Durio v.
Corrections
Filed 5/13/13 Durio v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
SHALAY DURIO,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
D061914
(Super. Ct.
No. ECU06360)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Affirmed.
Barrera
& Associates and Patricio T.D. Barrera for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Vickie P. Whitney and Christopher H. Findley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Defendant and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Christopher
Durio's (Christopher) daughter, Shalay Durio (Shalay),
filed a second amended complaint containing claims for
against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the
Department). In the second amended
complaint, Shalay alleged that in June 2010, the Department's correctional
officers attempted to end an altercation between Christopher and a cellmate by
negligently spraying pepper spray in Christopher's face. Shalay further alleged that immediately
following the incident, the Department's officers knew or had reason to know
that Christopher was in need of immediate medical care, that they failed to
summon such care, and that Christopher died as a result. Shalay claimed that the Department was liable
for failing to summon medical care pursuant to Government Code section 845.6.
The Department filed a motion for
summary judgment in which it maintained that undisputed evidence established
that it was immune from all of Shalay's claims as a matter of law. The trial court granted the Department's motion
and entered judgment in its favor.
Shalay appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
In September 2011, Shalay filed a
second amended complaint. The second
amended complaint contained the following allegations:
"On or about June 15, 2010, Defendants,[
by and through their correctional officers acting under defendants'
supervision, attempted to end an altercation involving [Christopher] and a
cellmate. Defendants by and through
their correctional officers acting under defendants' supervision, ended the
altercation by negligently applying pepper spray to [Christopher's] face. [Christopher] suffered from 'shortness of
breath' and/or asthma and should not have been pepper sprayed. . . .
[¶] . . . Immediately following the pepper spray incident,
defendants' agents and employees knew or had reason to know that Christopher .
. . was in need of immediate medical care.
Defendants failed to take reasonable action to summon medical care.
[¶] . . . On June
15, 2010, after being pepper sprayed and complaining of difficulty
breathing, Christopher . . . passed away at defendants' facility and was
pronounced dead. Defendants' agents and
employees were negligent and responsible for [Christopher's] death under
[section] 845.6 by their delays in administering medical care to [Christopher],
failing to summon immediate and proper medical care, and administering improper
care to [Christopher]."
Shalay incorporated these
allegations in claims for wrongful death, negligence, and battery. In her prayer for relief, Shalay sought money
damages.
B.
The Department filed a motion for
summary judgment. In its motion, the
Department argued that the undisputed evidence established the following facts
relevant to Shalay's claims.
The Department is a public entity
and Christopher was a prisoner in a correctional facility managed by the
Department. Shortly after 2:30 a.m. on the morning of June 15, 2010, a correctional
officer, Officer F. Alvarez, applied a spray containing oleoresin capsicum
(O.C. spray) into Christopher's cell to break up a fight between Christopher
and his cellmate. At 2:40 a.m., after securing Christopher, a
sergeant summoned prison medical staff to assist in the decontamination of
Christopher from the O.C. spray. An
officer led Christopher to a nearby shower to decontaminate. Christopher stood in the shower for a few
minutes, and then lay down in the shower.
At 2:45
a.m., Christopher informed a correctional officer that he was
having "difficulty breathing" and was experiencing "shortness of
breath." Also at approximately 2:45 a.m., a registered nurse, C. Ramirez,
arrived at the scene. Nurse Ramirez
requested that an officer move Christopher from the shower so that Nurse
Ramirez could examine him. As
Christopher was moving out of the shower, he complained of difficulty
breathing, but was able to walk under his own power. During the initial portion of Nurse Ramirez's
examination, Christopher appeared to be breathing normally and had a pulse
within the normal range.
At 3:11 a.m., Christopher stopped breathing and became
unresponsive. At 3:11 a.m., Nurse
Ramirez started performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on him, and
requested that an ambulance be called.
An ambulance arrived at the prison between 3:40 and 3:45 a.m. The ambulance left the prison at approximately
4:00 a.m. A doctor at a local hospital
pronounced Christopher dead at 4:30 a.m.
