F.V. v. City of >Anaheim>

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 6/24/13  F.V. v. City of Anaheim CA4/3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT

 

DIVISION THREE

 

 
>

F.E.V., a Minor, etc., et al.,         Plaintiffs and Appellants,               v.   CITY OF ANAHEIM et al.,         Defendants and Respondents.

G046937            (Super. Ct. No. 30-2011-00499175)            O P I N I O N

 

                        Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Orange
County, Gregory Munoz, Judge.  Affirmed.

                        Law Offices of Dale K.
Galipo, Dale K. Galipo and Melanie T. Partow for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

                        Cristina L. Talley, City
Attorney, and Moses W. Johnson IV, Assistant
City Attorney, for Defendants and
Respondents.

*               
*                *

>I.

>Introduction

The
dispositive issue in this case is whether, under principles of collateral
estoppel, a judgment in a federal lawsuit on href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">federal civil rights claims based on
police conduct bars state law claims brought in state court based on the same
conduct.  We conclude collateral estoppel
bars the state court lawsuit.

Adolf
Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez (Decedent) was shot and killed in an incident with two
Anaheim police officers.  His mother and minor daughter (by and through
her guardian ad litem, David Vazquez) filed a complaint in federal court (the
Federal Complaint) against the City of Anaheim
and the two officers.  The Federal
Complaint asserted civil rights claims under 42 United States Code
section 1983 and five state law claims. 
The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the civil rights claims and concluded the police officers did not
use excessive force, act unreasonably, engage in conduct that shocked the
conscience, or engage in conduct amounting to an independent violation of the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  The federal court declined
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed
them without prejudice.

Decedent’s
mother and minor daughter (by and through the same guardian ad litem)
(collectively, Plaintiffs) then filed a complaint in superior court (the State
Complaint) against the City of Anaheim
and the two police officers (collectively, Defendants).  The State Complaint reasserted the five state
law claims dismissed without prejudice by the federal court.  Defendants demurred to the State Complaint on
the ground of collateral estoppel.  The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the
State Complaint.  Plaintiffs appeal.

We
affirm.  After we held oral argument in
this matter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the
federal court judgment.  (>Gonzalez v. City of >Anaheim> (9th Cir., May 13, 2013, No. 11‑56360) 2013
U.S.App. Lexis 9607.)  On our own motion,
we take judicial notice of this opinion. 
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (d), 459,
subd. (a).)  In Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 506 (>Hernandez), the California Supreme Court
held, under similar facts, that a federal court judgment adjudicating federal
civil rights claims collaterally estopped the plaintiffs in that case from
pursuing their state court wrongful death claim, including on the theory that
the officers’ conduct before the shooting was negligent.  Likewise here, the federal court judgment
collaterally estops Plaintiffs from pursuing their state law causes of action
based on both the shooting and on theory the officers’ conduct before the
shooting was negligent.

> 

>II.

>Allegations,
Facts, and Procedural History

A.  Allegations of the Federal
Complaint

In
the Federal Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted four claims for violation of civil
rights pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 and state law claims
for false arrest/false imprisonment, battery, negligence, and violation of the
Bane Act.  The four civil rights claims
were (1) unreasonable search and seizure—detention and arrest;
(2) unreasonable search and seizure and due process—excessive force and
denial of medical care; (3) substantive due process; and
(4) municipal liability for unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy.

The
Federal Complaint’s allegations were barebones: 
On September 25, 2009,
Decedent was driving his car near the intersection of Santa
Ana Street and Bond
Street in the City of Anaheim.  Decedent had not committed any crime, and
Anaheim Police Officers Daron Wyatt and Matthew Ellis had neither reasonable
suspicion to detain Decedent nor probable cause to arrest him.  Officer Wyatt “discharged a firearm at the Decedent,
striking him in the head, causing Decedent serious physical injury and
eventually killing him.”  (Some
capitalization omitted.)  Finally, the
Federal Complaint alleged Decedent was unarmed and posed no imminent threat of
death or serious physical injury to the officers. 

