Glaser v. Meserve
Filed 4/11/13 Glaser v. Meserve CA2/2
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
PAUL MICHAEL GLASER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
PAMELA MESERVE,
Defendant and Appellant.
B240385
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. SS021888)
APPEAL from
an order of the Superior Court
of
County. Lisa Hart Cole,
Judge. Affirmed.
Winston & Strawn, Marcus T.
Hall, Craig C. Crockett; Novak Druce Connolly Bove + Quigg and Marcus T. Hall
for Defendant and Appellant.
No
appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * *
Plaintiff
and respondent Paul Michael Glaser (Glaser) sought and obtained a six-month
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6
Meserve. When the order expired and
appellant resumed her harassment, Glaser sought and obtained a three-year
injunction and appellant appealed the second order.
We
affirm. Substantial evidence supported
the issuance of the order under section 527.6. Moreover, the trial court imposed no verbal
limitations on the written order and the order’s firearms restrictions do not
violate the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Parties and Their Relationship.
Glaser was an actor on the 1970’s
television show Starsky and Hutch.
Following the show, he became a director and later an author.
Sometime in
2000, appellant approached Glaser to see if he was interested in a Web site she
had developed for him, and he agreed that she could maintain it. Over time, he communicated with her about the
Web site, seeking her assistance in handling fan mail. She also began sending gifts to Glaser. Appellant was living in the Boston
area and Glaser thanked her for the gifts by telephone, thinking of her as a
passionate fan.
In 2008,
appellant flew to London to see
Glaser in a play and attended over 20 performances. Also in 2008, appellant moved from Boston
to the same Venice neighborhood to
which Glaser had recently relocated. She
constantly appeared in front of his apartment, and though Glaser’s children
questioned her behavior, Glaser tried to remain friendly with her.
At about the same time, Glaser
decided to self-publish his first book, Chrystallia,
and asked appellant for her assistance.
As early as 2007, appellant had been providing Glaser with editorial
comments on the book. Glaser offered to
compensate appellant for her time on publishing, and according to appellant,
she was to receive five percent of the royalties generated from book
sales. According to Glaser, after
working with appellant for approximately six to nine months, he realized that
his self-publishing efforts were not going to work. He retained professionals, who after two
meetings with appellant said they would be unable to work with her, as her
behavior disturbed them. Glaser terminated
her, but told her he would compensate her for her time once the book made a
profit.
Appellant
continued to contact Glaser and his friends and colleagues, and ultimately
moved in with Glaser’s next-door neighbor.
She would sit on the stairs opposite Glaser’s kitchen door while working
on her computer. And at some point she
lived only in her car, parked near Glaser’s home.
By early
2011, Glaser’s e-mail communications to appellant were focused on efforts to
get control of the Web sites that she had been managing, offering to pay her
for the rights, while appellant’s e-mails were focused on efforts to mend the
parties’ relationship.
Restraining Order.
Glaser applied for a civil
harassment restraining order on April
15, 2011. He sought the
order on the grounds appellant had been continuously lurking near his home,
following him and excessively e-mailing him.
In an attached letter submitted in support of the application, Glaser
explained that appellant “exhibits both a rational and very irrational side and
has continued to impose herself on me and my life despite my requests for her
to desist.†Appellant objected to the
application and wrote a letter to the court in opposition, attaching two
letters of recommendation from Glaser and a number of e-mail exchanges between
Glaser and her.
At a May 5, 2011 hearing, Glaser
testified about his concerns with appellant’s behavior, explaining that after
he terminated her, she kept showing up in his neighborhood and approaching
visitors to his home, sometimes leaving notes on their cars and sometimes
pleading her case in person. He was also
concerned that appellant had moved into the apartment just behind his, despite
his requests to stay away. He stated
that although appellant had not made any threats that would lead him to fear
for his physical safety, he did fear for his safety as a result of her
irrational behavior. The trial court
issued a restraining order, effective for six months. The order required appellant to refrain from
harassing, threatening, following or stalking Glaser, and directed that she not
contact him by telephone, message, mail or e-mail. The order further required her to stay at
least 20 feet away from Glaser and his home and vehicle. It also contained provisions preventing
appellant from owning, possessing or purchasing a firearm, and requiring her to
turn in any firearm in her possession or control. Appellant did not challenge the order on
appeal.
Second Restraining Order.
