C.G. v. Super Ct.

Filed 12/17/08 C.G. v. Super Ct. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

C. G. (petitioner), the mother of A.A. (the minor), seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate orders of the juvenile court entered at the dispositional hearing denying reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.^[1] (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Petitioner contends it was error to deny reunification services. Disagreeing with this contention, we shall deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 2007, a juvenile dependency petition was filed shortly after the minor was born, alleging that she had been placed at a childrens shelter after her birth under a protective custody order because petitioner was an inpatient at a mental health facility. The petition, as later amended, alleged additionally that petitioner was described as schizophrenic; that she had a history of not consistently taking her prescribed medications, rendering treatment difficult; that she had left her three other children with their father in Chicago; and that she heard voices telling her to drown one of her children.

According to the detention/jurisdiction report, petitioner was on a 14-day hold at the time of the minors birth and reported that she had been admitted for depression. According to her sister, petitioner had become depressed and unable to care for herself over the preceding seven years. When interviewed at the hospital after the minors birth, petitioner was often unresponsive to questions.

Prior to the jurisdictional hearing, a competency evaluation was ordered on petitioner, and a guardian ad litem was appointed for her. In April 2008, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition and ordered that the minor could be placed with petitioners sister. A second psychological evaluation was ordered. According to the dispositional report, petitioner exhibited mental health problems during visits with the minor, where, at times, she paced around the room or trembled. The social worker described one visit at which petitioner had left the minor with the aunt, who reported that petitioner was not feeling well because she had not been taking her medications. Petitioner was located shaking and trembling in another visiting room, at first refusing to respond to the social worker, then coming up to her and speaking incoherently and grabbing her shoulders. Petitioner refused to answer the social workers inquiry regarding whether petitioner had stopped taking her medications, and instead got down on her knees and begged to have the minor returned to her.

The social worker reported that petitioner continued to be noncompliant in taking her medications and refused to discuss possible resources for mental health services. Based on these circumstances and the two psychological evaluations, the social worker recommended that no reunification services be offered pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) (parent suffering from mental disability rendering him or her incapable of utilizing services).

The psychological evaluations were prepared by Doracy Testa, Ph.D., and Gary L. Cavanaugh, M.D. Both evaluators found that petitioner exhibited characteristics suggestive of schizophrenia.

According to Dr. Testa, petitioner provided scanty information, and took most of the interview time in silence or pacing in the room . . . . She refused to answer an array of questions, including those about her family background, her social, medical and psychiatric history, and her history of substance abuse. Dr. Testa administered a parenting skills inventory, which showed that petitioner did not possess the maturity or skills necessary for taking care of an infant on her own. Other testing indicated that petitioner was significantly compromised in her social judgment, executive ability, decision-making skills, conformity commitment (following rules, guidance) and maturity level . . . . Dr. Testa concluded that, at the time of the evaluation, petitioner suffered from a psychotic condition that rendered her unable to care for the minor and incapable of successfully utilizing reunification services.

A second evaluation by Dr. Cavanaugh produced similar results. Dr. Cavanaugh described the majority of his interview of petitioner as quite unsuccessful, with petitioner denying she needed any help and, upon further questioning, sitting immobile for 30 to 60 seconds without responding. Dr. Cavanaugh diagnosed petitioner with a psychotic disorder, although an exact diagnosis was not possible due to the lack of information provided by petitioner or available from other sources. Like Dr. Testa, Dr. Cavanaugh concluded that, at the time of his interview with petitioner, she was unable to care for the minor or utilize services. However, because of the paucity of information, he initially was not able to render an opinion as to whether she could become able to utilize services.

The contested dispositional hearing went forward in October 2008. Dr. Cavanaugh testified that, following his interviews with petitioner, he received records concerning her psychiatric treatment that suggested she had not received a lot of treatment, which he believed was due to her failure to return for follow-up appointments. Thus, while he was able to outline a course of treatment for petitioner that possibly might lead to her being able to utilize services, he was doubtful of her ability to follow through on accessing the necessary treatment based on her history of noncompliance. In addition, he acknowledged that the treatment plan he recommended -- which would include an active outreach program to assure petitioner was medication compliant -- was not available in the county. Moreover, even under this optimal scenario, he concluded it was possible but not very likely that petitioner could become capable of caring for a child. Dr. Cavanaugh confirmed that petitioner had not been capable of utilizing services when he interviewed her, and he did not feel she would benefit from services because she was unable to consistently keep her appointments for treatment.

Petitioners attorney conceded that petitioner was suffering from a mental disability but maintained there was insufficient information before the court that she was incapable of utilizing services. The juvenile court noted that petitioner had received some services prior to the dispositional hearing, that she did not appear to have availed herself of such services and that it would not be possible to arrange to have someone insure petitioner took her medication. Consequently, the juvenile court denied reunification services.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence that she was incapable of utilizing reunification services. We do not agree.

Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), provides that services may be denied if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability that is described in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820) of Part 4 of Division 12 of the Family Code and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services. The court must order services unless competent evidence from mental health professionals establishes that, even with the provision of services, the parent is unlikely to be capable of adequately caring for the child within the time limits specified in (section 361.5,) subdivision (a). ( 361.5, subd. (c); In re Joy M. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 11, 17.)

Denial of services is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.)

Here, both evaluators found that petitioner displayed characteristics symptomatic for schizophrenia. Dr. Testa found petitioners mental health to be significantly compromised in a number of ways that rendered her unable to care for the minor and incapable of utilizing reunification services. Dr. Cavanaugh found that, at the time of his interview, petitioner was unable to care for the minor or utilize services and that, even with an optimal course of treatment not available in the county, involving outreach to insure she remained medication compliant, it was possible but not very likely she could become capable of caring for a child.

Petitioner claims the evidence was insufficient because Dr. Cavanaugh felt she was not getting the treatment . . . she should be getting . . . . However, Dr. Cavanaugh believed the lack of treatment was the result of petitioners failure to access treatment on a consistent basis, and petitioners noncompliance was corroborated by other evidence. She also contends Dr. Cavanaugh indicated that he had insufficient information to know whether, after some treatment, she would be able to utilize such services. But this was no longer the case when Dr. Cavanaugh testified at the dispositional hearing.

Petitioner maintains Dr. Testa stated only that, at the time of her evaluation, petitioner would not benefit from services, and that she did not offer an opinion as to whether petitioner could utilize services if given proper treatment. To the contrary, based on Dr. Testas testimony that petitioner was incapable of successfully utilizing services, it is reasonable to infer she was not likely to be capable of adequately caring for the minor if services were provided.

Petitioner offers minimal legal analysis of her claim except to cite case law suggesting that services should not be denied unless the evidence indicates it would be fruitless to offer them.^[2] (See Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464.) Here, two mental health experts rendered opinions that were tantamount to this conclusion. Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts findings in support of denying reunification services.

DISPOSITION

The writ petition is denied.

BLEASE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

SIMS , J.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

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^[1] Further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2] Petitioner also distinguishes In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, in which the disentitlement doctrine was applied to a parent who refused to submit to psychological evaluations that were ordered to determine whether section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2) applied.