The
Department argued that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that it was immune
from all of Shalay's claims as a matter of law.
The Department contended that pursuant to section 844.6, it could not be
found liable for any of Shalay's claims arising from a Department employee's
application of O.C. spray.
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] The Department also contended that the
undisputed evidence described above demonstrated as a matter of law that the
Department could not be found liable for failing to summon medical care pursuant
to section 845.6. In support of this
contention, the Department argued that a sergeant summoned medical care before
Christopher exhibited symptoms that demonstrated a need for immediate medical
care, the responding nurse provided Christopher with medical treatment, and
prison staff summoned an ambulance when Christopher appeared to be in
"actual distress."
The Department supported its motion
with a separate statement of facts and declarations from Officer Alvarez, the
sergeant who initially responded to the scene of the fight and summoned medical
assistance, another officer who led Christopher to the shower and assisted in
moving Christopher from the shower, and Nurse Ramirez, all of whom are
Department employees. The Department
also offered various reports that these employees had prepared near the time of
the incident.
title="">[5]
Shalay filed an opposition in which
she argued that a jury could determine that the Department had failed to summon
medical care in light of undisputed evidence that the Department never
telephoned a prison doctor, who was on call but not at the prison at the time
of the incident. Shalay argued that a
doctor could have provided life-saving care such as administering medication,
performing an airway intubation, or using a defibrillator. Shalay further argued that the court should
reject any argument that the Department had met its duty to summon care by
"having two nurses[
on site providing CPR," because the "nurses were inadequately
prepared to treat [Christopher] for cardiac arrest . . . ." Shalay also argued that the Department could
be found liable for injuries arising from the application of the O.C. spray,
under the theory that the Department owed a duty of care to Christopher in
light of the " 'special relationship between jailer and prisoner.' "
Shalay supported her opposition
with a separate statement of facts and
numerous exhibits, including portions of the deposition
transcripts of several Department employees.
C. The trial court's ruling
and the appeal
After further
briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the Department's motion for
summary judgment. In its order, the
court stated in relevant part:
"[T]he Court finds that there is no triable issue
of material fact, and that [the Department] is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on all causes of action on the grounds that (1) [the Department] is
immune from liability for injuries to prisoners under Government Code section
844.6; (2) [the Department] is immune from liability for failure to furnish or
obtain medical care under Government Code section 845.6; and (3) there is no
dispute of material fact that [the Department] took reasonable action to summon
medical care within the meaning of Government Code section 845.6. Specifically, the court finds that [the
Department] submitted evidence showing that it summoned an ambulance within a
reasonable period of time after inmate Christopher Durio lost
consciousness. Plaintiff did not submit
evidence to refute the time frame provided by [the Department] and did not
submit evidence that the prison doctor could have arrived more quickly than the
ambulance had he been called."
The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the Department, from which Shalay time appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
The trial court properly granted the Department's motion for summary
judgment
Shalay
claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the Department established
a complete immunity defense with respect to each of Shalay's causes of
action.
A. Governing law
1.
law governing summary judgment
is entitled to summary
judgment when the party establishes that it is entitled
to the entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant may make this showing by
demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of all
of his causes of action, or that the defendant has a complete defense to each
cause of action. (Towns v. Davidson
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 466.)
In
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, applying the same
legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. [Citations.]'
[Citation.]" (Trop v.
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1143.)
2. General
principles of law governing the Department's immunity defenses
a.
Public entity immunity
Unless
provided by statute, California public entities are not liable for tort claims
seeking money damages. (§ 815.)
Section 815 provides in relevant
part:
"Except as otherwise provided by statute:
A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of
an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person.
Thus, "sovereign immunity is the rule in California;
governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set
statute." (Cochran v. Herzog
Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409.)
b.
The immunity of public entities for correctional activities
Sections
844 through 846 codify several specific provisions applicable to correctional
institutions. Of particular import to
this case are sections 844.6 and 845.6.
i.
Section 844.6
Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2)
broadly states that public entities are not liable for any injury to a prisoner
unless liability is imposed by statute.