While the first restraining order
was in effect, appellant contacted Glaser’s business associates about postings
on Glaser’s Web site. Once the order
expired, she immediately began contacting Glaser via e-mail; she expressed
concern about certain Internet postings but primarily expressed her desire to
reconcile with him. For example, part of
a January 2012 e-mail stated: “Do we
have to wait until our next life to really see that we are here right NOW, in
this moment for each other? (read:
friendship . . . learning/teaching . . . etc.)â€
Glaser applied for a second civil
harassment restraining order on January
25, 2012. He asserted that appellant
had resumed calling him and e-mailing him constantly; that she walked where he
was walking, sometimes circling back just to interact with him; and that she
blogged on his Facebook and Twitter accounts, representing herself as his
“liaison.†He attached some of her
recent e-mails. He sought a three-year
restraining order and asked that appellant be ordered to keep at least 100
yards away from him, his family and certain business colleagues.
Appellant objected to the order and
denied that there was a factual basis for it.
She attached copies of many e-mail exchanges—most between her and Glaser
during 2007 and 2009, as well as copies of her marketing plan for
Appellant and Glaser testified at a
February 8, 2012
hearing. At that point, appellant still
lived in Glaser’s neighborhood in an apartment about 400 yards from his
apartment. Glaser testified that
although he asked appellant to leave him alone, “she continues to call me,
e-mail me, repeating, repeating constantly to read the e-mails. It’s kind of bizarre. It’s like, you know, ‘I’ll never stop. I’ll never stop e-mailing you no matter what. And I will do this because this is my
calling. This is what I’m about.’†Appellant offered various explanations for
each time she contacted or attempted to contact Glaser and his family and
friends. She denied she was pursuing
him.
At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court issued a three-year restraining order. It commented that appellant had contacted
Glaser excessively, even after he asked her not to, and it understood why
Glaser was concerned. The trial court
stated to appellant: “Even though you
yourself may not appreciate how your conduct appears to others, I will tell you
from an objective point of view, it appears excessive. And I am concerned with the fact that you
specifically started when the first restraining order ended and you stopped as
soon as you were served with this. So
even though you say you can control yourself, I’m not confident that you can.â€
The trial court declined to issue
the restraining order in favor of any third parties in the absence of any
direct evidence from them. It explained
the scope of the order to appellant, describing how the order prevented her from
contacting Glaser directly or indirectly, either in person, by telephone, by
any electronic communication or through social media. It limited the order to a 25-yard distance,
explaining to appellant: “You are ordered
to stay 25 yards away from him. And you
obviously can walk on your street. But
if you see him, you’re not allowed to approach him. You need to turn in the other direction. And if your goal is exercise for you and the
dogs, then I’m sure you’ll appreciate that this is not a cumbersome thing to
do. You are not to be walking in front
of his house over and over. You can pass
it once. But you can’t repeatedly hang
around within 25 yards of him or his home, his job, or his workplace, or his
car, or his vehicle. This does not
prevent you from going to or from your home or place of employment. And that will be the extent of the order.â€
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the
restraining order on the grounds it was not supported by substantial evidence,
it failed to include certain limitations ordered by the trial court and its
firearms restrictions violated the Second
Amendment. Each challenge lacks
merit.
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the
Restraining Order Entered by the Trial Court.
A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review.
Section 527.6
authorizes a natural person who has suffered “harassment†to obtain a
restraining order and injunction prohibiting further
was designed to supplement existing law by providing an expedited procedure to
harassment victims and was “enacted to protect the individual’s right to pursue
safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California
Constitution. [Citations.]†(Grant
v. Clampitt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 586, 591.)
Subdivision
(b)(3) of section 527.6 defines “harassment†as “unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional
distress to the petitioner.†Subdivision
(b)(1) defines “course of conduct†as “a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose, including following or stalking an individual, . . . or
sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means
. . . .†(§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(1).)
After
the party sought to be enjoined has had notice and an opportunity to respond to
a petition seeking an injunction, the trial court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to receive relevant testimony “and may make an independent
inquiry.†(§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “If the judge finds by
clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an injunction
shall issue prohibiting the harassment.â€
(Ibid.)
On appeal
from an injunction prohibiting harassment under section 527.6,
“we review the evidence before the trial court in accordance with the customary
rules of appellate review. We resolve
all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing
party and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the
finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial
evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.†(Schild
v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762; accord, USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 436,
444.) The substantial evidence rule
applies without regard to the standard of proof required at trial. In other words, the standard of review
remains substantial evidence even if the standard below is clear and convincing
evidence.
title="">[2] (See Crail
v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750; In
re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 345; In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580–581.)
B. The Evidence Satisfied the Statutory
Requirements Necessary for an Injunction.
