Dickinson v. Union Pacific Railroad

Filed 9/26/07 Dickinson v. Union Pacific Railroad CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

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Plaintiff Cody Dickinson filed a motion with the trial court to enforce an award of postjudgment interest in a final judgment. The court concluded plaintiff was not entitled to interest because an oral agreement placed on the record at trial did not include an award of interest. We vacate the trial courts decision because the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs motion.

FACTS

Dickinson sued his employer, defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company, under the Federal Employers Liability Act (45 U.S.C. 51 et seq.) to recover damages for a personal injury. During the first week of a jury trial, Union Pacific admitted liability, and the action proceeded on the issue of damages.

During trial, the parties orally placed on record an agreement establishing the minimum and maximum amount of damages Union Pacific would pay. Dickinson refers to the agreement as a high/low verdict agreement. Union Pacific refers to it as a high/low settlement agreement. The transcript of the agreement reads as follows:

MR. PETRU [Dickinsons counsel]: Your Honor, theres several things -- well, a couple of things. First of all, I know theres some outstanding issues that we have not put on the record; but in light of our agreement, I dont know that its necessary to put objections, and basis for objections to preserve the record. Weve agreed that whatever the jury does in this case, the railroad will guarantee that Mr. Dickinson has a minimum verdict of $800,000; and we guarantee to the railroad that even if its higher, the highest verdict will be $2.5 million.

The other issues in the case -- there are other issues such as costs, cost bills, etc., that will be handled in the normal fashion. . . . [] . . . []

THE COURT: Lets have it again. The low is --

MR. PETRU: 800,000. The high is $2.5 million.

MR. JOHNSON [Union Pacifics counsel]: And there will be no appeals.

MR. PETRU: No appeals. My expectation is --

THE COURT: Have you had a chance to talk to your attorney, Mr. Dickinson?

[DICKINSON]: Yes, sir, I have.

THE COURT: This meets your approval?

[DICKINSON]: Yes.

THE COURT: And I have to assume youve talked to your clients?

MR. JOHNSON: I have, your Honor, and I have the authority to enter into that agreement.

No party asked the court to maintain jurisdiction to enforce this agreement.

The jury awarded Dickinson $2,213,258.00. The jurys special verdict was filed on August 30, 2005. On the next day, Dickinsons counsel mailed a copy of a draft judgment to Union Pacifics counsel. This draft awarded Dickinson costs and postjudgment interest. Union Pacific did not object to the proposed judgments terms.

On September 13, 2005, the trial court entered its Judgment on Special Verdict in Open Court, awarding Dickinson the special verdict amount of damages plus costs and postjudgment interest. Specifically, the court awarded Dickinson $2,213,258.00 with interest thereon per annum at the rate allowable under the law from the date hereof, until paid, together with [Dickinsons] allowable costs and disbursements incurred in this action . . . .

Union Pacific did not attack the judgment directly or collaterally. It also did not seek to correct any error in the judgment.

Shortly after judgment was entered, the parties disagreed over whether Dickinson was entitled to costs and postjudgment interest. Union Pacific argued in a letter dated September 22 that the settlement agreement entered into during trial did not provide for costs and interest. It said this dispute might have to be resolved through a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.^[1][2]

On September 26, Union Pacific paid the full verdict amount, and on the following day, it paid the full amount of Dickinsons cost bill. However, it continued to refuse to pay any interest because the parties oral agreement at trial did not expressly provide for it.

To obtain payment of interest, Dickinson filed with the trial court a Motion for Order Requiring Defendant to Satisfy Judgment in its Entirety . . . [CCP 664.6]. He argued that section 695.210 required the money judgment to include interest, and the judgment clearly awarded interest. By his motion, he sought to enforce the terms of the judgment and receive interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum from the date of the verdict.

Union Pacific opposed the motion. It argued the oral agreement made at trial was a settlement agreement enforceable under section 664.6. Thus, because the terms of that agreement did not specify interest, Dickinson had waived any right to interest.

The court commissioner hearing the motion agreed with Union Pacific: Plaintiff is not entitled to post-verdict interest as payment of such interest was not specifically included in the terms of the settlement agreement as recited by Plaintiffs attorney on the record.

DISCUSSION

Dickinson appeals from the commissioners order. He claims the court erred by disregarding the terms of the judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict. He also argues that even if the judgment was based on a settlement agreement, the terms of that agreement included his right to receive interest.

Union Pacific disagrees. It claims Dickinsons motion was in reality a motion to enforce the judgment in a case where the parties had entered into a settlement agreement. The court, it argues, correctly handled the motion as one to enforce a settlement agreement under section 664.6. It asserts the courts ruling on the merits is correct because nothing in the settlement agreement required Union Pacific to pay postjudgment interest.

Responding to Union Pacifics opposition, Dickinson argues that despite his labeling the motion as one under section 664.6, the court erred by deciding the motion under that statute. He claims the court had no jurisdiction to enforce the parties agreement under section 664.6. He now states his only remedy to obtain interest payments is to commence procedures for enforcing a money judgment under sections 695.010 et seq. We agree with this last assessment.

Except in limited circumstances not alleged here, a courts jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of a lawsuit ends once a final judgment is entered. (Riley v. Superior Court (1957) 49 Cal.2d 305, 309.) From that point, the court issuing the judgment has no authority to entertain motions to modify or enforce its judgment except to correct clerical errors or as provided in the Enforcement of Judgments Law ( 680.010 et seq.).

The same is true when judgment is entered pursuant to a settlement agreement unless the parties have taken advantage of section 664.6. (Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 437.) Prior to the enactment of section 664.6, a party
seeking to enforce a settlement agreement had to file a new action alleging breach of contract and seeking either contract damages or specific performance of the settlement terms, or alternatively had to supplement the pleadings in a pending case. [Citations.] . . . [Citation.] Expeditious enforcement of a settlement agreement was therefore not always possible. [] Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit. [Citations.] (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.)

Section 664.6 reads in full: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

The court is able to retain jurisdiction only if the parties expressly request it to do so. Without such a request, the court loses jurisdiction to enforce the agreement once the case is dismissed or a judgment is entered. (Wackeen v. Malis, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 433.)

Here, no party requested the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce their oral agreement. Thus, assuming for purposes of argument only that the oral agreement was a settlement agreement for purposes of section 664.6, the court had no jurisdiction to enforce it pursuant to the motion filed by Dickinson. The parties provide us with no other authority for the court to hear the motion, and we are aware of none. We therefore vacate the trial courts order due to a lack of jurisdiction. We express no opinion on the other arguments raised by the parties.

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court is vacated. Because the motion was originally filed by Dickinson, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(4).)

NICHOLSON , Acting P.J.

We concur:

MORRISON , J.

HULL, J.

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^[1] In the same letter, Union Pacific acknowledged that if Dickinson was entitled to interest, interest would accrue as of the date of the verdict as opposed to the judgments entry date.

^[2] All undesignated references to sections are to the Code of Civil Procedure.