The statute provides in relevant part:
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, except as provided in this section and in . . . [section] 845.6 . . . , a
public entity is not liable for:
"(2) An injury to
any prisoner."
Section 844.6 also makes clear that
this provision does not immunize a public employee
from liability for injury proximately caused by the employee's negligent
conduct, and specifies that a public entity has a duty to pay a judgment based
on a medical malpractice
claim against a public employee:
"(d) Nothing in this section exonerates a public
employee from liability for injury proximately caused by his negligent or
wrongful act or omission. The public
entity may but is not required to pay any judgment, compromise or settlement,
or may but is not required to indemnify any public employee, in any case where
the public entity is immune from liability under this section; except that the
public entity shall pay, as provided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825)
of Chapter 1 of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public
employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts
under any law of this state for malpractice arising from an act or omission in
the scope of his employment, and shall pay any compromise or settlement of a
claim or action, based on such malpractice, to which the public entity has
agreed." (§ 844.6, subd. (d).)
ii.
Section 845.6
The first sentence of section 845.6
reaffirms that a public entity is immune from liability for injuries caused by
the failure to furnish or obtain medical care for prisoners, but states that a
public entity is liable for the failure to summon medical care under certain
narrowly defined circumstances. The
statute provides in relevant part:
"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is
liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish
or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but . . . a public
employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope
of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that
the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take
reasonable action to summon such medical care." (§ 845.6)
Section 845.6 also makes clear that
this provision does not immunize a public employee
from a medical malpractice claim or excuse a public entity from its duty to
indemnify under section 844.6:
"Nothing in this section exonerates a public
employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts
under any law of this state from liability for injury proximately caused by
malpractice or exonerates the public entity from its obligation to pay any
judgment, compromise, or settlement that it is required to pay under
subdivision (d) of Section 844.6."
B. The trial court properly
concluded that the Department established that it is
immune as a matter of
law with respect to each of Shalay's claims
1. The
Department is immune as a matter of law from Shalay's wrongful
death
claim
Shalay contends that the trial
court erred in concluding that the Department established as a
pursuant to section 845.6 for her wrongful death claim.
a.
Applicable case law
In Castaneda v.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1051, 1070 (Castaneda), the Court of
Appeal described the scope of the duty to summon immediate medical care
provided in section 845.6. The
"creates . . . limited public-entity liability when: (1) the public
employee 'knows or has reason to know [of the] need,' (2) of 'immediate
medical care,' and (3) 'fails to take reasonable action to summon such
medical care.' (§ 845.6, italics
added.)" (Castaneda, supra, at p. 1070.)
The Castaneda court also
explained that "[s]ection 845.6 is very narrowly written to authorize a
cause of action against a public entity for its employees' failure to summon
immediate medical care only, not for certain employee's malpractice in
providing that care." (
reflected in the structure and text of the statute:
"A narrow reading of section 845.6 is also
compelled as a matter of statutory interpretation. First, the duty to summon is presented as the
exception to the broad, general immunity for failing to furnish or provide
medical care. Second, section 845.6
imposes the duty to summon on 'public employees' generally, not medical care
providers in particular. Many such public employees are '[p]rison
authorities [who] do not have the medical training to know whether a prisoner's
medical condition has been properly diagnosed and treated.' ([Watson v. State (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 (
imposing a duty to do more than to summon medical care as it imposed
that duty on 'public employees,' such as
prison authorities, generally."
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071, fn. omitted.)
