Filed 10/24/17 Churches v. Oneto CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Amador)

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Plaintiff Rich Churches sued defendants Edward Oneto, Rux Oneto, and Oneto Group, Inc., alleging various claims hinging on his theory that a partnership had been formed, and defendants deprived him of the benefits therefrom. By stipulation, the trial court bifurcated two equitable theories and conducted a court trial, resulting in a detailed statement of decision finding no partnership had ever been created. The trial court reasoned that that conclusion undermined the remaining legal claims, and entered a judgment for defendants, from which plaintiff timely filed this appeal.

Plaintiff does not contest the order bifurcating the equitable issues for a court trial, nor does he dispute the trial court’s factual finding that no partnership existed. He claims that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial on his legal theories without his consent, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the legal issues.

As we will explain, regardless of how it was worded, the bifurcation order meant that a jury trial would follow the court trial only if any of the pleaded legal claims survived the court trial. Because plaintiff does not explain how any of his claims are viable notwithstanding the finding that no partnership had been formed, we presume none were. Therefore, once the trial court found no partnership had been formed, we presume there was nothing left for a jury to decide. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the limited issues tendered on appeal.

The complaint alleged plaintiff had possession of a dormant power plant and surrounding land, and the owner had agreed to sell it to plaintiff. Plaintiff then needed money to complete the sale, and alleged he formed a partnership with defendants, but he was deprived of his rightful share therein. He pleaded theories of (1) dissolution of partnership, (2) conversion of money, (3) breach of an oral contract, (4) fraud, (5) right to declaratory relief that a partnership existed, and (6) promissory estoppel. Each captioned cause of action incorporated preliminary allegations that a partnership had been formed (“paragraphs 1 through 23 of this Complaint”).

Before trial, a minute order stated: “Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate is hereby granted. The declaratory relief cause of action will be tried to the Court immediately preceding the jury trial on all remaining issues.” The referenced motion to bifurcate is not in the appellate record. However, before evidence was taken, plaintiff’s counsel clarified in open court that he wanted both the fifth claim (for declaratory relief) and the sixth claim (for promissory estoppel) to be tried to the court. Defense counsel concurred, and the trial court accepted this as a stipulation of the parties.

After four days of testimony, the trial court allowed the parties to file closing briefs (not in the appellate record), after which it would issue a tentative statement of decision the parties could challenge. After scheduling the posttrial briefing, the trial court observed: “we are down to the yes-or-no answer and the Court is going to have to make a decision and then there’s going to be more trial time and more expense or there is not going to be.” (Italics added.) Neither party disputed this characterization or asserted that there necessarily were additional issues to be tried.

The proposed statement of decision found no partnership (or joint venture) had been formed by the parties, and found that plaintiff failed to prove a clear promise that would support his theory of promissory estoppel.

Plaintiff did not object to the proposed statement of decision within the allotted time, but did object to the proposed judgment, contending the statement of decision resolved only the declaratory relief and promissory estoppel claims. The trial court directed defense counsel to prepare a judgment “as to those causes of action” and not to prepare a judgment that would resolve the whole case.

The trial court then entered a defense judgment reciting in part that “there are no remaining issues to be tried to a jury.” Plaintiff timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff emphasizes that when the bifurcation motion was granted, and when it was expanded upon stipulation of the parties, the trial court indicated a jury trial would follow the court trial. He argues that because no such jury trial followed the court trial, the trial court misunderstood the bifurcation, and he has been denied his right to a jury trial. He separately couches this as a lack of “jurisdiction,” claiming he did not “accept” the jurisdiction of the trial court to resolve the legal issues.

The first question raised by plaintiff’s claims is whether he was entitled to a jury trial based only on the purported assurance by the trial court that a jury trial would follow the court trial. The second is whether plaintiff has shown there were any issues remaining that warranted a jury trial after the court trial. The answer to each of these questions is “no.”

First, plaintiff claims the stipulation was made with the understanding that a jury trial would follow the equitable court trial. But plaintiff’s counsel was presumed to know the well-settled rule that in so-called “mixed bag” cases--cases raising both equitable and legal claims--a court trial may determine issues in such a way as to obviate the need for a jury trial.

A recent case explains this in detail:

“A jury trial, [a]s a general proposition . . . is a matter of right in a civil action at law, but not in equity. . . .

“By joining its equitable and legal claims in one action, the [plaintiff] did not lose this jury trial right. It is settled in this state that where legal and equitable issues are joined in the same action the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the legal issues. . . .

