Minor for any length of time. However, during the 18 months of court hearings, Father never moved out of PGM’s home to allow for the evaluation process to start.
In addition to the above, the circumstances of this case give rise to several other considerations that a court may take into account at a section 366.26 hearing, including: (1) the detriment caused by severing a positive and loving relationship with a caregiver; (2) instability in terms of the management of the home; (3) limited awareness of the physical and emotional needs of the child; and (4) whether minor has not lived with a parent for a long period of time. (See In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 418-419; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212; In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141-1142; In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 915; Constance K. v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 704.) In this case, all these factors are present: (1) Father has limited awareness of the physical and emotional needs of Minor; (2) Father lives with PGM who has not been cleared to have Minor in her care; (3) Minor has never resided with Father; and (4) Minor has bonded with foster parents, who are also the prospective adoptive parents and the only real parents Minor has known.
Based on information as set forth ante, the juvenile court had substantial evidence of detriment—detriment to the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of Minor. The evidence showed that Minor could not be placed in Father’s care without receiving supervision; and the only person offered up for this role, PGM, never took the necessary steps to be approved for placement.
C. REASONABLE SERVICES WERE PROVIDED TO FATHER
For the first time on appeal, Father contends that “reasonable services were not provided because of the failure to refer father to life skills courses, refer father and the minor to PCIT within the 18 months of services, and lastly due to the departments [sic] inability to take the time to craft a safety plan.”
As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to “the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) A family reunification plan must be designed to eliminate the conditions that led to juvenile court jurisdiction, specifically tailored to fit the unique circumstances of the offending parent and put the family on notice as to what must be accomplished to reunite the family. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)
The reasonableness of reunification services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case and assessed by its two components—content and implementation. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.) “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) To be reasonable, the services provided need not be perfect. “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The mere fact more services could have been provided does not render the efforts of CFS unreasonable. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 973.) A parent who consents to the terms of a reunification plan waives any right to complain on appeal about the reasonableness of the plan. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476; In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 231.)
“In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘If there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of a juvenile court, a reviewing court is without power to weigh or evaluate the findings.’ ” (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1361-1362.)
Preliminarily, as argued by CFS, Father waived his right to argue the adequacy of the reunification plan by failing to raise the issue in the juvenile court. A parent must object in the juvenile court that he or she believes the services offered were inadequate or waive his or her right to raise the issue on appeal. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Because Father never informed the court he believed the services he was offered were inadequate, he has waived his right to make that argument on appeal.
1. VISITATION
Father contends that “the limitations on Father’s visits were not liberalized and should have been at a minimum longer supervised visits and ‘unreasonably foreclose[d] family reunification.’ ” We disagree.
At the hearing, Father’s counsel acknowledged the appropriateness of the visitation order. His counsel argued, “We are asking, at a minimum, that irrespective of what the Court does today, that the Court have that visitation stay the same.” Later at the same proceeding, Father’s counsel requested that the court modify the recommended findings and orders regarding visitation: “Would the Court modify the visitation order so that Father can still get the eight hours per week?” (Italics added.) Such requests by Father’s counsel acknowledged the appropriateness and reasonableness of the court’s visitation order.
Moreover, not only did the evidence show that Father never requested additional visitation, it showed that Father failed to engage with Minor during the visitation that he had with her. The social worker noted that “[F]ather does not generally come to get his daughter or return her following the visits. He does not seem very motivated to attempt to care for his daughter during visits as noted on one occasion, the undersigned went to the home unannounced and [Father] was in his room sleeping, while [PGM] cared for her. On a second unannounced visit, [PGM] had taken [Minor] to a family member’s home and [Father] did not take part in the family visit.”