The Castaneda
court also explained that California courts have concluded that the failure of
a health care professional who is summoned
to provide medical assistance to a prisoner to thereafter provide adequate treatment to the prisoner does not come within the
scope of the duty set forth in section 845.6:
"The distinction between failure to summon medical
care—for which the State can be held liable under section 845.6—on the one
hand, and negligence in providing care—for which the State is immune—on
v. State of California [(1982)] 139 Cal.App.3d 72 [(Nelson)]. There, the
plaintiff was incarcerated when he complained of various medical problems that
were symptoms of diabetes. (Id.
at p. 75.) He filed a tort claim
reciting the ' "failure of the Department of Corrections to diagnose and
treat or allow claimant to maintain his ongoing medications." ' ( Id. at p. 80.) The plaintiff's ensuing complaint was based
on the failure to summon immediate, competent medical care under section
845.6. ([Nelson], supra, at p. 78.) Nelson held 'as a matter of statutory
interpretation, that the act of a doctor or other such professional who, in the
course of treatment of a prisoner, fails to prescribe and/or provide the
correct medication is [not] the legal equivalent to a failure to summon medical
care as set forth in [§ 845.6].' (Id.
at pp. 80–81.) 'Once a practitioner
has been summoned to examine and treat a prisoner, he or she is under a
duty to exercise that degree of diligence, care, and skill such as is
ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession. Failure to do so is malpractice. [Citation.]
Failure of a practitioner to prescribe or provide necessary
medication or treatment to one he or she has been summoned to assist is a
breach of such duty and as such is also medical malpractice and clearly,
as a matter of the plain meaning of the statutory language, cannot be
characterized as a failure to summon medical care.' (Id. at p. 81, italics added.)
the parameters of governmental liability under section 845.6. Watson determined section 845.6
'confers a broad general immunity on the public entity' and the duty to
'summon' medical care under section 845.6 neither encompasses a duty to provide
reasonable medical care, nor includes a concomitant duty to assure that prison
medical staff properly diagnose and treat the medical condition, nor imposes a
duty to monitor the quality of care provided.
(Watson, supra, at pp. 841–843.)" (Castaneda,
supra, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1071-1072.)
The Castaneda
court acknowledged that in Jett v. Penner (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 1091
(Jett), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that " ' "immediate
medical care" as used in the statute includes both diagnosis and
treatment and . . . the need for "immediate medical care" can
arise more than once in relation to an ongoing serious medical condition.
. . ." (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073, quoting
the Castaneda court expressly
rejected the Jett court's reasoning:
"[T]he Ninth Circuit's application of section 845.6
ignores California authority interpreting that statute. California courts hold the failure to
prescribe necessary medication or, once summoned to provide treatment, to
ensure proper diagnosis, or to monitor the progress of an inmate that the
public employee has been summoned to assist, are issues relating to the manner
in which medical care is provided, and do not subject the State to
liability under section 845.6 for failure to summon. ([Nelson], supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 80–81; Watson,
supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841–843.)
"Jett also contradicts the Legislature's
determination, in enacting section 845.6, not to require follow-up or
monitoring of medical care. 'As the bill
[for section 845.6] was originally introduced the public employee was required
to "see" to it that a prisoner needing medical care received it. As amended he was required only to
"summon" medical care.'
[Citation.]" (
1074.)
Applying Nelson
and Watson, the Castaneda court considered whether there was sufficient evidence in
the record in that case to support a verdict against the Department for failing
to summon medical care pursuant to section 845.6. The court concluded that the Department could
not be found to have breached its duty under section 845.6 based on evidence
that a nurse and a doctor working for the Department had failed to ensure that
Castaneda receive certain diagnostic testing necessary to detect cancer. (Castaneda,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072.)
In reaching this conclusion, the Castaneda
court reasoned:
"On this record, the State summoned medical care
for Castaneda. Indeed, it did more than
summon, it treated him. Both Dr. Leong
and Nurse Pasha assessed him; both included cancer as part of their
differential diagnosis; both diagnosed his condition; and both referred
him for further treatment, namely, medication and a biopsy. Under Nelson and Watson, the
failure of these two public employees to provide further treatment, or to
ensure further diagnosis or treatment, or to monitor Castaneda or follow up on
his progress, are all facts which go to the reasonableness of the medical care
provided, but do not constitute a failure to summon medical care. (Watson, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 841–843;[Nelson],
supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at pp. 80–81.)" (Castaneda,
supra, at p. 1072.)
b.