“The recognition [in a prior case] that a plaintiff did not give up his or her jury trial right by combining equitable and legal causes of action, however, was accompanied by an important caveat: A trial court handling such a combined action could, and in many cases should, hold a bench trial on any equitable issues first. [Citation.] ‘[If] any legal issues remain [after the bench trial], a jury may be called.’ [Citations.] Thus, while a plaintiff retained his jury trial right, the extent of the issues actually tried by jury could be impacted by the trial court’s findings in equity. Where a mixed bag of legal and equitable claims is presented in a case, a court trial of the equitable claims first may obviate the necessity of a jury trial on the legal claims, but otherwise the plaintiff cannot be denied the right to a jury trial on the legal causes of action. If there are equitable and legal remedies sought in the same action, the parties are entitled to have a jury determine the legal issues unless the trial court’s initial determination of the equitable issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, leaving nothing to be tried by a jury.” (Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 354-355.)[1]

Many cases make the same points, including the cases defendants cite on appeal. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1237-1245; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 864, 871-872; Dills v. Delira Corp. (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 124, 128-131.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply brief at all, much less a brief addressing these cases or the well-settled points they make.

We find these cases dispositive.

Therefore, any statement by the trial court at the time of the stipulation to the effect that a jury trial would follow the equitable court trial was impliedly conditional: The legal effect of the bifurcation was that a jury trial would follow unless the trial court’s resolution of the equitable claims left nothing to be tried by a jury. We reject plaintiff’s view that the wording of the bifurcation order, the scope of the stipulation, the wording of the statement of decision, or all of the above, limited the trial court’s ability--and duty--to determine if the findings reached at the equitable court trial precluded liability on any or all of the remaining legal claims.

Second, plaintiff has not shown that any of the legal theories pleaded in the complaint remained triable in light of the findings made at the equitable court trial. Although normally we would parse the complaint to determine whether any legal claims stood unaffected by the finding that no partnership existed, here we need not do so in order to reach this conclusion. This is because plaintiff’s brief does not analyze the complaint to try to demonstrate any of the legal claims remain viable notwithstanding the factual findings made in equity. Plaintiff does not state the factual basis of any of the remaining claims, identify the elements of the legal theories pleaded in support of the captioned causes of action, or attempt to explain how his legal claims remain unaffected by the trial court’s factual findings. Plaintiff’s job, as the appellant, was to demonstrate the continued viability of his remaining claims. (See, e.g., Tilbury Constructors, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 466, 482 [forfeiture on appeal after a demurrer, because the plaintiff “failed to provide any adequate legal analysis in its opening brief of [the] causes of action and the potentially complex legal analysis necessary to determine whether it has stated a cause of action”].) He has not even undertaken the required analysis, let alone met his burden to show the claims’ viability. Therefore, we presume there was nothing left for a jury to decide.

Plaintiff’s separate characterization of the alleged problem as one of jurisdiction adds nothing to the above discussion. Although he contends that he did not accept the trial court’s jurisdiction to decide the legal issues in his case, the trial court already had jurisdiction, in the sense of fundamental power, to try the equitable issues.[2] (See Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Jurisdiction, §§ 1, 11, pp. 575-576, 584.) Once it resolved those equitable issues, the trial court had the duty to determine whether the complaint alleged any issues that stood independently in light of the equitable ruling, such that a jury trial was warranted. It concluded no legal theories remained to be tried in light of the absence of a partnership. The court did not need plaintiff to separately accept the trial court’s jurisdiction to resolve the legal claims, because plaintiff submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by filing his “mixed-bag” complaint. (See In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 47 [“ ‘Jurisdiction of the cause attaches at the time of commencement of the action’ ”].) Thus plaintiff impliedly accepted that the trial court’s resolution of equitable issues might obviate the legal issues.

Further, as we have already noted, plaintiff has not explained what legal issues remained for a jury trial, that is, he has not explained how he could possibly prevail at a jury trial where the jury undoubtedly would be instructed that the issue of whether a partnership existed had been resolved adversely to the plaintiff. (See Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1244 [“a form of quasi-collateral estoppel occurred here; the prior disposition of the related claims by the court in equity estopped Nwosu from relitigating the already determined issues in his claims at law”].) Thus, he has not established any prejudice.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall pay defendants’ costs on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278 (a)(1).)

/s/

Duarte, J.

We concur:

/s/

Mauro, Acting P. J.

/s/

Murray, J.