2. REFERRAL TO LIFE SKILLS COURSE
Father contends that he “was not provided reasonable services as he never received the life skills training CFS identified as necessary for Father to have his daughter returned to his care.” We disagree with Father.
During the course of the dependency hearing, Father never argued that it was unreasonable for CFS not to have provided Father with a referral to a life skills course. Although the social worker did refer Father to life skills training, it was never made a component of Father’s reunification plan. Father, also, never objected to the absence of this component from his service plan or the absence of a referral.
At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court asked Father’s counsel, “if the court were to consider giving Father more services, what services would you suggest that would put us in a different position?” Counsel suggested the possibility of PCIT, but failed to request services of life skills training.
3. REFERRAL TO PCIT
Father contends that the “lack of a referral to PCIT was unreasonable.”
At the 12-month hearing on June 16, 2017, the juvenile court made the following statement: “I’ll order PCIT, if available.” The court made the condition, “if available,” because PCIT was normally only available if the case had progressed to the point that return was highly likely. Moreover, it was pointed out that the benefits of PCIT would be limited in light of the psychological report, but could be helpful at some time in the future. In response, Father’s counsel stated, “I think as an assessment tool, more than anything.” The court then asked Minor’s counsel, who objected to continuing Father’s services, whether she would object to continuing services and adding the PCIT component to Father’s case plan. Minor’s counsel responded: “I guess my only comment is, yes, I have an objection to continuing services, because I don’t see the point of where we’re going. We have a pysch eval that says [Father] cannot do this.”
After the 12-month hearing, the social worker indicated in the 18-month review report dated October 2, 2017, that Minor “was referred to SART services through SELPA, in order for [Father], to receive PCIT. An assessment on [Minor] was completed on October 2, 2017. At the time of this writing, PCIT has not been initiated.”
At the 18-month review hearing on December 5, 2017, Father’s counsel did not object to the timeliness of the referral and only discussed PCIT at the court’s prompting, noting that the referral did not go through in October and she believed that PCIT was significant to the case. Father’s counsel noted: “And I think that is a huge—would be hugely important because that’s the interactive therapy where someone is watching him interact and giving him directive, et cetera.” The juvenile court responded, “I just—in light of all the services that have been provided and the psychological evaluation, I just don’t think that he has the ability to be an independent parent with this child. And his main source of support is not able to have [Minor] placed with her. . . . [¶] And I don’t think that PCIT would change any of those issues. So, unfortunately, I’m going to have to follow the recommendation of [CFS]. I just don’t know what services [CFS] can provide to change this situation.”
In sum, PCIT would have had little or no benefit in light of Father’s cognitive deficits. Under the totality of the circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s finding that Father had received reasonable services.
4. CREATION OF A SAFETY PLAN
Father contends that “CFS failed to investigate the creation of a safety plan.” Again, Father failed to raise any objections below. At the 18-month review hearing, Father argued that CFS should have assessed relatives other than PGM. CFS, however, indicated that no relatives had asked to be assessed. The juvenile court also stated, “Okay. Because I’m wondering why we’re at a .22 and now only hearing about relative assessments. Because there’s no need to move [Minor].”
Father’s counsel responded that according to PGM, relatives had asked to be assessed. When Father’s counsel was pressed for the names of the relatives, she could only name paternal great-grandmother. Counsel for CFS reminded the juvenile court that when the social worker attempted to assess paternal great-grandmother, she was in New Orleans caring for a sick relative, and stated, “Once I return to California, which is unknown, I will consider caring for [Minor]. But will not commit to anything at this point.” Counsel for CFS reiterated that, as the status report noted, no other relative came forward to be assessed.
Thereafter, Father’s counsel did not argue that services were unreasonable because CFS failed to assess paternal great-grandmother or any other relative. In fact, the objection that services were unreasonable was never made at any point in the proceeding. Therefore, this issue is not only without merit, but Father forfeited the argument for appeal.
For the reasons set forth above, Father’s writ petition is denied.
DISPOSITION
The writ petition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



MILLER
J.


We concur:


McKINSTER
Acting P. J.


FIELDS
J.