Gustafson v. Jones

Filed 5/26/06  Gustafson v. Jones CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b).  This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

            Carrie Gustafson appeals from a judgment in which the trial court rejected her causes of action arising out of a failed real estate deal.  In the action below, Gustafson alleged that Charlissa Jones breached a contract formed after Gustafson timely accepted a counteroffer to purchase Jones's house.  On appeal, Gustafson contends the trial court erred by requiring her to introduce evidence of facts admitted in the pleadings and by making findings contrary to admitted facts.  She also claims she and Jones entered into a valid and enforceable contract when she timely accepted Jones's counteroffer.  We affirm the judgment.

Factual And Procedural Background

            Typically, in an appeal after trial, we would begin by summarizing relevant evidence introduced at trial before addressing an appellant's legal contentions.  Here, however, Gustafson presented very little evidence at trial, choosing instead to rely on the allegations of her complaint.  Because the evidence Gustafson offered at trial does not provide a context sufficient to understand the disputed issues, we start by discussing the pertinent allegations in her complaint.

            1.            Complaint

            Gustafson, acting in propria persona, filed a 24-page complaint with 53 pages of exhibits on September 26, 2003.  The complaint contains a lengthy narrative of Gustafson's search for a house in West Oakland, including her dealings with Jones, Jones's real estate agent, and the agent's lawyer.  As relevant here, Gustafson alleged she contacted Jones's real estate agent, Denise Smith, to schedule an appointment to see Jones's house, which was listed for sale by Smith.  The asking price was $269,000.  Before submitting an offer for the property, Gustafson asked Smith whether an offer must be submitted on a California Association of Realtors (CAR) form.  Gustafson alleged she was told that an offer on a form derived from Miller & Starr's California Real Estate Forms would be satisfactory. 

            On August 14, 2003, Gustafson delivered an offer to Smith based on a Miller & Starr form, offering a total purchase price of $260,930.  In a cover letter accompanying the offer, Gustafson explained that her offering price was the asking price with one qualification.  The qualification was that Gustafson had deducted 3 percent from the asking price, purportedly to account for the fact she was representing herself in the transaction.  She wrote that â€