>B.  Summary Judgment in Federal Court

The
United States District Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of
the federal civil rights claims.  In an
order entered July 11, 2011,
the district court provided this factual background:

“On September 25, 2009, at
approximately 2 a.m.,
Defendant Officers Ellis and Wyatt were en route to a service call regarding a
sleeping transient.  While the Defendant
Officers were waiting at a red light to turn left, a Mazda MPV van stopped in
the left turn lane next to them.  When
the signal turned green and the Defendant Officers were turning left, the Mazda
veered into their lane, causing Officer Ellis to brake aggressively to avoid a
collision.  The Mazda then turned into a
gas station at the corner.  The Defendant
Officers continued to their service call regarding the transient, but were
unable to locate him. 

“Subsequently,
the Officers returned to the same intersection in an attempt to locate the
Mazda, and found the van at the same gas station where it had stopped earlier.  The Officers parked on the street so they
could observe the Mazda.  Officer Ellis
saw a male enter the Mazda and drive away. 
The Officers then followed the Mazda to see if any law enforcement
action would be necessary, and observed the van weaving within its own traffic
lane. 

“At
2:11 a.m., Officer Wyatt advised over the police radio that he and Officer
Ellis intended to make a traffic stop, and activated the patrol unit’s
emergency lights.  The Mazda then made a
right turn onto another street, where it drove to the left of the center of the
roadway, and eventually stopped at the curb. 
As the van was turning, Officer Wyatt saw the driver reaching down
towards the right side of the driver’s seat and leaning over with his right
hand extended, as if he was picking something up.  When Officer Wyatt got out of the police
vehicle and approached the Mazda van, the driver was still in the same
position, but also looking over his left shoulder as if waiting for Officer Ellis
to approach the vehicle.  Officer Wyatt
then drew his gun, pointed it at the driver, and said, ‘if you reach down there
again I’m gonna shoot you.’  When Officer
Ellis approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, he saw that the driver’s
right hand was clenched into a fist and appeared to be holding something in a
plastic bag.  Officer Ellis told the
driver to turn off the vehicle and show his hands.  Both Defendant Officers could see the
driver’s hands in his lap area, but he still had not opened his right
fist.  Officer Wyatt then reached through
the partially open window on the passenger side of the van and unlocked the
passenger side door.  He again told the
driver to open his hand.  When the driver
still did not comply, Officer Wyatt reached inside the vehicle and struck the
driver with his flashlight three times across the right elbow or tricep, using
a backhand motion.  The driver then
raised his right fist toward his mouth and moved his left hand in the area
between the door and the seat. 

“Officer
Ellis tried to open the driver’s door, but it was locked, so he reached through
the window on the driver’s side to unlock the door.  Officer Ellis asserts that he then reached
through the window and inside the vehicle, reaching around the back of the driver’s
head with his right arm, while attempting to control the driver’s right hand.
Officer Wyatt testified in his deposition that he believed Officer Ellis was
applying a carotid restraint on the driver. 
Officer Wyatt then backed out of the vehicle and requested assistance
over the police radio.  Officer Ellis
told the driver to turn off the engine and give him his hand.  The driver did not respond to either of the
Officers’ commands and tried to push the Officers away.  Officer Wyatt did not see the driver’s hands
make contact with Officer Ellis while he was being held in a head
restraint.  However, Officer Wyatt
believed the driver was trying to strike Officer Ellis.  Officer Wyatt then entered the van,
putting both knees on the passenger seat, and punched the driver five to six
times on his head and face. 

“While
Officer Ellis was restraining the driver, the driver reached toward the van’s
steering column gear shift.  Officer
Ellis believed the driver was attempting to shift the van into a driving gear,
so he struck the driver on the back of the head with his flashlight.  Nevertheless, the driver managed to reach
forward toward the gear shift, ‘slap’ it into a driving gear, and step on the
gas pedal.  Because Officer Ellis feared
that he would be pulled forward with the van, he pulled himself out of the
driver’s side window and struck the driver as he was withdrawing from the
vehicle. 