In her wrongful
death claim, Shalay incorporated allegations that the Department failed to take
reasonable action to summon medical care on Christopher's behalf and that this
failure caused Christopher's death.
Shalay further alleged that the Department was liable pursuant to
section 845.6.
As described in detail in part II,
the Department presented evidence that its employees summoned Nurse Ramirez
prior to Christopher exhibiting any symptoms that would lead a reasonable
person to know that he was in need of immediate
medical care. Within minutes of being
summoned, Nurse Ramirez responded to the scene and began providing medical
attention to Christopher. As
Christopher's condition worsened and he stopped breathing, Nurse Ramirez began
performing CPR, and requested that an ambulance be called. Shalay
failed to present any evidence that contradicted the Department's evidence in
this regard.
In light of the case law discussed above, the Department
established as a matter of law that it could not be found liable for failing to
summon medical care under section
845.6. (See Nelson, supra,
139 Cal.App.3d at p. 81; Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072
[applying Nelson and concluding
Department was immune as a matter of law from claim that nurse summoned to
provide medical treatment failed to provide adequate treatment].) Any evidence that Nurse Ramirez failed to
properly provide adequate treatment
to Christopher cannot support a claim for fail to summon medical care pursuant to section 845.6. (Castaneda,
supra, at p. 1074 ["Once summoned, the quality of medical care is a
matter of medical policy and practice, imposing on medical practitioners a duty
to exercise that degree of diligence, care, and skill possessed by other
members of the profession, but it is not a violation of the employee's
obligation to summon medical care under section 845.6"].)
Even assuming that the Department had
not satisfied its duty under section 845.6 by summoning Nurse Ramirez, as noted
above, the undisputed evidence also established that as soon as Christopher
stopped breathing and became unresponsive, Nurse Ramirez started performing CPR
and requested an ambulance, and that someone at the prison called for an
ambulance. On these facts, no reasonably
jury could find that the Department or its employees failed to summon medical
care under section
845.6. (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070, quoting § 845.6
[public entity can be found liable for breach of duty to summon under section
845.6 only where "(1) the public employee 'knows or has reason to know [of
the] need,' (2) of 'immediate medical care,' and (3) 'fails to take
reasonable action to summon such medical care.' ")
Shalay argues that at 2:45 a.m.,
upon the first signs that Christopher was having difficulty breathing,
correctional employees should have summoned a prison doctor, who was on call
but not physically at the prison, and that their failure to do so constitutes a
breach of the duty to take reasonable action to summon medical care within the
meaning of section 845.6. We are not
persuaded. In this case, it is
undisputed that, prior to 2:45 a.m.,
a correctional officer had already summoned medical care and that, as of 2:45
a.m., Nurse Ramirez was examining Christopher and providing medical care. For the reasons stated above, this evidence
establishes as a matter of law that the Department cannot be held liable for
failing to summon medical care under section 845.6.
Shalay cites two cases, Jett,
supra, 439 F.3d 1091, and Flores v.
Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106 (
that a treating doctor's failure to summon additional
medical care for a prisoner may constitute evidence upon which a section 845.6
claim may be based. However, for reasons
discussed below, neither of the cases that Shalay cites supports reversal in
this case.
In Jett, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that evidence that a doctor failed to summon additional
medical care to set and cast a prisoner's fractured thumb could support a
verdict in the prisoner's favor under section 845.6. (Jett,
supra, 439 F.3d at p. 1099.) As
discussed previously, the Jett court
reasoned, "the term 'immediate medical care' as used in the statute
includes both diagnosis and treatment."
(Ibid.)
In Flores, the
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries that he sustained after prison doctors
failed to transfer him from a prison infirmary to a hospital for treatment
related to an ulcer. (
1112-1113.) In describing the nature of
the plaintiff's claim against the State of California for failing to summon
medical aid pursuant to section 845.6, the Flores
court noted, "Although plaintiff argued to the jury that the doctors were
negligent and liable for malpractice in their treatment of plaintiff and in
failing to transfer him to the hospital immediately, he also argued that the
State was liable for the doctors' failure to transfer him, such failure being
equivalent to a failure-to-summon medical aid under the statute." (Flores,
supra, at p. 1115.) The Court of
Appeal concluded that the $250,000 limitation on noneconomic damages embodied
in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) (Civ. Code, § 3333.2
) did not apply to the plaintiff's claim.