In order to support the issuance of
an injunction, Glaser was required to show that appellant had engaged in a
course of conduct constituting harassment that would both cause a reasonable
person and actually caused him to suffer substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
Here, the evidence showed appellant
had engaged in a course of conduct that both annoyed and harassed Glaser, and
served no legitimate purpose. Even
assuming that appellant had a legitimate basis to contact Glaser while she was
working with him on his book, the evidence showed that by January 2011 the
parties no longer had a working relationship.
Nonetheless, appellant continued to e-mail and call Glaser, to walk by
his home and to approach him in person, even though he told her he wanted nothing
to do with her. There was sufficient
evidence to show that her contact had no legitimate purpose. For example, in a January 2011 e-mail
appellant wrote: “I am NOT letting
GO. I AM NOT forget[t]ing and I will not
let YOU forget either . . . no sir . . . no more
BS from you. I LOVED YOU. It is not a terrible thing!†In April 2011 appellant wrote: “I loved you Paul . . . I
trusted and believed everything, every word you shared and promised me
. . . I can’t let go or forget that. Why can’t you understand this? I need to know why!†And after the first restraining order
expired, appellant wrote in a January 2012 e-mail, “Paul
. . . don’t you think that maybe fate brought us together? Or maybe in our next life, when we meet
again, we will really know that the reason we ARE here IS to help each other
. . . to appreciate the gift of each other, what we can learn
from each other and teach [each] other with open kindness, understanding and
compassion . . . .â€
The evidence was likewise
sufficient to show that appellant’s harassment would cause a reasonable person
to suffer substantial emotional distress.
Appellant’s conduct was akin to that of the defendant in
181. There, the court found substantial
evidence supported the conclusion
that a reasonable person would have suffered substantial emotional distress as
a result of the defendant’s unwanted contacts with the plaintiff spanning
almost one year. (Id. at p. 189.) The
defendant, a former patient of the plaintiff therapist, engaged in conduct
including confronting the plaintiff at a local market, posting negative
consumer reviews on the Internet and distributing flyers with disparaging
messages about the plaintiff, and engaging in volunteer activities at the plaintiff’s
children’s schools. (
Glaser, appellant similarly blogged on Glaser’s Facebook and Twitter Web sites,
contacted his children and volunteered for a foundation he founded on behalf of
his deceased wife. Correspondingly, this
evidence supported the
conclusion that Glaser had suffered substantial emotional distress. (See Ensworth
v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110–1111
[“the record contains
sufficient evidence of Mullvain’s harassment of Ensworth to allow the trial
court to draw the conclusion that Ensworth indeed had suffered substantial
emotional distressâ€].)
Appellant
summarily contends that her conduct did not amount to actionable harassment,
citing a series of cases she characterizes as involving conduct more egregious
than hers. (See, e.g.,
1055, 1057 [evidence of harassment included the defendant’s threatening
violence and a lawsuit, falsely accusing the plaintiff of having AIDS and threatening
the plaintiff’s family members]; Elster
v. Friedman (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1441 [evidence of harassment
included the defendants’ disturbing the plaintiffs by playing excessively loud
music, making meritless complaints to animal regulation officials, parking in
unauthorized spaces and stealing the plaintiffs’ bicycles].) But the only way in which appellant has been
able to draw a distinction between her conduct and the harassment involved in
the foregoing cases is by reciting the evidence in a light most favorable to
her position. She ignores the
well-established principle that “[a] reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below.
[Citation.]†(
Cal.App.3d 475, 482.) Properly viewed,
evidence concerning appellant’s consistent, repeated and unwanted contact of
Glaser showed a continuing course of harassment.
Appellant next contends
there was insufficient evidence to show that her actions caused substantial
emotional distress, either objectively or subjectively. “[E]motional distress†is generally understood to include,
among other emotions, fright, nervousness, anxiety, humiliation and worry. (See Thing
v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 648–649.)
“Section 527.6 does not define the phrase ‘substantial emotional distress.’ However, in the analogous context of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase ‘
means highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable
conduct’ [citation], which entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial
emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should
be expected to endure it.’ [Citations.]†(Schild
v. Rubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 762–763.)
Expressly stating that it considered appellant’s conduct
from an “objective†point of view, the trial court explained to appellant that
she had “really gone overboard and beyond the pale. And I understand why Mr. Glaser is concerned.â€
Substantial evidence supported
the trial court’s conclusion that Glaser should not have been expected to
endure appellant’s excessive and accusatory e-mails, unwanted personal contact
and irrational behavior. We reject
appellant’s contention that Brekke v.
Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400 shows Glaser’s evidence was
insufficient. There, the defendant, a
teenage boy, wrote a series of “vile
and vitriolic letters†to his girlfriend, the plaintiff’s teenage daughter,
that included significant profanity and threats of violence directed toward the
plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 1405–1406, 1413.)
The court concluded that “[w]ithout
doubt, defendant’s socially unacceptable course of conduct would have seriously
alarmed, annoyed, or harassed a reasonable person, and would have caused a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.†(Id.
at p. 1414.) While appellant’s
e-mails were not as profane or threatening as the letters in
what has been held inadequate to cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress. For
example, in Schild v. Rubin, supra,
232 Cal.App.3d at page 763, the court held that the objective standard was not
satisfied by evidence that noise created by neighboring children playing
basketball for up to 30 minutes in their backyard interrupted the plaintiffs’
weekend naps “and, in general, interfered with their ability to rest and relax
in their own home.†(
playing found to cause only “transitory emotional distress [as] the natural
consequence of living among other people in an urban or suburban environment†(
“socially unacceptable course of conduct†found to cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress (Brekke v. Wills, supra, at p. 1414).
Substantial evidence also showed
that Glaser suffered substantial emotional distress. Evidence satisfying the subjective prong of
section 527.6 may be
circumstantial. (Ensworth v. Mullvain, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1110–1111.) In upholding an
injunction under section 527.6, the Ensworth court rejected the proposition that
direct testimony is required to establish that a plaintiff actually suffered
substantial emotional distress; it found sufficient the plaintiff’s testimony
that the defendant followed and spied on her, repeatedly drove around her
house, made numerous phone calls and sent threatening letters, and contacted
other professionals in the community in an effort to harm the plaintiff’s
reputation. (Ensworth v. Mullvain, supra, at
pp. 1108, 1110–1111.) Here, in
addition to testifying about evidence of appellant’s conduct, Glaser testified
at the first hearing that he had gotten to the point where he could not control
or manage appellant’s behavior and that, because of her irrational behavior, “I
fear for my safety.†At the
second hearing, he reiterated that he did not believe appellant was able to
stop herself from contacting him, and he felt as if he were being pursued. He worried that if appellant was incessantly
e-mailing, calling and approaching him, he did not know whether she was capable
of more. Any further evidence on the
point would have been cumulative. (
direct testimony concerning emotional distress would have been cumulative in
view of testimony about the defendant’s conduct and declaratory evidence that
the plaintiff suffered
emotional distress].)
Appellant lastly argues that there was insufficient
evidence of a threat of continued harassing conduct warranting the
injunction against potential future misconduct.
(See Russell v. Douvan (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 399, 401 [“a
prohibitory injunction necessarily addresses future conductâ€];
Cal.App.4th 324, 332 [injunctive relief should not “be exercised in the absence
of any evidence establishing the reasonable probability the acts will be
repeated in the futureâ€].) Here, the
evidence plainly showed and the trial court expressly found that appellant’s
behavior was likely to continue in the absence of an injunction. Appellant immediately resumed her harassment
of Glaser when the first injunction expired. Toward the end of the hearing, when
appellant was objecting to the issuance of the injunction, the trial court
repeatedly pointed out that appellant had demonstrated she was unable to
control herself in the absence of a court order. In one comment, the trial court stated: “I’m satisfied based on the evidence that I’ve
seen, specifically the extensive number of e-mails that you’ve sent that stop
specifically when the notice of this restraining order was given. I really don’t think you can control
yourself.†There was substantial
evidence that the injunction was reasonably necessary to address future
conduct.
C. The Injunction Did Not Contain Any
“Softening Limitations.â€
At the end of the hearing, the
trial court explained to appellant some of things she could and could not do
under the injunction. It explained that
the 25-yard distance would permit appellant to walk her dogs and pass by
Glaser’s home. On the other hand, she
would not be allowed to loiter in front of Glaser’s home or any other place he
might frequent, or to approach him should she encounter him on the street.
Appellant attempts to characterize
the trial court’s comments as “softening limitations†on the injunction,
erroneously excluded from the order itself.
We decline to consider the trial court’s comments as anything more than
a description of the order that was entered, requiring appellant to stay 25
yards away from Glaser.