“Officer
Wyatt, who was still in the van with the driver, yelled at the driver to
stop.  The driver did not comply.  Officer Wyatt then tried to knock the gear
shift into neutral or park two to three times, but the driver batted his hand
away each time.  The driver drove while
alternating his hands between the steering wheel and the areas on the side of
his seat; he did not have both hands on the steering wheel at the same
time.  Officer Wyatt yelled at the driver
to stop, but the driver did not comply. 
Officer Wyatt then drew his gun and fatally shot the driver in the head.  The van had traveled approximately 50 feet in
the span of 10 seconds, which is equivalent to less than 5 miles per
hour.” 

In
granting summary judgment on the civil rights claim based on excessive force,
the district court stated:  “Officer
Wyatt did not use excessive force when he struck the decedent’s arm with a
flashlight in an attempt to get the decedent to open his right hand.  Both Officers Ellis and Wyatt tried multiple
times to gain the decedent’s compliance without the use of force.  They ordered the decedent several times to
open his hand, but each time, the decedent refused to comply with their orders,
keeping his fist clenched.  Given the
decedent’s consistent failure to comply with the Officers’ orders, Officer
Wyatt had legitimate concerns that the decedent might have either a weapon or contraband
in his fist.  As such, it was reasonable
for him to use some level of force to gain compliance from the decedent.”  The district court concluded that “even
assuming that Officer Ellis used a carotid restraint on the decedent, such use
of force was reasonable under the circumstances.”  In addition, the district court concluded,
“even considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
Court finds that Officer Wyatt acted reasonably under the circumstances when he
shot the decedent in the head after ordering the decedent to stop the car and
trying to stop the car himself several times.” 


The
district court also stated:  “Plaintiffs
argue that because the Officers acted recklessly and negligently before the
shooting, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that they provoked the deadly
force situation and should therefore be liable. 
However, the Ninth Circuit has held that ‘the fact that an officer
negligently gets himself into a dangerous situation will not make it
unreasonable for him to use force to defend himself.’  [Citation.] 
‘Thus, even if an officer negligently provokes a violent response, that
negligent act will not transform an otherwise reasonable subsequent use of
force into a Fourth Amendment violation.’ 
[Citation.]  As discussed above,
none of the Officers’ actions prior to the shooting constituted an independent
Fourth Amendment violation.  As such,
Plaintiffs’ argument is not persuasive.” 


On
the substantive due process claim, the district court found that Officers Wyatt
and Ellis were forced to make “split‑second decisions” in an “emergency
situation” requiring “immediate reaction.” 
Although Decedent was unarmed, the officers’ conduct did not “shock the
conscience,” the standard for a substantive due process claim, because the
officers reasonably reacted to a perceived or an imminent threat to their
safety.

Defendants
also moved for summary judgment of the state law claims.  The district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without
prejudice. 

On
May 13, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its unpublished
opinion affirming the federal court judgment. 
(Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, >supra, 2013 U.S.App. Lexis 9607.)

>C. 
Allegations of the State Complaint

Following
the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims, Plaintiffs filed the
State Complaint, which asserted causes of action for (1) false
arrest/false imprisonment, (2) battery, (3) negligence,
(4) wrongful death, and (5) violation of the Bane Act. 

The
State Complaint overlaps the Federal Complaint but provides more detail.  The State Complaint alleged the following:

On
September 25, 2009, Decedent was driving his car near the intersection of
Santa Ana Street and Bond Street in the City of Anaheim.  Anaheim Police Officers Daron Wyatt and
Matthew Ellis ordered Decedent to stop. 
Decedent had committed no crime and the officers did not have cause to
stop Decedent.  Both officers approached
Decedent’s car.  Officer Ellis placed
Decedent in a carotid restraint, and Officer Wyatt struck him in the arms and
head with a flashlight and punched him in the face.  Decedent never hit, punched, kicked, or
threatened either police officer. 
Officer Wyatt then got into Decedent’s car and fired a gun at Decedent’s
head from six inches away.  Decedent
suffered serious physical injuries and later died.  Decedent was unarmed. 

>D.  Demurrer

Defendants
demurred to the State Complaint on the ground the federal court judgment
collaterally estopped Plaintiffs from pursuing their state law causes of
action.  The trial court granted
Defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of the Federal Complaint, the
district court’s order granting summary judgment, and the judgment on the
Federal Complaint.