(Flores, supra, at p. 1114.
) The Flores court reasoned that because the State was immune from a
vicarious liability claim against it premised on its employee's commission of
medical malpractice, the "the failure-to-summon theory" was "the
only proper basis for recovery against the State." (Id.
at p. 1116; see also ibid.
["[a]lthough the failure to summon assistance could have provided a basis
for the finding of professional negligence against the doctors, this does not
render the true nature of the action against the State one for professional
negligence"].)
We acknowledge the tension between the reasoning of the
courts in Castaneda,
liable under section 845.6 based on the alleged failure of a medical
practitioner who is treating a prisoner to seek additional medical care for the
prisoner. (Compare, e.g.,
p. 81 ["Failure of a practitioner to prescribe
or provide necessary medication or treatment to one he or she has been summoned
to assist . . . clearly, as a matter of the plain meaning of the statutory
language, cannot be characterized as a
failure to summon medical care"] with Flores, supra,
192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1117 ["It would be at least . . . anomalous, we
think, to insulate the State from liability simply because, fortuitously, the
employees who failed to summon assistance were doctors rather than other prison
personnel"].) However, for the
reasons summarized in Castaneda, we
agree that section 845.6 provides for liability only where a public employee
fails to summon medical care, and
does not extend to the summoned employee's treatment
decisions with respect to how to provide such care.
In any event, in this case, even assuming we were to follow
matter of law that it satisfied its duty under section 845.6 by summoning Nurse
Ramirez, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that no reasonable jury
could find that Nurse Ramirez failed to summon
medical care.
name="_ftnref10" title="">[10] Shalay is therefore not entitled to reversal
of the court's judgment based on the reasoning of Jett or Flores.
Accordingly, we conclude that
the Department established as a matter of law that it is immune from Shalay's
wrongful death claim premised on the Department's alleged "fail[ure] to
take reasonable action to summon medical care."
2. The Department is immune
from Shalay's negligence and battery claims
Shalay
contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the Department
established as a matter of law that it could not be held liable with respect to
Shalay's negligence and battery claims premised on Officer Alvarez's act in
spraying Christopher with O.C. spray.
Citing Giraldo v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 231, 250 (Giraldo),
Shalay argues, "there is a 'special relationship between jailer and
prisoner, imposing on the former a duty of care to the latter.' " Shalay contends that Officer Alvarez breached
this duty by spraying Christopher with O.C. spray and argues that
"[p]ublic employees and public entities are liable for injuries from their
negligent acts or omissions to the same extent as a private person,
A statutory exception
a public entity may be vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of its
employees ([§] 815.2), that rule does not apply in
the case of injuries to prisoners." (Lawson
v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1383, citing §
844.6.) Section 844.6 makes clear that
the Department is not liable for any injuries to a prisoner unless liability is
imposed by certain statutory provisions, none of which Shalay contends
applies. (§ 844.6 ["except as
provided in this section and in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in
Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code,[
a public entity is not liable for: [¶] . . . [¶] An injury to any
prisoner"]; see also § 815, subd. (b) ["The liability of a
public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject
to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this
part"].) Thus, even assuming that
Officer Alvarez breached a duty owed to Christopher under Giraldo, the Department is immune from Shalay's negligence and
battery causes of action.
name="_ftnref14" title="">[14]
Accordingly, we conclude that the
Department established its immunity defense as a matter of law, and that the
trial court therefore properly granted summary adjudication in favor of the
Department on Shalay's negligence and battery claims.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE,
Acting P. J.
HALLER,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] We refer to the decedent and the plaintiff by their first
names for purposes of clarity.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory
references are to the Government Code.
As discussed in greater
detail in part III, post, section
845.6 provides that the Department may be liable for failing to summon medical
care under certain specified circumstances.
