Garcia v. Jacobs Engineering Group







Filed 9/23/11 Garcia v. Jacobs Engineering Group CA2/1





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JOSE GARCIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B227492 (Super. Ct. No. GC044375)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Joseph F. De Vanon, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
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The Homampour Law Firm and Arash Homampour for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Haight Brown & Bonesteel and Rita Gunasekaran for Defendants and Respondents.
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Jose Garcia appeals from the judgment dismissing his tort suit after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The court agreed with defendants that all of the claims alleged in Garcia’s second amended complaint are barred by the so-called firefighter’s rule. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Garcia is a sheriff’s deputy employed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the Department). The Department provides policing and security services at East Los Angeles College pursuant to a contract between the Department and the Los Angeles Community College District.
On the date in question, Garcia was working for the Department at East Los Angeles College. A backhoe excavating a construction site at the college ruptured a gas line, and Garcia assisted in evacuating the area. He alleges that in the process, he “was seriously injured when he became exposed to toxic fumes” from the gas leak that was caused by the rupture.
Garcia filed suit against several entities that were allegedly involved in the construction project, claiming negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. He then filed a first amended complaint, naming the Southern California Gas Company as an additional defendant and adding certain allegations concerning defendants’ conduct.
Defendants demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing that all of Garcia’s claims were barred by the firefighter’s rule. Defendants then stipulated to take the hearing off calendar and to allow Garcia to file a second amended complaint. The court entered an order to that effect, and Garcia filed a second amended complaint.
Defendants again demurred on the basis of the firefighter’s rule, and the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Garcia timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a judgment entered after a demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we “must assume the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations” and “must also consider judicially noticed matters,” and “we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.)
DISCUSSION
Garcia argues on three grounds that the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the second amended complaint on the basis of the firefighter’s rule.^[1] We find none of Garcia’s arguments persuasive.
“Under the firefighter’s rule, a member of the public who negligently starts a fire owes no duty of care to assure that the firefighter who is summoned to combat the fire is not injured thereby. [Citations.] Nor does a member of the public whose conduct precipitates the intervention of a police officer owe a duty of care to the officer with respect to the original negligence that caused the officer’s intervention. [Citations.]” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 538; see generally 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, §§ 845-859.)
The firefighter’s rule applies straightforwardly here. The ruptured gas line, which was allegedly caused by defendants’ negligence, caused Garcia to intervene by assisting in the evacuation of the area, and it also allegedly caused his injuries. Defendants therefore are not liable for Garcia’s injuries.
Garcia’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. First, he argues that the firefighter’s rule does not apply because a gas leak was not “the [t]ype of [r]isk [u]sually [d]ealt with by [Garcia].” (Bold and underlining omitted.) (“[A] gas leak was not the type of hazard inherent nor reasonably incidental to [Garcia’s] occupation.” We disagree. Assisting in an evacuation necessitated by some sort of public safety emergency is an ordinary part of the duties of a deputy sheriff, and assisting in such an evacuation necessarily exposes the deputy to the dangers inherent in the emergency that precipitated the evacuation. The cases Garcia cites do not stand for the proposition that the specific type of emergency—a gas leak, a fallen power line, a crashed aircraft, etc.—must itself be a “type of risk usually dealt with by” deputy sheriffs. Garcia cites no authority for that proposition, and we have found none. We accordingly reject his first argument.
Second, Garcia argues that the firefighter’s rule does not apply because he “was already present at the scene working as a private security officer,” so the rupturing of the gas line “was an act independent from those which necessitated [his] presence.” The argument relies upon the following exception to the firefighter’s rule: If the plaintiff’s injuries are caused by tortious conduct independent of the conduct that required the officer to intervene, then the firefighter’s rule does not shield the tortfeasor from liability. (See 6 Witkin, supra, Torts, §§ 855-856.) The exception does not apply here, however, because Garcia was responding to the emergency created by the ruptured gas line and was assisting in the consequent evacuation. It is irrelevant that the ruptured gas line did not cause Garcia to be stationed at East Los Angeles College, and it would likewise not matter if he was already present at the construction site when the rupture occurred. The rupture was nonetheless “the original negligence that caused the officer’s intervention” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538), namely, Garcia’s assistance with the evacuation.
Third, Garcia argues in his opening brief that the Department’s contract with the Los Angeles Community College District rendered him a “private safety employee[],” not a public safety officer, so the firefighter’s rule does not apply. Garcia concedes in his reply brief, however, that the argument lacks merit.
Fourth and finally, Garcia argues that his claims are covered by subdivision (a)(2) of Civil Code section 1714.9, a statutory exception to the firefighter’s rule. We disagree. The exception applies only if “the conduct causing injury was itself not the event that precipitated either the response or presence of the [plaintiff].” (Civ. Code, § 1714.9, subd. (a)(2).) As we have explained, the conduct that injured Garcia was the event that precipitated his response, so the exception does not apply.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Garcia has not shown that the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ demurrer to the second amended complaint.^[2] We therefore affirm the judgment of dismissal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.


ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.


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