The
trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, on the
following ground:  “All five causes of
action asserted in this action require a determination as to whether Officers
Wyatt and Ellis acted reasonably under the circumstances.  This issue has already been litigated and
decided in [the federal court action].”

> 

>III.

The Requirements of Collateral
Estoppel

Are Satisfied.

>A. 
Threshold Requirements

“‘Collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior
proceedings.  [Citation.]  Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine
only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled.  First, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.  Second, this issue must have been actually
litigated in the former proceeding. 
Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former
proceeding.  Fourth, the decision in the
former proceeding must be final and on the merits.  Finally, the party against whom preclusion is
sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding. [Citations.]’ 
[Citation.]”  (>Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 511.) 


>B. 
Requirements Two Through Five

We
start by addressing requirements two through five, and address the first
requirement (identity of issues) at length below in part C.  Requirement two (actually litigated) and
requirement three (necessarily decided) are satisfied.  In granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
civil rights claims, the district court decided adversely to Plaintiffs the
issues whether Officers Wyatt and Ellis used excessive force against Decedent,
whether the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances, and whether the
officers’ conduct shocked the conscience under substantive due process
standards.  Those issues were fully litigated
in the district court.  (See >Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 511 [“For purposes of collateral
estoppel, an issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it was
properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding”].)  Litigation of those issues was necessary to a
ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and resolving Plaintiffs’
federal civil rights claims.

The
fourth requirement (finality) is satisfied. 
The judgment on the Federal Complaint has been affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and is final notwithstanding the possibility of
further proceedings before the Ninth Circuit or review in the United States
Supreme Court.  (Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 505 F.3d 874, 882 [“a final
judgment retains its collateral estoppel effect, if any, while pending
appeal”]; Tripati v. Henman (9th Cir.
1988) 857 F.2d 1366, 1367 [a pending appeal
does not affect a judgment’s finality
for preclusion purposes].)  “A federal
judgment ‘has the same effect in the courts of this state as it would have in a
federal court.’”  (Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 411; see also >Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1978) 20
Cal.3d 881, 887 [“A federal judgment is as final in California courts as it
would be in federal courts”]; Martin v.
Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 761 [“A federal court judgment has the same
effect in the courts of this state as it would in a federal court”].) 

The
final requirement (privity of parties) is satisfied because the parties against
whom preclusion is sought—Plaintiffs—were also the plaintiffs in the federal
court action.

>C. 
Requirement Two:  Identity of
Issues

1.  The Hernandez
Opinion

The
“‘“identical issue” requirement addresses whether “identical factual
allegations” are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate
issues or dispositions are the same. 
[Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (Hernandez,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 511‑512.)  In this case, the factual allegations
resolved in federal court are identical to those raised in the State Complaint
and were necessary for Plaintiffs to recover under the state law causes of
action. 

>Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th 501, is on point. 
In Hernandez, the decedent led
City of Pomona police officers on a high‑speed car chase until the
decedent’s car crashed.  (>Id. at p. 506.)  The decedent got out of his car and ran away,
with the police on foot in close pursuit. 
(Id. at p. 507.)  According to one witness, the decedent lifted
his shirt to expose his waistline and yelled that he did not have a gun.  (Ibid.)  According to one police officer, the decedent
at one point reached toward his front pocket and yelled that he had a gun.  (Ibid.)  One police officer broadcast over his radio
that the decedent had a gun.  (>Ibid.) 
A police dog was released and joined the pursuit.  (Ibid.)

The
police dog caught up with the decedent, struck him in the shoulder, and spun
him around.  (Hernandez, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 507.)  According to
one police officer, as the dog struck the decedent, he reached toward his
waistband and yelled, “‘I got a gun’” or “‘Gun.’”  (Ibid.)  In response, the officer fired his gun at the
decedent.  (Ibid.)  The other police
officers, hearing gunshots, assumed the officer was in a gun battle with the
decedent.  (Ibid.)  The officers fired a
total of 37 shots, hitting the decedent 22 times and killing him.  (Ibid.)  The decedent was unarmed.  (Ibid.)

