Cator v. Bakhtar

Filed 1/19/10 Cator v. Bakhtar CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheila Fell, Judge. Affirmed.

Leonard Chaitin for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Parker Stanbury and John D. Barrett, Jr., for Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

Introduction

Appellant Linda Cator brought a wrongful death action against respondent Homayan Bakhtar for the death of her daughter, Andrea Nelson. The trial court found Cator failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bakhtar was responsible for Nelsons death.

Cator argues overwhelming evidence establishes as a matter of law that Bakhtar was a substantial factor in causing Nelsons death. She ignores the trial courts role in making credibility determinations and weighing evidence. We determine whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. It does, and we therefore affirm.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

Nelson was a known drug user and had twice overdosed. In the evening of January 27, 2003, she went to Bakhtars house. When Nelson arrived about 7:30 p.m., she could barely walk without assistance, and Bakhtar assumed she had been using drugs. Nelson and Bakhtar hung out and had consensual sex.

Nelson and Bakhtar left in her car sometime at about 10:30 p.m. As Bakhtar drove, Nelson mentioned she did not feel well, reclined her seat, and lapsed into unconsciousness. Rather than calling 911, Bakhtar drove Nelson directly to Hoag Hospital, where the emergency room staff were unable to revive her. Nelson died from a drug overdose.

Cator believed Nelson had taken drugs during the afternoon of January 27, 2003. Bakhtar did not see Nelson take cocaine or drink alcohol that night.

Cator sued Bakhtar for wrongful death, asserting theories of both negligence and negligence per se. Both parties waived jury and opening statements. The court found in favor of Bakhtar, stating: Plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof to establish that this Defendant was the cause of her daughters death. Plaintiff has not been able to meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. She can conjecture and surmise, but these are not sufficient to find liability against this Defendant.

Discussion

Cator argues the evidence at trial established, as a matter of law, that Bakhtar was a substantial factor in Nelsons death as he provided [her] with the drugs which caused her death. She argues, in essence, the evidence was so overwhelmingly one-sided that no reasonable fact finder could find against [her]. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 565‑566.)

Cators argument reaches too far. The trial court was entitled to find each of the cited facts equivocal, vague, or otherwise lacking in probative force. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 566.) Cator misconstrues the sufficiency of the evidence test and the limited scope of our review. When a trial courts factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion. [Citation.] The substantial evidence standard of review is applicable to appeals from both jury and nonjury trials. [Citation.] (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143.)

We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. (Sanchez‑Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 907.) The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.)

Neither party requested a statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc.,  632.) Therefore, we must infer the trial court made all necessary findings supporting the judgment, and determine whether substantial evidence supported those findings. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)

The record includes evidence sufficient to support the judgment. The evidence showed that Nelson had two previous drug overdoses and had been in drug rehabilitation. Cator told the Orange County Sheriff‑Coroner Division investigator she believed Nelson had been on speed and acting high during the afternoon of her death.[1] Bakhtar told a detective that Nelson was hardly able to walk when she arrived at his house and informed the police investigator he did not see her take any drugs the evening she died. The coroner ruled Nelsons death an accident.

Cator relies on three pieces of evidence to support her contention the trial court had no discretion but to find Bakhtar liable. First, Nelsons cousin testified that Bakhtar told her, during a telephone conversation soon after Nelson died, that it was just an accident, the accident wasnt supposed to happen. Second, Bakhtars brother told the police that Nelson did not appear under the influence when she arrived at his home. Third, Bakhtar supposedly made inconsistent statements about Nelsons behavior. Cator argues this evidence left no doubt as to Bakhtars liability.

Cators argument ignores the fundamental principle that [a]t trial, it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 996, quoting People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) The trial court here might have concluded those witnesses were not credible or their testimony was outweighed by other evidence. The court could have found Bakhtars statement that Nelson could hardly stand when she arrived at his house was more credible than the statement made by Bakhtars brother that Nelson did not appear to be under the influence. Indeed, Cator had told the police and the coroners office that Nelson appeared high when she left Cators house that evening.

In addition, where competing reasonable inferences can be drawn, the appellate court must draw inferences in favor of the judgment. (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.) From Bakhtars statement that Nelsons death was accidental, it may be inferred he did not give her drugs and had no part in her death. As Cator suggests, the trial court could have drawn the inference from the inconsistencies in Bakhtars statements that none of them was true. But the court alternatively could have declined to draw that inference and instead drawn the inference the inconsistencies were caused by confusion in a stressful situation.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs incurred on appeal.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.

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[1] The parties joint list of agreed facts at trial included statements by a police detective and the coroner division investigator, neither of whom testified at trial. No hearsay objections were raised to their statements.