Cal.App.4th 1443 is instructive. There,
the court rejected efforts to give significance to comments the trial court
made when denying a preliminary injunction, reasoning: “Because
we review the correctness of the order, and not the court’s reasons, we will
not consider the court’s oral comments or use them to undermine the order
ultimately entered. [Citations.] Here, where the trial court was not required
to prepare a statement of decision or explain its reasons for denying the
injunction, it is especially important to refrain from using the court’s oral
comments as a basis for reversal.†(
Construing the trial court’s comments as limiting the scope
of the injunction would serve to undermine the trial court’s order. Glaser sought an order that appellant stay
100 yards away from him and his family members and business associates. The trial court entered a much narrower order,
requiring that appellant stay 25 yards from Glaser only. Its comments indicated that the 25-yard
distance would enable appellant to continue to walk on her street and to
otherwise travel to and from her home or workplace. Interpreting the trial court’s comments as a
basis for modifying its written order “would in effect require the trial court either to prepare a
statement of decision where none is required or to say nothing during argument
to avoid creating grounds for impeaching the final order. We decline to place the trial courts in such
an untenable position.†(
II. Appellant Waived Any
Constitutional Challenge to the Firearms Restrictions by Not Raising the Issue
Below, and, in Any Event, Her Challenge Lacks Merit.
Though appellant did
not challenge the injunction on this basis in the trial court, she now contends
that the injunction’s firearms restrictions violate the Second Amendment to the
United States Constitution. As a threshold
matter, we conclude that she waived the issue by failing to raise it
below. “‘“Typically,
constitutional issues not raised in earlier civil
proceedings are waived on appeal.â€â€™
[Citations.]†(
Cal.App.4th 240, 254; accord, Hepner v.
Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 [“In civil cases,
constitutional questions not raised in the trial court are considered waivedâ€];
In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
728, 735 [explaining that appellate courts ordinarily do not consider matter
raised for the first time on appeal, including constitutional issues].
constitutional challenge as a question of law and exercise our discretion to
consider it (see Bayside Timber Co. v.
Board of Supervisors (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1, 5), we would find no Second
Amendment violation.
Anyone subject to an injunction under section 527.6 is
subject to mandatory firearms restrictions which prevent the enjoined person
from purchasing, owning or possessing a firearm and requiring that person to
relinquish any firearms then owned or possessed. (§ 527.6, subds. (t)(1) & (t)(2).)
that her right to bear arms under the Second Amendment is infringed on by these
restrictions.
The Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: “A well regulated
militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.†In
U.S. 570 (Heller), the United States
Supreme Court struck down Washington D.C.’s ban on handgun registration on the
ground that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess
firearms. (See also McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) __ U.S. __ [130 S.Ct. 3020,
3026] [finding the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller “is fully
applicable to the Statesâ€].) Though
appellant argues that her right to possess firearms should be similarly
protected, we disagree.
“Although
it struck down the District of Columbia handguns ban, Heller recognized
and affirmed certain traditional limitations on the right to bear arms,†and
“identified an expressly nonexclusive list of ‘presumptively lawful
regulatory measures,’ stating ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions [a]nd qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’ [Citations].â€
(People v. Delacy (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487–1488, italics added [upholding constitutionality of Pen.
Code, § 12021, subd. (c)(1), which prohibits possession of firearms by persons
convicted of specified misdemeanors].)
We
construe the firearms restrictions in section 527.6 as “analogous to a
prohibition on felon weapon possession, a type of restriction expressly listed
by Heller as untouched by its holding.â€
(People v. Delacy, supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) We are also
guided by the myriad cases applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to uphold
Title 18 United States Code section 922(g)(8), a statute which criminalizes
possession of firearms and ammunition by persons subject to a domestic violence
injunction. (E.g., United States v. Mahin (4th Cir. 2012) 668 F.3d 119, 123–125
[collecting cases]; U.S. v. Lippman (8th
Cir. 2004) 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 [“No circuit court which has addressed the question has found
§ 922(g)(8) unconstitutional under the Second Amendmentâ€].) As
explained in U.S. v. Emerson (5th
Cir. 2001) 270 F.3d 203, 261, while “the Second Amendment does protect
individual rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be made
subject to any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions
for particular cases that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of
Americans generally to individually keep and bear their private arms as
historically understood in this country.â€
Accordingly, were we to reach the issue, we
would conclude that the firearms restrictions in section 527.6 do not run afoul
of the Second Amendment.
DISPOSITION
The civil harassment restraining order is
affirmed. Parties to bear their own
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
FERNS
We concur:
____________________________,
P. J.
BOREN
____________________________,
J.
CHAVEZ
otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
reject appellant’s assertion–renewed at oral argument–that a de novo standard
of review applies here. In view of the
disputed evidence and the conflicting inferences to be drawn therefrom, we
review the trial court’s order for substantial evidence. (See R.D.
v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181,
193–194.)