The
decedent’s parents and minor children, the plaintiffs, filed a complaint in
federal court against the City of Pomona and the police officers, seeking
damages in connection with the decedent’s death.  (Hernandez,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 507‑508.)  The plaintiffs asserted federal href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">civil rights claims under 42 United
States Code section 1983 and state law claims.  (Hernandez,
supra, p. 508.)  The federal court bifurcated the federal and
state law claims, and the federal claims went to trial before a jury, which
rendered a verdict in favor of all but one of the police officers.  (Ibid.)  The jury could not reach a verdict as to the
remaining police officer, and the federal court granted his motion for judgment
as a matter of law, based on qualified immunity.  (Ibid.)  The federal court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs’ state
law claims.  (Id. at p. 509.)

The
plaintiffs filed an action against the same defendants in superior court.  (Hernandez,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 509.)  The complaint included a
wrongful death claim based on the same allegations the plaintiffs had set forth
in the wrongful death claim of their federal lawsuit.  (Ibid.)  The defendants demurred to the complaint on
the ground that in the federal action, the issue of excessive and unreasonable
force had been decided in their favor and that decision barred the plaintiffs’
state law wrongful death cause of action under collateral estoppel
principles.  (Ibid.)  The trial court
agreed with the defendants on the issue of excessive force, but overruled the
demurrer because, the court concluded, the federal court judgment did not bar
the plaintiffs from recovering under a theory that the defendants failed to
summon medical aid and prevented aid from being rendered once it was
available.  (Id. at p. 510.)  To
expedite an appeal, the plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice their wrongful
death claim to the extent it was based on allegations regarding medical
aid.  (Ibid.)  The plaintiffs then
appealed from the judgment in the defendants’ favor.  (Ibid.) 

The
Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.  (>Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 510.) 
The Court of Appeal held the federal court judgment did preclude the
plaintiffs from recovering on the theory that the police officers failed to
exercise reasonable care in using deadly force. 
(Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal then held, however, the
plaintiffs could proceed on the theory the officers failed to use reasonable
care in creating, through their preshooting conduct, a situation in which it
was reasonable for them to use deadly force. 
(Ibid.) 

The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal. 
The Supreme Court held that, “on the record and conceded facts here, the
federal judgment collaterally estops plaintiffs from pursuing their wrongful
death claim, even on the theory that the officers’ preshooting conduct was
negligent.”  (Hernandez, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 506.)  The court
explained that the issue whether the officers exercised reasonable care in the
use of deadly force was raised, submitted for decision, and actually decided
against the plaintiffs in the federal action in resolving their claims under 42
United States Code section 1983.  (>Hernandez, supra, at p. 512.)  The
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the standard of reasonableness in
a section 1983 action based on excessive force is not the same as the
standard of reasonableness applicable in a negligence action under California
law.  (Id. at p. 513.) 

Although
the federal jury did not make a finding on the officers’ conduct before the
shooting, the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the finding by the
federal jury that the shooting was reasonable, “liability in this case may not
be based on the officers’ alleged preshooting negligence.”  (Hernandez,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 517‑518.)  The officers had probable cause to arrest the
decedent and therefore did not act unreasonably by making the decision to
pursue him.  (Id. at pp. 518‑519.) 
Various California statutes protected the officers from civil liability
based on the manner in which they carried out the pursuit.  (Ibid.)

2.  Plaintiffs’
State Law Causes of Action

The
federal court judgment collaterally estops Plaintiffs from pursuing their
wrongful death and negligence causes of action. 
Here, as in Hernandez, the
issue whether Officers Wyatt and Ellis exercised reasonable care in the use of
deadly force was raised, submitted for decision, and actually decided against
Plaintiffs in the federal action in resolving their claims under 42 United
States Code section 1983.  The
district court, in granting summary judgment, adjudicated the issues whether
Officers Wyatt and Ellis used excessive force, acted reasonably under the
circumstances, and engaged in conduct that shocked the conscience under
substantive due process standards.   In
affirming the federal court judgment, the Ninth Circuit concluded the officers
did not use deadly force and had probable cause to believe Decedent posed a
significant threat of causing death or serious injury to them or to
others.  (Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, supra,
2013 U.S.App. Lexis 9607 at pp. *12, *16.)

Plaintiffs
argue the district court’s conclusion the officers acted reasonably under the
circumstances did not extend to their conduct before shooting Decedent.  To the contrary, the district court rejected
Plaintiffs’ argument the officers acted recklessly and negligently before the
shooting, and found that “none of the Officers’ actions prior to the shooting
constituted an independent Fourth
Amendment violation.”  On the issue
of the officers’ prior conduct, the Ninth Circuit concluded:  “[Decedent]’s representatives argue that the
shooting was provoked by the officers’ prior conduct.  As a result, they claim we should hold the
shooting unreasonable.  However, we have
held that in order for an officer’s conduct to render an otherwise reasonable
response unreasonable, the prior conduct must itself be an independent
constitutional violation. 
[Citation.]  Because the officers’
prior conduct never amounted to a constitutional violation, the shooting was
not unreasonable as a result.”  (>Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, >supra, 2013 U.S.App. Lexis 9607 at
pp. *16‑*17.)  Thus, “in light
of the finding [by the federal court] that the shooting was reasonable,
liability in this case may not be based on the officers’ alleged preshooting
negligence.”  (Hernandez, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 518.) 

The
federal court judgment also collaterally estops Plaintiffs from pursuing their
battery and false arrest/false imprisonment causes of action.  A title 42 United States Code
section 1983 claim has been described as the federal counterpart of a
state law cause of action for battery or wrongful death.  (Yount
v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 902.)  A common law battery cause of action against
a police officer making an arrest or detention requires proof the officer used
unreasonable force.  (>Ibid., citing Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273‑1274.)  In the false arrest/false imprisonment cause
of action, Plaintiffs alleged Officers Wyatt and Ellis deprived Decedent of his
freedom of movement “by use of force, threats of force, menace, fraud, deceit,
and unreasonable duress,” and detained Decedent without probable cause.  

The
Federal Complaint alleged a claim for civil rights violation based on
“unreasonable search and seizure—detention and arrest” (capitalization
omitted), the district court adjudicated the issue whether Officers Wyatt and
Ellis used excessive or unreasonable force in placing Decedent in a carotid
restraint and striking him, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  The officers had probable cause to make a
traffic stop, and, as the district court concluded, the officers’ actions
before the shooting did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment
violation.  When the officers approached
Decedent, he refused to comply with their orders to unclench his fists and
demonstrate he was unarmed.  Thus, under
principles of collateral estoppel, the federal court judgment bars Plaintiffs
from recovering for false arrest/false imprisonment.

Plaintiffs’
fifth cause of action asserted a violation of the Bane Act, which is cited in
the State Complaint as Civil Code section 51.7.  The “‘Tom Bane Civil Rights Act,’” or the
“‘Bane Act,’” is codified at Civil Code section 52.1, while section 51.7 is
commonly known as the “‘Ralph Act’” or the “‘Ralph Civil Rights Act.’”  (Venegas
v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 845 (conc. opn. of Baxter,
J.).)  The fifth cause of action alleged
that Officers Wyatt and Ellis “interfered with or attempted to interfere with
the rights of DECEDENT to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
to be free from state actions that shock the conscience, by threatening or
committing acts involving violence, threats, coercion, or intimidation.”  These allegations track section 52.1,
subdivision (a).href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1]

“Civil
Code section 52.1 authorizes an action at law, a suit in equity, or both,
against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or
coercion, with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by
federal or state law.”  (>Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th
329, 331.)  “A defendant is liable if he
or she interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or
coercion.”  (Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947,
956.) 

In
the fifth cause of action, Plaintiffs alleged that Officers Wyatt and Ellis
interfered with Decedent’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and substantive due process rights to be free from state
actions that shock the conscience.  The
district court found against Plaintiffs on their civil rights claims, which
included claims of unreasonable search and
seizure, excessive force, and violation of substantive due process.  As a consequence, Plaintiffs are collaterally
estopped from pursuing their cause of action under Civil Code
section 52.1. 

> 

>IV.

>Disposition

The
judgment is affirmed.  Respondents shall
recover costs incurred on appeal.

 

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    FYBEL,
J.

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

BEDSWORTH,
ACTING P. J.

 

 

 

IKOLA, J.